INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CIA TRAINING PROGRAM - AUGUST 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93-00791R000100120001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 145
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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INSPECTOR GEAERAL'S SURVEY
OF
CIA TRAINING PROGRAM
August 1960
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF
CIA 'TRAINING PROGRAM
TABLE _OF CONTENTS
I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.. OOOOOOO ????????* OOOOOOOOOOO ?????00???
ho
25X1
ADMINISTRATION OF AGENCY
A. .Legal Authority O OOOOOOOO OOOOOOO ?.?.??.?.....?.....?.
Page
1
3
3
B. ,Scope of Present Program....?.??....?.???.?????????? 4
Co CoSt OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 0 SO 0 ? OOOOO 0 ? ? 00 ? ? 00 ? 0 ? ? 0 0 0 ? .? ?? ? .6
MICE.OF TRAINING?. OOOOOOOOOOOO ? ??????????????????????0
A. Introduction. 000moec0000poopoomoiloo OOOOO oom
10
10
B. The Intelligence School.?????000??? OOOOO ????????????
17
C. Operations School..?...........?.??.??.?..???00???.?
25
1. Introduction. OOO OOOOOOOOOOO ???.????.?...????.??
25
2. OOOOOOOOOOO ???..?. OOOOOOOOOOOOOOO ??.??
27
3. Covert Training????? OOOOO 00 OOOOOOO ??????.0 OOOOOOO
4o
4. Military Reserve Officer Training O OOOOOO ........
49
D. .School of International CommUnism
53
E.? Language and Area School
56
1. Introduction..?... OOOOOO * O 000 OOOOO ????????? OOOOO
.56
2. Organization .and Activities
58
3. The Voluntary Language Training,Program..... OOOOO
60
4. The Nev Tutorial Language Training Program
62
5. Evaluation.. O0O11006?0064,000060 OOOOOO 0600 OOOOOO 00
65
6. Area Knowledge Courses OO OOOO 0 OOOOOOOO 00.000001100O
71
7. The 'Introduction to Overseas EffectiVeness"
Coarse
73
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Page
F. Junior Officer Training Program?mo???0???......... 76
1. Establishment of the Program
2. Activities
3. Future of the JOT Program?e????0 OOOOO 0 OOOOO .??.?
4. Training the- Specialist Professional Officer
76
77
82
93
IV. .0THER AGENCY TRAINING
101
A.
Non-OTR Training
101
B.
External Training
106
C.
On-the-Job Training
111
D.
Communications Training
114
1. Introduction
114
2. Training.Requirements
115
3. Training Structure
116
4. Evaluation
118
E.
Technical School OOOOOOOOOOO
OOOOOO ............ OOOOO
120
1.
2.
3.
4.
Introduction OOO OO 00 OOOOOO 06.00110 OOOOOOOOO 04100?0OO
The Technical School OOO OOOOOOOO ??.0?00.0??0???.?
Evaluation
Major Problems
120
120
123,5X1
125 -
F.
129,
1.
Introduction
129
2.
Organization
129
3.
OOOOOOO 0 OOOOOOOOOOOOO 0?000 000?0 0
130
4.
ion
131 25X1
5.
Maintenance of Contact
after Training ...0 OOOOOOO
131
6.
Act ivit ies OO OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 000011080?00,4100,0
131
7.
Evaluation
132
8.
Major Problems
133
ii
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Page
V. THE FUTURE OF TRAINING IN THE AGENCY.. OOOOOOOOOO 135
A. Critique of Present Program .......... OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 135
B. Fundamental Principles of Training 138
C. The Apprenticeship 140
1. General Preparatory Training 140
2. Skills Training 142
D. Mid-career Training .......... OOOOOOOO OOOOOOOOOOO 147
E. .Senior Officer Training 150
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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
1. This study was initiated at the request of the DDCI to determine
the nature and extent of the Agency's training effort and to evaluate its
effectiveness in meeting the Agency's present and future needs. It should
be noted that this is an Agency-wide functional study and is not intended
to be a formal inspection of the Office of Training. Problems of organi-
zation and management, processes and procedures or administration are
not dealt with in this report unless they have significant bearing on
training objectives.
2. All formal training programs and facilities in headquarters
were examined
specifically for this study. Hovever information gathered in IG field
inspection trips has been incorporated where appropriate. The principal
has been extensively reviewed during the
past two years and further consideration of that problem is not deemed
pertinent to this report.
3. Evaluation of the effectiveness of Agency training was obtained
through interviews with operations officers recently returned from over
seas duty, students currently enrolled in training courses, present and
former Junior Officer Trainees, supervisors of employees with technical
skills acquired through Agency training and with more than 100 senior
officer's in the Clandestine Services and elsewhere in hgadquarters.
Evaluation also took into consideration the substantive content of train-
ing courses in relation to the needs of an, intelligence service, the
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duration of training periods and level of instruction,, the qualifications
and experience of instructors and the relationship of training to career
planning and development.
4. The Agency's training effort also has been studied in comparison
with the programs of other government agencies particularly that of the
Foreign Service. Some industrial programs have been weighed as well to
provide some background for an evaluation of the Agency's approach to
induction, basic and advanced preparatory training.
5. In total the following pages present a comprehensive view of all
of the activities currently engaged in for the preparation of people to
do the work expected of them by the Agency. The final section of the
report attempts to project intelligence training needs into the future
and suggests a program that will achieve the desired objectives.
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II. ADMINISTRATION.OF AGENCY TRAINING
A. Legal Authority
1. The-Agency's legs4 authority to provide training for its
employees at public expense is granted by the Government Employees
Training Act (P.L. 85-507; 72 Stat. 329), enacted in 1958. By Execu-
tive Order 10,8051 dated April 30, 1959, the President designated the
Agency as excepted from various specific provisions of the Act referring
chiefly to the responsibility of the U.S. Civil Service-Commission for
the promotion, coordination, review, etc., of the training programs and
operations provided for by the Act. Prior to the enactment of the 1958
Act, the Agency's authority for training activities vas section 4 of
the CIA Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 208), which section was repealed by the
1958 Act.
2. The chief provisions of the 1958 Act applying to. the Agency
may be summarized as follows: Congress declared its policy to be that
"self-education, self-improvement and self-training" by Government
employees "be supplemented and extended. by Government-sponsored programs
for the training of such employees in the performance Of official duties
and for the development of necessary skills and knowledge and that such
programs should be designed to lead to improved public service, dollar
savings, and the building and retention of a permanent cadre of skilled
and efficient Government employees, well abreast of scientific, profes-
sional, technical, and.management development both in.and .out of Govern-
ment." The Act then proceeds to direct the head of each department to
place in effect a program for the training of employees in such
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department by, in and through Government facilities and non-Government
facilities and authorizes the head of each department to pay the salary
of employees under his jurisdiction during the period of training as
well as the expenses of such training. It is directed that each such
prog.ram shall provide for the encouragement of self-training. The Act
requires each department had to "conduct and complete a review of the
needs and requirements of such department for the training of employees)
under its jurisdiction" at least once every three years. This report
constitutes such a review.
3. The source of authority for all training administered by
the Agency to persons who are not employees is section 8.B. of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended (P.L. 81-110).
B. Scope of Present Program
1. CIA's training effort has been characterized by early
years of extremely rapid growth, followed by consolidation of programs
and the slow evolution of a general philosophy in the operating offices
on the place of training in intelligence. The achievements thus far
with respect to induction training have been substantial. Integrated
training programs are today provided to the great majority of the
Agency's new employees as a matter of policy. In 1960, for the first
time, recruitment and training of professional officers for the DD/P
and to meet about one-fourth of the similar requirements of the DD/I
and DD/S are to be accomplished through the Junior Officer Training
Program (JOTP). Training programs for clerical and semi-professional
employees have been solidly established for much. longer periods of
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time. Basic general training for these categories has been undertaken
by the Office Of Training. Where Special skills have been involved the
training most frequently has been adminislerOd by the component concerned
or arranged externally.
2. Training objectives and programs have varied considerably
among the Directorates of the Agency. The DD/S with its many specialized
assignments has tended towards local training programs, as for example in
the Offices of Communications and Logistics. The DD/I in light of its
requirement for Specialists in both social and physical sciences has been
oriented towards external training and to date has preferred to hire
individuals previously trained and requiring no extensive further invest-
ment on the part of the Agency. The DD/P with its generic requirement
for professional competence in the domain of Clandestine intelligence has
had to look internally to the instrument Of the JOTP, which it now fully
accepts for all new Officer training, and, generally, to its own resources
for advanced training of journeymen officers in the specialized areas of
operations.
3. Taken as a whole., CIA training does not yet reach extensively
nor systematically into the .area of advanced training of career employees.11
To an important degree training is a derivative of organizational policy
in the broad field of personnel management and since the Agency has not
yet reached a consensus on the place of such tools as job standardi31
.rotation,,gompetitive.evaluation, mid-career training, senior executive
training and sabbaticals, there is no obvious and .self-evident career
training pattern instilled in the minds of either the Agency's staff
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employees or its managers.'
4. ''The absence of a general conviction on the place of training
in career development is also explained by the fact that the first genera-
tion of intelligence .officers acquired their Skills and know-how on the
job and with minimum exposure to formal training. Their integration into
a training system has been_and is apt to remain on a catch-as-catch-can
basis pending the evolution of the stronger personnel :management tools
referred to above.
5. The subordination of the Office of Training to the DD/S has
also materially limited the power of the Director of Training to develop
and to control unified Agency -training policy. There- has been consider-
able- growth over the years in .OR responsibility to undertake Agency-wide
coordination of training but little augmentation of its power to enforce
a common policy. Security): compartmentation, and diversity of program
have perhaps made it inevitable from the beginning that the component
.offices would retain as local prerogative training responsibilities which
in .other :organizations are more customarily concentrated in a single
authority and clothed with the power of the senior command.
C. Cost
1. The Office of Training has recently assembled figures on. the
cost of training in OIA. whiCh-are incomplete in some respects but
represent the best information available at the present time. The subject
is complex and its measurement requires various arbitrary decisions with
respect to:
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a. Separation of capital investment from operating costs in
training programs.
b. Allocation of cost to training where a facility has ma-,--
tiple uses and. its personnel have other responsibilities in addition to
training.
c. Allocation of cost to training where the trainee is
moving from apprentice to journeyman status and his efforts Ware increas-
ingly productive in character.
The enumeration of major categories of CIk training and their
costs in FY 59 is as follows:
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Office of Communications
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Internal Trailing ,Program
Training
Grand Total
2. .The list omits outlays for instructors, equipment, and
-facilities providing :boat formal courses and_on.-the-job training in
six offices or staffs of the DD/S, five offices of the DD/I and three
elements of the DD/P.
3. .The cost of Training Officers is not included. One or
.more individuals are assigned in each major component of the Agency,
usually part-time, to develop and process training requirements and
to conduct liaison with 0Th. :There is an additional investment in
clerical support for most of these :officers.
4. Facility costs are -omitted in the case of the principal
field training installation o? the Office of Communications
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Co-Users to whom this cost has been allocated include the CIA
emergency relocation program and the engineeringdevelopment activities
of OC.
5. The figures include student salaries in thb case of JOT'
.who are assigned to. OTR during their first two years with the Agency.
..11bweVer, eighteen Months of this two-year period, on the average) are
spent on the job in increasingly izodUctive assignments. Salaries of
All other trainees are not included.
.6. A rough indicator:of total cost of student participation
An Agency training.programs can be obtained by application of the now
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suspended five per cent requirement on staff in training to the annual
expenditure of the Agency on wage and salary. The five per cent rule,
while in effect, varied considerably in yield between components and
through time. A figure of three per cent is perhaps more realistic.
In the Office of Communications, to cite a specific example, estimated
salaries of employees while in training, using GS-8 as the mean, totalled
n 1959. It is estimated that the total of all expenditures
for training in the Agency will approximate
annually- This
would include the cost of training facilities, training personnel and
salaries of trainees.
7. The Agency obviously has it within its power to alter
present proportions between formal and on-the-job training so that
employee departures from duty for purposes of training will be sub-
stantially reduced and instructor, facility and student salary costs
thereby curtailed. On the other hand, the purpose of training is to
make an investment in the employee which will yield an increase in
productivity and thereby recoup the initial investment and more. The
Agency may well look forward to training economies through consolidation
of facilities, better scheduling of employee participation and the
development of more efficient instructors and instructional techniques.
The growing complexity of professional operations and of skills required
by intelligence make it extremely unlikely that the Agency can afford or
will decide to spend less than present-day amounts on the preparation of
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its employees to perform their jobs.
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III. OFFICE OF TRAINING
A. Introduction
1. The .antecedents of CIA's present-day training program are
readily identified for it has been the undoubted good fortune of the
Agency to descend in continuous line from the wartime Office of Strategic
Services. Even today there continue-among the staff a substantial con-
tingent of officers who helped to establish OSS training programs, who
were trained in OSS classrooms, and who have conducted and evaluated
the operations of the past to derive the content of developing intel-
ligence doctrine.
2. -Continuity in terms of the administrative structure of
training understandably became extremely thin immediately after the war
when the contracting OSS structure was divided with operations compo-
nents in the form of the Special Services Unit passing to the control
of Army and research elements transferring to the Department of State.
The reunion of the parts took place during 1946 and 1947 first by forma-
tion of the Central Intelligence Group, then by establishment of the -CIA.
Included among the elements was a training division In the Office of
Special Cperations which for the next two years or so required just five
rooms in Que Building for administrative purposes and numbered on paper
Ostaff positions.
3. Theadministrationof training in its present-day form was
inaugurated -on 3 January. 1951 with the establishment of an Office of
Training and the EOD of its first and present director, Col. Matthew C.
Baird. Be reported for the next four years directly to the DCI, until
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early in 1955, at the recommendation of the Inspector General, OTR
(along with the Offices .of Personnel and Communications, which had
also been rOPorting directly to the DCI) was brought under the Deputy
Director for Support where it is presently located.
4. The Training Division of OSO had been expanded in 191.1.9
to provide for the training needs of the Office of Policy Coordina-
tion. There was a substantial requirement for paramilitary training
in this period
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preempted these facilities, the Training 25X1
Division began the search for a permanent installation and was moving
along towards the choice of
at the time of its integration with the Office of Training.
5. The Director of Training wascharged at the outset with
responsibility for the development of a junior officer training program
and for the planning of career development. By mid-1951 he had
launched the first JOT class which ran for fourteen weeks and con-
centrated on clandestine tradecraft including the orientation, basic
and advanced operations courses provided by the Training Division of
the DD/P. The training efforts of the support and research components
of CIA were virtually nonexistent up to this time; consequently OTR
was extremely active in the first few months in launching an orienta-
tion program for all new employees of the Agency, induction and
refresher training for clericals, and instruction in languages. Also
in July of this year the first career service plan was submitted to
the DCI. The plan, however, called for a high degree of selectivity of
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personnel. .In consequence, task forces were :established to study the
issues involved.and.approximately two more years elapsed before a career.
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6. OTR acquired a staff.of somel I persons during 1951, then
doubled in size in each of the successive two years. In 1954 it numbered
above n persons on duty and levelled off at this strength .where it has
remained to the present. :This rapid expansion not only reflected the
general growth pattern and training demands of the Agency, but, in
addition, it indicated the planning and development of .a permanent,
large-scale organization able to deal with a broad range of typical
present-day governmental training requirements. In 1953 the curriculum
was-expanded to provide courses in cammunism, in supervision and manage-
ment and in such administrative areas as operations support and adminis-
trative,procedures. From that time forward there has been a prolifera-
tion of.courses adapted to special needs, but no further expansioninto.
major new departments of instruction. The relative youth of the Agency,
however, may have forestalled thus far the evolution.of a training
peAternandfacility for mid-careerists, an area which the Department of
State has been investigating actively in recent years.
7. About five years were required to. stabilize the Office of
Training in its mission and functions and in its present structure.
Until early 1953) the. Office consisted of two components withe. Deputy
Director (ftecial) directing covert training .programs and a Deputy
Director (General) directing the programs of the Agency. In 1953
substantial unification occurred with the designation of a single deputy
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director, four staffs and eight operating divisions. In 1955 proceeding
jointly, with the Inspector General and Management Staff, OTR arrived at
its present organization in four major schools:
Operations School
Intelligence. School
School of International Communism
language and Area School
supported by four staffs:
Plans and Policy:Staff
Assessment and Evaluation ,Staff
Registrar (including control of external
training)
Support Staff
8. There are several aspects of CIA training history worthy of
special note.
a. The extreme diversity of skills and professions employed
by intelligence -- estimatOd at 1250 distinct job descriptions.at the
present time -- and the extent of compartmentation dictated by security
considerations unaoubtedly combine-to explain the large number of relatively
autonomous component training programs. Communications training, for
example, with roots deep in OSS,experience, has remained the exclusive
responsibility of the Office of=Communications from the beginning. In
the DD/P relatively large scale systems have evolved in the Technical
Services Division-- audio surveillance) secret writing and photography
for example -- and in the SR Division in covert training
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DD/S in turn has sponsored the development of local
training programs in Logistics, Security and Medical Staff for example,
and DD/I has developed formal courses including information handling
and statistics. There are a number of influences at work tending to
stabilize these programs in their present locations among which security
considerations, limited demand, accessibility and responsiveness to
local needs may be noted.
b. A second pervasive influence affecting training
policy has been the quality and location of physical training facilities.
Dispersion of Agency offices and buildings has been paralleled by the
dispersion and general inadequacy of OTR classrooms. Some of the
present-day administrative pattern undoubtedly reflects the strong
desire of operating offices to economize on staff and instructor time
through sharply focussed local training.
c. Finally, it is a frequently stated objective of all
government training programs to avoid duplication in an internal train-
ing system of courses and programs readily available and often of high
quality offered at universities or elsewhere. Both DO/band DD/I have
acknlowledged this principle by sending staff outside for training in
the operation of specialized equipment; e.g., International Business
Machine, and for graduate study in such fields as mathematics and
economics. The DD/P has made some use of external language training
by OTR arrangement although this for the most part has involved use of
State Department's Foreign Service Institute facilities rather than
private institutions. Wawithstanding, the Agency has not, for reasons
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of security, placed heavy reliance to date on outside or shared community
facilities.
9. Mention should also be made of the effort over the past ten
years to establish training prerequisites for job assignments and to 1
derive predictable student enrollments on which to base development of
training facilities, recruitment of instructors, and scheduling of
classes. For jobs involving technical skills of one kind or another,
the component offices have acted responsibly and with considerable
uniformity to stipulate training prerequisite to appointment or pro-
motion to journeyman status. Beginning as early as 1952 the principal
staffs and some divisions of the DD/P issued instructions which specifiedA
professional intelligence training essential to the principal job assign-
ments. The DD/I did not move as positively in this direction because of
the expectation that most of the professional skills it required could
be recruited ready trained in the open market. Unfortunately, Agency 1
experience with job standards has produced discouraging results, to the
extent in some cases that regulations have been rescinded. Training
, requirements have all too consistently taken second place to operating
priorities deriving from international crises, health problems, personal
preference or prejudice. The Agency's experience, however, has not been
unique as is apparent in the following recent comment on the much older
training program of the Department of State:
"In the Department of State, it is probably still true that many
officers dislike being assigned to training. Operations officers
in the geographic bureaus try to prevent their best men from being
assigned to training and they tend to succeed in this endeavor ...
It seems likely that training in the Department of State will never
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be .of high quality until training is accepted -- as it is in the
military services -- as an .essential part in the process of
25X1 developing high-quality orficerse" pp 40-41, Recruitment and
Training for the Foreign Service of the United States, Staff
Study for the Committee on Foreign Relations. GPO. 1958k.
?
10. It should be noted in conclusion that an earlier Agency-wide
measure to deal with these questions was launched in 1956 with the
issuance 01 I"Headquarters Participation in Training." This
regulation stipulated that it would be the policy of the Agency to
expend at least five per cent of its total man-hours of headquarters
"on-duty" staff personnel in training. While the regulation remains
in force at the present time, a general revision of training regulations
is currently in process and the five per cent requirement has been held
in abeyance by informal action for the past twelve months. The require-
ment, nevertheless', had a major influence on component office policy
towards training and on the volume of training provided to Agency per-
sonnel. It moved the component offices and the Office of Training to
undertake orderly inventory of training courses and better programming
of training requirements. Many offices substantially met the five per
cent requirement and all offices have given their training problems
.more careful consideration as a result. It seems certain that the
measure made a timely contribution towards the evolution of a better
coordinated, Agency-wide training program. On the other hand continua-
tion of an arbitrary figure for training simply perpetuates training
for the sake of compliance with a regulation. The Agency is now mature
enough to require the supervisors tow accept the responsibility for insur-
ing that all personnel receive the training they require.
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B. The Intelligence School
1. The five faculties comprising the Intelligence School include
intelligence orientation, intelligence production, clerical training,
operations support and management. There is a T/0 of
instructors of w4om five are on assignment from other parts of the Agency.
There is no simple rule of thumb setting the jurisdictional lines of the
School. Orientation, clerical training and management training are. Agency-
wide responsibilities. .Operations support instruction is addressed to ,
DD/S and DD/P requirements. Intelligence production courses deal with the
needs of professional employees in the DD/I. The School contributes a
major portion of the initial ten weeks of headquarters training of JOT's
and is exclusively responsible for the subsequent twelve weeks of train-
ing in intelligence production provided to that segment of the JOT's who
are designated to go to the DD/I. Thus the School has contact with
virtually every new employee of the Agency, in many cases in advance of
his acquaintance with his working supervisors.
2. BO other school in AOTR is faced with more elusive problems
than those withwhich the Intelligence School mutt deal. Where training
in skills has been involved, its-staff has proceeded with confidence and
general efficiency. In the areas of employee orientation, management i
skills and intelligence production, however, there has been limited con-
sensus as to what was to be done and the OTR effort has been subject to
constant adjustment. The principal problems facing the school are dis-
cussed in detail below.
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3. Orientation of any audience diverse in age, grade and profes-
sion is a difficult undertaking without introducing the complication
peculiar to CIA of security limitations on description of complex and
interesting activities. There are two obvious objectives in orienta-
tion -- to provide motivation and to impart certain general facts about
an organization. There are ever present dangers of superficiality and
boredom in brief treatment of orientation subjects. There is no effective
measure of results. CIA now provides separate orientation series for its
clericals, its JOT's and for all other professional employees, GS-7 and
above, entering the Agency. The principal exemptions from Agency orienta-
tion are operators recruited by the Office of Communications and employees
in very sensitive positions.
4. With the JOT program now undergoing major expansion as the
principal supplier of professional manpower to the Agency, various ques-
tions have been raised about the orientation training appropriate to a
declining EOD!,populationof non-JOT's. There is desire to economize on
instructor staff and on the time of senior officials who make up the large
roster of guest lecturers employed. The Basic Orientation Course for non-
JOT's has just recently been reduced from four to three weeks, consisting
of one week of general orientation and two weeks on Communism. Guest
lectures have been taped and transcribed in order to experiment with
heavier use of reading materials. This approach is perfectly reasonable
so long as the attendant risk is recognized and guarded against. Motiva-
tion by impersonal means is apt to be far more difficult to achieve than
by face-to-face lectures and discussions with the leaders of the Agency.
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Secondly, the Agency must scrupulously avoid any suggestion that the non-
JOT is a sectand-class citizen to be segregated in all respects, including
training, from the JOT elite. Rather, he must be given every inducement
to upgrade the role he plays and to rise by demonstrated excellence to
top rank, particularly through opportunity to qualify for JOT training.
5. There is a further aspect of orientation, namely, written
communication, in which the Agency's practice departs from that of most
large :organizations. For reasons of security few of the usual devices for
staff communication, including employee publications, newsletters, annual
reports, employee manuals and bulletin boards covering employment oppor-
tunities and other Agency business, are put to general use by CIA to
motivate and integrate its employees into the organization. There is
no way of determining what this costs the Agency in quality of service
and in employee turnover. The entire field merits new study including
the possibility of revision and reissue of the 1952 brochure "Your Job
in the Central Intelligence Agency."
6. In management and supervision training the principal problem
is the relatively embryonic state of development of the subject anywhere --
in government, in private business and in the universities. Handling of
people is, first of all, an art, not a science. In addittion, CIA with its
brief history of extremely rapid growth, youthful staff and evolving mis-
sion does not yet afford settled patterns from which to derive a management! '
doctrine. In this situation management training must employ instructors
who have a record of successful administration of operations and it must
reach today's managers as well as those showing potential for the future.
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Up to the present time the record of participation by managers in manage-
ment training has been rather poor. The DD/P, in particular, with major
inherent problems in staff communication, has participated least, having
enrolled, for example, 42 out of 216 taking management courses in 1958
and 1959, of which only nine attended during the latter year. The Agency's
senior managers, with some notable exceptions, simply have not been con-
vinced that they or their staffs require special management training to
perform their jobs efficiently. Many of those who would concede that
such training could be of benefit are dubious about the content of the
present instruction.
7. There is evidence enough of deficient management practice inl
the Agency, even though the Agency's over-all performance has undoubtedly,
improved with increasing maturity. There would of course continue tc, be
cases Of deficient practice were all managers formally trained in manage-
ment techniques and policy. The Agency, however, has yet to take a firm
position on the need for such training in.treparing its executive personnel\
to exercise their responsibilities. The experience of the Department of
State suggests what may lie ahead for CIA on its present course. Only in
1956 andvunder strongest pressure did the Department finally launch a
plan for mid-career training for its Foreign Service Officers of ranks 3,
4 and 5, to run twelve weeks and to include two weeks devoted to case
studies in executive management.
8. The problem with respect to instruction in intelligence for
the DD/I professional intelligence officer is once again a lack of con-
sensus on what is needed. The problem is discussed in greater detail at
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a later Point in this survey in connection with the training of economists.
The DD/I offices to date have generally denied need for such training.
Certain courses in intelligence-research-techniques have been developed by 1\
i
OTR but enrollments have been insignificant. Courses in effective speak- / /
ing, writing and conference leadership, which, in general, have limited
bearing on substantive competence, have been offered but in the face of
the very grave doubt that the deficiencies should have been tolerated dur-
ing recruitment and apprenticeship. Again it is difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness of this training in the context of the many elements which
determine the individual's over-all performance on the job. Be this as it
may, courses which instruct all performers, strong or weak, in preferred
techniques would appear to be on considerably safer ground than those
which are purely remedial in character.
9. Training in intelligence- for DD/I professionals can and must
achieve a better rationale than aid for the marginal performer. A way is
open if the DD/I will agree to recruitment of the bulk of his jilnior
officer requirement through a truly Agency-wide JOT system and if he will
send hisbest qualified .officers to cooperate with the Office of Training
on a continuing basis in the design and evaluation of the JOT course con-
tent. As the Agency matures, mid-career and senior.officer training will
be essential to assure a breadth of vision in intelligence complementing
that which the. DD/I professional will obtain in his speciiti field through
sabbaticals and through. continuing, activity in outside professional asso#
ciations. The content Of this training need notbe unpalatable to DD/I
personnel for it has the precedence of the senior staff colleges for the
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military and there is an unending array of cross-disciplinary problems on
which the intelligence researcher must be challenged to think constructively.
10. Clerical training raises a host of questions for which there
are no simple answers. The basic- factor determining present CIA clerical
training policy is the difficult market for clerical staff. The Agency
has a large requirement for clerical support overseas and out of its own
and State Department :experience has reached the conclusion that clerical
employees under 21 years of age are apt to be too immature to adjust satis-
factorily to the living conditions and work pressures of overseas assign-
ments. This limitation and its high standards in recruitment generally
throw the Agency into the competition for the highest quality personnel
on the market. There are, of course, many other complications, including
salary competition and high living costs plus difficulliving conditions
in the headquarters area. .The most important additional factor is the 25)(9
Agency's large-scale employment of young women who are marriageable or,
if married, contribute a major element of the attrition rate by reason of
childbearing. CIA recruited in excess of
clerical personnel during
J1959 and could expect according to current experience to have the average '
clerical employee resign after only 18 months of service.
11. The initial location and .screening of clerical candidates
for employment is performed by CIA field recruiters. .These men look in
particular to the heads of responsible commercial training schools for
leads ,On desirable candidates. Applicants are required to take United
States Employment Service proficiency tests wherever possible, where this
is not feasible the testing may be waived until EOD on presentation of
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certification of proficiency by. a high school or commercial training
institution. Such certification unfortunately has frequently proved to
be unreliable. The recruiters themselves present and score a test worked
out by OTR's Assessment and Evaluation Staff covering basic aptitudes and
personality factors. About 8o per cent of -all candidates are rejected in
the present period for poor test scores and-other deficiencies. The long
wait for security clearance is a factor at this point in holding. desirable
candidates and ,the Office of Personnel has found it necessary from 1948
forward-to bringeboUt.half.of its clerical recruits on duty-in an interim
.assignment pool in. advance -of clearance.
12. -UP-to this point the Agency has exercised options on the
rigorousness of its testingand the decision to EOD in advance of full
clearance. It is perhaps inevitable that the recruiters, the clerical
trainers and the consumers differ on the policies involved. The trainers
understandably hope to start with personnel of high proficiency, instead
they frequently meet up -with recruits who fail .to demonstrate their
certified qualifications. The recruiters) with intimate knowledge of
.the market and in view of the high"CIA attrition rate) question the need
.and results of the A&E testing and the) to them) unrealistic rate of
rejection of candidates. Both ,parties attest-to the frequent waste of
quality personnel in inadequate assignments. An-off-the-cuff estimate
is that eight out of 'ten secretaries With shorthand make little or no
use of their skill because their executives do not-dictate their
correspondence.
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13. The dlericaltaculty.offers instruction in typing, shorthand,
.English usage, and geography. A three-day Agency orientation is provided
for clericals cleared for office duty. A packet of these courses Is pro-
vided at induction for individuals awaiting dleArance. The average length
of training at this point is three weeks, the range is from one to five
weeks. A second packet of courses is provided as refresher instruction
for individuals seeking to qualify for more responsible assignments, or
This training runs
25X1
25X1
20 - 30 hours part-time.
14. In summAry, clerical training must be weighed in the broader
context of clerical recruitment, job assignment, utilization and attrition.
Must the Agency hire employees who require extensive training in typing
and .shorthand immediately following entrance on duty? Does the A&E test-
ing applied to clerical candidates justify itself in the light of present-
day attrition rates? Are the recruiters reaching segments of the market
less subject to attrition due to marriage and childbearing? What portion
of clerical loss is due t0 waste of talent in low' 'quality assignments?
The evidence on. these matters must be regularly reassessed.
It is recommended that:
The DirectorscOfPersonnel and Training together with representa-
tives from operating components take a fresh look at the over-all
problem of clerical usage and. make recommendations for a more .effed
tive system. This should be followed by an OTR reassessment of the
clerical training program.
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25X1
C. Operations School
25X1 1. Introduction
a. The Operations School has the principal responsibility in
OTR for training of professional personnel for the Clandestine Services. It
is composed of four programs including headquarters and field training
training are discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this survey. The
Overseas Training Staff has support rather than instructional responsibilities
and is concerned with the provision of training materials and the selection and
training of instructors for Agency and foreign liaison projects overseas. Its
role in providing training materials is described in connection with the dis-
cussion of traininK doctrine in the section dealing with
25X1
b. The Headquarters Training Staff is responsible for training
in clandestine Operations. The JOT, for example, after graduation from basic
intelligence training, will receive further specialized training in operations
from this staff. It is the principal 'point of contact between operating
diviiions and staffs in the DD/P and the Office of Training for the development
and execution of new courses reflecting the experience and changing needs of
the DD/P. It draws heavily On the DD/P for instructors and guest lecturers
and works closely with the Overseas Training 'Staff'and DD/P personnel in the
development and testing of training materials.
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t. Courses offered by the Headquarters Training Staff in 1960
Clandestine Services Review
Covert Action Operations
Clandestine Services Liaison Operations
Clandestine Scientific and Technical Operations
Counterintelligence Operations
Countetintelli ence Familiarization
formation Reporting, Reports, and Requirements,
Information Reports Familiarization
Cable Writing Refresher
25X1
d. AretetanDD/P personnel will make most of the contacts they
may have with OTR through this Staff'and the courses listed above. They fie-
quently will possess practical knowledge of the subject being taught and their
judgments. of the training will be promptly and candidly stated. They object
most frequently to what they consider to be the excessive length of these courses
and their inflexible scheduling. he average man in a line assignment insists
that he 'cannot break 'away for longer than a week at a time for full-time training
and that, preferably, he should be offered part-time courses so that he can
attend to his job'partof each day. There is a fairly sttong preference state
for short seminars which will bring people of comparable experience and quali-
fications together for a Useful exchange of ideas.
e. Headquarters Training competes directly with priority operating
programs for the time of DD/P personnel. The DD/P has not yet made it mandatory
that an employee have formal training in a given field before operating in that ,
field. .The inevitable tendency 'of the operational program to win out combined
with the employees, scepticism about his need for training, produce 'poor
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25X1
enrollments, frequent cancellations and Underemployment of instructional staff.
These issues are noted throughout this survey and provide the basis for some of
the principal recommendations presented in the final section. The Headquarters
'Training Staff can and does modify its courses under constructive criticism
but this is of limited consequence to the extent that the operator learns
the job and dispenses with formal training.
(3) The major portion of the basic training program for the
Clandestine Services, and in Particular for junior officer trainees under the
JOTP, was transferred from headquartersl harly in 1953. ,This
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duty, however, there appear to be distinct limits to the necessary motivation
, growing out of the individual's concern for his subsequent career and his fear
of a gradual loss of touch with "reality". Tours will be extended only through
career planning that assures each man a reasonable next assignment in place
of the present "hunting license" to enter the market and fend for himself.
(3) The instructor rotation pattern is not sufficiently
staggered at the present time. In consequence, the problems of recruitment,
training and continuity of program have been unreasonably concentrated in
several recent years. A minim um solution based on orderly career planning
procedures in the DO' would be a three year tour with a turnover of one-third
of the teaching staff annually.
f. Training Doctrine
(1) The question of what to teach has been unusually per-
plexing for a new organization in a new field of peacetime governmental activity.
The basic responsibility for what is customarily termed "training doctrine"
clearly lies with the operating offices of the Agency and not with the Office -7
of Training. Present OTR understanding of the concept is summsrized in TAB A
of the OTR EMergency, Contingency, and War Plan, 15 FebrUary 1960, as follows:
"Training Doctrine: Doctrine gonsists or7principles
and policies applicable to a subject which have been
developed through experience or theory, that represent
the beat available thought, and indicate and guide but
do not bind in practice. It is the responsibility of
the operating components to develop and forward to OTR
such doctrine as they desire taught to their personnel."
-(2) :There is no fulltime staff of professional intelligence
officers charged with the development of CIA or Directorate training doctrine.
?The DDA with its pronounced orientation towards the academic professions has
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not yet come to grips with the issue of training in intelligence for its pro-
fessional specialists. The DD/S shares some of the DD/I motivation by virtue
of its requirements for specialists such as lawyers and engineers which it
expects to satisfy by hiring ready trained individuals in the market, but
with respect to training in intelligence it generally reflects the attitudes
and practices of the DD/P. The DD/P, finally, has not reached a stage where
it could justify centralized management of this segment t51. its responsibilities
and instead has left the matter to its subordinate commands, in particular the
senior staffs, to execute as each has seen fit. A considerable amount of doctrimal
material has been generated in the DD/P over the years. On the other hand, there
are large numbers of project files throughout the DD/P containing significant
operational experience, often in subject fields for which no formal training is
yet provided, which have never been exploited for training purposes. Some
courses
concentrate on World War II cases, classics of their kind,
for lack of the time and professional judgment required to develop more recent
cases for instructional Use. NO component office in the DD/P claims that it has
made more than a beginning On the problem of distilling and recording the
doctrine of its operations.
(3) The ramifications of the problem are far-reaching.
-Operating 'responsibilities leave little time for experienced officers to study I
such matters. .The DD/P0 generally speaking, is still in the first generation ofi
commanders so that many men at branch chief level and above have had only
limited contact if any with Agency training programs and problems. The Agency
has yet to evolve mid-career and senior executive training which will invite
analysis of the roles of chiefs of station, and of branches, and which will
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aeseMble experienced individuals in the manner 'of the 'military 'staff colleges
to dissect, compare, and evaluate operating experience.
(4) PerbaPS the principal source of DD/P doctrine today is.
the operations offider,_-detailedto-OTR'as an instructor and the contribution
he makes in revising inherited training materials to reflect his own judgMent
and experience. A second source is the DD/P lecturer, a regular feature of I
many OTR courses. .A third source is the IO/P project entailing Special ttaining
of participants and the development of specially tailored training materials.
Against these -normal And positive factors, however, must be set the testimony
available today from many quarters 'ofoffers or identification Of project files
suitable for training purposes which have-not been exploited for lack of time
to do the job.
(5) Deficiencies in the development of doctrine are not to be
attributed to the Office of Training. If anything., that Office has had to exceed!
its proper limits to develop instructional materials for its courses. .The record'
of OTR has been excellent in suggesting subjects for treatment, in eliciting the
'cooperation 'of iTylividUals in operating offices to develop course content and in
offering the 'end. product to the appropriate operating Office for certification.
The educational =thole staff in OTR has contributed significantly to' the orderly
development of textual'udaterials. The OTR war planning activity has specified
the systematic 'development and deposit "of course materials in Safe locations
against ':emergency need. ,Students have been encouraged'whergliter possible to work:
on live problems so that the end product 'willhave training potential in the
future. In its Overseas 'Malting Staff '(Qperations School), OTR has eVolved
'clearinghouse and publishing 'center with the most library-of'operations
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25X1
"doctrinal"-publications available in the Agency. The basic mission of this
Staff enables it to obtain current knowledge of the preparation of doctrinal
materials throughout the Agency. From this it has been a short step to Col-
laboration on projects, reference service and editorial'assistance to IMP'
offices and to instructors
as well as to programs overseas.
Unfortunately, the present scope of the activity is not widely publicized
because of the security limitations on general announcement and disseminatioh
of training materials associated with sensitive projects. This aspect of the
activity is in need of re-evaluation so that useful materials will not? stand
idle for lack of knowledge of their existence.
(6) It is obvious that both operating offices and training ,-
command have important roles to play in the development of doctrine. A basic
lack in present-day operations is provision for the analysis of projects for
historical and doctrinal purposes. Where a project at termination is judged to
have major doctrinal implications, one of its senior officers might well be
detailed to an am Training Doctrine Staff for a sufficient period to organize
evaluate and sterilize the project files for training purposes. The capabilities
of the Staff should include the best information handling practices so that
bibliographies and indexes will be regularly developed and their existence made
known to the professional personnel of the Agency.
(7) There is a further aspect of the doctrine problem which
concerns the open literature on intelligence and espionage. The Agency has been
engaged for some years in the development of a definitive library of intelligence
in its Historical Intelligence Collection housed in the Office of Central
Reference/DT/I.' At least one instance was discoveredof an instructor'
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who was unaware of the existence of the collection. .Since completion of a
-bibliography of the collection lies some distance in the future, its Curator
and appropriate officials in OTR should collaborate on the development of an!
appropriate working collection of open literature 4 Lnd effective
publicizing of the existence and potential usefulness of the parent collection
at headquarters.
g. Present State of the Training Curriculum. .
(1) The content and 'balance of the curriculum now offered
2514
reflects the current situation in training
doctrine. There is marked instability in content, scheduling, and enrollment.
) _
(2) Various operating offices have experimented with permissive
job standards outlining minimum formal training judged desirable for various basic
categories of assignments. Thus far, however, these have had relatively limited
effect in determining who receives what training preparatory to a given assignment.
(3)
where the enrollment of JOTIs for basic
training is controlled, curriculum problems include: (a) insufficient time to
fit tradecraft and more specialized operations training into a crowded schedule,
25X1 and (b) concern that the benefits of training will be lost before the individual
has opportunity to apply them in practice, or that the content is meaningless
25X1 until he gains operating experience. Many operating officials express, the
'opinion that the
technique
'T
'urriculum still does not train in investigative
to the degree of proficiency that should be required
25X1 of any case officer. The students themselves testi that tradecraft training\
25X1
forrexample? is sub-
stantially lost over the intervening two years before overseas assignment.
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(4) The junior ?Mc/graduating
faces a sizeable
and growing list of advanced training courses as v/011 BS the formidable demands
of language and. area training limited only by the specialization dictated by his
first assignment. At the present time JOT'S, both in apprentice status and
permanently assigned to operating Offices, comprise less than 10 per cent of
the total DD/P professional personnel for whom the advaneedOperations-courses
have been designed. Yet given both JOT and non-JOT sources of possible demand
for training these courses have not -drawn and are not drawing sufficient enroll-
ments_to_sustain themselves. The typical pattern for any new course hai-been-a
-
mildly coerced adequate- enrollment for the first presentation,. then a Stead
decline with intermittent cancellations when student numbers have been too sMall
to promise reasonable -classroom discussion or to justify tying Up training
instructors and facilities. ,OTR officials .cited eight situations of this kind in
s_
a memorandum on the subject in December 1958. The Chief Instructor for Bead-
quarters Operations Training reported in May Of this year that there had been no
improvement in the intervening eighteen 'months.
(5) :The explanations of DD/P line officers concerning low
enrollments are varied. -Considerable scepticism is expressed about training for
training's sake. The present generation of executives has had minimUm formal
In
training and believes firmly in learning On-the-job under experienced senior
officers. Many believe that the training of their subbrdinates is now reaching ,
the saturation point and that small enrollments are inevitable. Operational
priorities and current ceilings on manpower cause many branch chiefs to inaist
that they cannot release Individuals for training without increase in T/O for
that purpose. There is some opinion, but noconsensus, that] sanctions will be
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required, such as those now being experimented with in the Foreign Servicel, to
solve the enrollment problem. These May include a more powerful central personnel 1
management to oversee personnel assignment decisions, the development and enforce \
ment of job standards, and. a policy that makes promotion contingent on aatis-
25X1
faction of training requirements.
(6) The 'problem derives in Part from faulty communication
between the authorities concerned. The line command will not acquire indoctrina-
tion in the values of formal training withoUt more awareness of training programs
and policies. -Confidence in the curriculum and reasonable enrollments will n-ct
appear overnight and certainly cannot be achieved by decree. OTR has briefed
parties of line commanders on activities in the past but the contacts rL,
have been too brief and intertittent. In spite of all of the hazards of bureau-
cratic prOcedure, OTR should experiment with the concept of Boards of Overseers
composed of senior grade officers from the Directorates rotated to the assignment
for relatively brief periods.of three to six monthsr who- will meet regularly with
the training, management and faculty for detailed briefings and project investigation
of current protatms. The problem is one of leadership and it rests. with the
Director of Training'andthe Deputy Directors of the Agency.
h. The future of Paramilitary Training
25X1
(1) The faculties 'which are concerned with para-
military training moved to standby status shortly following the end of the Korean
War. Emphasis changed from the training of active participants in paramilitary
operations to the indoctrination of case officers in the potential Of PN[ao that
they couldrecognize possible applications and call in the experts to perform
detailed planning and execution.
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(2) In 1959 the DD/P through the CA Staff Conducted an intensive
review of the whole subject of Unconventional warfare which led to the conclusions
that its PM Capabilities surviving from the Korean War period were rapidly
disappearing and that there was. need for a standby PM capability consisting of
professional staff, normally employed in regular DD/P assignments, but qualified
through special training to compose task forcer as needed to organize, train for
(3) Out of this review there has since been developed thecon-
cept of a_Contingency Force nuMbering several hundred individuals to be trained
or refreshed by formal courses and annual maneuvers,, regularly certified as
physically and mentally fit for PM duty, arid regularly reinforced with new blood
by the training Of select ZOT volunteers in a three-conths postgraduate I'M course
25X1
(4) It is not possible at this date, following the first
Maneuver held in May and preceding the first training of MT's -whiCh begins in
August, to evaluate the 'prospects of the program. There are the Usual uncertain-
ties concerning possible erosion of skills from lack of use, and thelikklihood
that the line divisions in A live situation Wil; prefer to train other 'staff
for such purposes. because of their command positions. and superior knowledge of
the given area and the operational problems involved. The future of paramilitary
training and of the contingency force concept will require review at a later date.
It is recommended that:
(a) DTIk adopt for headquarters administrative and career planning
purposes a designation' Itbat adequately reflects the scope
and purpose of this intelligence training center.
25X1
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(b) DTR adopt a three-,year tour of duty as standard practice
for instructors and schedule replacement at the rate of one-third
of the instructor staff annually.
(c) DTR redesignate his Overseas Training Staff to better
reflect its expanding function as a clearing house for training
doctrine; that its role as a depository and an editorial and
coordination staff be negotiated with the Directorates and.:p:Lib-
licized, including preparation and dissemination of bibliographies
under the various security limitations that may apply.
(d) Curatorpliistorical Intelligence Collection, collaborate
with Chief, Operations School/OTR, to develop and publicize a
working collection of open intelligence literature
which will:Tully reflect the existence and capabilities of the
principal collection at headquarters.
(e) DTR experiment with the concept of A board-of overseers
composed of senior grade professional officers as a means to
improved communidationwith and indoctrination of consumers 4 and
to promote the development of more effective policies on curriculum
and enrollment.
(f) The DD/P establish in his office a position of DD/P
Training and Doctrine 'Officer having, responsibty and authority
for the formulation and implementation of Clandestine Service traini4g
policy and the development of' operational doctrine.
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4, Military Reserve Officer Training
a. Origin
(1) The training of military reservists is a basic responsi-
bility of the military services and, in general, is beyond the purview of this
survey. Agency employees with active military reserve officer status are required
to devote a certain amount of their own time to military study in order to main-
tain that status and to advance within their service. The Agency is required
only to grant leave to the reservist for 15 days each year so that he may
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participate in an active duty training program of his choice. The reservist
has a wide variety of programs to choose frOm and there is little doubt that
the individual and the Agency frequently derive benefit from this activitkm
(2) In 1957 the Military Personnel Division, Office of
Personnel) proposed an Agency sponsored program which Would permit reservists
to perform their 15 day active duty training
The purpose was to
relateCsuch training More closely to the Agencyle wartime mission and the uncon-
ventional warfare courses offered'by OTR would evolve into 'a logical extension
of the already established program conducted at the weekly meetings of the
Reserve. Permission was requested of the military services in April 1958 to
use the OTR courses in UW to meet the active duty tour for reservists. The
Army and Air Free concurred but Navy and Marine Corps refused because the program
111 did not meet theirAraining requirements.
25X1
25X1 (3) Arrangements were made with the Office of Training to
25X1
conduct four courses;
Each course was of two weeks duration and for the
balance of 1958 were scheduled a total of seven times. OTR found favor with the
program Partly, at least, because staff officer requirements for UW training were
at low ebb and it offered a means of maintaining -a training capability acknowledged
to be important but which otherwise could hardly be justified. OTR stipulated,
however, that Reserve training would be subordinate to regularly scheduled opera-
tions training including tutorials and special exercises. It also was subject to
the availability of instructor personnel. The Military Reserve Officer Training
Program
course
25X1
was launched on 2 June 1958 with the opening of the first
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b. Current Activities
25X9
(1) Since the program started a total of IIII(of more than
eligible) Army and Air Force reservists have elected to take the OTR courses
as their active duty training. One running of the
in February 1960 was cancelled for lack of applicants but all others have been
25X1
well attended. The last course to be scheduled fpr CY 1960 began 11 July;
thereafter for the balance of the year all Reserve Officer Training Courses
will be suspended because of the press of other requirements.
(2) The value of the program both to the individual reservist
and the Agency is difficult to appraise. Two weeks of practical field work and
demonstrations would appear to be a logical climax to the 4o weekly two-hour
sessions of instruction in UW operations the reservist receives throughout the
rest of the year. The program must be weighed in the light of the overall con-
tribution it makes to the Agency in preparing for its responsibilities to support
the armed forces in time of war. From this point of view some serious doubts emerge.
(3) It should be noted at the outset that the Agency's wartime e
role is not clearly delineated) that there is not universal agreement on the
nature and extent of the Agency's mission in time of hot war and that Uncon-
ventional Warfare is only one aspect of its mission. To place undue emphasis on
UW is to distort the whole picture. A very sound three-year cycle of instruction
for Agency reservists was approved by the Command Group in 1956 to study major
military forces of the world. Under this program UW as a subject for study assumes
an appropriate but relatively low level position.
(4) If it is intended, as has been implied, to prepare reservists
to participate in UW operations in time of war this program is entirely inadequate.
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Unconventional Warfare is a highly specialized field requiring extensive training
in depth not merely in the four Courses conducted] Ibut of the full
scope of clandestine and covert operations. It is a subject in which superficial
knowledge is far more dangerous than total ignorance. Furthermore the needs of
the Clandestine Service for officers capable of conducting paramilitary Opera-
tions must be met through a program designed for the purpose andhaving more
specific objectives in view. The DD/P has recently approved such a program in
connection witYthe establishment of the Contingency Task Force.
(5) The training facilitiesl !axe not able to mee
the requirements of both the Contingency Task Force and the Officer Reserve
active duty program and the latter will be suspended with the completion of
the course scheduled to begin 11 July 1960. Such suspension is in keeping with
the priority status of the Contingency Task Force program and if there are plans
to re-institute the Officer Reserve program at some time in the future they have
not yet been made known. In view of the obscure objectives and questionable
contribution made by the Officer Reserve active duty training program it must
be regarded more as a convenience than a necessity and therefore its continuation
is not justified. 25X1
It is recommended that:
The DTR confer with the Commanding Officers of the Army and Air
Reserve units to see if more practical reserve training, e.g.,
International Communism, could be handled by OTR for the reservists.
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D. School of International Communism
1. Three courses are offered by the School of International
Communism (SIC):
Introduction to Communiah, 80 hours full time, provides
basic instruction in Communist ideology and the International
Communist movement. It is designed to meet the needs of all
professional employees of the Agency.
Communist, Party Organization and Operations, 80 hours part
time, provides a practical working knowledge of the structure
and activities of Communist Parties outside the Sino-Soviet
Bloc-. It is available- to all intelligence officers although
patronized most by those engaged in clandestine operations.
Anti-Communist Operations 80 hours part time, includes the
planning and conduct of clandestine operations against Communist
Parties and is offered exclusively to DD/P personnel.
2. In addition to these programmed courses the School conducts
aeomewhat compressed version of all three courses for the JOT program.
There are heavy demands made for tutorial training principally of con-
tract agents and the-School.has,on.oCoasion developed tailor-made .courses
to meet the requirements of individual components.
3. The faculty consists of seven instructors all :?f whom are
OTR careerists. All are well qualified for their assignments and having
longer tenure than the average they profit from continuity Of instruction
from class to class and are able to develop' a depth .of knowledge of their
subjects to an unusual degree. .Several of them are much in demand as
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lecturers at other intelligence schools. The staff is augmented by S'
operations officers principally provided by CI Staff to give instruction' )
in the Anti-Communist Operations course.
4. Doctrine presents no problem for School of International
Communism. There is a wealth of substantive material flowing in from
several sources of which one of the best is International Communism
Division, Cl Staff. Finished intelligence publications as well as raw
information reports are received and reviewed and. the only problem is
one of keeping abreast of current knowledge and thinking about the Com-
minist movement. Operational doctrine .on neutralizing and cOuntering
Communist Party activities is neither as voluminous nor as well
',..."91t1M952010.
developed. It is, however, adequate for training purposes at the
present level.
5. An evaluation of the effectiveness of the School's training,
solicited from consumers and trainees alike, rates the courses extremely
high. The School is acknowledged to be superior to university courses
on International Communism (a) because of the inclusion of much classified
material usually not available to academic institutions and (b) because
its courses are designed for intelligence service use. Instruction is
described as conctse, hard-hitting and most effective.
6. The School is of major importance to the Agency's training
effort. It gives definition and purpose to the Agency's mission by
identifying and describing the menace and motives of International Com-
munism against the free world. It contributes largely to the motivation
of intelligence officers, particularly the junior members, and should
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become an essential element of the basic- training required :of all officers
regardless of their assignments to collection, production or support
components.
7. The only problem of major significance to: the School is the
heavy drain on manpower to.neet.requirements for tutorial training. Such
training is unpredictable, difficult to schedule, and, for security
reasons, impossible to conduct on a classroom basis. On a larger scale
this problem affects all of OTR and some suggestions for relieving the
condition?areoffered in a subsequent section of this report.
It is recommended that:
The courses on International Communism be given- wider
publicity and offered to the personnel of other :agencies,
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E. Language & Area School
1. Introduction
a. Recognizing the essential role that foreign language
skills play in the pursuit of the Agency's mission, Regulation
25X1
entitled "Language Development Program," lays a clear mandate on certain
key officials to develop the necessary capability. In brief, the program
calls for the determination of requirements for foreign language compe-
tence and prescribes action for training Agency personnel to meet those
requirements. The assigns responsibility to the Deputy .
Directors to .establish the requirements and to assure the continuing
attainment and retention of foreign language proficiency by staff person-
nel under their jurisdiction. The heads of Career Services and Operating
Officials are to direct or encourage their employees to engage in language
study and the Director of Training is to exercise general direction of
the program. He is to provide for directed and voluntary language train-
ing in approved courses and programs, establish standards and proficiency
tests; and to administer the monetary Achievement and Maintenance Awards.
The Director of Personnel is directed to maintain a current inventory of
the language competences of staff personnel. The Regulation further
'provides that a five-man Committee for Language Development; consisting
of one representative each of the three Deputy Directors and of the
Offices of Training and Personnel, shall recommend and periodically
review policies' procedures and other matters affecting the program,
including language awards.
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b. The various arrangements that have been worked out to
implement the program for formal language training may be summarized as
follows: (a) the .Office of Training, through its Language and Area
School (LAS), currently offers instruction in 18 languages; (b) use
is made of the training facilities of other Federal agencies, chiefly
those of the Foreign _Service Institute (FSI), where in FY 1959, 32
Agency employees received language training; (c) recourse is also had
to the language courses offered by universities and colleges and to the
tutorial instruction _available at the Berlitz -School and-Sanz-SChool;
(d) the Agency's Voluntary Language' Training Program, described below,
provides opportunity for oft-duty hours group instruction in approxi-
mately 20 languages; (e) finally, Agency personnel stationed abroad
generally have an opportunity for further formal language training at
their posts.
Various factors influence the Choice amOngthese
.facilities in each individual case. Accessibility and security considera-
tions in the avoidance of disclosure .of identities of Clandestine Services
personnel are best secured at Agency facilities. The _widest range of
languages (28 currently offered, with capability of 4o) is to be found
at Foreign Service Institute. The most concentrated training (so-called
"24-hour" use) is offered at the Army Language School at Monterey and at
The availability of the employee for only part-time
training, the cost of tuition, transportation and. maintenance of the
employee and his family pr, on the other hand, the coat and difficulty
of providing coverage Of a new Language at Language and Area School also
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are taken into cOnsideration. Other basic factors are the comparative
excellence of instruction and. the difficulty of the individual language.
For illustration, ,while some of the 4astern languages can be learned in a
Ametter?Of months two years of concentrated work sunder the most favorable
conditions are required for Chinese, Japanese- and Korean. Frequently, the ?
date Of availability of. the trainee and date -of the beginning of. a given
language course exercise inflUence in the choice.
2. Organization &.Activities
a. Language and Area School_consists of 25 staff personnel
(19 of professional grade; siX-clericals) and 24,cantract_emplOyees ,(nature
speakers Of. Various languages). It is Organized in three "faculties":
Language, Area Knowledge and Research and Administrative. The Language facility
comprisea four "Pepartments":_for Germanic, Romance, Slavic and Eastern European,
and Asian and African languages respectively. The small Area Knowledge faculty
is divided along geographical aines.
1). At-the time of this survey,- the School was giving full-time or
part-time instructionl.during,duty hours, in these 18 languages:
French Russian
Spanish Polish
Italian Czech
Rumanian Serbo-Croat
German
Swedish Japanese
Norwegian Chinese
Greek Arabic
Persian
Turkish
Nungarian
c. Instruction in several further languages, including Swahili,
Armenian, and Finnish, was -available in the Agency's VOlUntary Language Training
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program. In general the courses given by the school are comprehensive), aiming
at proficiency in reading, writing and speaking. The method of instruction
employed is the combined Use Of native speakers (instructors) or speaking and
drill, and instruction in grammar and structure of the language from the re-
spective department head, who is a linguistic scientist.and who also guides the
instructor in the best methods of teaching. that particular language to English-
25X9
speaking students.
e. For the proper ev&luatioh.oP these language-training-figures
a sharp distinction must be drawn between the varioUs types of.training. In
the nature of the difficUlt process of learning a foreign language, it is
only the directed full-time course that provides the best conditions for
progress. The directed part-time course, occupying half ofthe working day
and leaving the trainee immtrsed in his regular job the Other half of :the day,
Is objectionable to the linguists becattse it is considerably less effective
and much more time consuming. The principle of part-time training is accepted
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by Language & Area School.only as a?compromise in-order to accommodate employees
who cannot be released from their desks full-time. Of all Government agencies,
only CIA and NSA offer part-time language courses. The voluntary training
program stands still further down the scale, as it consists of time donated
by the trainee Outside his full work-day,- namely One hour of group wOrk a day
under a non-professionali.nstrUctor? supplemented by five hours of individual
work a week in the language laboratory On language tapes or Other material.
f. The tabulation On the following page presents a concrete picture
of the total hUnber of Agency staff employees who were receiving training in
various languages-as-of 1 May. 1960.
3. The Voluntary Language Training PrograM
a. The Agency's Voluntary Language Training Program was started
in 1957 to provide.employeesat Headquarters with an opportunity to receive
-instruction in language study without,expense-tutside Of regular duty hours.
Under the supervision-of Language & Area School, instructors for this program
were sought from among Agency, employees (largely from the DD/P) who possessed
a high degree Of competence in a given foreign language and who wishes to
conduct a group fellow-colleaguesAtairous-of studying that language. Such
instructors receive as compensation payment at overtime rates. The average
compensation is $4.38 an hour. These voluntaryjnstructors were given some
coaching by School instructOrs in the techniques of teaching.a language.
Classes for small groups. were established .as requested, being held in Various
convenient places in Agency buildings -either -at 700 a.m..Or at 515 p.m.
In the first two and a .half years of the program, that is, by 1: March. 1960,
.the following results were obtained: ,a roster:ofl !instructors was built
25X9
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LAS
EXTERNAL
Full-Time
Part-Time
Tutorial
Full-Time
Part-Time
Arabic
9 students
5 students
2 students
2 (1 at Col. U;
5 (2 at Georgetown;
(2 Basic courses)
(Basic course)
1 at Georgetown)
3 with private tutor)
Chinese
8 students
4 students
2 students
2 (1 at FSI?Washington
1 (FSI)
(5 Basic,
3 Advanced)
(Basic II)
1 at FSI?Formosa)
French
4 students
16 students
11 students
7 (5 at FSI, elem.
1 (priv. tutor elem.)
(Intermediate
course)
(6 Basic I,
6 Basic III,
4 Interm. II)
1 at Georgetown
1 at Sanz)
German
8 students
24 Students
7 students
1 (1 at FSI, elem.)
(Intermediate
course)
(8 Basic I,
7 Basic II,
7 Reading II,
2 Interm. Sem.)
Greek
9 students
(4 Basic I,
3 Basic II,
2 Interm. I)
Hungarian
2 students
(Workshop-Reading)
Italian
2 students
9 students
(Intermed. II)
Japanese
9 students
2 students
4 (1 Monterey elem.
2 (1 at Berlitz elem.
(5 Basic II,
4 Intermed. II)
3 FSI?Tokyo)
(2 elem. 1 int.)
1 at Sanz elem.)
Norwegian
2 students
Persian
4 students
(Familiarization)
Polish
7 students
2 students
1 (Monterey elem.)
(4 Adv. Seminar,
3 Wkshop-Read.)
Portuguese
2 students
1 (FSI, elem.)
Romanian
3 students
(Wkshop-Read.)
Russian
54 students*
1
3 (1 at Georgetown, adv.
(9 RSW II**
1 at Berlitz, elem.
4 RSW III
1 Priv. T. adv.)
3 RSW Advanced
13 Basic Reading
2 Int. Seminar I
2 Int. Seminar II
5 Adv. Seminar I
5 Adv. Seminar II
3 Int. Reading (Science & Tech.) II
5 Int. Reading (Econ. & Pol.) II
3 USSR-Int. Area & L. II)
Serbo-Croatian
3 students
1 (FSI, elem.)
(Basic Read. II)
Spanish
3 students
3 students
1 (Berlitz, elem.)
(Basic Read.)
Swedish
2 students
Turkish
12 students
1 (FSI, elem.)
(7 Basic I,
4 Basic II,
1 Intermed.)
Czech
1 (at FSI, elem.)
Indonesian
1 (at FSI, elem.)
Thai
Korean
2 (at FSI, elem.)
? ? .
Icelandic
1 (Priv. Tut., elem.)
Malayan
? ?
1 (at Sanz elem.)
Totals
29 Full-Time
157 Part-Time
45 Tutorial
27 Full-Time
14 Part-Time
Recapitulation
Full-Time 56
Part-Time, including tutorials 216
* Of these 54, 9 were from DD/P area, including 6 from SR/Div.
** RSW indicates a "comprehensive" course, reading, speaking, writing.
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up, Of whom. had actually been used.. On that date there were
25X9
employees
who were studying.ten different languages in 146 classes. By that time approx-
imatelyE::::]employees (an almost .equal nuMber of men and women) had participated
in a total of 20 languages.
b. Participation in the program wasy of course, strongly stimu?
lated by monetary awards for achievement and maintenance of proficiency in
foreign languages. This program was established simultaneously with the
25X1 Voluntary language program byl [nd provides for awardsyvarying
25X1
in aunt from
25.00 to' $600.00.accoraing,to the level of proficiency attained
25X9
.Or maintained and the degree of difficulty. of the language studied.
c. A survey of the experience with the voluntary language program,
conducted by the Language & Area School early in 1960, disclosed that there25X9
had been an excessive amount of diffusioil: too many persons had merely taken
a language long enough to acquire a smattering of it (and to obtain an award).
In the first two years out of 'who completed a triMester, I iwere ii5X1
the beginning grades, in the Intermediate. and only0in the advanced
grades. Furthermore, only25.yer cent of.the total had studied a language 25X9
other than French, German, Spanish or Russian. Out Of 1. ho had studied
one of the Pour Western languages (French, German, Spanish.and Italian)y only
12 or 15 had received assignments where they could use their new knoWledge.
Accordingly, the bases of the voluntary language program and of the 'wards
Program have recently. been modified, in order to focus them more accurately
along lines of Agency interest.
d. Since there was believed tO be no Agency shortage in the Pour
Western languages, the elementary level of these languages was eliminated
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25X9
from both programs. This change reflected the view that in order to get
training. at Agency expense the employee should choose a language in which
there are shortages and which bear a relation to the person's future assign-
ments or assignability. The result. of these changes is that during the 21-week
semester running from 7 March. to29 Ju1y4960, there were only 17-1students
in the voluntary program studying ten languages. We are of the view that
these changes were salutary, for such proliferation of language study is
impressive only when viewed quantitatively and the cost of the two programs,
in terms of money and Of employee energy (though donated voluntarily at off-
duty times) is not inconsiderable.
4, The New Tutorial Language Training Program
a. The Agency's recent experience with language training by
tutorial lessons presents .a vivid illustration of the evil results flowing
from the failure of the NVP area to establish language standards and to make
adequate plans for the language training of the individual officer who is
about to go overseas. Given the fact-that it requires approximately 250
class hours for a student of average aptitude to achieve an elementary
proficiency in one of the common languages, tutorial training, if relied on
excessively, would require a very large tutorial staff. Reliance on com-
mercial tutoring schools, such as the Berlitz School, presents security
problems in many cases and is extremely expensive ($5-6 per hour per student).
These and other considerations caused the Agency to shift its policy, three
or four years ago, of relying predominantly on tutorial training and to sub-
stitute as the standard method of training the current system. of full-time
and part-time class instruction. This new policy meant that tutorial training
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was to be restricted to exceptional situations, e.g., (a) in languages for
which infrequent, sporadic requirements make the scheduling of regular classes
uneconomical, e.g., Dutch Polish, etc.; or (b) cases where covert training
is required owing to security considerations that prohibit the individual
from exposing his identity to other trainees.
b. This distinction has long been disregarded to a substantial
extent by the DD/P branch chiefs in requesting language training, for their
people. Numerous requests for tutorial training have been based on the
grounds that shortness of time or pressure of.other duties did not permit
the individual to be scheduled for a regular class. In many of these cases,
the real reason for failure to place the individual in a.regularly-scheduled
1
class was bad planning or lack of understanding on the part of the branch
chief of the importance of language training or of the amount of time required
for proper study. The result was that the school's small staff, already
heavily engaged in regular class instruction was subjected to an excessive
work-load and increased recourse had to be had to outside tutoring. In the
calendar year 1959, 42 individuals received tutorial training at Berlitz or
Sanz Schools or from private tutors.
c. In order to alleviate these strains, Language and Area
School in February. 1960, instituted a new program for increasing its own
tutorial strength at moderate cost by recruiting tutors from among those
wives of staff employees who are native speakers of foreign languages. By
1 July 1960, this new program had developed to the point where a roster of
about 40 such tutors capable of tutoring in 18 different languages, had
been developed, security clearances for some 31 had been obtained and the
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large number of 62 persons had received, or were then receiving, tutorial
instruction for periods of varying length. The new tutors are paid at the
average rate of $3.00 to $3.50 an hour. They receive coaching in instruction
techniques from the staff and the level of excellence of their instruction
is stated to be at least as good as that offered_at the commercial tutoring
schools, recourse to which has been largely eliminated by the new program.
The estimated cost of the new program is $27,000 a year.
d. Although the achievements of the new program are thus sub-
stantiall. an analysis recently made of the first 59 of the cases handled
under the new program disclosed that whereas four were in the category of
covert training and 15 were in languages for which no other training oppor-
tunity existed except in commercial schools, the remaining 40 cases were in
the four common languages (French, German, Italian and Spanish) and of these
23 were mere ,beginners in the language. There is no evidence that a,few weeks
of training prior to departure abroad has any effect in the development of. an
operationally useful.proficiency in even the easier languages and hence, that
little gain to the Agency can be expected in the 23 cases just mentioned. This
result is of course traceable to the lack of Mandatory standards of language
competence. These considerations provide additional support for the general
recommendations made later in this report for putting teeth into the Agency's
language training policyl,but on the specific point of cutting.down-on the
abuse made in resorting to tutorial training instead of regular class
instruction,
It is recommended-that:
The DD/P instruct.all.supervisors to observe, in requesting language
training, the principle that training in regular classes is the normal
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and most effective method, and that resort to tutorial training shall
be had only in exceptional cases and where required by security con-
siderations, unavoidable pressure of time, or other valid reason.
5. Evaluation
a. Giyen the Agencys foreign intelligence mission, its size
and the amount of annual attrition, the figures quoted earlier at once
raise prima.facie a doubt whether the Agency is fully discharging its
responsibilities in the matter of developing and maintaining its language
capabilities. A number of cases of failure to provide necessary language
capability in the field have been observed. Thus, in the course of our
survey of Near EastADivision at the end.of 1959, a serious deficiency in
language competence and.only very superficial area knowledge was found at
practically. all posts in that area. At a number of posts in Arab-speaking
lands, the station had not a single staff employee who spoke Arabic. In
general, these conditions also had. been found to exist in that area at the
time of our 1957 Survey; thus no real improvement was noted in the course
of three years. It should be stated) however, that in the fall of 1959 \
the DD/P learned of this situation and ordered that a suitable number of
employees be sent at once to training in Arabic. It is significant that
it required a high-level direction to achieve this improv*-Ment. 25X1
b- An evaluation of the adequacy of the Agency's effort in
language training is severely hampered by the delay of. the Deputy Directors,
particularly the DD/P, in complying with the provisions of
for establishing their respective language requirements and a dependable
inventory of the language competence of their personnel based upon the
objective test procedures administered by the Language and Area School.
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Thus, as of the beginning of 1960, only 25 per cent of Agency personnel
claiming a language competence had taken the tests with the result that
the Agency's voluminous roster of language competence of Agency personnel
consisted, in approximately 75 per cent of the instances, solely of a
statement of the individual employee's self-evaluation, as submitted by
him in 1957. Recently, however) the heads of the three principal components
have issued instructions to their employees to take the language tests and
as a result the rate of testing has increased substantially. It should be
mentioned that in February and April) 1960, the DD/I and the DD/S0 respec-
tively, concluded the preparation of detailed Surveys of the language re-
quirements of the positions under their jurisdictions and that a survey of
training requirements, including language training, is presently being con-
ducted by three divisions of the DD/P area. The information being produced
in the DD/P effort appears, however, to be related to the needs and desires
of the individual employee rather than to the requirements of the position.
c. The following excerpts from a survey of language abilities
of employees in the Agencyas of 31 August 1959 illustrate the gap between
the numbers of abilities claimed and abilities tested, respectively. The
source was the Agency Language Roster. The survey shows the number of
employees who have claimed any level of proficiency in,a language, the
number of tests taken in that language and, of those tested, the number
with intermediate or high levels of ability.
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25X9
LANGUAGE CLAIMED NO. OF COMPREHENSIVE SPECIALIZED
TESTS Interm High Interm High
Read Speak Read Speak
Arabic,
modern
written
Arabic,
other
(Syrian,
Lebanese,
Western,
etc.)
Chinese,
Cantonese
Chinese,
Mandarin
Japanese
Korean
Russian
(The columns in the table above should be read individually, since the same
person may appear in more than one category. In considering the foregoing
figures, it should be kept in mind that a great many of those who have claimed
abilities, but have never submitted to tests, do in fact possess the abilities
claimed. LAS uses 70 per cent as a rule-of-thumb measure. It should also be
kept in mind that these figures are Agency-wide figures, not broken down to
show the numbers with reference to the individual area division presumably having
the greatest operational need of abilities in a given language.)
d. The extremely small number of employees receiving language
training is attributable to .a number of interrelated causes:
(1) There appears to be a lack of true conviction on the
part of many division chiefs and other line officers of the importance of
language competence. There is often a feeling that "a good job can be done
without foreign languages." This attitude of indifference is believed to be
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a carry-over from the mentality of OSS days and may have its original roots
in the traditional American isolationism of post World War I days.* Two
results flowed from this attitude: (a) efforts to make the Agency Regulation
mandatory from the point of requiring language competence for prescribed
positions did not overcome resistance based upon the "State's Rights" theory; (b)
the senior officers did not press with sufficient energy for adequate language
25X1 training for their subordinates.
5X1
25X1
apathy towards foreign languages: our indbility, to communicate in anything
but English stems from our traditional. isolationism of post-World War T days,
the paralyzing prejudice held by Our intelligentsia that Americans are not
gifted for languages, with the accompanying placid assumption that everyone
should understand English. He points out that while in 1914 45% of high
school students were enrolled in modern language courses, as late-as 1954755
there were barely. 15 per cent, with over half of the nation's high schools
not even offering a modern language. Another consequence of this attitude
is that whilethe ideal time to initiate an individual into the mysteries
of language is before adolescence, in the U.S. schools foreign languages
make their first appearance long after the child has lost full capacity for
them.' then points out that this generally dismal picture is
relieved by certain bright spots, such as the passing of the National Defense
Education-Action (which authorized a total of $887,000,000 to be utilized for
a four-year program of development of science, mathematics and language train-
ing) and the calling of -a number of conferences of national leaders in many
fields for f coming to grips with the nation's language defi-
ciencies. concludes his article by recommending that teaching
methods be articularly by stressing the actual use of the foreign
tongue and by broadening the range of languages taught, and in other ways.
He points out that progress towards a better understanding at the grassroots
of the language problem inits relation to our international_communication
needs is resulting from the series of "citizens consultations" held in hundreds
of U.S. communities under the sponsorship of the U.S. National Commission for
UNESCO, as a result of which parents, educators and civic leaders have spear-
headed drives to improve language facilities at the local level.
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(2) As With training generally the individUal branch chiefs
usually have the decisive voice in determining how much language training
their people receive and, with smaller WO's and personnel ceilings, there
is nowadays a tendency for a branch chief to be extremely reluctant to
release his man from the daily work of the unit for the prolonged absences
required for effective language training. An incidental result is that in
many cases the case officer is released for training so late before his
departure for an overseas post, that his language training. is too curtailed
to be adequate. Thus, the major deterrent to adequate language training
is the fact that for all practical purposes the program is still controlled
from the branch level.
(3) There appears to be very little high-level advanced
planning concerning language requirements, e.g., provision ofcompetence
in Chinese in anticipation of the increased Agency requirements that would
result from a recognition of Communist China by the U.S.; likewise in
connection with possible political developments in Africa beyond the immediate
future.
(4) Policy as to the creationof area Specialists and their
assurance of an advancement comparable to that received by a generalist'has not
yet been clearly established. Case officers, therefore, have a fear that
by becoming specialists they limit their awn prospects for advancement. This
attitude results in a reluctance to become a master of the extremely difficult
languages such as Chinese, Japanese and Arabic. This condition focuses atten-
tion on the importance of clarification of the problem of area specialists.
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(5) With reference to the Russian language, a special
attitude (a sort of "schizophrenia"), has resulted from the peculiar position
of SR Division which stations its personnel abroad in nonlBloc countries.
These officers acquire the host country language in order to operate and
?they profess to find it sufficient even in dealing with Soviet nationals
found there, since the latter are always trained in the local language.
This attitude has resulted in SR Division attributing minor importance to
learning Russian, as is evidenced by thefact that in 1959-only two Agency
employees were taking full-time Russian courses.
e. There appears to be a real question whether the Agency's
concept of language training.-- as implemented by the line officials of
the DD/P area -- has kept pace with the Agency's general maturing. There
is a strong tendency to rest content with the present reservoir of personnel
Who are competent in the more difficult languages, and to overlook the fact
that the supply of Americans having ,native fluency in foreign languages is
drying up. The differentiation between.a generalist and a language-area
specialist has not been carried to its logical-conclusion and implemented
in terms of career-planning,and long-term study. Evidence of coordination
between language training and the prospective long-term developments in such
areas of political explosivettess as Africa south of the Sahara is lacking.
Certainly, the Agency's needs will never be fulfilled by the considerable
number of employees who participate in short-term programs without ever
reaching a functiOnal level in writing, speaking or reading. We have grave
doubts that the Agency's long..term world-wide communication .needs are being
adequately prepared for.
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f. We accordingly believe that intervention at the highest Agency
level is required in-order to secure effective handling of,the problem of
ensuring that Agency:language competence will attain the proper levels required
both .y current needs and by probable future developments. There appears to
be urgent need to make Agency policy statements more specific and more effective.
,It is recoMmended that:
(1) DCI issue instructions thatAgency.Regulations be amended by
, adding new provisions (a) directing the Deputy Directors to identify:the
categories of employees for whom specified degrees of language proficiency ,
are required and to tie these standards of proficiency into promotion
practices, and (b) directing the Deputy Directors to identify those positions,
or that proportion of positions, in .each overseas station that may be filled
only by indiViduals who possess, to the degree specified, the language
commonly used in the general ,area of that station.
(2) DCI issue instructions that Agency Regulations be further amended
to make language proficiency testing, according to Agency standards, man-
datory. for all employees who are required to have language skill.
.(3) ,DD/P direct that in all long-range operational planning the
iMplications with respect to possible radical change in requirements as
to the nature or 'extent of language capabilities be carefully considered
and that the conclusions reached be regularly and promptly communicated
to the DTR.
(4) .DD/P-give clearer recognition to the necessity for develoPing
in larger numbers than at the present rate linguistically qualified area
specialists.
(5) The Deputy. Directors take such measures as may be necessary to
cause all staff employees under their jurisdiction who claim language
competence to sUbmit-to the Office of Training tests at the earliest
practicable moment.
(6) DD/P" consider the advisability of placing.directly on the division
chiefs the responsibility for 'all scheduling of language training for per-
sonnel in the division and for monitoring the timely carrying out of the
language training thus scheduled.
6. Area Knowledge Courses
a. Language and Area School has a small Area Training Staff, con-
sisting of three professionals and a secretary, which, with the help of guest
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speakers drawn from the Agency-at large, offers short, concentrated oriep-
tation courses on particular countries and geographical areas. The courses,
called "Americans Abroad Orientations", are intended for personnel and their
dependents who are about to go to the area or country for the first time.
They vary in length from one to four days. At the present time, courses
on 30 different. countries and areas are available, including the Middle East,
North Africa, Africa South of the Sahara and Southeast Asia. In each course,
the area's geographical political) sociological and economic characteristics
are examined, the problems existing between that areaand the United States
are briefly analyzed _and guideline's for living,abroad.and advice on getting
along well with the inhabitants are given. Use is made of illustrative filMs:
and various papers, Maps, booklets, etc., are distributed to each .participant
25X9
for study.
b. During the first six months of 1960, lo such courses, covering
a total of 30 separate countries and areas, were given to a total number of
DD/I areas. These figures represent a considerable increase over corre-
sponding 1959 figures. The increase resulted from an expansion of the number
of countries covered and from direct efforts on ?the part of the Staff to
increase interest in the courses on the part of branch chiefs and training
officers. As part of this approach) courses are given upon request on even
very short notice and even to a single travelbqn in order to insure that
every traveller may have an opportunity to benefit. This practice of ready
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availability has resulted in considerable duplication of courses within short
intervals, but, on the other hand, has begun to make the branch chiefs and
training officers realize the value of these courses, which may lead to more
regular scheduling in the future. Recording of the lectures of visiting
speakers enables the Staff to present the sage lecture subsequently to single
trainees or to groups too small to justify the presence of the speaker himself.
0. It is our impression, gained from comments heard in the course
of this survey and through attendance by a member of this staff at part of
the course on Latin America, that such orientation courses afford the prospec-
tive traveller a valuable insight into his new area, which in turn should enable
him to accelerate his adaptation to his new surroundings.
d. In former years the Area Staff also offered more extensive
area courses, lasting ten weeks or longer, in which instruction in some depth
was offered to employees who required more comprehensive knowledge. Among
the areas covered were Africa, the Far East and the Soviet Union. These
long courses suffered, however, from lack of students and the decision was
taken to offer them in the future only upon specific request. None has been
given thus far in 1960 except the course on the Soviet Union) which is now
given by the School of International Communism) rather than by Language and
Area School.
7. The "Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness" Course
a. Early in 1959 Language and Area School developed and presented
a significant new high-level course called "Introduction to Overseas Effective-
ness", which is designed to increase the sensitivity to other cultures on the
part of the junior officer who is facing his first overseas assignment and
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thereby to make him more effective in his official contacts. (The Americans
Abroad Orientation courses are on a lower leyel and are designed to explain
the peculiarities of the specific culture of a foreign country or area and
thereby to facilitate the individual's personal adjustment.) This new
course offers, first a study of the methods used in the behavioral sciences
for studying and Understanding the actions and reactions of individuals, both
as individuals and as individuals groUped into societies, and, second, the
application of those methods to the practical problems of work and life in
other countries. The course is described as "an introduction to the art of
assessing and influencing other-culture people through an understanding of
their values and behavioral patterns." The course includes also "concern
for the human factor in supervision) particularly, as influenced by special
forces playing on the individual in a foreign environment." The major
objective of the course is the more efficient and more effective discharge
of Agency responsibilities abroad. The problems of personal adjustment
abroad are touched Upon Incidentally, because of the importance of successful
personal adjustment to the effectiveness of an individual's work. This exper-
imental course lasts two weeks and the guest speakers include scientists,
anthropologists, sociologists and other social scientists of high rank.
b. This course was developed and introduced by the School at
the emphatic request of COPS/DDP following a trip to the Far East in the
course of which he had observed the inability of high-level Agency personnel
to establish communication with the people of that
country, quite apart from language difficulties. The course is considered
to be directly in line with the recommendations for training U.S. personnel
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that are stated in the 1958 OB Report entitled "United States Employees
Overseas." It.has been given three times thus far and is to be given in
September to the current JOT class, with the prospect of perhaps being
permanently incorporated into the JOTP--Qurriculum. The course received
strong endorsement from the group of senior DD/Pofficers who were selected
to attend the second presentation of it in order.to evaluate it. We accord-
ingly feel that it is a valuable, high quality,contributionto.the Agency's
training program. It is regrettable that DTEt,,. faced with the general diffi-
culty of obtaining:adequate enrollment.to.OTR's training courses, has tenta-
tively,decided not to schedule this course regularly (except to the JOT1s,
as stated.above). We think .it quite likely that division chiefs and-other
senior supervisors would, if made aware of the potential value of such a
course, be inclined to grant a higher priority to this course.
It is therefore recommended that:
The DD/P, as well as the DD/I and-DD/S, strongly recommend to their
division chiefs, assistant directors and.other senior officers that they
familiarize themselves, through attendance thereat, with the contents of
the Introduction to Overseas Effectiveness course.
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F. Junior Officer Training Program (JOTP)
1. Establishment of the Program
a. A recruitment and training program for junior officers
was inaugurated in CIA in 1951 immediately following the establishment
o? the Office of Training. The first class of JOT's was assembled in
July of that year. Recruitment of JOT's was assigned to the Office of
Personnel) selection and placement were reserved to the JOTP administra-
tion, and assessment and training were delegated to the appropriate staffs
and schools of OTR. The concept of selection in depth was implemented
during the first two years by mans of a policy of assigning the trainee,
after formal instruction, to on-the-job training with a line unit while
continuing his slotting on the OTR rolls. This now well established
policy was also based on recognition that the first experiences of the
JOT with supervision and work assignments are vital to his long-range
motivation and that a monitoring and recovery mechanism is essential
both for the man and the program against the hazards of the operational 25X1
scene.
b. Also in 1953, a separate campus was acquired by OTR
for JOT and other operational trainingl L .This promoted
integration of faculty and of curriculum, afforded vastly improved train-
ing facilities, and placed the students in surroundings conducive to full
concentration on training.
c. Between July of 1951 and December of 1959 the Junior
Officer Training Program enrolled a total of 517 men and 59 women, 576
in all, at a rate of about 45 per year during the first five years and
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80 'per year from 1956 to the present. In 1960 the JOTP is expanding
once again to a new level of 114.2 studentsper year. As of the end of
1959 there were a total of 238 JOT graduates on duty in the component
offices of the Agency as follows: 187 or 79 per cent with the DD/P,
42 or 18 per cent with the DD/I and nine or three per cent with the
DD/S. A loss of 170 JOT students or graduates was incurred over the
nine years, and the balance of 168 consisted of students still under
JOT? control and assigned either to the first phase formal training
or to the second-phase on-the-Job training in operating offices.
2. Activities
a. Recruitment of JOT's is performed by the Office of
Personnel by means of a staff of seven field recruiters who canvass
,Ct1
the U.S. academic world, andl.inparticular, work through some =1 ,2s
consultants spotted in leading colleges and universities.,' Selection
is accomplished by an elaborate filter process which includes for eacli
candidate a field interview and field administered intelligence test,
screening and tentative selection by the JOTP, initiation of security
,
clearance, headquarters visits by the candidate for medical examinatign,
assessment testing and extensive interviewing, a pre-employment poly-
graph test and a final decision based on all of the evidence assembled.
b. Junior officer training commences with a block of ten
weeks of instruction at headquarters on internationsl communism and on
the structure and functions of the Agency. A prime objective in this
period is evaluation of the candidate's suitability for case officer as
against intelligence research or support training. This determination
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is made at the end of the first ten weeks of training. The JOT class is
then broken into three sections and each henceforth pursues a separate
pattern of training.
25X1
c. , The 1960 expansion of the JOTP includes increased quOtas
for the DD/I and DD/Sand is requiring OTR to devote increased effort to
the design of courses that will be effective for these latter Directorates.
The plan
training
Students
for 1960 is to Send students earmarked for DD/P case officer
going to the DD/S will be given ten weeks
25X1
Operations Familiarization and.Operations Planning and Management. ,DD/I
.nominees will take the six-weeks Operations Familiarization Course at
then return to headquarters for a 12-week course in Intel-
25X1
ligence Production.
d. At the end of approximately six months of formal train-
ing, the JOT, while remaining on OTR rolls, is assigned to 12 to 18
months of on-the-job training in an operating office. .The sponsoring
office must prepare and submit a training plan for each apprentice for
JOTP approval. Both the JOT and his supervisor report in writing every
four months on the progress of the training. The JOTP has authority to
reassign a student when the initial assignment fails to work out satis-
factorily.
e. Determination of the initial training assignment and of
the permanent assignment at termination of JOTP control are obviously of
vital importance to the success of the system. The initiative on these
actions has rested largely with the JQTP in the past and has involved
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extensive negotiation principally at the branch level of operating com-
mand. In the DD/P the growth of the program is now forcing the evolution
of a more formal placement system.
f. In the case of the JOT class completing formal training
in June 1960) the DD/P has directed for the first time that Panel C of
its Career Service coordinate the assignment process. Panel C has can-
vassed the operating divisions to obtain JOT requirements including firm
commitments to provide suitable on-the-job training and to make slots
available for permanent assignment at the end of the training period.
The JOTP then nominates students against the Division quotas .on a two-
category basis. There will be some JOT's who by virtue of language,
special talent and preference- are peculiarly suited to a particular
area. There will be others not thus qualified who may be nominated to
several areas. Following nomination there will be interviewing of
candidates with the operating ,office exercising essentially complete
freedom to acceipt or reject each individual on his_or her merits. Final
transfer of the JOT from JOT?' to DD/P control is subject to ratification
by Panel C.
g. The pattern of JOT characteristics andbackgrounds as
developed over the first nine years is of interest. About 40 per cent
have fallen within the age bracket 20-244 50 per cent in the range
25-29, and under 10 per cent 30 years of age and over. The average age
at EOD has been 26. Approximately one-third of the trainees possess one
or more graduate degrees. About one-fifth have had significant formal
training in language and area. Four-fifths have lived or travelled
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overseas for extended periods of time. Half of the male JOT's are
married. Five Ivy League schools supplied 106 of the 508 JOT's recruited
over the period 1951-1958. .Eleven schools out of 148 producing JOT
appointments accounted for 40 ppr cent of the enrollment over the first
eight years. During 1958-1959 22 per cent of the recruits came from
the Far West and South, 15 per cent from New England and 65 per cent from
the Midwest and Middle Atlantic States.
h. As noted-earlier, CIA has recently moved to recruit and
c,
train a substantially increased portion of its professional officer types
through the JOT system. The revised JOT training quotas as approved by
the DCI on 27 February 1960 compare with previous rates as follows:
Annual current number JOTP graduates Graduates authorized
(Average for FY 58/59) 1960 forward
DD/P 55 go
Dp/s 3 8
DD/I 6 25
Total 64 123
The JOTP is authorized henceforth to recruit 142 JOT candidates annually,
the excess over 123 representing allowance for attrition during training.
i. The new rate of 90 JOT graduates for the DD/P is expected
to be reached in 1963. This number will suffice to cover projected annual
DD/P losses that must be made good by outside recruitment. In addition
to this source, however, there will be staff additions at the GS-9 level
and above by promotion, transfers into the DD/P from other parts of the
Agency, and separate recruitment for TSD,? amounting in all to 60 per irear.
The projected comprehensive DD/P requirement thus amounts to 150 profes-
sional officers GS-9 and above per year. The JOT rate of eight for the
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25X9
DD/S is expected to cover frbm 15 - 25 per cent of the annual requirement
for professionals in that Directorate. .The DD/I rate ofr-lwill provide
from 25 - 4o per cent of its professional needs.
25X9
j. The expanded program spells a substantial increase in
workload for the JOT system. -Somer77--lcandidates.have been interviewel5x9
.annually in recent years to produce' referrals to headquarters. About
half of these have led to. initiation of clearance, further assessment and
25X9
the end result oil 1EOD's for junior officer training. It is
.estimated that the new quotas will require in chain sequence
interviews, field referrals, and clearance.actions to net
fiel5x9
trainees. The number of professional recruiters has already been Increased
to nine to meet the added burden of requirements. A plan also is under25X9
consideration to expand the consultant program to cover more universities
and to stimulate a greater response to recruitment need
k. The outlook in .JOT recruiting for 1960 is thought to be
25X9
generally satisfactory, particularly so in the case of candidates offering
graduate degrees. This attests to the apparent competitiveness of the
Agency position. in the market, The G$-7 is now the standard entrance grade
and the G$-9 is generally granted at grduation from the JOTP two years
later. There is considerable concern, however, over the fact that 48 '
accepted candidates rejected the Agency's offer in 1959 due to better
opportunities elsewhere, doubts about the program or change in personal
circumstances. While this loss may simply indicate the price of doing
business in a quality market, it obviously bears watching to ensure that
the Agency makes a strong appeal to talented Individuals andthat it remains
competitive salary-wise in the market.
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1. The JOTP has achieved solid acceptance in the Agency by
locating students of high character and demonstrated academic performance,
then instructing and motivating them in the objectives and methods of
intelligence to the point where they readily adapt to and become produc-
tive in operating assignments. Once separated from the JOTP, the
stiffest test of all is the willingness and ability of the JOT to fend
for himself.
3. Future of the JOT Program
a. Recruitment
(1) Numerous policy questions arise in this area of
administration of the JOT system. Many of these stand out in a comparison
of the JOTP with the Foreign Service Officer recruitment program in the
Department of State. By contrast, the JOTP administration has enjoyed
singular freedom of action while the Department has been subject to
constant public and congressional examination particularly as an out-
growth of the work of the Wriston Committee. New rules and structure
may be imposed on the JOTP to achieve specific benefits but at consider-
able risk of hampering the positive leadership the program has enjoyed
thus far. The Department
policies and experience should, however, be
followed closely with the intention of adopting and profiting from
measures of proven benefit.
(2) JOT recruitment does not assuredly reach all
American citizens who may possess suitable qualifications for careers in
CIA. The absence of a publicly advertised, competitive entrance test,
and the use of professional officers on recruitment tours (as now
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practiced in the case of ORR) would remove any doubt that the Agency does
not adequately protect the inherent privilege of citizens to learn of and
to.apply for employment with it.
(3) There is no requirement that the JOTP balance its
appointments by State or region of origin and schooling. While the present
patterns of recruitment do not appear to be seriously out of balance in
this respect there are aspects of the Agency's policy here which will
bear observation. The first is the possible political implication at
some time in the future of disproportionately low representation of
officers from the South and to a lesser extent from the Far West. The
second concerns heavy recruitment of students from Ivy League schools
and the possible influences on loyalty to associates and judgment of
individual performance which this circumstance may be alleged to generate.
(4) The JOTP administration may be assuming excessive
responsibility in the screening and selection of junior officer candidates.
This same issue is noted below in connection with the final assessment
and assignment of JOT's to active duty. As the JOTP assumes increasing
responsibility for determining the types of individuals who are to man
the Agency it seems obvious that the current operating experience of
senior professional officers should be brought to bear in ma4ing the
decision. There are today fairly numerous consumer comments that present
JOTP selections tend to overemphasize intellectual qualities and to
underemphasize rugged and adventurous traits. A policy of panel examina-
tion of top candidates with professional line officers included on the
panels would insure JOTP sensitivity to Agency needs at this point.
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(5) There is a second possible source of independent
judgment of applicant qualifications in the use of outstanding public
citizens in the panel selection process. These individuals may have
the handicap of limited acquaintance with intelligence but they may also
contribute useful insight based on long experience in government,
corporation or university administration.
b. Agency Sponsorship of JOT Military Duty
From its inception, the JOTP has sponsored military
duty for candidates who have not fulfilled this requirement and whose
services would probably be lost to the Agency unless employment were
arranged prior to military service. A noteworthy feature of the
program has been the arrangement with the Services to detail the JOT
officer back to the Agency for the last 12 - 24 months of his active
duty status. During the first eight years there were 141 cases of
military sponsorship of which 83 or 59 per cent remained on duty at
the end of the period. The program has been expensive to the Agency
in loss of time from intelligence training and in the high attrition
suffered. The JOTP has been able to recruit the majority of its
students with military training already accomplished. A recently
introduced factor in the situation is the decision to give selected
JOT's additional formal training in paramilitary subjects. A correla-
tion of the two blocks of training may prove possible and of benefit
to the Agency.
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c. Intelligence Training for Specialists
The JOTP has been oriented from its beginning toward the
development of generalists. It has sought to recruit and train junior officers
of fairly diverse background to perform basic intelligence assignments anywhere
in the world. The JOT generalist has proved himself well suited to the profes-
sional work of the DD/P and to many of the basic duties of the Offices of
Current Intelligence and Operations in the DD/I. With limited exceptions,
the Program has not undertaken systematic recruitment and training in intel-
ligence for specialists -- lawyers, accountants, economists and scientists --
required by the DD/S, the research offices of the DD/I and the Technical Serv-
ices Division of the DD/P. This situation poses two questions which the Agency
has yet to answer: Will the specialist profit from formal training in intel-
ligence? Should the Agency pursue a policy of developing all of its profes-
sional officers and in particular its future leadership according to a common
basic training and development pattern? The arguments on both sides of these
questions are diverse. There is reluctance in the support and research areas
to afford the training time involved in the case of specialists. There is a
widespread opinion that the principal career opportunities lie with the DD/P
and that JOT's will not voluntarily elect service with the DD/S or DD/I. On
the other hand, the small number of JOT's who have been assigned to spe-
cialist duties in the Agency have served with distinction and, finally,
the current plan to introduce more JOT's into the DD/I and DNS seems
certain to bring these questions into sharper focus in the near future.
It seems safe to say that the possibilities of a single, integrated plan
for recruitment and development of all professional officers is the course
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for the future. (The problem of training specialists for the intelligence
profession is appraised more fully in the following section of this report
entitled "Training the Specialist Professional Officer".)
d. Placement of JOT!0,
(1) The JOTP exercises substantial freedom in the assess-
ment and allocation of JOT's to specialized training and in their placement
in operating offices for on-the-job training. Part of the explanation
lies with the Agency, part with the JOT's themselves.
(2) Few if any Agency components have successfully
projected manpower requirements several years into the future, either ?in
terms of numbers or special qualifications. Any projected division
requirement for a given number of officers with specific language, area,
or other competence may have doubled or evaporated three years hence
depending on a host of possible developments. In consequence, operating
offices have been forced to limit their specifications to the general
qualifications of character, educational performance, linguistic aptitude
and personality. The JOTP has employed educational and psychological
screening as aids to JOT selection but in the last analysis has relied
on its collective judgment based on long experience.
(3) The Program has also shown considerable tolerance
toward the preferences of the individual JOT, both at time of selection
for specialized, e.g., case officer, training and later in the selection
of a job assignment. Some men with excellent qualifications for the DD/I
and DD/S can regularly be expected to find the DD/P more attractive. Thus
it is not certain at this stage that the new DD/I and DD/S quotas can be
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filled. There is an understandable gravitational pull to the DD/P career)
but in addition there is a subtle instructor and student climate that
rates selection to the DD/P as success and allocation to the other Direc-
torates as "second rank" performance. In some instances this climate is
generated even in the recruitment stage. The JOTP, OTR and the Office of
Personnel must combat these prejudices with vigor if they are to cater
successfully to the basic needs of the DD/I and DD/S.
(4) The JOTP and the Directorates are overly isolated
from each other and communication on junior officer training policies at
the intermediate command levels is clearly deficient. One answer, as with
recruitment, is to rotate line officers to serve on JOTP panels that make '
basic decisions so that their advice on placement policy will be assured.
The JOTP will acquire a convincing base for its judgments and the line
officials will return to their regular duties with increased awareness of
training and personnel development policies.
e. Attrition among JOT's
(1) It was noted earlier that the JOT is expected to
stand on his own two feet following graduation from JOTP sponsorship.
How well he is succeeding in doing so is a matter of obvious concern to
trainers for the light it may shed on the effectiveness of selection,
instruction and motivation. The subject is of increasing interest in
the Agency; however, there is as yet no systematic program for review of
JOT careers and identification of adjustment problems before they mature
to the point of resignation. Both the Office of Personnel and the
Inspector General Staff conduct resignation interviews, and the Directors
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of Personnel and OTR and the JOTP see many JOT's and ex-JOT's informally
on career matters.
(2) There has been severe attrition amounting to a
total of some 20 per cent per year among JOT's in training. Of these,
the JOT's under military sponsorship have contributed a loss rate of
40 per cent :women 17 per cent and civilian men 14 per cent. Approximately
one-half have departed to pursue other careers of greater interest to
them while the remainder have left for reasons associated with CIA
employment. There is no evidence at hand that would indicate that the
Agency's experience is unfavorable when compared to that of other large
organizations. In view, however, of basic handicaps facing careers in
intelligence including security restrictions, ethical issues and the
relatively low ceiling on earning power, it is essential that the Agencyl
regularly measure its officer development experience against that of
comparable organizations.
(3) The attrition record for JOT graduates is even
more difficult to evaluate. The evidence for the classes of 1951 through
1955 should be of interest since these individuals are by now well
advanced in status as case officers with five to seven years of experience
on-the-job. The significance of the record is qualified, however, by the
rapid evolution of recruitment and instruction policy during this initial
phase of the program and by the fact that these classes were launched in
the setting of the Korean War, the rapid early expansion of the Agency's
manpower, and in an era of business prosperity with varied employment
opportunity. Of the 243 individuals enrolled over the five years,
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1951-1955, there were 118 remaining on duty at the start of 1960. Of the
, 125 losses, approximately half occurred from duty stations following
grdduation from the JOTP. Thirty-five of the student3losses were cases
of failure to return from military duty.
25X9
(4) At the present time JOT graduates account for
approximately six per cent of the
professionals, G8-9 and above,
in the DD/P. The patterns of JOT career adjustment may be expected to
change considerably as this proportion increases and as JOT careerists
begin to compete for senior grade jobs. In the DD/P there are a number
of questions here which will require forthright, coordinated answers if
JOT graduates are not to walk the halls trying haphazardly to achieve
personal solutions.
(5) There is no consensus thus far on what training
and experience should constitute the case officer apprenticeship. In the
absence of a pattern, the individual faces many difficulties in planning
his future and gauging his progress, while his supervisor in the absence
of a doctrine tends to let immediate operational priorities override
the longer range career considerations involved.
(6) There are no standards setting forth minimum train-
I
ing and language competence which the apprentice must possess as prereq-
uisites to the given overseas assignment. There is a proliferation of
advanced operations courses but no policy as to which are essential to
initial overseas assignment and which may wait for a subsequent tour of
duty at headquarters.
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(7) There is no pattern in the scheduling of overseas
duty. The prospect of overseas assignment is a significant factor in JOT
recruitment and therefore a possible source of frustration when the junior
officer finds his initial headquarters tour stretching into the third and
occasionally the fourth year. The present prospect is that this issue
will grow in importance as the four-year or longer tour of duty becomes
standard Agency practice. It is conceivable that the DD/P will have to
establish a ceiling on the number of months of headquarters duty the
l'unior Officer shall serve prior to assignment overseas.
(8) Another approach to the concept of apprenticeship
is to schedule some of it overseas including formal training in language
and area. This has the appeal of realism and the drawbacks of greater
expense and difficulty in finding supervisors who are qualified and
motivated to work with junior officers and who can find the time under
operating pressures to provide effective guidance. The prospect of a
large influx of JOT's into the DD/P annually only two years hence makes
it appear desirable to experiment now with this approach.
(9) Problems in the management of JOT's with 10 or 15
years of experience as case officers lie some distance in the future.
With respect to the question of formal or refresher training for such
officers, the present experimentation of the Department of State with
mid-career and senior officer training is of interest. Many officers
at this stage will be moving into chief of base and deputy chief of
station assignments for which as yet there is no formal preparation.
The question of diversification of experience through rotation is one
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which faces the senior JOT graduates, and non-JOT's, at the present time
There is insufficient evidence for generalization but in some cases the /
experience here has been discouraging. Some former JOT's now operate on
the conviction that diversification is a matter ,of personal initiative,
and accomplished by knowing the right person and being in the right place-
at the right time. Well qualified officers have located suitable
vacancies only to find that the concern of the employing Branch for its
own, perhaps less well qualified individuals, has precluded appointment.
The net result then is frustration and possible resignation for the
individual and haphazard administration, of the broad personnel objectives
of the Directorate. The power of decision here lies with the Branch
Chief. The Panel system of Career management as now constituted doesn't1
really get at the problems involved. In some manner, particularly in
the case of highly qualified and expensively trained JOT's, it will be
essential that the DD/P, and in time the DD/I and DD/S, provide for a
more orderly personnel administration. The career officer must know what
to expect and how to plan the broad outlines of his career. The Depart-
ment of State is also experimenting with this problem as a result of
severe criticism by the Wriston Committee of its previous informal
practices. Recent State innovations include the development of training
and experience standards for all Foreign Service positions, the establish-
ment of an inventory system on punched cards to record individual training
status and to derive annual training requirements, the imposition of
sanctions to enforce training policy including a requirement that language
competence be a prerequisite to advancement, and, finally, the, creation
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of a Career Development and Counselling Staff of experienced Foreign
Service Officers to advise on personnel policy and monitorthe career
planning of individual officers. These measures are not yet proved
instruments of a forward looking personnel management policy, nor are
they necessarily suited to the needs of CIA. They do merit close
observation and they are suggestive of the directions in which the
Agency may need to move if it experiences severe attrition among its
most highly qualified and carefully trained personnel.
It is recommended that:
(a) The DCI establish as Agency policy that all junior '
professional officers enter Agency employ through the JOTP
(b) The DTR establish a JOT Selection Panel composed of
line officer representation from the three Deputy Directorates
tpgether with appropriate representation from the Office of
Personnel and Training. The Chief, JOTP, should chair the panel.
(c) The DTR should give consideration to the feasibility of
the use of outstanding public citizens in the panel selection
process recommended above.
(d) The DTR arrange for the participation on a rotational
basis of line officer representation from the three Deputy
Directorates in JOTP placement panels.
(e) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel take
steps to eliminate prejudices that have arisen which tend to
assign second class status to DD/S and DD/I careers.
(f) The DD/P establish minimum standards of training and
experience for case officer apprenticeship including general
preparatory, batic skills, language and advanced operational
training, and that he determine the feasibility by experiment
of some form of overseas fmniliarization as a part of the
apprentice period.
(g) The DTR together with the Director of Personnel undertake
to monitor the present efforts of the Department of State to
improve personnel management and training in the Foreign Service
for measures that may be adopted for the Agency's benefit.
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4. Training the Specialist Professional Officer
a. The following discussion of training policy and programs in ORR
IS intended to highlight the problems of the specialist professional officer
in CIA. Although not necessarily typical of all specialists, it contains the
basic elements applicable to those who prepare for a chosen vocation prior to
embarking on an intelligence career. ORR was selected because it has devoted
much time and careful consideration to the possible roles of training in the
development of economists for intelligence. The conclusions that have evolved
out of its experience to date are so basic and so clear that they merit citing
in detail. They are contained in a paper prepared in 1958 on the subject of
"Training for Economic Intelligente Production" and may be summarized as follows:
(1) A founiation in the conceptual framework of economics;
(2) Ability to work in primary sources through command of
the necessary languages;
Study of the geography, economies, histories and cultures,
as well as the government and politics of target countries;
(3)
(4) Appreciation of the impact of new weapon systems on
military strategy, national security and the industrial
economies of countries concerned;
(5) Familiarity with industrial and technical problems and
developments;
(6) Indoctrination in the machinery and procedures of intelligence.
b. The fourth and sixth areas clearly fall within the responsibility
of the intelligence community to provide although it should be noted that the
requirement is for orientation, not professional competence, in the fields of
technology or strategy concerned. The balance of the specifications relate
to the normal present-day academic preparation of 'economists. Their under-
lying purpose is indoctrination in research methodology. All of which makes
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it clear that ORR will normally expect to recruit its professionals ready
trained from the open market. In fact, it is doubtful that an intelligence
organization could justify or succeed if it undertook to provide such pro-
fessional preparation internally in competition with sCademic institutions.
c. The normal career considerations of professional economists
continue to exert a major influence on MR training policy once an economist
is recruited and entered on duty in the office. The sabbatical at the end
of ten or more years of professional service is mentioned with increasing
frequency as the most natural and desirable block of training at mid-career.
It is a consideration for the future in ORE only because of the youth of the
Office and of its professional personnel.
d. Professional stature through full-fledged participation in
professional associations is another element of almost equal importance.
ORR was required on security grounds to bar its professionals from such
participation during the first years of its existence. Beginning in 1959,
however, the Office turned to outside economist consultants to evaluate
periodically the quality of its performance. TWO of their recommendations
since adopted have called for responsible participation by ORE economiSts
in their professional associations, and for distribution of selected sanitized
ORE studies to a roster of some 150 economists and businessmen throughout the
country. The implication is that ORB economists have been in danger of becoming
Inbred as intelligence researchers. A further motivation for the change is
the hope that overt demonstration of qualitywill ease the ORB recrui Luient
problem which is discussed below in another context.
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e. Thus the profile of the present-day professional economist in
intelligence reflects the strong gravitational pull of the academic world.
Training requirements that would mean substantial and continuing instructional
load for OTR have been at a minimum. Internal training for the economist in
intelligence has tended to be peripheral to his specialty or focussed on
deficiencies in performance. The freer contacts now in prospect between ORB
and the outside world indeed are likely to reinforce present patterns and to
accelerate the adaptation of academic career patterns to ORB needs.
f. This ORB pattern which appears eminently sensible from the per-
spective of the economist must also, however, be examined from the point of
view of the intelligence administrator. The painful fact in the present
period is that economists are in exceeding short supply in the market.
Therefore the natural policy of recruitment of prepared professionals does
not work. ORB is forced to resort to emergency recruitment measures including
employment of partially trained economists. A number of conflicts then arise
over the manner in which such individuals may best be prepared for and inte-
grated into the profession of economist in intelligence. 0
g. Some five years ago ORB began experiencing personnel shortages
which it then undertook to make good by regularly sending professional
economists to canvass the universities jointly with the Agency4s recruiters.
The results to date have been generally disappointing with an average of three
to five recruitments for every 100 interviews of selected potential candidates.
These recruitment teams have been at a disadvantage in the salary competition
among other things and through time have sought and secured certain compensa-
tions such as authority to reimburse for EOD travel expenses when the candidate
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possesses an M. A. degree. This authority has not thus far been extended to
the other recruitment programs of the Agency including, in particular, the
JOTP, which suggests a teed for greater uniformity of practice as noted in
the discussion of that program.
h. In light of these disappointing results ORR late in 1959 developed
aAunior economist training program which as now contemplated proposes to
recruit students in their senior year of college, bring them into the Agency
upon graduation for a year oforientation arid assessment; then send the most
promising to graduate schools for advanced training (the Masters Degree) at
Agency expense. This approach has now been' authorized but is not yet
underway.
i. The relationship between this program and the Agency's JOT program
at the present time is ambiguous to say the least. The recently approved
plans for expansion of the JOT program call for the delivery of 25 graduates
per year to the DD/I. Obviously some will go to ORR. Many of these men And
women will have had graduate training, some of it in the social sciences.
The training of the DD/I JOTgs will be characterized by increased emphasis
on intelligence research methodology and reduced emphasis on clandestine
operations.
j. The prospect of all of this, however, is that ORR will now be
recruiting three different patterns of professionals no two of which will have
a common preparation in intelligence. The JOT will be exceptionally well
grounded in intelligence and perhaps, though not necessarily, less well
prepared in economics and research methodology. The ORR juniOr economist
will apparently have no grounding other than apprenticeship experience in
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intelligence research and will not even achieve productive professional
status, as an economist until some time in the third year or later. Finally,
it is to be expected that ORR will succeed in recruiting some professionally'
trained economists but these will receive little beyond orientation to-compare
with the JOTis advanced preparation in intelligence.
k. For further evidence of the -desirability of exposing economists'
to JOT training, the records of JOT trained personnel now on duty in ORB were
examined. The evidence supplied for all eleven individuals involved showed
impressively favorable results. A number of these Jars had had full opera-
tions training and even some experience in DD/P assignments. It is conceivable
that some of their effectiveness in their ORB roles resulted from their fuller
appreciation of collection methodology and programs.
1. Also to be noted in passing is the conflict between JOT and ORB
demands on the recruitment system. ORB makes heavy use of the Agencyls pro-
fessional recruiters each fall at the time they are needed and will be needed
increasingly to support the expanded JOT requirement. There is even some
indication of competition between the two requirements for the same individual.
m. The recent Inspector Generals Survey of the CIA Career Service
proposed for career management purposes to classify the economist as a
specialist outside the profession of intelligence. His calling is not
peculiar to the Agency and he has the option of pursuing it elsewhere in
the government or in private life whenever he chooses to do so. The reaction
of ORB economists and other DD/I specialists to this proposition was emphatic
disagreement and the counterclaim that they be classified in the first place
as professional intelligence officers, secondly as economists.
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n. Thus the issue for the DD/I is whether to develop the specialisti
intelligence officer with or without training in intelligence/ The paper
on "Training for Economic Intelligence Production" referred to earlier pre-
scribed only the basic orientation course (now three weeks in length) as
formal Introduction to intelligence. Nathing'more. Apparently ORR expects
to rely almost exclusively on experience without the benefit of training
to broaden the outlook and. acquaint the ORR Career economist with the many
aspects of the total intelligence business that add up to the profession of
intelligence.
o. There is an alternativeto this approach and it lies in providing
some training in 'common for 'all intelligence officers regardless of their
specializations. This objective underlies the JOT program and has done so
from its start although here again separatist tendencies In the component
offices of the Agency have led tO excessive JOTP concentration on DD/P
officer requirements.
p. An obvious additional means to the present endis a policy of
rotation of officers between compatible assignments in the research and
collection arms of the Agency. .The DD/I offices have always been receptive
to such action, the DD/P generally opposed on grounds of security, staffing
difficulties and the lack of inducements that would bring DD/P careerists
for tours of duty in the DD/I. NO one has argued that the DD/I officer must
'rotate to the role of Case officer and manage agents. On the other hand, the
preparation of many-DD/I professionals for tours of duty as reports officers
in the DD/P is obviously excellent and well above the level of preparation
of many present-day reports officers. There is little question but that the
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area competence of the DD/I professional would profit enormously from this
intensely practical intelligence experience. Out of the arrangement would
also come opportunity for on-the-spot interpretation of DD/I requirements I
1 in the field. The DD/P reports officer serving in the DD/I could be expected
to benefit in turn from increased awareness of the uses to which his reports
are put and of their present-day limitations in the eyes of consumers.
q. There is no intent here to advise reduction in the amount of
kinds of present-day ORB training for economists. Nor at this stage will
agreement come 'easily on the content of training in intelligence for ORR and.
other DD/Ispecialists. The DD/I must work very Closely with the Office of
Training in the future to insure that such training, particularly that pro-
vided DD/I JOTts, is of professional quality, realistic, and accomplishing
results equivalent to the successes achieved by the JOT program in the DD/P
to date.
r. The role of the economist in intelligence is likely to change
with any increase in emphasis on his training in intelligence. It may be
preferable over time to staff ORB with a small corps of professional economists
at the Ph. D. level by lateral recruitment or contract and to support this
group with a much larger staff of professional officers well trained in
economics and in the doctrine and methodology of intelligence. The latter
would constitute a professional economist-intelligence officer corps with
preparation and versatility that would enable them to serve effectively both
in collection and analytical roles. If the economist is not to have pro-
fessional training in intelligence, and if the Agency cannot find a way to
recruit and hold him for career purposes, then the DD/I may be well advised
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to contract for his economic analysis with an outside organization in the
sense of the
s. Due to the youth of the Organization perbaps more than for any
other reason there is yet to evolve a consensus on what?constitutes the
professional intelligence officer both generalist and specialist. In its
absence agreement is difficult to reach on. how he is to be recruited and
trained. Lack of agreement: produces the paradoxes that are now apparent in
the recruitment and training programs discussed above.
It is recommended that:
(1) The DD/I direct that the recruitment and initial training
of junior analysts be accomplished through the JOTP; that increased
emphasis be 'placed by the Agency's recruitment facility on the
recruitment of JOT's with academic backgrounds suited to DD/I needs;
that ORB and other specialists recruitment be phased down 'as prO-
duction of JOT's increases and generally limited to senior analysts
at the Ph. D. level.
(2) The DD/I and the DD/P initiate a test prorai for the
rotation of qualified DD/I professionals to the DD/P to serve as
reports officers with part of the tour to be spent. overseas; DD/P
reports officers in turn to rotate to the DD/I for training and I
experience in the evaluation and use of intelligence reporting.*
(3) Advanced external training for analysts be phased some-
what later in the career pattern, perhaps after the fifth year of
duty; to permit maximum play of JOTP and other intelligence prep-
aration-during the apprenticeship period.
--------
*Note: A similar recommendation was made in the Inspector General's survey:
of the Far East Division; DD/P, dated June 1958. The lack of recognizable
progress in this important effort impels us to repeat the recommendation
here.
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IV. OTHER AGENCY TRAINING
A. Non-OTR Training
1. Formal courses of instruction are conducted within several
of the Agency's major components to train employees in their own special
fields. The OTR provides technical guidance and assistance in setting
up the courses, furnishes training materials, testing and other services,
monitors the instruction and maintains Training records.
2. Such training is conducted in each of the major components
of the DD/S area. The extensive facilities of the Office of Communications
are discussed in a later section of this Survey. The Office df 'Personnel
runs a two-week Personnel Officers course primarily intended for 'those officers
serving in other components of the Agency both in headquarters and overseas.
There also has been established a program of semiannual conferences for
senior Personnel officers.
3. Internal training in the Office of Logistics assumes greater
proportions. Many officers in the professional categories, such as
engineers, lawyers and specialists, bring their qualifications with them
when they enter Agency employment and generally must go outside the
Agency when additional training is required. The internal program has
been designed for the majority of rank and file logistics careerists who
must learn how to handle the Agency's complex logistics requirements.
The principal training effort is the Logistics Support Course which runs
for six weeks and is given at least twice annually. In this course the
trainee who is preparing for field assignment receives instruction in
procurement, supply, warehousing, real estate, transportation and other
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specialties. Other formal courses of lesser duration include a general
logistics orientation, a procurement seminar for higher level officers
and other subjects of concern to logistics officers.
4. Training in logistical support for non-Logistics careerists
has been primarily tutorial in nature up to the present time but more
formal arrangements are evolving. The development of an indoctrination
course on Logistics procedures for DD/P field personnel is being
encouraged by increasing requirements for such instruction. Efforts are
being made to introduce a suitable course in 1961.
5. The Comptroller's Office conducts formal courses in Principles
of Budget, Cost Principles, Budget Formulation and the specialized tech-
niques of internal budgetary systems. Although primarily designed for
budget and finance careerists these courses are open to administrative
and operations officers as well and such attendance is encouraged.
6. The Office of Security also has a rather extensive formal,
training program which includes basic instruction for special agents,
training security officers to support clandestine operations, indoctrina-
tion in audio countermeasures techniques and
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7. Within the DD/I area the Office of Operations with its
diversified activities accounts for the major part of internal training.
Contact Division conducts a combination of basic and refresher training
covering information gathering techniques both in general and in specific
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STATSPEC
substantive fields. Headquarters and regional conferences are held at
regular intervals to keep field representatives in touch with current
activities I I runs formal courses on propaganda analysis and report-'
ing and FDA conducts foreign language reading courses designed for its
awn careerists but open to others as well.
8. The Office of Central Reference has developed a formal
course Of instruction in the CIA Library Indexing System for the training
of Agency documents analysts and reference librarians and personnel of
the military services who are concerned with the Intelligence Subject
Code. It also conducts field trips for industrial analysts to familiarize
them with equipment, techniques and products of various US industries.
9. The Office of Research and Reports gives instruction in
economic statistics and reports writing and is in process. of launching
a "baccalaureate" program which is discussed in detail in another section
of this report. Photo Intelligence Center runs a short course in photo
interpretation and is considering an external contra-at for training in
photogrammetry for its staff officers. OSI is in procesS of evaluating
its internal training needs and probably will establish a formal training
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program soon.
10. In the Clandestine Service the two major training activities,
Technical School and I I have already bepn described. . Other training
is now limited to Records Integration Division courses in records keeping
and mechanization.
11. The cost of non-OTR training cannot be determined. Except
for Communications, Technical School and
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are not budgeted and costs are not recorded. Instruction is provided by
regular staff officers, space is found wherever available, and adminis-
trative overhead is absorbed in the regular cost of doing business.
12. The need for this type of specialized training is unchal-
lenged. Objectives are clearly defined and standards are uniformly high.
It is directed at the people who need it and since it is under local con-
trol it is taken as required. It comes closest to having the chief
qualities of the ideal training situation in which needs, requirements,
standards, methods of instruction, course content, level and duration,
and attendance are all given direction by a single authority.
13. While the evaluation of non-OTR training is generally
favorable there is emerging a problem which requires careful attention.
It is evident that there is a growing tendency to extend some of these
individual courses from the essentially specialized training of a well
defined limited group of employees into the larger area of general train-
ing by inviting attendance by non-careerists whose assignments are only
remotely related to the specific subject being taught. This trend if
unchecked will lead to an undesirable dispersion of training,responsibility
and authority and an uneconomical duplication of training functions. The
Inspector General supports the concept of centralization of training
wherever the factors of economy, efficiency and effectiveness prevail.
When a 14mited purpose training program is enlarged to serve a general
need it should be tested against certain criteria to determine whether the
responsibility should remain with the component or be assumed by OTR.
Such criteria may be expressed as follows:
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Is there a demonstrated need for training employees other than
members of the sponsoring career service?
Are additional training facilities required beyond those
possessed by the component conducting the program?
Is the course content or doctrine- derived from or substantially,
augmented by another career service?
Does the program require additional manpower either for
Instruction or support?
14. Existing regulations are not explicit on this point. The
DTR!s responsibility to develop and direct training programs within OTR
is clear but for non-OTR training it is blurred by references to review,
approval and advice to Deputy Directors. In the opinion of the Inspector
General it should be the clear responsibility of the DTR to determine'.
under whose auspices such training programs should be conducted.
It is recommended that:
a. The DTR be specifically charged with the responsibility of '
determining under whose auspices non-OTR training will be conducted
and,
b. Pertinent Agency regulations be amended accordingly.
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B. External Training
1. Authority for "Training at Non-CIA Facilities Under the
Government Employees Training Act" is contained in Agency Regulation
revised 23 June 1960. :The regulation specifies that Operating
Officials shall originate requests for external training, that heads of
career services shall review and endorse all requests, and that the Office
of Training shall designate non-CIA facilities with the concurrence of
the Director of Security, approve or disapprove all requests, set
administrative requirements for participation in .external courses and
budget and control funds necessary to meet the cost of such training.
2. Under the above authority, CIA sent 759 of its personnel to
courses, conferences or demonstrations provided by 103 outside.organiza-
tions during 1959. An additional 465 persons were enrolled in corre-
spondence courses or in local classes conducted by International Business
Machine and Radio Corporation of America in the field of data processing
and communications. The cost of the year's program amounted to approxi-
mately $300,0001 including travel and per diem as well as registration
fees.
3. Of the 759 persons attending external training programs, 499
participated in full-time courses, 260 in part-time courses. Approximately
one-half of the enrollments involved absences of one week or less from
regular duties.
4. A breakdown of the non-CIA organizations providing training
shows that 34 per cent consisted of American universities, 34 per cent
were governmental, of which half were civilian, half military, 24 per cent
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were private commercial or professional organizations, six per cent were
tutorial in nature, and the balance, two per cent, were foreign govern-
ments and universities.
5. The following is a resume of the principal external training
programs. External language training was provided to 96 Agency personnel
of whom 39 were enrolled full-time, 57 part-time, in language courses
averaging a semester in duration and often representing installments
towards long-term language training objectives. The general problem of
language training is examined in detail elsewhere in this survey. For
the present it may be noted that the range of languages included here is
by no means limited to the so-called exotic Varieties. The training in
world languages as a rule reflected special operating requirements, or
conflicts in scheduling between the OTR language curriculum and the
individual's assignment and travel plans.
6. A total of 100 individuals attended various weapons and
missile orientation courses sponsored by the Armed Services. This require-
ment has been noted in the section of this survey which deals with the
training of professional officers in the DD/I. Both economists and
scientists have a pervasive need to appreciate the implications of the
new weaponry, something which cannot be adequately accomplished by read-
ing nor obtained from unclassified sources.
7. A third example of external training sharply focussed on a
specific Agency need is correspondence course training in electronics fOr
personnel of the Office of Communications. There were 143 new enrollments
in 1959 and an overall total of 570 OC personnel participating in such
training at the end of June 19600 The program reflects both the rapidly changing
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character of this complex field and the desire to enlarge the career
-0Wortunities of journeymen communicators (G8-7-9) who characteristically
bring high school educations and military training to the Job.
86 The external training for professional personnel in CIA is
extremely diverse in-character. In part it reflects refresher needs, it
part individual deficiencies, but over-all probably reflects an effort to
adapt a basic preparation in a profession to the peculiar interests and
emphases of the Agency. As. discussed in the section of the survey dealing
with DD/I 'professional careers and training requirements, it seems entirely
possible that external training for professionals in the form of sabbatical's
will expandconsiderably as the Agency ages and a substantial portion of
its personnel moves to mid-career status with seniorities of ten and twenty
years of experience.
9. The Agency's external training in skills is intensely practi-,
cal. It reflects such situations as the acquisition of complex equipment
and the necessity of training personnel to operate and maintain it. The
record shows that this training ranged through_ courses in diesel motors,
heliarc welding, photolithography, packaging and carloading? and fire
inspection. . The second principal cluster of skills courses concerned
business subjects such as patents, contracts, accounting, budgeting and
fiscal procedure, executive and management training, and cost reduction
in office personnel management.
10. Present-day policy on external management training appears
to be forward looking in character and to provide for a sampling of the
principal external offerings in order to keep Agency personnel abreast of
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this new and rapidly changing subject. Agency participants are required
to have completed OTR management training as ,a qualification for enroll-
ment.
11. Participation in cdnferences .and :.seminars may be both a
reward for and stimulus to improved performance in Agency assignments.
The relatively small numbers of individuals attending ,any given program
simultaneously would appear to reflect sober management reservations
,about junketing and the preferable alternative of seeing that the trainee,
relays his information to his associates through staff meetings, trip
reports and other suitable devices.
12. It is unlikely that there can ever be complete agreement
about the line to be drawn between external training ,cle?4y addressed
to Agency needs and that which enhances the individual's powers in a
specialty for which he was hired and in which he has a moral obligation
to maintain proficiency on his own initiative. A prime test in justify-
ing both external and internal training policy is the rate of attrition
among individuals in whom the Agency has invested expensive training.
A substantial resignation rate is noted elsewhere in the discussions of
JOT training and the training of economists for ORR. The school of
thought that places principal emphasis on on-the-job training is inclined
to be extremely sceptical about subsidized training in an employee's
chosen professional field. The feeling is that it tends to forgive the
individual his personal Obligation and yields a low return in terms of
job motivation and attrition. This group would place greater emphasis on
the individual's motivation and responsibility by delaying such investment
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until there was reasonable demonstration of career intentions and in the
area of sabbatical training would ask the individual to beara substantial
portion of the cost himself.
13. Better evidence is required on which to. base a judgment of
the present balance and effectiveness of the external training program
As.one step towards tighter admigistration.of the program it is suggested
that the Office of Personnel assemble the training records of resignees
fora, period of twelve months and that appropriate representatives of OTR
.examine this evidence to determine whether there is-a reasonable rate of
return from external training investments and whether modifications are
desirable in the guidelines to approving officials concerning minimum
length of service in the Agency prior to external training; ceiling on
amount and frequency of external training to be invested in the given
staff member; and length of service to which the individual should be
obligated following such training.
It is recommended that:
MR review the training records of employees in professional
categories who resigned from the Agency during FY 1960; or longer
if necessary; to determine if a more definitive policygoverning
external training is.required.
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C. On-TI.ainin.
1. In the total process of acqu r ng
edge necessary to perform
assigned tasks effectively, on-the-job training plays a major role. It goes
on constantly in every place and at every level and it takes many forms.
Advice, guidance and direction given and received by superior and subordinate
alike, experience derived from daily work activity, the interchange of cpinion?
thoughts, ideas and observations, all contribute to the process of learning
while working. In fact it may be said that the formalized training Courses
such as those donducted by OTR merely supplement on-the-job training. i7
2. In this respect the burden of training falls upon the supervisors
in all echelons of the command structure. It is not only the mechanics or
the techniques of the job that the employee must master; but his growth and
development that also is involved. While this responsibility is generally
acknowledged by most supervisors it is not Observed uniformly or consistently
and presents one of the major management problems of the Agency.
3. One of the benefits derived from the adoption in 1956 of the
five per cent training requirement was the stimulus given the on-the-job
program. Wherever such training was organized into a recognizable course with
proper objectives, specified periods of time and qualified direction, it was
accepted as the equivalent of formal OTR courses and credited against the
requirement accordingly. As a result more time and attention was given this
activity by responsible officers and a general improvement in on-the-job
training was achieved. ?Tle OTR was able to better perform its assigned func-
tions of review and approval.
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4. Although the five per cent requirement has been rescinded all
other elements of.responsibility,for on-the-job training remain. The Deputy
Directors and Operating officials are charged by
with ensuring that
their employees are properly trained, including organized on-the-job-training.
The DTR still is responsible for developing effective programs and the general
supervision of the training effort. With respect to on-the-job- training the
responsibility of the DTR is almost impossible to perform satisfactorilL_____J
5. On-the-job training is not fully organized throughout the Agency.
and it is impractical to attempt to impose a formalized program much beyond ,
what has already been done. A number of components have well designed courses
of instruction but these are generally, limited to orientation.or simple skills
related to internal procedures. Here the DTR can provide the usual support
and is able to evaluate the results. The bulk of on-the-job training does
not lend itself to organization.and it would be patently unfair to hold DTR
responsible for any measure of supervision. Furthermore, it is, in our view,
improper to divide the responsibility between the. appropriate commanders and
the head of a supporting service.
6. Deputy Directors are quite properly charged with ensuring that
employees are adequately trained and it is equally proper for them to look
to their senior subordinates to perform this task. For effectiveperformance,
however, the responsibility must not be reassigned below this level. All Agency
components, including the area divisions of the Clandestine Service, have
designated someone as a training officer. In smaller components he may have
other duties to perform; in others he may have assistance. His functions vary
from place to place but in the majority he performs duties of a routine nature.
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His stature also varies but in general it is far too low to enable him to
effectively handle the training responsibilities of the component head.
7. The solution to this problem lies first in the acceptance of
training as a function of command; second, the establishment of the training
responsibility at the highest level of component command at a minimum; third,
the elimination of the split responsibility that now rests obscurely on the
DTR. This can be accomplished within present Agency personnel ceilings al-
though some increase in grade level may be required.
It is recommended that:
a. The DCI authorize the establishment of senior grade positions
for selected Training Officers at the Assistant Director or DD/P
Division Chief level with job qualifications designed to ensure the
effective performance of proper 'training functions.
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b. The DTR initiate an amendment to hich more clearly
describes his responsibility to render on a v ce, guidance and support '
.to the on-the-job training,effort.
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D. Communications Training
1. Introduction
a. The Office of Communications (0C) is responsible for the develop-
ment of staff competence in the fields of radio operation, cryptogtaphy, and
maintenance of communications equipment. To meet these responsibilities it
must train a replacement flow of communicators, retrain and refresh its entire
corps periodically in changing techniques and equipment, and ensure that its
engineers and senior managers achieve a level of competence that fUlly supports
the communications requirements of the Agency. ,
b. Research and development throughout the field or communications
is in an extremely dynamic state in the present period, accordingly there is a
continuing cycle of improvement in equipment, training of personnel in its
operation and maintenance, followed by its phasing into operations. Obso-
lescence status does not necessarily follow for older equipment, however, since
the range of CIA requirements runs the spectrum from nearly automatic, hi
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volume central message systems to a one-man manual operations. The intimate
imperative of the system is to have an individual ready and in place to provide
a communications link with a when normal facil-
ities are interrupted by political crisis.
c. These far-ranging responsibilities have caused OC to evolve
a highly disciplined skills school and an external training program ranging
from correspondence courses open to all ranks of communicators, to training
In residence
the Office.
for senior personnel whose further training will benefit
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2. Training Requirements
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a. A corps of approximately IIII men is required to man the radio,
cryptography and equipment maintenance assignments of OC at headquarters and
overseas. About 1111 Of this number are cryptographers (CTC) fairly evenly
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divided between headquarters and overseas. Another-odd. men are radio
operators (CTR) and here the staffing is predominantly overseas so that about
of the personnel are on foreign duty at all times. The balance
of the corps falls in the GS-9 -11 grade range and is occupied with super-
visory, technical maintenance and instructor duties. Responsibility for the
training of these and of all other personnel in OC is assigned to the Tele-
communications Training and Techniques Staff (0C-JT).
b. The character and volume of training administered by OC-T in
1959 is summarized in the following table:
OC personnel trained in OTR courses
OC personnel trained by non-OTR components
Total non-Communications training
OC personnel in external and part-time training
OC personnel in correspondence training(6/1/60)
Total
Communications training:
Cryptographic non-OC personnel
OC personnel
Total
Operations OC personnel
Technical non-OC personnel
OC personnel
Total
Covert non-OC personnel
OC Orientation non-OC personnel
OC personnel
Total
Grand Total
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3. Training Structure
a. Headquarters training in communidations is an exclusive responsi-
bility of the Office of Communications and is provided at its own facility known
as the training facility
was inaugurated in 1951. Considerations of OBS precedence, security, highly
specialized instructor qualifications and unique equipment dictated the decision
that communications training remain 'with OC rather than fall to the Office of
the control of the OC Engineering Staff. In the event of an emergency OC
11.
training would probably require location elsewhere.
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b. The training corps at Flconsists of instructors ate-CAI
support personnel. These compose four training faculties manned as follows:
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?Cryptographic instruction
Technical instruction
Operations instruction
Special training
instructors
instructors
instructors
instructors
recruited from Signal
Center
recruited from Engineer-
ing Staff
recruited from Operations
Division via OC-T
recruited from Special
Projects Staff
c. The typical CTR (radio operator) recruit is a high school
graduate who has completed military -service including training and experience
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in communications. He enters OC as a G3-6 and is sent immediately to
course in radio operations and cryptography. The basic training
1 Comprehensive Radio Operator Course intermeshed with
live
includes :
cryptographic training And terminating:with a
problem exercise as a final test of proficiency. At the end of this period,
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the graduate is promoted to GS-7 and returned to headquarters preparatory to
assignment overseas.
d. The CTC (cryptographer) receives formal';training
He is given no training in radio or equipment maintenance. At the end
of this period he is assigned to the Signal Center at headquarters in the status
of apprentice where he will receive on-the-job training and experience for
about one year before assignment overseas. The CTC is the less skilled assign-
ment and his pay sCale lags about one grade behind that of the CTR in the
GS-7 -10 pay range.
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e. The OC pattern of assignment provides for initial field
and headquarters. The radio operator will spend most of his time in the field
with fairly brief headquarters visits sandwiched in for training. Eight months
prior to the end of each overseas tour the CTR is given an assessment test to
evaluate his proficiency and identify weaknesses for which ref*esher training
will be prescribed. A passing grade in the assessment test is now a mandatory
requirement for promotion to the journeyman level - GS-8. An average of three
and one-half weeks of refresher training is being given at lat the present
time to returnees. This amount has fallen steadily since inauguration of the
testing system in 1957 and speaks for the discipline and high efficiency of
the program.
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4. ? Evaluation
a. The Office of Communications has not lacked nor failed to
respond to pressure from its customers to increase the capacity and efficiency
of its service. Its work in the research and development of new equipment is
in fact largely responsible for the new program known as
in which the
DD/I and DD/P are collaborating to bring information reports transmission
out of the 19th century and on to a basis that will surpass present-day
cables in speed, accuracy and security.
b. The growth of automation is having an increasingly significant
impact on the personnel and training policies of OC. Pilot training is planned
this year for the blending of the cryptographer and the radio operator into a
new type of communicator to be assigned to the operation of the latest, nearly
automatic equipment. He will not supersede these specialists for many kinds of
jobs but he will be adapted at less cost in training to an increasingly
important area of communications operations.
c. The accomplishments in the field of refresher training are
highly creditable to OC as reflected in the decreasing length of training
required by experienced personnel. It also speaks well of the quality of field
supervision where the principal opportunities lie to encourage self-improvement
by review and enrollment in correspondence courses.
d. The present-day cryptographer and radio operator personnel are
very much cut-off from the rest of the Agency. The OTR courses in intelligence
orientation and operations familiarization are required only of those employees
making the dump to GS-11. The intelligence orientation requirement was eliminated
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ILLEGIB
in the early fifties for OC communicator recruits. In the present very tight
promotion situation most communicators face long periodsoof service at present
grades. An opportunity exists to stiffen the motivation of men in such circum-
stances through continuing awareness of the A.gencyls structure and objectives
and, in particular, by keepin them well informed of new developments in the
technology of communications.
e. Little evidence was developed concerning possible deficiencies
in the content of technical training. There is some protest among the rank
and file about the emphasis on theoretical aspects of electronics in their
training of radio operators but no evidence that it does not yield a valid
return particularly from the more capable students. OC has been conscious
of the problem of instructor efficiency and has obtained assistance from the
educational methods specialist in OTR in Improving its performance. Through
good administration of a homogeneous staff the OC school has been relatively
free of the problem of unpredictable enrollments and course cancellations
which have plagued OTR at headquarters. OC would appear to boast the best
record in the Agency in setting standards of proficiency, then seeing that
.every employee receives the training necessary to meet and maintain these
standards. Our only recommendation is that the communications school remain
unchanged from its present form, status and successful method of operation.
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E. Technical School
1. Introduction
a. Training Clandestine Service personnel in technical tradecraft
skills is a major responsibility of Technical Services Division (TSD), DD/P.
The Technical School, staffed and administered by TSD, has been established
for this purpose.
b. Within the organizational structure of TSD, the Chief of Train-
ing is a member of the Plans and Training Group, the senior staff element of:
the Division. The Chief of Training serves as an advisor to Chief, TSD, in
training matters, as the focal point of contact with /Mr), and as administrator
of the Technical School.
00.00e77r
2. The Technical School /c.)
a. Organization
(1) Technical School is organized as an integrated component
to provide technical training in the Headquarters area. It is physically
located in H&S Building where its facilities consist of four rooms equipped
with technical gear, a general classroom, small conference room, training aids
room, vault and office space for the Chief and Administrative Assistants. _)(
Space is generally, adequate for the present size of classes and methods of
instruction but there is no room for significant expansion without dispossess-
ing other tenants of the building. The training equipment inventory is Valued
at approximately $100,000.
(2) The faculty consists of a Chief Instructor, five senior
and seven assistant instructors. In addition there are two other employees
serving.as Registrar and secretary.
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(3) Eight regularly scheduled courses and one semiannual
seminar-are conducted by Technical .School. ,These cover the range of TDS's
technical operational support functions as follows:
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(4) ,The first three of 'these plus the .
are regarded by Technical .School as basic to the needs of all case of=cers.
The balance are intended to serve selected officers required to acquire more
They are scheduled frequently enough so that there is no significant problem
in dealing with tutorial requirements.
b. Instructors
(1) Most of the instructors are drawn from the Technical
Aids (operational support) area of TSD and with only one exception they
have had overseas experience. Each has a primary skill and already -has
or is in process of developing secondary skills at a level that will enable
him to instruct in any course. This provides an unusual degree of flexi-
-bility in the mayement of instructors wherever they are needed and in the
rescheduling of courses on short notice.
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.(2) :All instructors are required to take the Operations
Familiarization.Cpurse atI land the Instructional Techniques Course
at OTR headquarters in preparation for their assignments. ,This in Addition
to their basic skills qualifications and overseas operational, experience
provides the Technical School with a high level of instructor competence.
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c. :Activities
,(1) ;The total attendance for allTechnical School training
during CZ 1959 was
(2) In addition to the scheduled and tutorial training
functions regularly. performed Chief, TSD Training, and the instructors of
the Technical School are frequently called upon for briefings in various
aspects of technical tradecraft. While no accurate record is maintained
of the manhours devoted to this activity it does assume significant pro-
portions. Instructors also participate in training courses conducted by
OTR and give lectures, briefings and demonstrations in certain military
training programs.
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d. Relationship with OTR
(1) The Chief of Training, TSD, keeps in close touch
with OTR and properly coordinates his activities
by
with the D12.1 as reOred
Technical School courses are reviewed by the OTR Educational
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Specialist and. all instructors are required to take the OTR Instructional
Techniques course. In this way t* gives technical supervision to the TSD
training effort according to his assigned responsibility.
(2) In the training and briefing of contract agents and
representatives of foreign intelligence services Chief of Training coor-
dinates with Chief Covert Training, OTR, or with the.operating division
as appropriate. Technical School instructors are provided to perform their
services either In Covert Training installations or in safe sites controlled
.by TSD.
3. Evaluation
a. Opinions gathered from Clandestine Service supervisory and
operating personnel concerning the effectiveness of Technical School training
were generally very favorable. Course content, quality of instruction, school
facilities and management were acknowledged to be uniformly superior. The
flexibility displayed by Technical School in meeting unusual demands and the
cooperative spirit with.which unscheduled requirements were accepted received
special commendation.
b. There was divided opinion on the degree to which case officers
should be trained in technical skills. Such opinion was influenced by prox-
imity to TSD overseas bases where the services of specialists can be obtained
on short notice. Branch chiefs, for example, whose stations are located in
the more remote areas, preferred to have their case officers trained in greater
depth and to be more self-sufficient in technical tradecraft. In those areas
where TSD technicians are readily available, indoctrination in TSD capabilities
is held to be more appropriate to the needs of the station. Technical School
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has met this problem in a most practical way be designing its courses to
develop an acceptable level of skill in the shortest time possible. It is
basic training intended to enable the case officer to perform effectively
with a minimum of support but not intended to make him an expert in any of
the technical fields.
c. The ultimate test of training is the proficiency demonstrated'
by the trainee in actual operating situations. Technical School has been
largely unsuccessful in obtaining critical comments or appraisals of the
effectiveness of its training either from the field or headquarters. Field
reporting does not include comment on such subjects as the technical competence
or lack thereof of case officers -- and headquarters apparently has not been
concerned with such evaluations. In any event the Chief of Training has had
to be content with a negative response that in the absence of criticism the
efforts of Technical School are found to be satisfactory.
d. A comparison of the present state of technical training
provided by TSD with conditions found in the 1956 IG survey of TSS shows
that substantial improvement has taken place. Training as a major responsi-
bility has been accorded proper status in the organizational structure and
is receiving effective support from Chief, TSD, and his senior staff officers.
The whole effort has been upgraded, facilities improved, and a sound program
developed. Meaningful training standards for TSD personnel are being applied
and phased requirements for minimum training in several fields have been
established. In all TSD training is being handled with notable competence
and effectiveness.
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4. Major Problems
a. Probably the principal problem with which Chief of Training,
!
TSD, must contend is the inadequacy of guidance and direction from the DD/P.
As was found in Operations School and elsewhere, the initiative for the
development of training standards and doctrine has been passed to the trainers
y default. The Chief of Training has found it necessary to establish train2,1
? ing standards for case officers based upon his own personal experiences and
the experiences of others in TSD. He outlined the courses and determined
the content and level applying such limited criteria as the length Of time
he could hope to have students made available for training and their ability
? to absorb technical subjects based on past performances. The course outlines,
were then presented to the DD/P Training Officer for review and approval which
was customarily, granted without question. The DD/P has not stipulated the
basic training required for all operating personnel nor has he established
minimum standards of proficiency in technical skills to be acquired and main-
? tained 'by case officers.
b. A related problem and one which has a direct bearing on opera-
tional support provided by TSD concerns the depth of case officer training in
certain technical subjects. TSD maintains a staff of technicians in head-
quarters and in its overseas bases to furnish direct technical operational
support to Clandestine Service field installations. A good deal of TDY travel
is involved and TSD is plagued with the usual difficulties inherent in this
tyPe of service in trying to meet the demands Of the operators. It appears
logical to assume that requirements for support service could be reduced by
increasing the capability of the case officer to do more for himself.
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.It.is recommended that:
The DD/P study the extent to which it isfeasible to develop a
greater capability in technical tradecraft in operations officers,
establish minimum standards of technical.training.as basic to the
requited preparation of all operations officers and issue policy
accordingly for the guidance of the Technical School, TSD.
f. In_any consideration of the total problem of.. training
employees for 'clandestine operations the question inevitably arises of the
divided jurisdiction between TSD .and OTR. Technical skills are as much a
part of operational tradecraft as are recruiting, elicitation or the handling
of agents and it is logical to assume that all such training 'should be under
centralized control. ,Technical training has been the responsibility of TSD
since its inception and although beset-by inadequacies in its earlier stages
it has now developed into a well organized, effective program. No major
problems attributable to the separation of functions have been found.. .The
transfer of TechnicaL.School_to OTR would not improve the quality of in-
struction and the slight advantage of economy of administration would.b*
offset by management difficulties in obtaining the services of qualified
technicians, a .problem.that has plagued TSD even when the source of such
talent is under its direct control. At some time in the future it may be
desirable to consolidate all operational training under a single program
in OTR but for .the present we recommend no change.
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V. THE FUTURE OF TRAINING IN THE AGENCY
A. Critique of Present Program
1. Summarizing the data presented in the preceding sections of
this report we find in many respects a very encouraging picture of accom-
plishment and, even more encouraging, a determined effort in many places
toward greater achievements in the effective preparation of Agency
employees for intelligence work. Notable progress has been made over
the past few years particularly in the vital area of operational train-
ing for which no comparable effort exists outside the Agency. The
magnitude of training activities is substantial though certainly not
excessive. The results are generally acknowledged to justify the money
and manpower invested by the Agency in this essential program.
2. From a more critical point of view certain significant
weaknesses emerge which tend to blur the picture and retard the develop-
ment of a more effective program. Perhaps the most significant of these
is the lack of acceptance on the part of many command officers of their'
responsibility for the training of their subordinates. Training is a
function of command the responsibility for which cannot be transferred
to supporting or service elements. The OTR and other training units
can-provide centralized facilities, expert services and good administra-
tion but only the command echelons can set standards and levels of skill
and competence and require their subordinates to meet them. In the
Clandestine Service, most particularly, this has not been done. Uniform
standards for operations officers (both headquarters and field) have not
been established nor has officially approved doctrine been prescribed for
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use in training courses. Training still is permissive and is subject
frequently to the whims of individuals and lower echelon supervisors.
Only those officers entering the Clandestine Service through the JOTP,
are sure to have fulfilled the operational training required and that
is accomblished before they come under the administrative- control of
the DD/P.
3. Another significant weakness is the inadequacy of com-
munication between using components and training units. Both OTR and
Technical School, TSD, for example, have made repeated efforts to
obtain evaluations of course content, quality and levels of instruction
and appraisals of effectiveness but with little success. Critical com-
ments solicited by the inspection team were freely given but upon
further exploration it was found that such criticisms were seldom
passed on to the training elements. Reporting from the field on the '
degree of competence displayed by officers of all categories is prac-
tically non-existent.
.4. A third major weakness is the failure to closely relate
training to career planning and management. The absence of long range
career planning was observed in the IG's study of the Agency's Career
Service Program and the knowledge gained in the course of this study
serves to underscore the need for such planning. Without it a sound
training program cannot be developed. Training is costly and the
Agency can afford the investment only if it can be assured of an
adequate return.
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5. Finally, although there is a multitude of individual coursesi
on most subjects required by the intelligence profession, they have not
been molded into an integrated cohesive program that will ensure the
proper preparation of Agency officers as they progress throughout their
careers. The JOT program is a start in this direction but must be carried
to its logical conclusion if it is to become the means of supplying the
able competent officers the Agency so badly needs. The recommendations
made in the preceding sections of this report.especially those pertain-
ing to the JOT program will go far to strengthen the Agency's training
effort.
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B. Fundamental Principles of Training
1. As we have already noted there is no question about the
Director's authority to expend federal funds for the training of Agency
employees in the field of intelligence and we also have found that in
the absence of any alternative it is necessary for such training to be
conducted internally. Before proceeding to outline a training program
projecting into the future certain fundamental principles of training
should be examined.
2. Men learn by experience to which formal training is only
an adjunct. Theoretically it would be possible to take a young man of
average aptitudes and accomplishments and throughca complex series of
exposures to work experiences ultimately produce a seasoned, trained
intelligence officer. By means of a well organized training program
it can be done far better and in much shorter time. It requires,
however, a coordinated effort on the part of command echelons to
develop an integrated program and an adequately staffed and equipped
vehicle for its implementation.
3. Training for the intelligence profession is analogous in
some respects to that of other professions in its requirement for
initial broad general preparation to be followed by advanced training
in specialized fields. The young man who enters West Point, for example,
spends four years acquiring the rudiments of Army military sciencb to
be graduated as a most junior officer into a specific branch of the
service. Similarly physician and lawyer devote a major portion of their
time to the broader aspects of their professions before specialization.
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And so it should be in the intelligence profession. The Agency's
training program should adopt the principle of a comprehensive general
education in all facets of intelligence work for all its professional
employees before specific permanent assignments are made,
.4. Learning is a continuous process whether it be in the
form of knowledge gained through work experience or through formal
training courses. Since learning is a matter of progression and growth
it followsIlogically that the training program should be designed to
accommodate this principle. Training should be phased to meet the
needs of career development with an orderly progression through the
various stages of the individual's service in the Agency.
5. Training also must have clearly defined objectives and
such objectives should be formed in terms of the work for whieh the
individual is being prepared. Standards of training should be related
to the standards of performance the individual is expected to meet.
NO man should be assigned a job he is not prepared to perform and the
zatisfactory attainment of a training objective should be a required
qualification for assignment.
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C. The Apprenticeship
1. General Preparatory Training
a. At this stage in the Agency's development there are two
influencing factors which bear upon the future of training. The present
professional staff has to a large degree taken existing training courses
Applicable to its functions or at least has acquired experience equiva-
lent to such courses, and the JOT Program is evolving into the principal
source of new employees in the professional ranks. .As the proportion of
JOT's rises and the training needs of the preeent staff are satisfied
through existing courses the requirements for basic training for non-
JOT's will vanish. Hence the opportunity is present to modify our present
approach and establish a comprehensive integrated program which will serve
for the years to come.
b, In designing such a program a distinction must be drawn
.between staff employees and all others. The staff employee category
includes the great bulk of professional officers in headquarters and
those- overseas who man the Agency's regular installations. Included in
the "all other" categories would be deep cover staff agents, contract and
career agents and any other employees whose training would have to be con-
ducted by covert or clandestine means. The program we are concerned with
is devoted to the staff employee category.
c. Adhering to the fundamental principles of training the
first step would appear to be the organizing of a comprehensive, general
preparatory training course in intelligence work for all new professional
employees. This course should cover all aspects of the intelligence
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process including collection, production and support. .Although specific
skills training should not be injected at this early stage, the course
should be more than a mere orientation. It should be a thorough indoc-
trination in the intelligence profession and would resemble the current
10-weeks phase of the JOTP. More time should be devoted to support
activities than the two days now allotted in the JOT course and perhaps
the overseas effectiveness course could be deferred to a later stage but
the remaining subject matter should be retained. In addition general
skills applicable to most of the Agency's functions should be inauded
such as observation, elicitation, deduction, interpretation and report-
ing. These would contribute to evaluation as well as training.
d. Completion of the initial phase of general preparatory
training will not qualify the trainee to immediately engage in productive
work. Ideally for a well rounded education in intelligence a succession
of work experiences in the three Deputy Directorates should take place at
this point. .Unfortunately the number of trainees involved wbuld make this
extremely difficult to administer and would impose an intolerable burden
on the management of operating and support components called upon to
provide such on-the-job training. It is possible however to devise a
program of simulated work experience which would incorporate the pertinent
functions of the intelligence process within a reasonable period of time.
e. This fundamental course should lay the foundation for
advanced and specialized training but it should be sufficiently self-
contained to stand by itself as a qualifying factor for a career in CIA.
Completion of this phase should permit a coarse screening, a ''wash out"
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stage, which will identify and eliminate the obviously unfit. When this
stage has been reached a tentative determination may be made of the
vocation the individual should pursue throughout the major portion of
his career. The duration of this elementary phase is difficult to fix
withOut making a detailed analysis of subject matter and course content
which is beyond the purview of this study but the present JOT experience
would indicate that amaximum of six months would provide an adequate
'period of time for a well rounded course.
f. At this point the junior officer has received a thorough,
indoctrination in intelligence work and has been exposed to the workings
of the various subdivisions of the Agency. He should now be ready to
acquire the skills he will use for the major portion of his career. Those
to be assigned to the Clandestine Service will go on to learn the trade-
craft of eapionage; others to learn intelligence research and analysis
and the production of finished intelligence; andtiillubthers to take up
the various functions of support. The duration of advanced training will
vary according to the requirements and standards of the work to be per-
formed but not until the entire training period has been satisfactorily
completed should the trainee be released for permanent assignment. Less
than satisfactory performance in basic training should be cause for
termination automatically.
2. Skills Training
a. For the support services of the DD/S.area skills training
presents no unique problems. As we have noted earlier the major support
components already have good training programs conducted internally and
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augmented by the generous application of external training facilities.
Furthermore many trainees destined for support work will bring with them
certain basic skills already acquired before entering on duty with the
Agency.
b. There is one area in which more can be done. The selec-
tion and training of general support officers, for which there is a growing
demand, should be started at an earlier stage. This is more a matter of
development than formalized training although there is ample room for a
combination of both. The general support officer must have an intimate
knowledge of all support services and also a comprehensive understanding
of the intelligence activities he is to support. He must be a broad guage
individual with a capacity for absorbing the intricacies of the many faceted
support functions and the ability to administer them effectively. He is
a most important cog in the Agency's machinery who sometimes is not
accorded the recognition he deserves. It takes a good deal of time to
produce an able general support officer and there is a need for an
organized program to develop the standards and requirements and provide
the means to reach the objectives.
c. In the DD/I area advanced training problems also are
relatively simple to resolve. The fundamental skills required are in
research) collation, analysis and interpretation, and the preparation of
finished intelligence reports. Certain courses already provided by OTR
serve these purposes although some reservations as to quality and level of
instruction were found among consumers. It was also noted however that
the OTR training effort did not receive a full measure of support from
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the DD/I area particularly in establishi4g standards related to job ,:qqui
\
requirements, the development of doctrine and in providing the services
of qualified instructors. Needless to say full cooperation on both
sides is necessary if effective results are to be obtained.
d. The diversification of functions in the DD/I area
will produce requirements for advanced training beyond those specified
above. The information gathering functions of the Office of Operations)
for example, would require additional training in the basic skills
Involved, as would the information storage and retrieval functions of OCR.
e. The complexity of Clandestine Service activities creates
additional problems in the pace and scope of adyanced training and the
trainee must be prepared to undertake a lengthy apprenticeship. Since
espionage is fundamental to all clandestine operations it follows logically
that all operations officers should have a thorough grounding in opera-
tional tradecraft, technical skills, and the management of operations.
Advanced training for the Clandestine Service officer should include all
these things and perhpps lay the foundation for further future development
but should not extend beyond this point at this stage.
f. Overseas operational experience is an essential element
of the education of an operations officer and it should be acquired at the
earliest possible time. There is much disagreement on the proper timing
of the initial tour of field duty for the junior officer but the consensus
favors an early start. There seems to be little to gain from a lengthy
headquarters assignment particularly when training already has covered"mu;,
much of the activity and we would advocate that the field tour begin not
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ample time for preparation for travel and an indoctrination in the
activities of the field station of assignment.
g. During this initial tour the junior .officer must be
maintained in a training status. He is still an apprentice and his pur-
pose in being overseas is to learn at first hand about clandestine opera-
tions. The station of assignment should be large enough to accommodate a
few trainees without seriously upsetting the staffing patterns and should
be provided with a general outline of the nature of on-the-job training
the junior officer should receive. The mentor system is suggested.
h. Upon return from the overseas assignment the junior
officer should be ready for specialized training in depth in a selected
functional field or in a geographic area. The trainee has acquired a .
firm foundation of training and experience; he has been.exposed (perhaps
for the first time) to a foreign environment and culture; he has had time
to mature, and to be able to decide for himself what the future holds for
him; and, since he has been under constant observation during this entire
period) the Agency is able to judge his potential and capabilities and
can exercise sound judgment as to his further development. Not until he
reaches this point in his education should the junior officer undertake
to engage in one of the several specialties which comprise the major
operational functions of the Clandestine Service. If he is to continue
as an FI officer he should have intensive language and area training. If
covert action is to be his special field his training will include
psychological warfare,
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Similarly specialized training should be prescribed for officers destined
for labor operations, counterintelligence, scientific and technical and
other majOr operational fields. The duration of specialized training
cannot be fixed; it will vary from a few months for a functional specialty
to two years or more for difficult language training. It should be inten-
lain and complete .and have as its objective the best possible preparation
of a,professional intelligence officenl
i. Summarized briefly the pattern that emerges for the train-
ing .of Clandestine Service officers is this: (a) a general preparatory
phase Of indoctrinatibn in all aspects of intelligence work, (b) at
advanced phase for the acquisition .of fundamental skills, (c) a period
of on-the-job training in headquarters and overseas, and, (d) the
specialized training phase of intensive study in depth. :The general
pattern will be the same for DD/I and DD/S officers except for the period
of overseas experience. The time element will be for.CS officers at least
24 to 48 months, allowing a tour overseas, plus the variable- period of
specialty training; for DD/I and DD/S0 not in excess of six months.
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D. Mid-career Training
1. The need for some form of tratining-at the middle career level is
acknowledged by .trainers and consUmers alike but there is little agreement On
the nature, extent or even timing of such a course. Mid-career training
generally throughout government and industry is accepted as a part of 'au
overall program of the proper preparation of 'people to perform effectively in
their assignedfunctions. The Foreign Service Institute, for 'example, offers
a course for Foreign Service Officers at the F50 3, 4 and 5 levels -which is
designed to "encourage the development of a broad and integrated professional
philosophy that will enable the officer to function with a more acute aware-
ness and a deeper understanding of the eseentialthatacter'and tole of his
profession." (It should be noted that the 12 week course includes two weeks
devoted to executive management.) While this purpose may not be completely
appropriate to the Agency, it does contain some of the essential character-
istics applicable to any:program of training at mid-career.
2. Before advancing suggestions for the purpose and nature Of such
training a definition of mid-career should be agreed upon. ?The middle point
of a man's career Will, of course, vary with the individual and will be
influenced by circumstances both favorable and unfavorable. An 'age and grade
projection of what may be considered an average mareer would take this form:
GS Grade
9
11
12
13
14
15
Age
25_
30
35
40
45
50
In actual practice intervals between promotions in the lower grades may be
shorter and longer in the upper grades. While this projection admittedly is
rather arbitrary, it seems reasonable to assume that the young man of 25
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entering the service should aspire to grade GS-15 by the time he reaches 50 years
of age. If he does not his chances of attaining that grade thereafter diminish
rapidly. We realize that 25 years of service is not regarded by many as a full
lifetime career and that GS-15 is not the foll limit of grade levels available.
The projection may be extended through GS....18 and age 65 without materially
altering the relationship of age and grade. ?The number of supergrade positions
always will be limited and since we are seeking something having application
to the majority of officers we believe it more practical to use the projection
shown above.
3. The midale point in grade falls between GS-12 and 13) in age between
35 and 40) and in length of service between 10 and 15 years. This point appears
to be most appropriate for a number of reasons. At the GS-13 level an officer
usually is expected to assume major supervisory responsibilities for which he
should be thoroughly prepared. One of the deficiencies noted in the current
training effort is the inadequacy of proper preparation of employees assigned
managerial responsibilities. Grade GS-13 also is in many areas of the Agency
a crucial point; it is a "break-through" level which distinguishes between
journeymen and senior officers. It is in effect the gateway to more senior
positions and one of the more difficult to penetrate.
4. The age bracket of 35 to 4o also is very significant. It is the stage
at which the individual becomes more mature) he is more aware of the full extent
of his responsibilities both at work and at home and his concern with his future
is greatly sharpened. It is no coincidence that the average age of professional
officers in grade GS-12 and over who leave the Agency for some other occupation
is 39.4. It is frequently a turning point in a man's life.
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5. In terms of years of service this middle point is most appropriate
also. The officer has served his apprenticeship and at least seven to twelve
productive years in his specialty. He probably knows all there is to know
about his job but has had little opportunity to participate in or learn about
other activities. The danger of atrophy is greatest at this point.
6. A mid-career training program designed with these factors in mind
should have as its purpose: (a) to prepare officers to assume broader
responsibilities particularly in the field of command; (b) to refresh and
rekindle their motivation in the interest of the government and the intelli-
gence service) and (c) to broaden their outlook of the Agency's mission through
a better understanding of the interrelationships of its many parts.
7. We anticipate some initial difficulties in the development and
scheduling of a mid-career program but as employees' promotion and growth
rate stabilizes there should be a fairly uniform progression of officers
through this mid-career stage which will provide stanciArd, almost routine
attendance for a regularly scheduled course. The seminar form of approxi-
mately 12 weeks is favored by most and would appear to be appropriate to the
purpose.
It is recommended that:
The DCI authorize and direct the establishment of a mid-career
training course for officers at the GS-12 and -13 level in order
to prepare them for broader responsibilities particularly in the
field of command, to refresh their motivation in the intelligence
service and to broaden their understanding of the interrelationship
of Agency functions.
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E. Senior Officer Trainin
1. One of the readily identifiable problem areas in the Agency today
is the pronounced shortage of senior level officers thoroughly experienced in
all aspects of the intelligence profession capable of understanding and ef
fectively dealing with complex Agency-owide and inter-agency problems* The
Agency finds itself in this circumstance partly through its historical evoluo.
tion in which some components descended in unbroken line from World War II
organizations; partly because the organizational structure has fostered the
growth of three semi-autonomous sub-divisions; partly because a sound security
concept of compartmentation has been permitted to develop into a policy
approaching "apartheid"; and partly because the pressure of operational and
functional demands placed on the Agency since its inception have compelled
the direction of its great energy to the rapid development of people to do
specific jobs well and defer to some later date the development of people
who can do all jobs well. There also enters here some element of the prodigal
use of talent because it is plentiful, the substitution of numbers of people
to make up for lack of broad individual competence and the resorting to
group judgments in place of executive skill.
2. Preparing individuals to assume and effectively discharge the
responsibilities of senior management is more a problem of development than
formalized training although the latter has a definite place in the scheme
of things. As we pointed out in the Inspector General's report on the Career
Service Program, the absence of an organized method of career development has
seriously hampered the proper preparation of officers for key positions and
some sound long range planning must be instituted to meet this need. We
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still are hopeful that such an effort will be successful in the near future.
For the present, however, there is an immediate need to do everything possible
to improve the effectiveness of today's staff of senior officers and those to
be selected in the next few years to come. For this purpose we suggest a
senior officer training program.
3. The objective of a senior officer program may be briefly stated
in these terms: to develop more officers capable of formulating and evaluating
comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in the U. S. Government.
This objective is sufficiently broad to encompass all aspects of the intelli-
gence profession, the internal management of Agency affairs and the inter--
relationships of the Agency with the intelligence community and the policy
making elements of the government.
4. The level at which this program is aimed should not be lower
than GS-15 although a case can be made to include selected individuals at
the GS.-14 level. It should be regarded as the preparatory phase for officers
entering the final stages of their careers with the Agency and therefore provide
a rounding out of their earlier experiences and training.
5. The greatest benefit of this program is to be derived from the '
interchange of opinions and ideas through the exploration of the entire
spectrum of Agency and community problems. For this purpose a combination
of seminars and case studies with a minimum of orientational lecturing would
be the most productive. A mixed enrollMent of DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S officers
could profit by exposure to each other's problems. A budget officer, for
example, might make a solid contribution to a discussion of counterintelligence
operations, a case officer might speak with conviction on information storage
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and retrieval, and an analyst may offer valuable ideas on logistical matters.
Executive management should be stressed at this level but no subject, opera-
tional or administrative, should be neglected.
6. A senior officer program to be most effective must be allotted
a period of time adequate to the full development of its objective. A
similar program, though on a somewhat broader scale, conducted by the Foreign
Service Institute rims for nine months. We do nbt contemplate so extensive a
program to meet Agency needs at the present time. As the program evolves in
the future it may be found desirable to invite attendance by senior officers
of other intelligence agencies in which event a longer course might be justified.
For the initial effort at least and until experience can be gained we believe
a course of about four months would be most effective.
7. In magnitude, taking into account the problems of administration
and technical methods of handling such a program; it is suggested that enroll-
ment be limited to not more than 40 officers at one time. The program should
be conducted at least twice annually although it is believed possible to run
two courses concurrently if necessary. A reasonable goal would appear to be
the participation of 80 to 100 officers each year.*
*Note: At the present rate of promotion about 50 officers will enter the
GS-15 level each year. It is anticipated that promotions will stabilize
at this rate for the foreseeable future. This will permit ultimately
scheduling the senior officer program semiannually with an attendance of
about 25 at each session. For the first few years, however, the effort
must be made to accommodate a large part of the present staff as well as
the newly elevated officers.
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8. The question of location must also be considered. Ideally, from
the academic point of view,
of normal Agency activities
concentration and thought. This would point to
an atmosphere relaxed and free from the tensions
would provide the best surroundings for undisturbed
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as the most appro-
priate site but practical considerations seem to impose insurmountable obstacles.
Separation from family for an extended period of time, while tolerated by the
JOT, would be strongly resented by the senior officers. Unlike the military
services Agency facilities at
do not provide for studentat dependgi
and it would be economically unfeasible for the Agency
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even if the local market could meet the demand. It appears therefo3x41
that there is no alternative at present to conducting the program at head-
quarters with the attendant disadvantages of proximity at home offices and
the ever present danger of interruptions and distraction by continuing 'contacts
with working colleagues and associates.
9. The success of the program can be assured only by highest level
direction and proper planning. Officers who are to participate must be released
from regular duties for the full duration of the course and required replace-
ments arranged for well in advance so that their functions can be carried on
in their absence. It is our opinion that all officers should be required to
participate upon reaching the GS-15 level but if this proves to be impractical,
at least for the present, then selection should be based on merit, accomplish-
ment and potential. Appointment should be regarded as a reward for achievement
and an acknowledgement of superior ability opening the way to the highest
levels of executive management.
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10. Other than the salaries of the participants no extraordinary cost
is contemplated for this program. It should be administered by the DTR who
will be expected to provide supporting services. In the initial formulntion
of the program the services of technical experts will be needed but instructors
as such can be dispensed with. Seminar and discussion leaders can be drawn
from the Agency at large or, better still) from among the partidipating officers'
themselves. None of the customary testing and evaluation practices are called
for. It may be desirable to enlist and pay for some expert outside talent to
handle such subjects as advanced management but the cost for such services
would be modest when compared with the cost of full-time instructors.
U. On a number of occasions in the past suggestions have been made
to establish an Intelligence Staff College along the lines of similar Military.
institutions. Some such proposals have been reviewed in the process of this
study and much thought has been given the matter. There is mUch to be said
in favor of some form of staff college for intelligence officers but it is
believed that the Agency is not yet ready for such an undertaking. A senior ,
officers 1 program as outlined herein may well lead to the ultimate establish-
ment of a broader and higher level school but to meet the Agencyls most urgent
need this program should be developed without delay.
It is recommended that:
The DCI authorize and direct that a senior officer program be
established to develop more officers capable of formulating and
evaluating comprehensively policy concerned with intelligence in
the U. S. Government generally in keeping with the outline described
above.
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To summarize our views on the future of training in this Agency we advocate
first, that the JOT system of recruitment, selection and training be adapted to
meet all junior officer requirements throughout the Agency (about 250 annually
at present); secondly, that an organized program of required training be
instituted phased to coincide with and supplement professional career develop-
ment and growth. The pattern we envision is one of annual classes of junior
officers having the essential qualifications of background and motivation for
intelligence work following an orderly progression of general preparation by
means of comprehensive indoctrination and training in the basic skills of the
profession; then the period of specialized training to prepare for the productive
years to follow. The pattern is filled out by a mid-career training phase for
selected officers ready to assume broader responsibilities and finally by a form
of "terminal training" to develop the Agency's executives.
This pattern if followed will meet the bilk of the Agency's personnel require-
ments and will substantially raise the level of professional competence in every
field. It is necessarily based on certain assumptions. It is assumed for example
that command echelons will accept fully their responsibility for the proper prep-
aration of the employees of their commands to do the jobs expected of them; that
they will establish rigorous training and job standards and insist that they be
met; that they will produce the authoritative doctrine essential to their training
needs; and that they will require the necessary long range personnel planning so
essential to any training program. It is also assumed that the Director of
Training and heads of training elements will continue to strive for greater
competence in instructors, better training techniques and facilities and more
skillful administration.
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In Conclusion we -would like to reiterate that the success of the Agency
depends in large measure on the success of its training and development program.
In the intelligence field there is no room for failure.
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