SUMMARY OF PRAVDA ' S REPLY TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ' S ADDRESS OF 16 APRIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200290051-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: April 25, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE '77A
Gal 2irnili 1"J o7 a7
SUMMARY OF PRAVDA'S REPLY TO
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADDRESS OF 16 APRIL
Pravda's reply to the President's 16 April speech on
he international situation constitutes an effort to regain
the initiative in the "peace offensive" through a strong
appeal to world opinion. The appeal is couched in terms in-
tended to prove the consistent rightness of Soviet foreign
policy during the post-war years and to fasten the blame for
the continued existence of unsolved international issues
upon the United States, This "peace offensive," as elabo-
rated by the Pravda editorial, differs from those periodi-
cally conduct-e-d-Tn the past by the Soviet Government only
in its more comprehensive character.
Pravda touches on all international issues of outstand-
ing impnce as follows:
Korea.- The Korean war has been a test of the foreign
polic a of the USSR and the "Anglo-American bloc" during
recent years. The USSR has invariably supported a "just
truce" through "deeds rather than words.".
Germany.- Having made Western Germany "an instrument
of itnamic? foreign policy," the United States is re-
sponsible for the continued disunity of the German state,
President Eisenhower failed to note that the Potsdam Agree-
ment already offers a basis for a German settlement.
Pravda's call for a German peace treaty unification of
the country,, and the evacuation of foreign troops reveals no
change in the Kremlin's position on Germany, The USSR has
consistently argued that the Potsdam Agreement must form the
basis for an agreement on Germany. References to the "Anglo-
American bloc" and to the special concern of the French
people with the US "dynamic" foreign policy in West Germany
are part of the conventional Soviet splitting technique.
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China: The President failed to "illuminate" the ques-
tion o Tina and said nothing about admitting the Chinese
People's Republic to the United Nations or about restoring
its "lawful territorial rights, including Taiwan." Secre-
tary of State Dulles a few days later, however, revealed
the American Government's concern over the fate of Nation-
alist China and its pride in the political and economic
blockade of the Chinese People's Republic. In these state-
ments Mr. Dulles revealed the US Government's "martial in-
clinations." Such "aggressive" American policies towards
China., however, are "doomed to failure."
Eastern Europe: The President implied that the govern-
ments of the Eas ern European states were forced upon them
from outside. This is untrue, and it is absurd to expect
the USSR to assist in the restoration of "reactionary re-
gimes." The responsibility for barring entry to the United
Nations to the democratic governments, not only of Eastern
Europe, but also of China, lies with the United States.
Liberation Movements: In calling upon the USSR to use
its in uence to retard the liberation movements among colo-
nial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia, the President reveals
ignorance of the true nature of these movements and contra-
dicts historical laws.
Austria: An Austrian treaty can be achieved on the
basis ofaagrreements previously reached with "genuine regard
for the democratic rights of the Austrian people."
The United Nations: The United States, not the USSR,
is responsible or perverting the charter of the United Na-
tions. It is not too late to remedy the situation provided
that no government strives to convert the UN into an instru-
ment of its own policy. Moreover, the UN cannot function
as it should while Communist China remains outside and "some
Kuomintang scarecrow" is admitted.
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Disarmament: In his speech, Eisenhower also dwells on
the ques on o the reduction of armaments. He devotes to
this question his corresponding "Five Points." The Soviet
side, of course, does not object to the proposals laid down
in these points.' The President's attempts to blame the USSR
for the arms race are without foundation. The USSR has been
concerned solely with the restoration of its peace-time
economy and has repeatedly made concrete proposals for dis-
armament, including prohibition of atomic weapons. The
President, on the other hand, offered proposals "of a too
general nature which can in no way advance the complicated
matter of armaments reduction." The US in the pursuit of
its aggressive foreign policy and aiming at world domina-
tion, started the arms race. But the President evidently
considered it "inconvenient or disadvantageous to talk about
all this openly."
US Economic Aid: The President's offer to divert funds
from arms production to a program to reduce want and need
seems on the surface to be worthwhile. However, it appears
that what he has in mind is a variant of the Marshall Plan
or Point IV, by which weaker states are subordinated to the
"dynamic aims" of US foreign policy. Such a scheme has been
found unacceptable even by countries adhering to the US Bloc.
Pravda's treatment of the above and other less important
issues suggests little inclination to compromise on the part
of the new Soviet regime. The editorial indeed rejects the
concept that there has been a "termination of a certain era
in Soviet policy" and particularly in Soviet foreign policy,
"the correctness of which has been proved by the entire
course of international development." Having thus by impli-
cation, at least, cast aside the possibility of major change
in Soviet foreign policy, Pravda suggests that it is more
appropriate to speak of the "end of an era". in US policy.
Thus it is inferred that it should be the US rather than the
USSR which should compromise on international issues. "But
the new United States President himself for some reason
takes under his protection the whole policy of his prede-
cessor, whom he had criticized in his time, and not without
grounds, particularly during the election campaign."
Pravda concludes by reiterating the Kremlin's alleged
willingness to discuss international issues. The USSR, un-
like President Eisenhower, does not set up a series of
"preliminary conditions," but would welcome "any step by
the US Government or the government of any other country....
directed towards a friendly settlement of contentious ques-
tions .... by direct negotiations and when necessary, within
the framework of the United Nations."
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Thus, having set forth its general position in general
terms, the Kremlin in effect calls upon the United States to
make specific proposals and to take the next concrete step
towards discussions.
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