INDONESIAN ARMY PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200290037-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: April 14, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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re
The highly fac io
issues of army policy: (a) the demobilization of poorly trained
units of guerrilla origin in order to reduce army costs and to
enhance its efficiency and (b) the retention of a western mili-
tary mission to assist in army training.
Officials of the Defense Ministry and army headquarters
who favored these policies and who resented aggressive efforts
by the nationalist-leftist bloc in parliament to prevent their
implementation attempted on 17 October 1952 to force the disso-
lution of parliament. The attempt was unsuccessful and these
officials have now been largely purged.
General Simatupang, a member of this group and Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces, has thus far remained in office. On
4 April, however, the army commander in East Java reportedly
delivered an ultimatum to the Defense Section of parliament,
stating that unless the government takes "speedy action against
those considered as leaders of the 17 October affair," army
forces in East Java "will not be responsible for results."
At a closed session of parliament on 11 April, the Prime
Minister promised action.
The Netherlands has maintained a military training mission
in Indonesia since the latter's independence. In March, under
pressure from the nationalist-leftist parliamentary bloc, the
government requested the mission's withdrawal at the end of the
year.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
14 April 1953
Current Situation
alized Indonesian Army is split over basic
t
II. Background
The Indonesian Army is composed of many factions including
Japanese-trained units subsequently used against the Netherlands
during the struggle for independence, Dutch-trained units which
were used by the Dutch during the struggle and numerous guer-
rilla groups of various political and religious complexions
who continue to give loyalty primarily to their immediate
leaders rather than to the top army command.
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Various factions, particularly former guerrilla elements,
have been disturbed by the policy of the Defense Ministry, which
has been supported by army headquarters, to demobilize poorly
trained and unreliable units. They also resent the presence of
a Netherlands military training mission which has been in Indo-
nesia since 1949. These factions received parliamentary support
from the National Party (PNI) and extreme nationalist and
leftist groups.
The present army dispute arose when Bambang Supeno, an of-
ficer who had retained a position of importance from revolution-
ary days, last July carried criticism of army policy directly to
President Sukarno and the Defense Section of parliament.
Although the Defense Minister, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, dis-
missed Supeno from his post, the parliamentary Defense Section,
which is weighted with nationalist and leftist elements, seized
upon the incident as an opening wedge whereby they might bring
defense issues to a head.
Their criticism of defense policy centered upon three
points: (a) demobilization thus far indicated that Dutch-
trained units were being retained at the expense of men who
had fought for Indonesian independence; (b) the Defense
Ministry was unduly influenced by the Socialist Party; (c)
instances of corruption in the Ministry could be cited. These
charges led to a full scale parliamentary debate which culminated
on 16 October 1952 in the passage of a motion, sponsored by the
PNI and supported by the entire nationalist-Communist bloc, de-
manding reorganization of the Defense Ministry and departure
of the Netherlands Military Mission.
Top defense officials countered the following day, 17
October, by requesting President Sukarno to dissolve Parliament.
Sukarno refused but promised national general elections to re-
place the provisional appointed body which has functioned as
parliament since 1949.
Meanwhile subordinate officers, who had a background of
guerrilla service, in three of Indonesia's seven military
commands pronounced the Djakarta development "a coup" and used
it as an opportunity to seize command in their respective areas
and to proclaim their primary allegiance to President Sukarno.
Such action occurred in East Java, East Indonesia, and South
Sumatra.
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The cabinet confirmed the new command in East Java and
replaced the South Sumatra usurper with a retired officer of
nationalist sympathies. Fearing separatist sentiment in East
Indonesia and further aggravation of the military-political
situation, the cabinet permitted Lt. Col. Warouw, the usurper
in East Indonesia, to remain de facto commander. The Sultan
(Defense Minister) claiming that cabinet action in the case of
Warouw amounted to encouragement of insubordination and ap-
parently aware that Warouw had a record of unreliability,
resigned in early January.
Meanwhile the Army Chief of Staff, A. H. Nasution, a pro-
western officer, had agreed to accept responsibility for the
17 October affair. He was dismissed in December. Several
high-ranking officers who had supported the action resigned or
were dismissed at the same time. The secretary-general of the
Defense Ministry, Ali Budiardjo, a Socialist, was forced to
resign in early April.
Nationalist elements are now clamoring for the dismissal
of Gen. Simatupang, the highly competent Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces. Not content with mere dismissal, nationalist
elements apparently want all participants in the 17 October
affair to be court-martialled and sentenced.
Anti-Communist and pro-Western elements in the army and
Defense Ministry, in their effort to prevent a reversal of
their policies, appear to have played directly into the hands
of the nationalists and Communists. The Sultan of Jogjakarta
and Nasution -- both strongly anti-Communist -- have long been
Communist targets and are now safely out of policy-making or
even influential positions. Demobilization appears to have
been left to the discretion of territorial commanders and is
therefore likely to be stalemated in most areas. The Nether-
lands Military Mission has been asked to leave at the end of
1953 and no other western mission is scheduled to assist
Indonesia although a tentative request has been made to
Australia.
The Prime Minister's capitulation to the East Java com-
mander by promising further army reorganization in order to
"settle" the 17 October affair presages continued army in-
terference in governmental affairs and increasing influence
of the nationalist-Communist bloc upon government policy.
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