CIA CURRIED FAVOR WITH KHOMEINI, EXILES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600400011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: November 19, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

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WASHINGTON POST
-~ L-- 19 November 1986
Press and broadcast reports from Iran
CIA Curried Favor have repreatedly accused the U.S. govern-
ment of backing anti-Khomeini exile activ-
With Khomeini Exiles mes. Informed sources said that the Khof
meini regime knows many o of the details of
9 the CIA operations because it has agents in-
Sources Say Agency Gave Regime List of KGB Agents side the Iranian exile groups.
Some of the Iranian exiles in Paris said it
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Reagan administration's secret over-
tures and arms shipments to Iran are part
of a seven-year-long pattern of covert Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency operations-some
dating back to the Carter administration-
that were designed both to curry favor with
the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
and support Iranian exiles who seek to over-
throw it, according to informed sources.
In 1983, for example, the CIA partici-
pated in a secret operation to provide a list
of Soviet KGB agents and collaborators op-
erating in Iran to the Khomeini regime,
which then executed up to 200 suspects and
closed down the communist Tudeh party in
Iran, actions that dealt a major blow to KGB
operations and Soviet influence there, the
sources said. Khomeini also expelled 18
Soviet diplomats, imprisoned the Tudeh
party leaders and publicly thanked God for
"the miracle" leading to the arrests of the
"treasonous leaders."
At the same time, secret presidential in-
telligence orders, called "findings," author-
ized the CIA to support Iranian exiles op-
posed to the Khomeini regime, the sources
said. These included providing nearly $6
million to the main Iranian exile movement,
financing an anti-Khomeini exile group radio
station in Egypt and supplying a miniatur-
ized television transmitter for an 11-minute
clandestine broadcast to Iran two months
ago by Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who vowed,
"I will return."
One well-placed intelligence source said
that this support of the anti-Khomeini exile
movement is "just one level above [intelli-
gence] collection," and that the money in-
volved was eauivalent to the "walking-
around money" frequently distributed in
American political campaigns. Administra-
tion officials stressed that the CIA opera-
tions are not intended to bring about Kho-
meini'a downfall but are aimed primarily at
obtaining intelligence about his regime
through the exile groups.
The White House and administration
spokesmen declined to comment on these
CIA operations. Vice Adm. John M. Poin-
dexter, the president's national security af-
fairs adviser, told a television interviewer
Sunday. that "I don't want to confirm or
deny any other operations" and added that
,.we aren't seeking the overthrow of the
is well-known within their groups that they
have received CIA money. Sources also said
that some of the CIA money was used to
speculate in currency markets in Switzer-
land. '
Administration sources said that all CIA
programs concerning Iran have been de-
signed with several objectives: to build brid-
ges to potential Iranian leaders, to use the
exiles for information about what is happen-
ing in Iran, to develop independent intelli-
gence sources, to win friends, to diminish
Soviet influence and to keep pressure on
the Khomeini regime by demonstrating that
the exile and dissident opposition is active.
Iran is strategically vital because of its oil
supplies, warm-water ports on the Persian
Gulf and proximity to the Soviet Union.
Trans 'political turhulencf! and the possibil-
ity that one of the exile groups could some
day assume power justifies a U.S. strategy
that proceeds on several tracks, according
to several administration officials, and that
view is shared by some former U.S. intel-
ligence officers.
"I have no knowledge that the Reagan ad-
ministration is giving money to the Iranian
exile groups, but I see no reason not to give
*,hem
hem money and at the same time extend a
to Khomeini," Stansfield Turner, CIA
director in the Carter administration, said
Monday. "Playing both sides of the fence is
not unusual, as long as they did not fund any
exile group to the extent that they. would
try to overthrow the [Khomeini) govern-
ment. There is not a prayer that they could
do that."
But one well-placed administration
source said the CIA operations involving
Iran were ad hoc and inconsistent, rather
than being the result of a coherent U.S.
strategy. "The U.S. does not have a policy
but a series of actions," said the source, who
described the administration as "groping in
it maze" on the Iran issue.
Despite the CIA efforts to curry favor
with the Khomeini regime, Iran continued
to encourage violence against American in-
terests, sources noted. For example, intel-
ligence shows that Iran directly supported
the October 1983 bombing of the Marine
Corps barracks in Beirut in which 241 U.S.
servicemen were killed. This was less than
a year after the CIA received a list of KGB
agents in Iran from a Soviet defector and
gave the names to the Khomeini regime.
Sources said that the British intelligence
service also participated in the operation
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recent overtures made under President built, the CIA received an unexpected wind-
Reagan to "moderates" in Tehran have fall of intelligence information in Iran through
stopped Iranian government sponsorship of the defection of Vladimir Kuzichkin, a senior
terrorist actions against Americans. KGB officer in Tehran whose job it had, been
In January 1981, when Reagan took of- to maintain contacts with the Tudeh party.
fire and 52 Americans returned after 444 Kuzichkin defected to the British in late 1982
days' captivity in Tehran, the CIA had al- and was debriefed later by the CIA, giving
ready begun under President Carter a num- the United States details of Soviet and Tudeh
ber of anti-Khomeini operations. One was operations in Iran.
designed to gather intelligence about Iran The CIA then provided Khomeini with
and support Iranian exiles, sources said; lists and supporting details of at least 100
another was a more ambitious plan that one and perhaps as many as 200 Soviet agents
senior source said was designed to inflict in Iran, sources said. After arresting and
"punishment" on the Khomeini regime, executing most of the alleged agents, Kho-
which was holding the U.S. hostages. meini outlawed the Tudeh party on May 4,
Under Reagan and his CIA director, Wil- 1983, and expelled the 18 Soviet diplomats
liam J. Casey, the first major Iranian oper- believed to be involved in KGB operations.
ation was intended to support an exile Many Tudeh members were arrested, in-
group headed by the shah's former naval cluding the party's secretary general and
commander-in-chief, Rear Adm. Ahmad six central committee members, and they
Madani. The Madani group received several were forced to make televised confessions
million dollars, but proved too independent that they spied for Moscow.
by insisting on control of their own anti- One well-placed source said the CIA ac-
Khomeini operations, and the CIA connec- tion was intended to cripple KGB operations
tions were soon dissolved. in Iran while offering "a gesture of good
In 1982, the CIA began supporting the will" to Khomeini.
main Iranian exile movement, the Paris- There were reports at the time of an up-
based Front for the Liberation of Iran (FLI), heaval in the Tudeh party, but it was not
Headed by former prime minister Ali Amini, known that the CIA had a role. The role of
the FLI advocates Khomeini's ouster and Kuzichkin also passed largely unnoticed ex-
since 1983 has called for restoration of the cept for a 1985 column by Jack Anderson
Iranian monarchy. and Dale Van Atta reporting that the de-
The CIA has given the FLI $100,000 a fector had brought with him two trunks full
month. But beginning about two year,,, ago, of documents about the KGB and the Iran-
two members of the National Security ian communist party. The column reported
Council staff, Lt. Col. Oliver North Jr. and that the British "secretly turned the infor-
Vincent M. Canistraro, became involved in mation over to Khomeini."
supervising the CIA operation after hearing A CIA memo of May 17, 1985, saving
allegations that the FLI was mismanaged, that the United States was lagging behind
and ineffective. the Soviets in cultivating Iranian contacts
The allegations included charges that for a post-Khomeini era
was apparently one
,
some FLI members were providing useless of the first actions that led to Reagan's de-
and questionable information to the CIA and cision to begin secret overtures to the Iran-
that CIA funds were being used to speculate ians and eventually to ship them arms this
in currency markets in Switzerland. Con- year.
sequently, the FLI member functioning as A recent CIA-supported operation was
liaison with the CIA was ousted in 1985. His the sudden appearance on Iranian television
successor, however, was discovered to be a two months ago of Reza Pahlavi, son of the
former communist who advocated hostage- late shah. That clandestine anti-Khomeini
taking and who was a suspected Khomeini broadcast was made possible by the CIA,
informer, according to U.S. and Iranian which provided technical assistance and a
sources. miniaturized suitcase transmitter, the
That liaison was removed earlier this sources said. The broadcast disrupted two
year, and the CIA appointed one of the channels of Iranian television for 11
shah's former cabinet officers as the new minutes at 9 p.m. on Sept. 5. It is not known
overseer of the FLI money, the sources whether the shah's son knew that the CIA
said. had provided support for the broadcast.
Neither the CIA nor the White House The Khomeini regime apparently was
ever seriously believed that exile groups aware of or suspected a U.S. role in the
were strong enough to overthrow Kho- clandestine appearance and responded with
meini, sources said, and none of the current a radio broadcast of its own, declaring that
operations includes paramilitary support. "the terrorist government of Reagan ... in
As part of the FLI support, the CIA also a disgraceful manner was the vanguard of
provides equipment and $20,000 to this puppet show."
$30,000 a month for the organization's Ra-
dio Nejat, or Radio Liberation, which broad- Staff researchers Barbara Feinman and
casts anti-Khomeini programs for four Ferman Patterson contributed to this report.
hours a day from Egypt to Iran, according
to U.S. and Iranian sources.
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USA TODAY
17 November 1986
COVER STORY
President's
men mobilize
to save face
How the L
arms deal
came about,
timeline;
Congress
reacts, 4A
By Johanna Neuman
USA TODAY
There is no need, he said on CBS's
Face the Nation, "for further signals" of
"good faith" in the form of arms to Irani-
an moderates. Asked whether he had
"the authority to speak for the entire ad-
ministration," Shultz replied, "No."
The secretary of state had taken a
back seat to the NSC staffers hired and
once directed by Robert McFarlane, who
has since left government.
For 18 months, they opened diplomat-
ic channels to Iran, sent defensive arms
and Bibles as "signals of good faith." It
was a secret held so tight that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were not even informed.
"It is an unconstitutional exercise of
power," said Scott Armstrong, director of
National Security Archive, a research
group. "The last time we had such an ex-
Vice Admiral John M. Poin- treme example of it was Watergate. Peo-
dexter - point-man for a Ple forget that the Constitution splits for-
White House on the ropes in eign policy power between the president
its effort to justify an arms-for- and Congress.,'
hostages deal with Iran - fin- The NBC's autonomy has made it a
gered his pipe Sunday and told unique back door for presidents exercis-
Congress to back off. ing foreign policy judgments that might
"I will make arrangements be unpopular on Capitol Hill - or need
to talk informally with them," the cloak of secrecy.
said Poindexter, on the eve of Created in 1947 to advise the president
this week's congressional hearings into the affair. But, he on risks to U.S. security, it is estimated to
told NBC's Meet the Press, "I probably will not participate." have a staff of 100 and an official budget
Poindexter finds his National Security Council at the eye of $4 million.
of the hurricane. Once a paper-shuffling White House unit Under President Reagan, it has gained
that gave Henry Kissinger cover for his secret missions to a reputation for activism, counting
China, the NSC, critics charge, has become Reagan's "A- among its successes the invasion of Gre-
Team" - a cowboy venture into back-channel, soldier-of- nada and the intercept of terrorists re-
fortune diplomacy, answerable to no congressional com- sponsible for the Achille Lauro hijacking,
mittee. .4SC survived previous flare-ups over its
foreign policy crafted by aides who talk
of invoking executive privilege to avoid
testifying before Congress and presidents
who cite national security concerns to ex-
plain secrets.
President Reagan's response to the cri-
sis, in a powerful speech last week, was to
wrap the arms shipments in the banner
of U.S. foreign policy, arguing that the
short-term hope for release of hostages
was the stepchild of a long-term need to
improve relations with Iran.
But Congress is returning with a Demo-
cratic majority, setting the stage for a
confrontation. Friday, the House Intelli.
gence Committee begins hearings to ex-
plore the White House's credibility and
legal posture.
Ever since news of the deal leaked two
weeks ago, the White House has un-
leashed a massive damage control pa-
trol, with top administration officials like
Chief of Staff Donald Regan defending a
president who put concern for the hos-
tages above other considerations.
But Secretary of State George Shultz,
whose primary concern is relations with
allies and foes in other world capitals,
has been putting distance between him-
self and the Iranian affair.
Former CIA Director Stansfield
irner thinks the NSC should be faulted
for performing ineptly.
"They appear to have acted with a lot
of amateurishness and naivete in this
case," he said. Opening sincere channels
to Iran "may happen some day, but this,
if anything, would have been a very, very
small toe in the water, had it succeeded."
But an ABC poll taken after Reagan's
Thursday plea "for your support," found
72 percent disapproved of arms transfers
to Iran. Despite Reagan's claim that the
transfers were not "ransom," 56 percent
did not believe him.
House Democratic Leader Jim Wright,
D-Texas, Sunday warned the White
House not to claim the mantle of execu-
tive privilege to mask details.
Recalling "that very, very sad episode
in American history surrounding Water-
te," Wright urged the administration to
pooperate.
Other critics, like Sen. Patrick Leahy,
Vt., are in a position to make life un-
comfortable for the White House.
The Washington Post reported Satur-
day Reagan ordered CIA Director Wil-
liam Casey's silence about the operation.
Leahy - vice chairman of the Senate In-
telligence Committee - believes Casey
broke the law by violating a 1984 pact to
keep Congress informed.
"There is a provision in the law which
allows the White House to delay report-
ing of a covert action provided it is re-
ported in a timely fashion," said Leahy.
"Many Republicans and Democrats
question whether 11 months is timely."
The White House will argue what Rea-
gan calls his "secret diplomatic initiative
to Iran" was an act of humanitarianism.
But some will wonder if humanitarian
concerns are the first priority of a na-
tion's foreign policy.
"He has damaged credibility every-
where," said Sen. James Exon, D-Neb.
"And if the American people buy this
one, God help us."
The president's men will also point to a
Hill that leaks, congressmen who cannot
keep a secret, as reason enough for a pri-
vate brand of diplomacy.
But observers questioned whether
Reagan's "Teflon" has worn off. In a sea-
son of foreign policy bombshells:
First there were reports that the ad-
ministration had lied about Libya,
launching a deliberate "disinformation"
campaign to discredit Colonel Moammar
Gadhafl - and topple his regime.
Then there were denials that USA
journalist Nicholas Daniloff had been
freed from a Soviet prison as part of a
swap for a spy held in New York.
Later, there were attempts to rewrite
the history of the Iceland summit, where
Reagan nearly signed an arms deal that
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatch-
er has since talked him out of.
And then there was Iran.
Contributing: Tony Mauro and Pat-
rick O'Driscoll
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;~-___ 16 November 1986
Arms for Hostages, 1980 Version
.4 Strange Tale of Iran.. lrms Dealers and the John . inclerson Cann sign
r. _.
By Alton Fiye
HE DEAL WAS the same: arms to
Iran for hostages. But the year was
1980, and the complications extend-
t only to Ronald Reagan and Jimmy
C,tr, but to the presidential candidacy of
thin weeks after war erupted between
Ida: and Iraq in September 1980, Tehran
growing desperate for military sup-
p. The shah's departure had thrown the
IiaYan military into disarray. Because of
it; previous close contact with the Amer-
ci" to overcome the suspicions of the aya
t41ts and the revolutionary guards. Thu:
IfWs military capacities were in sharp de
. Now Iran's need for spare parts an(
qthei supplies intersected the protracted
negotiations to free Americans then held
Rage in Tehran.
Signals of a possible "arms- for-hostages"
trade came from an Iranian who had served
as an agent in earlier sales of F-14 aircraft
to the shah's government. Apparently act-
ing on behalf of Iranian President Bani-
Sadr, the man sought unsuccessfully to
make contact directly with senior officials of
the Carter administration. A few days after
the war began, lie turned to an American
attorney with whom he had dealt previous-
ly-Mitchell Rogovin. At that point the sit-
uation became a volatile mixture of inter-
national intrigue and domestic politics-for
Rogovin was serving as general counsel in
the presidential campaign of John Anderson.
Rogovin immediately came to me as An-
derson's director of policy planning. The
accident of Rogovin's prior acquaintance
with the Iranian intermediary presented us
with an extraordinary dilemma. To involve
Anderson in negotiations regarding the hos-
tages--directly or indirectly-was too dic-
ey to contemplate. Yet, if the overture had
any substance at all, it had to be brought to
the president's attention. With Anderson's
proposed exchdp$g~}t~,t~ceFUqdpgg
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t ~f8 w`~? tc g
approval we met with Harold Saunders, the
assistant secretary of state handling the
hostage crisis.
Saunders heard us out and asked the
right questions. How could we be sure the
agent represented those for whom lie
claimed to speak? Previous maneuvers to
release the hostages had collapsed when
contacts in [ran proved incapable of carry-
ing out their commitments. Did this man
speak for authorities who could actually de-
liver the Americans to freedom? Rogovin
and [ took no position on the merits of the
W hen we resumed discussions with
the Iranian, we pressed for cred-
ible evidence that he was author-
ized to act and that those he represented
were in a position to bargain. He resolved
the first question conclusively by producing
a lengthy computer print-out providing
parts numbers and specifications in such
detail that they could only have come from
the Iranian air force. Most of the equipment
was for F-4 and F-14 aircraft, the mainstays
of the Iranian force. The Iranians also
wanted Phoenix missiles, the most sophis-
ticated weaponry for the F-14s.
1 We conveyed the parts list to Saunders
or review'within the government. On Oct.
, CIA Director Stansfield Turner briefed
nderson on the war situation and indicated
States to provide Iran anything so potent as
the Phoenix missiles, but we inferred that
supplying some materiel might not be out of
the question.
Meanwhile, we probed for a better sense
of the agent's ability to guarantee results, if
the United States were willing to meet the
request. A series of exchanges, interrupted
for communications with Tehran, produced
a straightforward offer to fly the hostages
to Pakistan or another mutually agreeable
location, where the Iranians would pick up a
plane load of the most urgently needed sup-
plies. But there was an even more forth-
coming offer. To demonstrate their good
faith, the Iranians would release American
charge d'affaires Bruce Laingen in advance
of any deliveries. These developments, too,
Rogovin and I reported to the State Depart-
ment.
When reports of a possible swap of weap-
ons for hostages began to surface in the
press, our suspicions flared, for we knew
that we were not the source. Bani-Sack-rsa
obviously trying to use the option toter
his standing in Tehran, and we spe61aTed
that Carter might manage to turn the pos-
sibility into an "October surprise" with de-
cisive impact on the election. Failing that,
we worried that our role as message-bear-
ers might be used against Anderson, if the
deal went sour. The irony did not escape us
that the overture conveyed by the Ander-
son camp might rescue Jimmy Carter, even
if it did not save the hostages.
We now know that a number of factors
were converging to produce a measured
offer by the Carter administration that ran
in a broadly parallel direction to that sug-
gested in the approach we conveyed. In
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mid-October the president approved a mes-
sage offering to make available $150 million
in aircraft parts and other equipment _Tre-
viously ordered by the shah's government,
but being held in U.S. warehouses. As Car-
ter put it in the debate with Ronald Reagan
on Oct. 28, "If the hostages are released
safely ... we would make delivery on-those
items which Iran owns."
Strangely, the Iranians never acknowl-
edged the offer. Then, as now, in bare ing
with fanatacism, pragmatism has little lev-
erage.
Frye is Washington director of the
cii on Foreign Relations.
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ON PAGE 16 November 1986
Dealing With Iran: How Experts See It
President R,- -igan'.s
decision to autnorize un-
publicized talks with Ira-
nian officials and send
them some weapons and
spare parts has touched
off a major dispute involv-
ing United States foreign
policy and has prompted a
heated debate that has
transcended the usual
partisan divisions in
Washington. Mr. Reagan
has angrily denied reports
that he traded arms for
American hostages held
in Lebanon by pro-Iranian
militants. Many of his
critics challenge this as-
sertion. Some experts who
have followed the United
States-Iran relationship,
ranging from former Di-
rectors of Central Intelli-
gence to scholars, were
asked these questions: is
it good or bad to trade
military supplies for hos-
tages? What are the pros
and cons of making such
overtures to the Iranians?
And what are the pros-
pects for the United
States to restore and im-
prove its ruptured rela-
tions with Iran? Here are
excerpts from their
replies:
Shaul Bakhash
Professor of Government
George Mason University
For the U.S. Govern-
ment that has made the
foundation of its policy not
to bargain with hostage-
takers, trading arms for
hostages is not a very
wise policy. It encourages
further hostage-taking; it
sends the wrong signals to
America's allies, and it
suggests that the U.S.
Government has not been
straightforward with its
own people.
The policy of slow pres-
sure, denial of arms and
technology, attempting to
give the specific country a
bad name abroad has
worked. The evidence is
the small signs of moder-
ation in Iran's foreign
policy, including recent
attempts to secure for it-
self a better reputation
abroad.
The U.S. has always
posed a special problem
for Iran because of the
history of relations and
because the current do-
mestic strains working
against the normalization
of relations are very con-
siderable.
William Quandt
Acting Director
Foreign Policy Program
Brookings Institution
I would make a distinc-
tion between a one-time
exception where you
might get all the hostages
for one dirty deal of spare
parts to Iran and say
that's it. What is particu-
larly dangerous is to get
into a more open-ended
thing where, one by one,
we get hostages out. It
provides a perverse in-
centive to Iran to keep
some hostages.
The dangers are that, in
setting up this pattern, it
sends some signals to
countries with whom you
have been pursuing a dif-
ferent policy, You appear
two-faced.
The potential benefits
are, I suppose, if you get
the hostages out, it is
worth something. It's
harder for me to buy on to
the argument that you
gain serious entree to
political circles in Iran
that will benefit you in the
future. In today's Iran,
any Iranian will take
arms where he can get
them. I doubt he will feel
any warm sentiments of
gratitude.
Associated Press
RIchard Helms
ormer C.I.A. Director
Ex-Ambassador to Iran
It depends a bit on the
extent to which we have
been sending spare parts.
If it is, as I expect, a few
spare parts, I would think
this was not an unfair ex-
change.
The danger in such a
practice is that if one is
prepared to pay for hos-
tages, there may be no
end to the number of hos-
tages taken.
On the other hand, it is
reasonable to say that if
this policy of trying to get
back the hostages does
not work, one can always
jettison it.
The benefits are simple.
It gets back American
citizens who have been
taken by individuals or
groups who have their
own agenda.
In this case, we're deal-
ing with a Lebanese splin-
ter group which wants to
get back from Kuwait
some of its members ar-
rested in that country, but
it is a splinter group not
directed by any foreign
state, be it Iran, Syria, or
Lebanon.
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The New York Times/ Doug Stee
l
R. K. Ramazani Stanfield Turner
Professor of Government Former C.I.A. Director
University of Virginia
The greatest concern I
have is that this is going to
prejudice our chances of
an improving relationship
in Iran in nonstrategic
areas, because it has put
egg on the face of the
moderates, and now the
moderates will go out of
their way to distance
themselves from us.
The possible benefits
one could think about are
establishing some modi-
cum of contact with the
so-called pragmatists,
and therefore pre-
positioning ourselves for
the postwar and post-Kho-
meini period.
If indeed it is not in the
United States interest for
either of two belligerents
in the Iran-Iraq war to
win, then to the extent this
maintains the balance of
power, it Is consistent
with American policies to
give arms.
From Iran, we have
perhaps seen exaggerated
statements that this kind
of deal might reduce our
credibility with friends in
the gulf region. These
countries have their own
reasons to maintain the
dialogue with Iran.
It undermines our abil-
ity to lead the rest of the
world in an anti-terrorist
crusade, which we badly
need to do. We had been
telling other people not to
deal with Iran. What the
rest of the world has to
perceive this as is a self-
ish, contradictory, hypo-
critical move on our part
to do what we told others
not to do.
I am persuaded that
this was primarily a swap
of arms for hostages. It is
asking people to be gulli-
ble to believe otherwise.
Nobody in the Khomeini
Government is going to
cozy up to the United
States. I think it is a very
slim chance as long as
Khomeini is in power, or
even when Khomeini is
gone. We would be well
advised to stay in the
background and let other
free-world nations, such
as Britain, Japan and
France, be the point pee-
ple for bringing Iran back
into the community of na-
tions.
Zbignlew
Brzezinski
National Security Adviser
To President Carter
If we had been able to
obtain the release of all of
the hostages for a single,
self-contained shipment
of arms, she arrangement
would have been distaste-
ful but palatable. Unfortu-
nately we were were
drawn into a situation in
which armed shipments
were apparently traded
for hostages almost on a
one-by-one basis.
That creates two nega-
tive consequences: The
Iranians can string us
along and even take more
hostages in order to keep
the arms flow going. It
creates the impression
that the United States is
siding with Iran against
Iraq in the war.
The effort to establish
some links with some
potential successors to
Khomeini is justified by
the geostrategic impor-
tance of Iran. I do not be-
lieve, however, that this
need entail a continuing
arms-supplying relation-
ship. There are other
ways in which such subtle
relationships could have
been cultivated.
,dam Colby
FFormer C.I.A. Director
I have no objection to
secret diplomacy and
communication with any-
one. It is particularly im-
portant to communicate
with those who are op-
posed to us. On the other
hand, this does not include
providing weaponry.
The danger is a
strengthening of Iran in
the gulf region. This could
lead to pressure on Saudi
Arabia and the gulf states
in the short term. It could
result in a surge of Is-
lamic fundamentalism in
countries such as Egypt,
Pakistan, obviously
Libya, Jordan, and na-
tions all the way from Mo-
rocco to Indonesia.
With the present Gov-
ernment, I have strong
doubts, They have indi-
cated total hostility. Their
cause is fundamentally an
ideological cause against
the "great Satan" - the
United States - and
against modern culture
and society.
Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600400011-9
 ARTICLE ~ Approved For Rel"/~(?/(7c1It4 R00060040001 _a
ON PAGE
13 November 1986
Soviet veto over SDI: it's called the `shootdown'
By Stansfield Turner
P RESIDENT Reagan says that at
Reykjavik, Mikhail Gorbachev de-
manded too much as a price for an
agreement on reductions in armaments -
a veto over the development and deploy-
ment of the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI, or "star wars"). That may sound
like an unrealistic demand, but is -It really,
when Mr. Gorbachev already has a veto?
He has it by virtue of the fact that he
could, and would, physically obstruct us
from building a space-based defense
against ballistic missiles.
. lb understand that, let's put the shoe
on the other foot. What if United States
intelligence told us that the Soviets were
on the verge of constructing an SDI of
their own invention? We would have to be
very concerned that our ballistic missile
force might not be able to retaliate if we
were attacked. If the Soviets also began
multiplying air defenses to the point that
we would not be certain that our bombers
and cruise missiles could get through, we
might conclude that we were about to lose
our ability to retaliate at all to a Soviet
nuclear attack. The doctrine of mutual
assured destruction (MAD), which has re-
strained both us and the Soviets from
initiating nuclear war for more than 30
years, would have broken down.
That could mean the Soviets might ini-
tiate a nuclear war on the presumption
we could not strike back. Or, more likely,
they might blackmail us by threatening a
nuclear attack including, perhaps, a de-
monstrative explosion in some remote
area of the US. In the first case, our
existence would be at stake. In the other,
our free way of life would be in jeopardy.
How would the Soviets respond? They
might knock down some of our space
activities, like photographic satellites. Or
they might complain in the United Na-
tions. Or they might break relations with
us, but they would not attack our soil
with nuclear weapons. They would still
be deterred by our assured retaliatory
capabilities. MAD would prevail.
What, then, if the shoe were on the
Soviet foot instead? It is almost certain
they would do the same, that is knock out
our SDI. Our scientists estimate that it
will take some 600 launches into space
over two years to build an SDI. Even
though we might be able to build an incre-
ment that could defend itself in less time,
there will be a period of nearly total vul-
nerability.
So the Soviets have a veto over our
deploying an SDI even now. What does
that mean in terms of how we negotiate in
the wake of Reyljav k? The President has
staked out his position that after 10 years
of further observance of the ABM Treaty,
we would be free to proceed to SDI.
Gorbachev has staked out his position
that we could not proceed without Soviet
concurrence - a veto. Clearly he would
prefer a negotiated veto to one he'd have
to enforce by shooting. Here, though, is
where our negotiators need to recognize
that Gorbachev can fall back on his shoot-
ing veto if he cannot get a written one.
Our negotiators should also under-
stand there are real advantages for us in
acknowledging the Soviet veto. We have
lived for more than 30 years in a world of
only offensive nuclear forces and strate-
gies. The balance that has kept each side
from using offensive forces has been deli-
cate, so delicate that it would be very ris-
ky for either to shift the rules of the game
unilaterally to a strategy of defense. Such
a dramatic move can be made only in tan-
dem without a real danger of misunder-
standing and overreaction.
Ironically also, the best hope for the
President's dream of a nuclear world In
which defenses predominate is to reduce
the size of both nuclear arsenals substan-
tially. Building a strategic defense for our
entire country against the size of the nu-
clear arsenal the Soviets now have, let
alone could build, is clearly a formidable
undertaking. It's probably not feasible,
There may, though, be hope for building a
defense if the threat is much smaller.
We will get such reductions in the Sovi-
ets' threat only through negotiated agreq-
ments. 1b induce them in that direction,
we would have to agree we would not
deploy an SDI without their concurrence.
Otherwise, their natural inclination
would be to proliferate weapons to give
them a hope of being able to overwhel
our SDI if, for any reason, they did not, or
could not, shoot it down.
The fact that SDI became a cartes cep
Am at Reykjavik has opened the door to
much-needed discussion of the interrelr}-
tionships between offense and defense in
the world of nuclear weaponry . The heart
of that relationship is that today's offen-
sive weapons will permit either side to
prevent the other from building a space-
based defensive system. That's very good
in the search for nuclear stability.
Stan4fceld Turner, author 4f "Se-
crecy and Denuicra