2 PANELS URGE A HALT IN NUCLEAR TESTING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 4, 1986
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE AF EARL proved For Release 2006/0 NEW YORK -&p1qlA--l91 00901 R0006002
ONPAG
12 Panels Urgea Halt in Nuclear
By DAVID K. SHIPLER
speciei to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 3 -- Two
panels of American and European ex-
perts on international affair's asserted
today that a comprehensive test ban
treaty, negotiated by the two great
powers, would go a long way toward
preventing additional countries from
acquiring nuclear weapons.
. After three years of studying the
problems of the spread of nuclear
arms, the Americans and the Euro-
peans agreed in separate reports that a
complete halt in testing by the United
States and the Soviet Union would
create pressure on other. countries to
sign such an accord.
Without testing, the specialists said,
nonnuclear countries would have diffi.
culty developing advanced weapons
and might refrain from crossing the
nuclear threshold.
The Reagan Administration, arguing
that testing was necessary for the
United states to catch up with Soviet
advances, has rejected Moscow's ef-
forts to negotiate a comprehensive test
ban and has refused to reciprocate for
a halt in testing timdertaken independ-
ently by the Russians in recent months.
The 1974 Treaty
The two countries' programs are now
governed by the Threshold Test Ban
Treaty of 1974, which limits nuclear
detonations to underground explosions
of less than 150 kilotons. Mikhail S.
Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has of-
fered to meet President Reagan in Eu-
rope to negotiate a complete ban.
"We're not going to have a real non-
proliferation regime as long as we have
an open race with the Soviet Union in
strategic arms," said the chairman of
the American panel, Gerard C. Smith,
who served as the chief United States
negotiator in the talks that led to the
1972 treaty with the Soviet Union on
.limiting strategic arms.
Similar "psychological and political
linkages" between the test ban and the
spread of nuclear arms were seen by
the chairman of the 11-member Euro-
pean group, Johan Jorgen Hoist, a for-
mer Minister of State in the Norwegian
Foreign and Defense Ministries.
-T
he 'Nuclear Haves'
In gathering signatures on the
Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons of 1968, the "nuclear
haves," Mr. Hoist contended, agreed to
restrain their own arms development
and production.
"The nuclear-haves have not de-
'livered on that bargain," he added. "A
comprehensive test ban treaty would
contribute the major step."
The two reports were published in a
single volume by the Council on For-
eign Relations, which sponsored the
studies in cooperation with the Center
for European Policy Studies in Brus-
sels.
The-23-member American aroun in-
chided James R. Schlesineer. former
Secreta of Defense and former Di-
rector of Central Intelligence: Li t.
Gen. Brent cowcro t. White Hous na-
tional security adviser in the Ford Ad-
ministration; Marshall D. Shulman. a(
s cia list onSoviet affairs at Columbia
University w o served as an adviser in
the Carter Administration, and Warren
M. Christopher, a former Deputy Sec-
retary of Sate. e.
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9 November 1985
Study Says a Small Mobile
Would Help U.S. Deter Soviet Strike
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 7 - At a time
when the Reagan Administration has
proposed a ban on intercontinental mo-
bile missiles, an Air Force analysis is
circulating showing that the develop
meet of an American single-warhead
mobile missile could help the United
States maintain the survivability of its
land-based missile force in a nuclear
conflict.
The Air Force calculations are con-
tained in a draft of a report by the Air
Force's ballistic missile office. The
analysis, prepared before the Adminis-
tration's shift against mobile missiles,
is circulating within the Pentagon and
has been reviewed by some members
of Congress.
The analysis, which was described
by Senator Albert Gore Jr., other Con-
gressional sources and Pentagon offi-
cials, deals with the number of Soviet
weapons that would be needed for an
effective barrage attack on a force of
American Midgetman missiles, ac-
cording to different scenarios.
Mr. Gore, who has been a leading
Congressional proponent of the Midget-
man program, said that the analysis
supports the conclusion that the Midg-
etman "offers a way to escape the theo-
retical first-strike vulnerability" of the
American land-based missile force,
"which has been the central stated con-
cern of President Reagan."
Reagan Arms Proposal
He said that if the analysis had been
made available to Congress before the
Reagan Administration disclosed its
new arms proposal "it would have been
impossible for the Administration
propose a ban on mobile missiles."
The Air Force analysis was prepared
as part of more comprehensive De-
fense Department report to Congress
on the Midgetman program, which was
due last Oct. 1. Congressional propo-
nents of the Midgetman have com-
plained that the report was deliber-
ately delayed.
A Defense Department official said
that civilian experts in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense have not yet had a
chance to examine the Air Force analy-
sis and are uncertain whether they
agree with it. The Pentagon official
said that that the report was one of sev-
eral on which the Pentagon has fallen
behind. The charges that the Pentagon
had held back the report, he added,
"are complete and total nonsense."
Although the Air Force has not deter-
mined the exact size of a mobile mis-
sile force, its analysis assumes that 500
single-warhead mobile Midgetman
missiles would be deployed on new
hardened mobile launchers that would
have the capability to withstanding a
blast pressure of 30 pounds per square
inch. The development of such a
launcher is an objective of the Midget.
man program and would be a signifi-
cant technological accomplishment.
Based on Military Reservations
According to the Air Force analysis,
these moIbi a missile launchers would
patrol a 5,000-square-mile area on a
small number of United States military
reservations. Given warning of a Soviet
attack, the Midgetman missiles would
be dispersed within a 15,000-square-
mile area on military land, Mr. Gore
said.
A successful Soviet barrage attack
on mobile Midgetman missiles within
this 15,000 square-mile-area would re-
quire using almost all of the Soviet cur-
rent land-based missile force, Mr. Gore
said. This would leave the Soviet Union
with few quick and accurate weapons
to hit other targets.
A Defense Department official cm
firmed Senator Gore's reading of the
Air Force. analysis, but cautioned that
the ability of Midgetman missiles to
disperse quickly within a 15,000-
square-mile area depended on the as-
sumption that the Midgetman missiles
would be kept continually on patrol and
not in garrisons on the military reser-
vation. If the Midgetman missiles were
based in special garrisons, they could
be more vulnerable to an attack, this
official said. He added that no decision
has yet been made on the missile's
"concept of operation."
The Air Force analysis does not con-
sider how reductions in the number of
offensive nuclear weapons would affect
the ability of the Midgetman to survive
attack. But Senator Gore said that it
the method of the Air Force analysis is
applied to the reduced level of arms en-
visioned in the Soviet and American
arms control proposals, the number of
warheads required to attack an Amer-
ican land-based missile force of Midg-
etman missiles, 50 MX missiles and
some Minuteman missiles, "would go
above the number of warheads" re-
tained by the Soviet Union."
Arguments for Mobile Missile
Proponents of small one-warhead
mobile missiles argue that they would
help stabilize the strategic balance be.
cause they would present a less inviting
target than' a 10-warhead MX and
would be difficult to attack. Some sup-
porters argue that mobile missiles are
a cheaper and more effective way of
reducing the vulnerability of land-
based missiles than proceeding with
the Administration's Strategic Defense
Initiative program, popularly known
as "Star Wars."
Some critics have questioned the
Midgetman program on technical
grounds. And some Pentagon officials
have privately questioned the program
on cost grounds and have expressed
skepticism that Congress will uli-
mately provide all of the funds for a
program that by some estimates could
cost over $40 billion for a force of 500
missiles.
The Administration decision to seek
a ban on mobile missiles marked an
abrupt departure. Paul H. Nitze, a sen-
ior adviser to President Reagan and
Secretary of State George P. Shultz on
arms control matters, spoke about the
"stabilizing" effect of the Midgetman
program in an Oct. 24 speech to the
American Defense Preparedness As-
sociation. Days later, the Administra-
tion decided to propose a ban on mobile
missiles. In that speech, Mr.. Nitze'
complained that a ban on new types of
offensive weapons proposed by the
Soviet Union would prevent the devel-
opment of "more survivable ICBM's,
including the new small ICBM, Midget-
man."
In a related developed, Gen. Brent
Scowcroft told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee today that the
development of American and Soviet
mobile missiles could lead to a more
stable nuclear balance. General Scow-
croft, a retired Air Force officer who
chaired the 1983 Presidential Commis-
sion on Strategic Forces, said that
partly as a result of the proposed ban,
American nuclear policy "is a state of
strategic confusion or disarray."
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of
Defense in the Ford Administration,
told the committee he believed that the
Administration action was motivated
partly by "tactical" concerns since the
Soviet Union is ahead of the United
States in the development of interconti-
nental mobile missiles.
,He added that the Central Intelli-
gence A en "is exceeding con-
cerned about e verification promo missues r.
Schlesinger said that "it is important
tates to .
in t ie long run Tor the United
.retain the option o mobility."
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 ARTICLE dppuRED
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TIME
8 July 1985
The Problems with Retalial
Fir ex-CIA chiefs weigh the options for countering terrorism
he TWA hijacking have fed
he desire to find some way to
o to terrorists what they are
oing to American citizens.
threaten and perhaps take the lives of hi-
jackers? Might swift retribution deter ter-
rorists, or at least punish them? What
about covert counterterror, the capacity to
identify and eliminate terrorists, pre-emp-
Navy strike team trains In California
"If there are casualties, so be it. "
tively or in retaliation? TIME Washington
Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott put these
questions to four former directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency. All agreed
that the U.S. should move vigorously and
effectively to oppose terrorism but not
adopt assassination as an instrument of
policy.
Each of the former CIA chiefs has had
other experiences that bear on the current
challenge. Richard Helms (Director of
Central Intelligence from 1966 to 1973)
spent many years in the CIA's clandestine
services and was Ambassador to Iran from
1973 to 1976, so he knows about Shiite
fundamentalism firsthand. James Schle-
singer (DCI from January through June
1973) was Secretary of Defense from 1973
to 1975. William Colby (DCI, 1973 to 1976)
ran the highly controversial Phoenix
counterinsurgency program in Viet Na
from 1968 to 1971. And at the reques
of Annapolis Classmate Jimmy Carter,
Stansfield Turner (DCI, 1977 to 1981) came
to the CIA from a career in the Navy. Their
interviews with Talbott follow.
RICHARD HELMS
It is very important to keep these inci-
dents in perspective and not get so incred-
ibly worked up over them. Terrorism, of
course, is a serious challenge, and we must
do our best to deal with it. But to declare a
"war on terrorism" is just to hype the
problem, not solve it. The quiet, steady
approach is better than bombast.
As for assassination, it's just not on.
The people of the U.S. won't stand for it.
In fact, there are problems with all levels
of violent action. Let's say the Delta Force
puts on masks and goes in and blows up
an installation around Beirut. We've vio-
lated the sovereignty of Lebanon and
killed a lot of people in cold blood. Are
they terrorists? You'll have a lot of argu-
ment about that, just on our side alone.
What if you send in a coup-de-main
group of civilians [a hit team]? If it comes
out that they were Americans-and it
takes no time at all for that kind of thing
to unravel in public-you're facing all
sorts of allegations.
If, instead, the blow-and-burn stuff is
done by surrogates whom you've trained
in the black arts and given a suitable cov-
er, there is a whole other set of problems.
If you've recruited them from dissidents
who have an ideological motivation, they
may be very hard to control. You may
think you've called the. operation off and
wake up one morning and find out they've
gone and done it anyway.
Let's say we have reason to believe that
Khomeini or Gaddafi is behind some ter-
rorist act, so you decide to strike by attack-
ing the Iranian oil fields or a Libyan air force
base. In the latter case, you've now got all
the Arabs against you. Saudi Arabia, Egypt
and the moderates will feel immense pres-
sure to line up with their Arab brethren.
We've got to get used to the disagreeable fact
that there really is no quick fix for terrorism.
What we do need is improved intelligence
work against terrorist groups. Penetration
can help derail the nasty stuff. When I was
in the agency, the CIA penetrated the P.L.O.,
and we helped head offseveral terrorist acts,
including an assassination attempt against
Golda Meir.
We also need improved cooperation
among free-world intelligence services. As
long as we have a leaky Congress and a
leaky oversight process, friendly services
C011Ull W
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APPEA ED __77
43*3
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Summer 1985
James Schlesinger
THE EAGLE AND THE BEAR:
Ruminations on Forty Years
Of Superpower Relations
he linkup of American and Soviet forces at Torgau on
the Elbe in April 1945 may be taken as the event symbolizing
a new era in international relations-one largely dominated by
the central relationship between two great powers, later known
as the superpowers. The meeting at Torgau meant the splitting
of Germany, the preeminent European power for three-quar-
ters of a century. Germany's division was to be both a fixture
of the postwar era and, additionally, a continuing source of
unease. Also, the event dramatically initiated what was to
become die Wacht an der Elbe, an American protection against
the power of the East of what was to become a democratic
Germany-and behind Germany an abiding American com-
mitment to the security of Western Europe. Despite the mis-
judgments in the immediate aftermath of the war, the lessons
of two world wars had been insinuated into American foreign
policy. Finally, in the way of symbolism, perhaps the brief
exchange of fire between Soviet and American forces on the
Elbe provided an early harbinger of the tensions that were
ultimately to emerge.
To be sure, the war had not entirely run its course. Yet
within a matter of weeks Hitler was dead and Germany had
surrendered unconditionally. Roosevelt, too, who through
America's immense power had become the dominant leader of
the West, was gone. The war against Japan was yet to be
completed, but because of the bomb, it turned out to be almost
a sideshow. The Soviet motive for joining the war against Japan
was more akin to that of Mussolini in 1940-to participate in
the spoils as the war was concluded-than it was to the spirit
of the grand coalition.
The American desire was to fulfill the promise of Wilsonian
idealism, of the Four Freedoms, of collective security and of
the peaceful resolution of disputes through new international
institutions. Russian goals were to establish a firm communist
base in Europe, to create a cordon sanitaire against Western
power, and unquestionably to obtain a position of authority in
postwar deliberations at least equivalent to that of Tsar Alex-
ander in 1815.
Carwnued
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Yet the tone of the relationship had already changed. Pots-
dam was quite different from Yalta. Only Stalin continued in
power. 'The new American President was figuratively as well
as literally from Missouri. He did not, indeed could not, share
Roosevelt's expectation of enticing Stalin and the Soviet Union
into a harmonious postwar structure. By the Potsdam meeting
in July, America had passed beyond its wartime dream of long-
term international collaboration with the Russians to a new
and skeptical study of actual Soviet conduct.
Churchill, too, was gone. Perhaps the great symbolic Western
leader in the wartime period, he had been replaced by Clement
Attlee. And Britain, one of the Big Three, commenced a long-
term decline from the prestige of the wartime period, lacking
the resources and perhaps the will to maintain its place with its
immensely powerful, continent-spanning allies. Britain's long-
term decline was symptomatic of the radically altered position
of Europe. Europe's Great Powers were destined never to
recover to the extent then anticipated. They would remain
dependent upon the United States for protection. Post World
War II Europe would be altogether different from post World
War I Europe. Whatever its inclinations, America could not go
home again.
Nonetheless, it tried. Therein lies a great irony of the postwar
period. In these latter days of discussions of the prospects for
mutual disarmament or arms control through negotiations, it
is forgotten that in 1945 the United States sought no mutual
concessions or guarantees from the Soviet Union. No protests
could then be made about the intransigence of the American
position. The United States simply and unilaterally disarmed.
The country gave way to the impulse to "bring the boys home."
The pace of demobilization can only be described as pell-mell.
The draft was ended. Military units were heedlessly broken up.
By 1947, aside from a handful of atomic weapons, U.S. military
power had been largely dismantled. In a reborn quest for
"normalcy," President Truman had terminated Lend-Lease
within a few days of the war's end. America sought normalcy.
Disarmament had occurred-without negotiations.
The irony, of course, is that it was the Soviet Union that
brought America's precipitate withdrawal to an end-and
thereby forfeited a heaven-sent opportunity. Whether it was
Stalin's brooding genius, his innate Georgian suspicion or deep
paranoia, it was he who brought the United States back to a
sense of its international responsibilities. The gradual elimina-
tion of dissent in Eastern Europe, culminating in the defenes-
tration of Masaryk and the Czech coup in 1948, was accom-
panied by pressures against Greece and Turkey and by the
Berlin blockade. Truman rose to the challenge. America re-
versed course: there was the Greek-Turkish aid program, the
Marshall Plan and the Berlin airlift. Moreover, by 1947 the
draft was restored and the United States began a modest
Continued
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rebuilding o its ml itary orces, to greatly augmen
the invasion of Korea in June 1950.
The Russians had committed a colossal blunder. They had
failed to understand-and to exploit-the rhythms of the
American democracy. Imbued as they were with their own
interpretation of America's geopolitical necessities, the Rus-
sians failed to grasp that the Americans simply did not think
the same way. The Americans had not read Lenin or Clausewitz
or Machiavelli. The themes of realpolitik remain contrary to
the spirit of the American democracy. But the Russians did not
know that. The paradox was that the Soviet understanding of
America's geopolitical requirements was closer to the mark
than was the American understanding. In a profound sense it
was Soviet misreading of the United States that induced Amer-
ica to accept its role in the central strategic relationship of the
last 40 years.
The Soviets' extraordinary misinterpretation of the Ameri-
can character and American style poses a question which de-
serves careful examination and may provide a long-term and
perhaps tragic theme for superpower relations. Are the moods
of the superpowers, reflecting both longer-term and more
recent experiences as well as their internal political dynamics,
so out-of-phase with one another that they preclude simultane-
ity in seeking a modus vivendi? That question has become
increasingly pressing, as the visible American willingness to
reach a long-term accommodation during the 1970s was
aborted as a consequence of the Soviets' deep-seated impulses
never to flag in the quest for marginal advantages. By the end
of the 1970s, the Soviets had managed to dispel much of the
American goodwill (and a fair amount of naivete as well). The
American anger continued, indeed expanded, during the
1980s-at just the point that the Soviets might have been
prepared to accept a longer-term accommodation. These con-
trapuntal fluctuations in mood may turn out to be the most
permanent feature of these 40 years of superpower relations.
By the end of the 1940s the general outlines of American
policy had been set. They reflected a determination to protect
the democracies of Western Europe and Japan, but additionally
(and somewhat adventitiously) picking up responsibility for
other states around the Soviet periphery, such as Greece,
Turkey and Iran. Conceptually, policy rested upon a strategy
of containment, reflecting the seminal views of George Ken-
nan. But containment came to imply far heavier emphases on
military measures and less on political measures than Kennan
personally would have liked (a concern that has increasingly
come to preoccupy him as these four decades have progressed).
Moreover, containment-at base a pragmatic strategy-came
within the ordinary exigencies of American life to bear those
very features of moralism and legalism that Kennan himself
had feared and decried as the characteristics of American
foreign policy.
3
t;ontinued
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 Approq @rcF#pk!f#M&WWair~fi~lca
may be called the Dulles phase of the Eisenhower presidency.
They were reflected in a certain preachiness and in the crusad-
ing rhetoric that Americans tend to find so attractive. But they
were also reflected in the U.S. sulkiness at the 1954 Geneva
conference on Indochina, in the U.S. refusal to accept the
results of that conference, in the unwillingness of Secretary
Dulles to accept the proffered hand of Zhou Enlai-and in the
frozen diplomatic relations with "Red China," which were to
have such baleful effects in Southeast Asia in the 1960s, and
which continued until Nixon unfroze them in the early 1970s.
The moralistic-legalistic approach to foreign policy was to reach
another high point, after that realpolitik of the Nixon-Kissinger
years, during the Carter years. Perhaps the most revealing
episode in placing legality above geopolitical reality came in
late 1979 with the vehement, and in some ways extraordinary,
reaction to the movement of Soviet forces across the interna-
tional boundary into Afghanistan. In reality, the geopolitical
damage had been done a year and a half earlier with the
overthrow of the Daoud regime and the establishment of
Moscow's protege regime in Kabul.
The emphasis upon the military aspect of containment inten-
sified during the 1950s. That emphasis, of course, had been
reinforced by Korea and the sudden revelation that fewer
nations could realistically be placed "outside the American
defense perimeter." President Truman had seized the oppor-
tunity to ease a domestic political problem by establishing a
quarantine in the Straits of Formosa during the war itself. But
after the armistice the policy actually expanded-into the
military containment of "Red China." One result was the
immensely high domestic political effect of the militarily incon-
sequential struggle over the offshore islands of Quemoy and
Matsu. Indeed, the tendency to equate military strategy with
foreign policy reached its apogee with the doctrine of massive
retaliation and its later corollary that we would respond by
fighting wars "at times and in places of our own choosing."
America's military advantages were immense during the
1950s. Our dominant position in strategic nuclear capabilities
meant quite simply that the United States could essentially
flatten the Soviet Union, with only the most limited Soviet
ability to retaliate against the continental United States. This
dominant position in nuclear forces lured the United States
into what was to become an excessive reliance on nuclear
weapons. It was enshrined in the doctrine of massive retaliation,
which, however great the reservations of intellectuals, re-
mained workable-as long as the United States retained stra-
tegic dominance. But it was unsustainable in the long run.
America's inherently transitory advantages in nuclear
weapons seduced the United States and its Western allies into
almost total dependency on the threat of nuclear retaliation.
In 1954 the United States adopted the New Look, emphasizing
nuclear forces and reduced spending-and allowed its land
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and tactical air capabilities to remain weak. The NATO alliance
abandoned the Lisbon force goals of 1950 and thereby solidi-
fied the habit of leaning on the nuclear crutch. For the short
run there might be certitude, but in the longer run it implied
for the West an uncertain trumpet, the biblical phrase that
Maxwell Taylor used to indicate our eventual vulnerability.
Needless to say, the problem of conventional military weakness
has continued to haunt the Western alliance.
Yet the Soviets themselves must have been continuously
haunted throughout the 1950s and later by their unquestioned
inferiority in terms of intercontinental strike forces. No doubt
the shift in alliance strategy to immediate use of nuclear
weapons brought pause to the Soviets regarding the advantages
that might be wrung from their immense conventional estab-
lishment. But that immense conventional establishment in turn
caused perplexity and concern in the West. Given the almost
disarmed state of Western Europe, what gain could the Soviets
derive from maintaining a World War II-sized army of 165
divisions?
Those in the West inclined to provide rationales-or ration-
alizations-for Soviet behavior hypothesized that thus holding
Europe hostage provided the Soviets with their deterrent against
the Americans. The threat of a massive attack that could
overrun Western Europe, so the hypothesis ran, would deter
the Americans from exploiting their overwhelming advantages
in nuclear forces. But fear of that immense Soviet force,
augmented by other Warsaw Pact capabilities, led to a general
rearmament by the West and to the further expansion of
American nuclear forces.
Whether the rationale attributed to the Soviets by Western
analysts did play any serious role in Soviet thinking is still
unknown. It was plausible. It fit the circumstances. It may even
have been true. It should be rioted, nonetheless, that even as
the Soviets developed an intercontinental counterdeterrent to
offset American capabilities, the Soviet Union maintained and
expanded its military forces arrayed against Western Europe.
In itself that should raise a question in the minds of those
inclined to provide rationalizations for the structure of Soviet
forces. Even if the old rationale had once played a role in
determining the size of Soviet military forces, quite clearly a
new explanation was now required.
The military dominance that the United States achieved
during the 1950s could not be permanently sustained-and
cannot be recovered. As late as 1956, during the Hungarian
uprising, the Soviets were obliged carefully to consider possible
American military reactions-even within their own satellite
empire. By contrast, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia and even more
clearly in Poland in the early 1980s, the relative Soviet position
had so improved that they needed to give little attention to the
arantinued
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cou d indulge in his bluster during the Suez incident about
raining rockets down on London and Paris-only after it had
become clear that the United States was separating itself from
its allies. Under any other circumstances the Soviets could not
risk provoking the United States, given its military edge.
Eisenhower himself was far more inclined than Dulles to
practice an open and flexible diplomacy toward the Soviet
Union. That ultimately resulted in the atmosphere of detente,
enshrined in the spirit of Camp David from the late 1950s, as
well as in secondary manifestations such as Khrushchev's her-
alded journey to Roswell Garst's Iowa farm and his visit to
Hollywood. It also resulted in the Atoms for Peace proposal-
including, rather farsightedly, the establishment of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, in which the United States
and the Soviet Union have effectively worked together.
Perhaps most notable, though inevitably abortive, was the
"Open Skies" proposal. That proposal was a prelude to the
numerous U-2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union
and to the shoot-down in 1960 that blew up the Paris summit
and dispelled the spirit of detente. Until Gary Powers' flight,
the Soviets had been forced to watch helplessly while American
planes overflew their territory. Then their SA-2 antiaircraft
missile ended that period of frustration and technological envy.
But it heightened Soviet respect for and fear of American
technology, further reinforced during the 1960s by the speed
of the deployment of our Minuteman force and by the clear-
cut superiority of the U.S. technology embodied in the Safe-
guard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system as compared to the
Soviet Galosh system. Such Soviet experience has bred a sense
of technical inferiority vis-a-vis the United States that borders
on a psychosis. The succession of the Open Skies proposal by
the flight of the U-2 may help explain the apparently excessive
Soviet reaction to President Reagan's Star Wars proposal.
Given that earlier, humiliating experience, the Soviets will no
doubt be wondering: what might these technological wizards
now have up their sleeves?
The arrival of the Kennedy Administration, in light of the
campaign assertions regarding the missile gap and in the after-
math of the blow-up of the Paris summit, brought significant
changes. The ignominious failure of the Bay of Pigs operation,
the bullying of the young President by Khrushchev at the
Vienna summit, the renewed Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile
confrontation all contributed to the grim mood within an
Administration dedicated to going anywhere, paying any price,
et cetera, to preserve freedom. Late in 1961, new reconnais-
sance techniques revealed that the missile gap was in fact a
myth and that the strategic advantage continued to rest with
the United States. But that disclosure alleviated only slightly
the tension felt during the Cuban missile crisis the next year.
Cof;tJnue
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tion changed. It became both less grim and less wedded to its
original missionary zeal. The Administration's interest in arms
control was stimulated. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was
signed in 1963-with the intention that it be the first fruit of
a much lengthier arms control process. Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara, who during the early years of the Admin-
istration had proposed counterforce strategies, city avoidance,
civil defense and damage limitation, turned increasingly away
from such concepts after 1963 and began to elaborate the
strategy of mutual assured destruction. In the last year of the
Kennedy Administration and throughout the Johnson Admin-
istration, the U.S. strategic force posture came to be guided by
a belief in arms restraint-which it was presumed would be
emulated by the Soviets. It became an article of faith that the
Soviets would terminate their intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) deployment at 1,000 missiles, as we had, if indeed they
chose to deploy that many. (They did not, in fact, stop until
1,618.)
From the first, the Kennedy Administration had shared
General Taylor's skepticism regarding reliance on the threat
of nuclear retaliation. It substantially increased funding for
conventional forces-and explicitly repudiated the New Look
strategy inherited from the Eisenhower Administration. A new
administration, reflecting both the campaign rhetoric regard-
ing "suicide or surrender" and Secretary McNamara's strong
convictions, was determined to provide a conventional deter-
rent in Europe that would by itself preclude Soviet conven-
tional attack. It also sought to establish a firebreak prior to any
use of nuclear weapons.
Sound as Secretary McNamara's logic might have been re-
garding the buildup of conventional forces, it signally failed to
recognize the psychology of our allies. The allies were wedded
to reliance on nuclear retaliation. The proposed buildup of
conventional capabilities was both resented and opposed be-
cause it would supposedly weaken deterrence and would thus
invite attack by the superior Soviet conventional forces. Given
their experiences, the allies had no desire "to refight World
War II." They portrayed as the only alternatives either the
agony of a conventional war or continuing peace through
nuclear deterrence. The Administration failed to help its own
case-by its rhetoric about the nuclear firebreak, by its ex-
pressed abhorrence of any reliance on a nuclear strategy, and
by its emphasis on building up conventional forces as a substitute
for nuclear response. It thus made very slow headway in its
attempt to move away from reliance on immediate nuclear
retaliation. Ultimately, it required both the departure of
France from the integrated military structure and the passage
of seven years before the alliance adopted the strategy of
flexible response in 1967.
By 1965, however, the Johnson Administration's attention
had begun to shift elsewhere, and at an accelerating pace. The
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war in Vietnam ecame the preoccupation of the A ministra-
tion and the focus of an increasingly rancorous domestic de-
bate. Gradually NATO became a secondary issue. It was increas-
ingly neglected, as the government's attention turned toward
Southeast Asia.
Two things should be especially noted about the pre-Nixon
Vietnam years. First, the Administration's rationale was pri-
marily directed not at the Soviet Union, but at "Red China."
Much, indeed far too much, was made of Lin Biao's rather
obscure prose about ultimately seizing the cities by initially
controlling the countryside. This was interpreted as a direct
threat to encircle the industrial world through control of Third
World countries such as Vietnam. President Johnson pro-
ceeded around the rim of Asia proclaiming the need to defeat
this malevolent strategy before we faced "a billion Chinese
armed with nuclear weapons." Indeed, the decision in 1967 to
deploy the Sentinel ABM system, featuring a thin area defense
of the continental United States, was directed primarily at a
prospective Chinese nuclear threat.
However far-fetched such reasoning may appear in retro-
spect, in this period the Soviets were increasingly viewed as a
restraining influence within the communist world-who
shared the American aspiration for some degree of interna-
tional stability. Compared to Mao, the Soviets were viewed as
relatively benign.
In the early years of Vietnam, it was widely believed (a view
that I found preposterous) that the Soviets were deeply con-
cerned that Vietnam might get out of hand, and therefore
were our partners in seeking a settlement of the issue. The
possibility that the Soviets might positively enjoy watching the
Americans stewing in their own juice was rejected out of hand.
That the Soviets would immensely benefit from the refocusing
of American attention on the supposed Chinese threat, and
from the diversion of American resources away from Western
Europe and the competition in strategic forces, was a reality all
too rarely examined in Washington. Surely the Soviets would
eagerly help extricate the American bacon from the Vietnam-
ese fire. Given these preoccupations and these beliefs, it is
hardly surprising that the conviction took hold that the Soviets
also shared American objectives with respect to arms control.
It was an article of faith that the Soviets sought only to match
American strategic capability; their buildup would cease as they
approached American force levels. That the Soviets do not
think like American liberals has been a lesson very slowly
learned.
The upshot was a growing faith in the inevitability of arms
control and in the effectiveness of the arms control process.
Collaboration on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (where super-
power interests coincided) furthered such hopes. At the Glass-
boro summit in 1967, the Americans attempted to persuade
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Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin of the legitimacy of these views.
Simultaneously they attempted to dissuade the Soviets from
deploying strategic defenses-for that would result simply in
the accelerated deployment of strategic offensive forces.
Though they failed to move Kosygin on that occasion, they
continued to believe that the logical force of their arguments
would ultimately persuade the Soviets.
All these hopes, however, were suddenly dashed by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That invasion, which to less
Utopian observers of Soviet conduct appeared inevitable in the
circumstances, rather surprisingly caught the Administration
by surprise. As in 1960, an external event had interrupted the
arms control process. The American reaction to what in Soviet
eyes should have been accepted as a fortuitous, if not irrelevant,
event-later repeated in Angola and even more markedly in
Afghanistan-makes sustained and unvarying participation in
bilateral arms negotiations impossible for the American de-
mocracy. V
Expectations regarding a new and more congenial relation-
ship with the Soviet Union reached a peak during the Nixon
years-and then faded. Nixon himself was unusual among
American presidents in that he came to office with a consuming
interest in, and well-formulated views about, foreign policy.
The principal achievements of his Administration lay in that
arena. Nor were these achievements preponderantly in rela-
tions with the Soviet Union. Perhaps the pinnacle was the new
and pragmatic relationship with the People's Republic of
China, which only a Republican president could have initiated.
By opening the door to triangular diplomacy, it markedly
affected superpower relations. Overall it has provided sizable
benefits in terms of international stability. The withdrawal of
American forces from Vietnam and the Paris Agreements,
though they provided something less than "peace with honor,"
permitted the United States to devote its energies finally to far
more significant issues. With Henry Kissinger's careful prod-
ding, a degree of stability and even some progress was achieved
in the Middle East.
Nixon's style in foreign affairs was wholly pragmatic. It may
even be inquired whether an approach so cold-blooded, and
therefore so uncongenial to the American temperament, did
not contribute to the various waves of ideology that followed
the Nixon years. The central feature of Nixon's approach to
the Soviet Union was the quest for "an era of negotiations, not
of confrontation." Given Soviet foreign policy objectives and
the Soviet style, that would require a degree of emotional
detachment on the part of the American people that was not
long sustainable. Almost inevitably the Polands and Afghani-
stans lead to confrontation, even if the Angolas and Nicaraguas
do not.
But in 1969 all that lay in the future. Putting Czechoslovakia
firmly behind us, the new Administration revived the strategic
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U.S.-Soviet relations. Nixon was not one to proceed to the
bargaining table without the wherewithal for bargaining. The
Administration proceeded toward the first-stage deployment
of the Safeguard ABM system (which unlike the Sentinel system
was intended primarily to defend the missile fields). That
decision was to have a highly felicitous impact on the negotia-
tions. The Administration also decided on the rapid MIRVing
(equipping with multiple independently targetable warheads)
of both the Minuteman and Poseidon forces, with a beneficial
effect on the bargaining process in the short term, but with a
far less satisfactory long-term result. As soon as the United
States initiated ABM deployment, Soviet willingness to bargain
rose. The Soviets wanted no limitations on strategic offensive
weapons, but they were notably eager to head off a major ABM
deployment. Nixon took the position that there would be no
ABM treaty-unless there was also limitation on strategic offen-
sive arms. The Soviets yielded, though the constraints imposed
were quite limited. The culmination lay in the Moscow agree-
ments of May 1972.
For those agreements to have achieved the purpose of sta-
bilizing the central U.S.-Soviet relationship, the Soviets would
have had to accept them in the larger spirit that the Americans
intended. As in 1945, Americans were ready for an end to
confrontation. But the Soviet craving to press for every advan-
tage not specifically precluded by the agreements once again
dissipated the vast goodwill generated among Americans.
For the limitation on offensive forces to have contributed to
arms stability, the Soviets would have had to refrain from
exploiting through new technology the possibilities allowed
under the agreement. Rut start na imm,-rliotahy -A.-.t,o
o the Moscow agreements in mid-May 1 , t ere was a
veritable explosion of Soviet R&D activity on all of the _new
g
eneration of missiles. Apparently the Soviets had deliberately
American signature was dr
on the agreements. As director of Central Intelligence_ I re-
implication to the National Security Council early in 1973 If
the Soviets were to marry the huge throw-weight advantages
that they retained under the agreement with the new technol-
ogies in missile guidance and MiRVing, the result would be an
American disadvantage rn counterforce that we could not
tolerate.
For the next two and a half years-and far beyond-the
question of how to rescind Soviet throw-weight advantages
became central to our Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).
In June of 1974 President Nixon carried to the Soviet Union
a proposal to establish a firm limit on MIRVed missile throw-
weight. The erosions of Watergate and the characteristics of
Soviet bargaining led to its rejection. Nonetheless, it would
l0,
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have been in the Soviets' long-term interest to have accepted
that proposal.
But for the time being the superpower relationship was
characterized by an effusion of goodwill. Brezhnev's American
tour in 1973-ten-gallon hats and all-was even more success-
ful, if less ebullient, than Khrushchev's. Countless delegations
spanned the oceans negotiating scientific and cultural exchange
agreements on trade and technology, and the like. From the
standpoint of the Soviet Union it was a rewarding period. But
the Soviets could not leave well enough alone. They proceeded
to poison the goose that laid the golden eggs.
It should perhaps be emphasized that for the Soviets the
fault lay not in deception but in subconscious impulse. On the
American side there was illusion-an exaggeration of the un-
derlying meaning of detente. For the Soviets, detente repre-
sented simply an updated variant of Leninist peaceful coexist-
ence: an absence of direct military conflict between the major
powers. It certainly did not mean an end to international
conflict. Indeed, the Soviets repeatedly stated that "detente
requires an intensification of the ideological struggle." If there
was deception, it was self-deception on the American side.
Given the mood of the times, too many Americans insisted on
reading more into detente than the Soviets intended.
Most dramatically was this the case in the Third World. The
Soviets had, of course, paid some lip service to abandoning the
search for marginal advantage-as in the "Basic Principles" of
U.S.-Soviet relations. But such grand declarations, however
satisfying, were not much of an inhibition when good oppor-
tunities presented themselves. In American eyes an early blow
against detente occurred in 1973 with the Yom Kippur War.
Soviet attempts to stimulate and to exploit that war were
startling to many Americans. The culmination was the Brezh-
nev letter to Nixon threatening to move Soviet forces into the
region and urging, in effect, a Soviet-American condominium
over the Middle East. It resulted in the alert of America's
military forces and, ultimately, a slow ebbing of the crisis. But
the atmosphere of detente never thereafter fully recovered.
While the Americans might not have known what the inten-
sification of the ideological conflict implied in 1972, within a
few years they were more enlightened. The Soviets had been
quite clear regarding their obligation to continue to support
wars of national liberation. Whether or not the Arab-Israeli
conflict could qualify under this rubric, adventures in Africa
or Southeast Asia clearly did. The intervention of Cuban troops
in Angola in 1975 was a further blow to detente-and an
indirect blow even to arms control negotiations. But the Soviets
had intended no armistice in Third World rivalries. If the
Americans were disappointed, it was because they had expected
more of the Soviets than the Soviets believed they had prom-
ised.
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Kissinger grittily attempted to keep the arms control nego-
tiations going. At Vladivostok, President Ford in 1974 achieved
a potentially useful cap on strategic offensive arms through
joint acceptance of equal aggregates of 2,400 missile launchers
and heavy bombers. But its potential was never realized. More-
over, during the political campaign in 1976 President Ford felt
obliged to drop the word "detente" from his vocabulary.
The evolution of NATO relations during the Nixon-Ford
years needs to be recounted. As the American-Soviet rap-
prochement grew, the European reaction was rather ambiva-
lent. Needless to say, Europeans were generally pleased with
the reduced threat of war. Yet, particularly on the European
right, there was widespread apprehension that an American-
Soviet condominium was being established over the body of
Europe. The American style in negotiations, which the Euro-
peans found to be excessively secretive and short on consulta-
tion, added to the suspicion.
The upshot came in the somewhat ludicrous quarrels about
the "Year of Europe" that Henry Kissinger announced at the
beginning of 1973. The Europeans, with their somewhat
heightened sensitivities, took this to be condescending. Some
tied the notion to a Soviet-American condominium to settle
Europe-without further consultation. Resentment was wide-
spread, fanned for its own special reasons by the French gov-
ernment. Yet the suspicion was unwarranted. What Kissinger
desired-and desired most fervently-was more firmly to in-
stitutionalize the Atlantic relationship before the generation of
Americans who recalled the postwar period passed away.
However worthwhile the effort, it was abortive. Soviet-Amer-
ican rapprochement seriously weakened the bonds of the alli-
ance. Europeans felt the need for American protection less
keenly, and their suspicion that the superpowers were plotting
things behind their backs was increased. Problems within the
alliance were intensified after the fall of 1973 because of basic
disagreements regarding the handling of the Arab-Israeli war
and its aftermath.
A few words should be said about military matters within
NATO, for military developments tended somewhat to alleviate
the political tensions within the alliance. With the end of the
war in Southeast Asia, I was determined, as incoming secretary
of defense, to refocus America's military commitment upon
the European security issues that had been so neglected during
the war years. I devoted considerable effort to defeating the
Mansfield Amendment. Its failure came as a pleasant surprise
to the Europeans, who had anticipated a drawdown of Ameri-
can forces. Also, the doctrine governing the use of America's
strategic forces was altered to emphasize selective strikes. This
would permit avoidance of the targeting of cities, which would
provide the Soviets with a powerful incentive to avoid striking
Western cities. By making an American nuclear response more
credible, these changes served to recouple America's strategic
forces to the security of Western Europe.
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New emphasis was also placed on the conventional deterrent.
This was, of course, made possible by the rebuilding and the
ultimate reinforcement of America's ground and tactical air
forces in Europe. But it also required a change in doctrinal
emphasis. I had benefited from the doctrinal misfortunes of
my predecessor, Secretary McNamara. I consequently coined
the term "NATO triad." Its underlying analytical concept was
that the triad's three legs-conventional, strategic and tactical
nuclear-were mutually reinforcing. Thus the strengthening of
conventional capabilities would, for example, augment the
deterrent effect of tactical nuclear forces. I stressed that con-
ventional forces were not intended to be a substitute for nuclear
deterrence, but to strengthen it. With these changes in empha-
sis, European doctrinal objections to the strengthening of con-
ventional forces were significantly diminished. Outside of
France, the obstacle to the building of the conventional deter-
rent became primarily budgetary rather than doctrinal.
In retrospect, the election of 1976 constituted a watershed
in American foreign policy. It brought to an end an extended
period of pragmatism, and launched a new period of the
moralism-legalism that has long marked the American style in
foreign policy. In the first phase, liberal moralism surged to
the fore; in the second phase, conservative moralism.
After a few years in office both the Carter and Reagan
Administrations moderated their policies and rhetoric, but
compared to their predecessors the degree of ideological zeal
remained notable. Not only was there a renewed note of
oscillating moralizing, but American foreign policy also was
characterized by substantial swings and by inconsistencies-
foreigners called it unpredictable. It was perhaps more disturb-
ing to our allies and dependents than it was to our opponents.
This poses a deeper-seated question that should be examined
before we bring the story of postwar superpower relations
down to the present time.
Winston Churchill had limned one Western view of the
Soviet Union in his pithy description: "a riddle, wrapped in a
mystery, inside an enigma." Despite the mists of secrecy that
still surround Soviet policymaking, that view has now become
somewhat obsolescent. The passage of almost half a century
has provided sufficient experience to make Soviet policy almost
predictable. There is persistency, perhaps even consistency-
and remarkably few sharp turns.
Can the same be said of U.S. attitudes and U.S. policy?
Hardly so. The American mood is subject to much wider swings
and, to a lesser degree, so is American policy. More than the
highly structured societies of Europe with their established
governing classes, the American democracy is governed by
public opinion with all its vicissitudes. Moreover, changes in
the party in power (unthinkable in the Soviet Union) may bring
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sharp swings in policy. It was the Americans who went home
in 1945, and then reversed policy later in the 1940s. It was the
Americans who shifted from the idealism of world organization
to military containment. It was the Americans who so eagerly
and innocently embraced detente-as the end to the "misun-
derstandings" in Soviet-American tensions. The Soviet view of
detente was far less inflated, merely a somewhat modernized
version of Lenin's "peaceful coexistence." It was the Americans
again who, a few years later, could grossly overstate the military
power of the Soviet Union and the strength of its so-called
geopolitical momentum.
Over the intervening years, President Truman could assert
mistakenly: "I like old Joe, but he is a prisoner of the Polit-
buro." President Carter could state that so secondary (and
predictable) an action as the Soviet move into Afghanistan had
fundamentally altered his view of the Soviets. President Reagan
could talk feelingly of "the empire of evil" and then embrace
arms control. The early days of the Carter Administration and
of the Reagan Administration provide a spectacular contrast
in both the style and the substance of foreign policy. Was this
great power-the great protecting power of the West-one
that could recognize its permanent interests?
By contrast the Soviets seem staid, almost stodgy: solid (if
somewhat brutal) men who persistently follow an established
formula. The Soviets pride themselves on being realists-
indeed, scientific materialists. With the exception of Nikita
Khrushchev (who was precipitately removed for his "adventur-
ism" and "harebrained schemes"), Soviet leaders come over as
rather stolid Leninists, guided primarily by their prudence and
by their respect for the correlation of forces. They are rather
different from the frequently mercurial and incurably romantic
Americans. To go back to Churchill's aphorism: which of the
superpowers is the enigma?
In another guise, the same issue was eloquently framed by
Alexis de Tocqueville almost a century and a half ago:
It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies
appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments.... A democracy
can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertak-
ing, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of
serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their
consequences with patience.
In the first 30 years of the postwar era, the American
democracy quite demonstrably rose to de Tocqueville's chal-
lenge. In the last decade, doubt has arisen over whether the
United States, given a proclivity to sudden shifts in policy, can
permanently match the steadier pressures of Soviet policy,
despite its far greater inherent strength. No longer are the
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 Api~t"t~AgtFBfik gr 4#fR 7Qe,.WCF49RptM I89e pclo??-9 A,<
the relatively easy domain of the North American continent.
As one moves closer to the sources of Soviet power-along the
periphery of the Soviet Union-the requirement for perceived
and acknowledged steadiness in the exercise of power becomes
more demanding.
Today American policy must be more than synchronized
with the moods of the American public. Leaders of smaller and
less powerful states close to the Soviet Union must, above all,
see a predictability in the basic course of American policy.
While somewhat less necessary, since occasional unpredictabil-
ity has its uses, our principal opponent should also be able to
discern an underlying predictability most of the time. Given
the greater volatility of American opinion in recent years, is
the American democracy up to the task?
The Watergate episode may merely have accelerated a tend-
ency that was already visible in the 1960s. In presidential
politics it brought to the fore outsiders with no experience in
Washington or in foreign policy, who proceeded to campaign
against federal institutions and against Washington as a symbol.
It may have been good politics; it was poor governance. No-
where has this been clearer than in foreign affairs.
Instead of "managing the Soviet relationship," we are now
more inclined to sermonize the Soviets on various subjects on
which they appear unpersuadable-human rights, Star Wars,
even Leninism itself. Sermonizing the Russians is an activity
that one earlier president, Dwight Eisenhower, explicitly de-
clared to be unproductive. Moreover, sermonizing provides a
most awkward posture from which to work out a modus viv-
endi.
Foreign policy has become far more personalized, less insti-
tutional. A president guided by his personal vision is assumed
to be in tune with the feelings of the people-the most appro-
priate guide to foreign policy. The judgments of any "estab-
lishment" count for far less. Commitments of earlier chief
executives are not necessarily binding. And if one chief exec-
utive can pay scant regard to the commitments of his prede-
cessors, so may the Congress disregard the commitments of the
incumbent.
No doubt this represents a foreign policy that in some sense
is more democratic, less hegemonial. But it is not consistent
with the way that great powers are expected to conduct foreign
relations-with steadiness and predictability. The United
States has become a more inward-looking, self-oriented nation.
The new American style has led to consternation as much
among our friends as our foes. But the more basic question is
whether such a style can sustain the American position over
the long run.
President Carter brought to the Oval Office immense en-
ergy, idealism, an open mind and moral conviction. Certain
accomplishments of his Administration-the Camp David ac-
cord between Egypt and Israel almost in its entirety and the
Panama Canal Treaty to a lesser degree-were products of
Jimmy Carter's special brand of moral fervor. (Whether it was _AsO A
PRMFUl P 're rn a qu or MpO a4 vr -9 ' dttinuesl
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is a different question.) Carter was, of course, building on the
Nixon legacy in the normalization of relations with China as
well as in the Middle Eastern peace process, but he added his
own special touch. With the exception of China, all involved
lesser powers. All were issues that could yield to enthusiasm
and moral fervor. In the world of power politics-notably our
relations with the Soviet Union and our European allies-the
results of the Carter Administration, were far less auspicious.
Carter early launched his old effort to lead the Soviet Union
into the paths of righteousness through his human rights cam-
paign. That was not, as the Soviets may have thought, a cynical
propagandistic attempt to place the Soviet Union on the defen-
sive. Rather it reflected a profound moral conviction. With
respect to arms control, Carter immediately abandoned the
Vladivostok accord and called for deep reductions-which
would most immediately affect the Soviet ICBM force. This too
reflected a conviction that his predecessors had not really tried
hard enough to obtain arms reductions, and that the Soviets
would be prepared to respond to his call. Both developments
were rather bewildering to the Soviets. The Soviets work best
when their opposite numbers, like themselves, are steady and
predictable. Within a year the human rights campaign had
been somewhat toned down and the SALT negotiations had
been put back in the traditional mold. But considerable damage
had been done in tearing up the accepted patterns of interna-
tional relations.
In his relations with Europe, Carter early committed a capital
blunder from which he never wholly recovered: the decision
not to produce neutron weapons. It was a wholly personal
decision, taken against the advice of all his agencies and in the
face of prior understandings with the allies that had been
worked out by his own underlings. In part it reflected his moral
aversion to a new category of nuclear weapons; in part it
reflected his irritation with his allies for their unwillingness to
take the heat with him on a deployment decision. This last in
itself reflected a lack of familiarity with the historic style of
decision-making within the alliance. To be sure, Helmut
Schmidt both distorted and exploited the events for his own
domestic purposes. Yet, throughout the balance of the Carter
presidency, Europeans continually worried about the strength
and the reliability of the United States.
A string of actions-the cancellation of the B-I bomber, the
squeeze on defense spending, the sudden reduction in ship
construction funds, the aborted attempt to remove our ground
forces from Korea, Me continuation of negative comments on
the Central Intelligence Agency-all reinforced the conviction
that the Carter Administration was soft on defense. A series of
setbacks-starting in the Horn of Africa, Yemen and Afghan-
istan, culminating ultimately in the disaster that was the fall of
the Shah, followed by the seizure of the embassy and the
hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan-created
for the Carter Administration a perception of weakness that
could not be dispelled. This had two immediate effects.
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It led first to a slowly gathering storm on the American right,
which ultimately came to view the developing world scene in
apocalyptic terms. The vulnerabilities of our strategic forces
were greatly exaggerated (which was subsequently to affect
attitudes on the SALT II issue). The overall weakness of Amer-
ican and Western military strength was repeatedly stressed. By
contrast, Soviet military strength was substantially overstated.
Moreover, a portrait was drawn of a worldwide Soviet geopol-
itical offensive, which was alleged to be gathering momentum
steadily. Indeed the very events, like Afghanistan, that in 1980
were taken as shrewd Soviet political moves in the quest for
world domination, just a few years later were treated as serious
Soviet setbacks.
But the public mood had been established. By the time the
SALT II Treaty actually reached the Senate in 1979, there was
an uphill fight for ratification-which would have occurred
even in the absence of the invasion of Afghanistan in Decem-
ber. Unavoidable provisions of the treaty, which had been built
into the respective strategic postures of the two sides, were
treated as a source of American weakness or even a sellout. By
this time the Carter Administration had scant credit to draw
on in terms of its posture on defense and Soviet policy. That
the Reagan Administration would adhere to the provisions of
this fatally flawed treaty for at least five years confirms that its
deficiencies were exaggerated at the time. Yet, overall, the
episode leaves one with a single clear conclusion: only a presi-
dent who enjoys a reputation for being strong on defense can
be successful in obtaining Senate ratification of an arms control
agreement with the Soviet Union.
The Reagan Administration, it has frequently been ob-
served, has no specific foreign policy monuments to its name.
It does have one generic accomplishment, a vital one: it has
restored America's international prestige and the perception
of American power. In foreign policy, that is immensely im-
portant-and can compensate for a significant number of
blunders elsewhere. Elsewhere, the Administration has had
some modest achievements in Central America and in chasten-
ing the likes of Qaddafi, a serious defeat in Lebanon, and some
success in easing tensions with our European allies, though,
these were tensions initially brought on by the Administration
itself.
Like the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration
has been highly personalized-almost anti-institutional. In its
early years, much of its foreign policy was set by the President's
:instincts, rhetoric and ideological convictions, that included a
proclivity to blurt out half-remembered truths from Reader's
Digest. Thus, it was early revealed that the Soviet leaders had
been authorized to "lie, cheat and steal" to further their policy
goals. Also disclosed was something called "the Ten Com-
mandments according to Nikolai Lenin." The President was
inclined to believe that his predecessors had failed to convey
i7.
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to the Soviets how tough America was and thereby to force
them to abandon their base designs just as Jimmy Carter had
felt his predecessors had failed vigorously to pursue arms
control. Moreover, the Administration's initial predilection was
to believe that America had regularly been defrauded in arms
limitation negotiations, and that any negotiations would have
to be postponed until such time as America's military posture
was restored. The net effect was to throw our relations with
the Soviet Union during the first three years of the Adminis-
tration into a chill as deep as the late 1940s.
These attitudes led to a rapid growth of alarm in Europe-
and the Administration's reputation sank almost to the level of
the Carter Administration's. It was partially rescued by an
excellent, if belated, speech by the President in November
1981 on intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations. But
early and indiscreet comments about nuclear war-and the
tensions surrounding the prospective deployment of the Persh-
ing II missile (ironically promised by the Carter Administration
to reassure the Europeans that America was not vacillating)-
created steady problems for the United States. The President's
inclination to view the Soviet Union as the source of all evil in
the world also led to a last-minute effort to preclude construc-
tion of the Soviet natural gas pipeline, including the imposition
of extraterritorial sanctions. The President had been warned
against such an effort by his professionals, but those warnings
were disregarded. In a sense it was the equivalent of Carter's
plowing ahead in his neutron bomb decision. Eventually the
Administration was obliged to back off.
The President's inclination to view all difficulties in terms of
the East-West conflict, with a touch of Armageddon thrown
in, has led to some exaggerated rhetoric. In Lebanon it was
stated that the entire American strategic position in the Middle
East would crumble if Syria's Assad and his Soviet sponsors
had their way. It was followed by a precipitate withdrawal of
American forces, and an even more precipitate dropping of
the subject. In Central America, the importance of Nicaragua
has similarly been overstated. While the Sandinista regime is a
geopolitical nuisance which we wish would either disappear or
moderate its behavior, it can scarcely be described as a major
threat to the republic. It remains an impoverished country,
almost like an Albania situated in the Western hemisphere. On
strategic and pragmatic grounds we may reasonably seek to
neutralize it as a potential base. But it ought not to be inflated
into a substantial threat to our existence. And the rhetorical
treatment of our henchmen in the region as the moral equiv-
alents of James Madison and George Washington does seem a
bit excessive.
The story of U.S.-Soviet relations during the first three
Reagan years has been told sufficiently frequently that it need
not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that the result was a chill
that stirred Soviet paranoia and frightened our allies. That the
Administration paid so small a price reflected the good luck of
three succession crises in the Kremlin. CO J
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 t [~ie Aenilnlsr~aon haci a1teRDdP9ts original 09000a10~0e90005-9 `~ ? The worldwide Soviet geopolitical momentum had become a
thing of the past. Indeed, the Soviet Union might actually be
"an economic basket case." Despite basically unchanged force
ratios, the Administration, which at first had exaggerated So-
viet military power, was now downplaying it. The window of
vulnerability was forgotten. Moreover, the tone of public com-
ment from Washington was reversed. Thus, the Administration
was in a position to exploit such Soviet blunders as the heavy
hand in Europe and the walkouts from Geneva, to say nothing
of such adventitious developments as the shootdown of the
Korean airliner. The President had also become seized with
the desirability of arms control. His apparent eagerness com-
bined with Soviet clumsiness helped turn international opinion
in U.S. favor.
Whether for substantive or political motives, the single most
important ingredient in U.S.-Soviet relations has now become
the negotiations over strategic defense. The President's origi-
nal speech in March 1983 touched a sensitive nerve in light of
Soviet experiences with Open Skies and the U-2, and the ABM
negotiations with the Nixon Administration. Touching a sen-
sitive nerve is not without utility; it certainly got the Soviets'
attention. The Star Wars proposal was, however, another of
those uncalculated ventures in personal diplomacy. Without
any preparation, indeed without any realization, it attacked the
prior foundation of the basic arms relationship. Our allies
suddenly learned that deterrence, on which security had rested,
was to be replaced. Britain and France learned that their
independent nuclear forces, into which they had poured a
considerable portion of the national treasure, were to be ren-
dered obsolete. We were all to learn rather suddenly that
deterrence was "immoral" and "flawed." Such phrases seemed
to have been borrowed from the Catholic bishops. While there
may be considerable satisfaction in dishing the left by stealing
its clothes, it hardly seems necessary to undermine the foun-
dation on which Western security must rest for the foreseeable
future.
An extraordinary measure of American capital is now being
invested in generating support for Star Wars among our allies.
All of this is being done in the name of a research program
that its strongest proponents regard as far-out and a very high
risk. In an R&D effort, the normal behavior is to allow the
technical uncertainties to be resolved before one reaches con-
clusions about force structures or strategy. In this case, the
results are being announced in advance: a revolutionary change
in strategic doctrine and the strategic relationships between CON i7
the superpowers.
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Not only our allies were caught by surprise. Even the De-
partment of Defense was unprepared. The President had been
moved not by the advice of the technical experts within his
Administration, but by some elderly outside advisers. Until the
President's address, the Department of Defense had steadily
been expressing skepticism (to put it mildly) regarding space-
bornt defenses. The Department was then obliged to wheel
about in order to support the commander in chief. Suddenly
altering-'the presuppositions on which international relations
are based-with scarcely any technical or policy advice and
without any advance warning-is not the way for the leading
Western nation to maintain a reputation for steadiness.
The superpowers have returned once again to Geneva. For
the Soviet Union that provides unqualified benefits. In a neg-
ative sense, much of the unwanted baggage of recent years has
been left behind: the shootdown of the KAL airliner, the walk-
outs from Geneva, the possible involvement in the attempt on
the pope's life, the three succession crises with the concomitant
weakness and blundering. In a positive sense, the Soviet Union
is well situated to achieve either its substantive goals or its
political and propaganda objectives. On substance, the Soviets
would clearly like to impose constraints on American technol-
ogy for strategic defense. If anything stirs Soviet paranoia it is
American technology and its possible implications. Conse-
quently, the Soviets will be prepared to pay a price to obtain
such constraints-and to avoid reopening the strategic arms
competition.
The President has said, however, that Star Wars technology
will not be negotiated. In that event, the Soviets are even better
situated to exploit the abiding differences between the United
States and its allies-especially the continuing, if not growing,
allied concern about any Star Wars deployment. The structure
of the negotiations, with separate tables for intermediate-range
nuclear forces and strategic defense, lends itself to such Soviet
exploitation. The Soviets are already saying to the Europeans
that substantial concessions can be obtained on the weapons
that threaten Europe, but the Americans are blocking that
outcome by their obstinacy over Star Wars.
At Geneva we shall be reading a sermon to the Soviets to
which they are unprepared to listen. That sermon propounds
the supposed mutual advantages of strategic defense that the
Soviets specifically rejected. It is based upon a "strategic con-
cept" that in fact is less a strategic concept than it is a rational-
ization for the President's vision. The concept in itself is
fundamentally flawed. According to the concept, when stra-
tegic defenses are deployed a so-called second phase will ensue.
But the prospect of deployment of strategic defense in that
second phase precludes attainment of the first phase, the radical
reduction of offensive arms. This is because the prospective
deployment of strategic defenses increases the premium on
missile throw-weight and on offensive forces generally-to
overwhelm any prospective defense. The Americans are now
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prepared not only to read to the Soviets a sermon to which
they will not listen, but one that is internally inconsistent.
In Geneva we must prepare for an extended period of siege
warfare-with the Soviets well positioned to exploit differences
between our allies and ourselves. The United States has sud-
denly-and without thinking the consequences through in
advance-altered the foundations on which East-West relations
have rested. That raises anew the question posed by de Toc-
queville in the 1840s-whether a democracy can adequately
persevere in a fixed design or await the consequences of its
measures with patience.
What then of superpower relations in the future? No one
can rely on the early disappearance of the ideological tensions
and the arms competition that have characterized the last 40
years. If liberty is to survive outside the Western hemisphere,
outside North America, the special role of the United States
cannot be significantly altered. Will the United States be able
to sustain its unique responsibilities during the decades
ahead? The portents are somewhat worrisome. What is re-
quired of a great power is stability of policy combined with
steadiness in execution.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the national mood was
one of self-criticism bordering on masochism. In the 1980s the
national mood has become one of self-congratulation to the
point of narcissism. If one is forced to choose, perhaps the
latter is preferable. But no more than masochism can narcissism
be a proper foundation for the steadiness and stability de-
manded of the leader of the West.
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and irector of Central
Intelligence.
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 ARTICL11 approved For Release 2 &?OT-~1A-RDP91-00901R0004
ON PAGE _Rai- 7 .~pril 1985
WHO'S WHAT, WHERE
JIM CONCANNON
? * * * * o,, c n, P T ED
JAMES SCHLESINGER
MITRE Corp.;
Former:; Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger has been
elected a' trustee of the Bedford"
based MITRE Corp.. which is in
volved in defense engineering.
Schlesinger also has been Secre-
tary of Energy. CIA director and
chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
**~~* E ERTED
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