NUCLEAR REACTION U.S. TESTS RESPONSE TO AN ATOMIC ATTACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150035-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: March 26, 1982
• Content Type: NSPR

STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PACT: L
Niiclear Reaction:
U.S. Tests Response
To an Atomic Attack
Recent Top-Secret Exercise
Fitst or Kind, Since
Flying in Doomsday Plane.
-By Joeue-J-Flauca , i ? ;.;:e
,Siaff Reporter of Trim WAti,?S?ntevr JouitNAL:.
-??WASHINGTON-It was on the fourth day
i:of the nuclear crisis when hundreds of So-
viet missiles-hit their targets in the U.S.? ? es.
The President died where he was sitting,
?in the cramped. "Situation Room" beneath
;the White House. Instantaneously, command
.over the nation's remaining civilian and mil-
:Rely resources shifted to his successor as a
!nuclear strike was called to retaliate. Mean-
:while, critical functions of the federal gov-
ernment - continued..,operating- - from
:,hundreds of locations scattered throughout
'the U.S. ? ? - -ell ? ? ? - -.? --ee. ?s.
,
This was the scene in a huge, world-wide
'inuclear war game that was. secretly - di-
i
.rected from the White House during the first
live days of March. As described by- high
-government officials,.. the. game - code'
named "Ivy. League"-was the first coin-
iplete exercise of the military and civilian
command- structures and communications
systems to be used in -all-out- nuclear.:war
since 1956. ..? essees 'see, es s. en ye
?The "war" was 'directed from- the-White
House by former Secretary -of State William
4P..RogerS, Who actedsas- the .S?President,-
;Richard Helms,.-former director of theCen-
Aral -Intelligence Agency and arr,bassadorto.
l,Iran, played the Vice President-se-2 ..i.? t ".:i.:11
# '?7?,-,-,, ,,...
.4presideut -ts.:!iftiaskfreite.,:;2:.;,,,.,,,,44.-
?1 .., Althongfilhe game pneducesomeee se,
scOnfUsed . moments 'ire the Situation. Rooth,
,
.4 reportedly, convincedpresidenf Reegait and
ethe galaxy : Of: hiS?',t6ii;national-secUrityAifft=-
tcials Who watChedit thaf.the,nadon lel the
plans and the capability to maintaincontnit-,
!ityof government during aimclear strike.-'
i "We did a lo'rbetterthan-we thought, we
'would," says one player. He. explains: that
ithe:ekercise evas.devised to act: on the 'phi-f,
dosophy. of President. Reagan and other- top.
I ? ?
ia.drninistration, officials: that 7 tprotectton ;of/.
ikey -government functions during a crisis. is
as. much et Sat deterrent to; nuclear swar ,.,ai
`.,building new.strategicehuclear weapons.\sysL-
items." ? .. '.', -????-e:74.-----?? '-':* ? ' :::::--,:?"-'''
?:-? ' The officials. whredescribe the game, and
wholequesta:nonyrnity say one.objectivein
`idiscussingethe gamesis -no make sure:that
i the ?tiler side is a.waree that, we have. the
capability., They.say.the game involved the
i movement of over 1,000 civilian 'and military:
1 players throughput, the world, inclucting,twee
unidentified ? Reagan Caftlevf;figetieffiettn
who. are- indine. to- succeed ident.Reagan ?
ould ?he. the ;lean; attacks; eseiseesleetretete"
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
26 March 1982
number of deputy and under secre-
taries of cabinet agencies acted as members
;of the National Security Council, while Pres-
ident Reagan, Vice President George Bush.
f
; Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr.,
;Secretary of Defense Caspar W:-Weinber-
ger, the President's national security ad-
viser, William P. Clark Jr., and other secu-
' rity-council members looked on..,, _
?`bTo -Fault" ? Procedure .' ?
l'?-???1
: Mr- Rogers, a New York lawyer., and Mr.
'Helms, currently the head of a:Washington
Iconsulting firm, Saffeer Co.. were picked by
!President Reagan and Vice president Bush
for the roles of the President and Vice Pres:
? i ident, The'garne was designed to create a,
:e "no fault,: atmosphere, where mistakes
? could be made and lessons learned without
necessarily telegraphing whet a U.S. official
. might do In stich a crisis.
During the last week in February, Mr.
' Rogers; Mr. Helms and the officials of the
game's mock National Security Council
were told that the.world situation had deteri-
orated. The response of both the Soviet and
.! U.S. governments- to the deepening crisis
f had been to order. mobilization for war. Af-
ter attacks on U.S. forces in Europe, South
Korea and in Southwest Asia; war had been
; declared. '
; ? The. players in the Situation Room were
then .told that Soviet tactical nuclear wears:
ons had been uted against a U.S. ship in the
!: North Atlantic and that chemical munitions
. had been fired at: some U.S. troop units
overseas, resulting in a large number of
1: casualties. . ,
k ? -The "President," after studying options
provided?by the office of. the:Joint Chiefs,
decided to use tactical nuclear weapons in
response tie the: 'chemical ? attack -and later
'ibegan: giving permission for, the release of
tactical warheads elsewhere-on--a case-byt
case 'basis as' the tempo- ofethe enemy at-:
racks, accelerated. ? s 0"
One. enajor.debate arnong.participanfs in
the room involved the 'question ofewheri.to
1 disperse -.Potential: successors:, to. the presi-;
d encY:' Another involved the...timing of-,the
; release of US.. military units to- help state
! and local governments managetheir evacus
.1 attn. and other clyil-defense roles. ? 6,
As one-major player describes it, the
de-
cisions ' :everes Made ?swiftly ,.` although I. the
'choices were .disturbinge,'you're right uP-.
against Something that has never, happened:
beforePlie- says. 'e -
I (Mr...Rogers?says of the gaMe..-'.!I not
? -In a position to talk about IL" Mr. Helms.
pays he is under similar, strictures. The
sources say that no NATO commands were
used during the game, aIthough'some Cana;
than Military headquarters, ,participated in
parts of it.) ?
?
"IvseLeague" players simulated the use
;of the ?hotline," the teletypedinkeWith So-
viet.leaders, repeatedly using it to explain
let.S. moves-and intentions in-an- attempt to
,alleviate the deepening crisis.'
ee ? .The eeseiee? ieelu si
e e@MraWl!.1 jill?VATOO-
ylayers eithulated the procedures needed to
.filLegaps hie: the 11.S- systeni .bY launching
eme ?4,eneee e _ e.esseseeseeee
00500150035-2
? The .ultirriate moment occurred late -1-re
the fourth day, when the mock North Ameri-
can Air Defense Command. reported a major
incoming Soviet missile attack. At that
point, technicians began switching off major
pieces of the U.S.-military and civilian com-
munications systems used by the Pentagon
and the Federal Emergency Management
.Agency to simulate the destruction.
:.*.? "Ivy League". posited a "worst case" So-
viet nuclear strike. some 5,000 megatons
raining down on the; nation.. (The first at-
omic bomb, the one That incinerated Him-
- shima, Japan,-had a strength of about '20,000.
tons of TNT, or one-fiftieth of a megaton.) - -"1
.. The genie also assumed that Soviet tar-
getere would attempt-what is called by mili-
tary planners a "decapitation strike," an ef-
fort to destroy Washington and the entire.
. federal command structure. .
'At that point in the game, with the Presi-
dent "dead,": control over the "war" shifted
first to Mr: Helms, who as the pretend Vice
President, spent part of the time aloft in the
National Emergency Airborne Command
Post: a specially equipped Boeing 747 that
has been described in the press as the
.`Doomsday Plane." e
Later, control shifted to each of two Cabi-
net officers, one in a secret federal facility
in Massachusetts and the other at a similar
facility in Texas. There, the two men, ac-1
companieci by "core teams" of officials
from key government agencies, took corn- 1'
- mand of the nation's remaining civilian and
military resources. ? -
A fourth "miniature White Hotise" was
established in a U.S. embassy in Europe to
simulate what would happen if a successor
to the President, such as the Secretary of
State, was consulting with U.S. allies when a
nuclear war broke out. ?
?????? The ground-rules- of the- game called for-
the President and his successors to use what
Is called the Single Integrated Operations
Plan, the pian for a major nuclear strike in
retaliation against a Soviet ICBM attack on
the U.S: The pretend- security-council Mem
hers involved in the game were top-level of-
ficials.? They included Thomas Reed, a fort
mer Secretary of the Air?Force who now Is al
consultant to Mr. Clark, the President's nae;
Hong. -4ecurity adviser ; ? Maker. Stoesse1,1 -
deputy secretary of state;_ Fred Ikle, under
'secretary "of- defense, and Air Force .Gen.:
James E. Dalton, staff director of the office
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ? - ?
? On March 5, when' the genie ended, PreS-
ident Reagan'placed a conference call to all
the command centers used during_the exel?-
cise, 'telling the players: e ?
.`:". "While we pray to God that we Will never
have- to use the procedures you have tested
She past week,' the nation is better. oft: foe
what has been done." ? . 7
? President; Reagan -added that "the exerts
Zise will not only .improve our ability to reH
'spond. ;to such a critical emergency-but.
more -importantly, the lessons learned wil;
1ROONOtt 341.1 Prove,: that our adver-
g to. gam, by such &vett
h
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AoRijpifc--'7.17R;j1), THE BOSTON GLOBE
24 March 1982
s????
ean mesa
? ?1, . ,. ..,,,? .., , ?,..A-4- ,-:'`4 - ::-..? - 1 ,::: .- ., -.4' , ? ?
';? 'Earlier...this month ,The,Globe:published. a .,,,i.agency s in-country team .tc.,, -,1i create a coup
section of Henry KiiSinger's memoirs centering 4-7.? climate by propaganda, , misinformation and
On.the'.disingenuous7Claim ' that :',":"otir govern-4.3 terrorist activities; (2) collect intelligence on
. ,
riient- had nothing to 'do with,plaiming [Salva- N :Coup-minded .'? Officers;1, and '(3)- inform- those
doi-,Allendes];Overthrow- and no tT involvement .. ,,..coup-minded 'officers that the US government
*.ithjhe- plotters',';`, who carried ;;Ont 'the1973: -:will give them ' full- support ,in a coup short 6
? ,
Military putsch fri..Ohile. 011 the day there direct US. military intervention 1.:,:-'-:-.Z`i''' ',.-: : ?-' : 1-
were reports, 'iriJhe Globe -"a:iiebther major' r;::;...i;,,j1.9,1.il-4%e?-;44'-'i..-0-Fi:a. ci,'..-..11-4;:;; kir] e-n.dq'S'i
_ .
Arr.-ler-few-1:: newsf]aperS', clegcribirig the' iieagan
: s.was ratified and; allowed -to, take office? :The
.Administration 7s plans for covertaction to :'de-
, ..:
,?:.;,-,CIA's? Karamessines --,- told ,--,:a.:::,' 'congressional
stabilize the leftist government Of Nicaragua
, Comrnmittee, that ',',Track .'2 never really ended,
,?-'..There are-of course--; Significant "differences2 What we were told to do in effect was well Al::
between, Nicaragua today and Chile In 1973 In .--
? lende IS now president ,:-:.'.- but Continue our ef-
NiCaragua thereisno'protofascist'grouP of up- ?.; --forts." Kararnessines,:::the Ultimate insider,
per-level, military:officers trained by American -
: said; "The seeds that ;were _laid in 1970 had
' Instructors and imbued with the strategic 'and '
. ?
c:4V? -
politi; doctrines,t of their,. instructors. T h their Impact in 1973
e ? ? . --?=7":: 41; ? ,
N.icii-aguan..ariny-:16 a, Sandinise.arini, and 'so': The Church Corninittees-!report on "Covert
-7.-Action in Chile' was even more spec ;fie. in HS
anyAmericanattemptto overthrow the regime
'.7finding that; by January', 1972; the CIA's San-
paramilitaryMust-pass through the risky stage of forming
tiago station "had successfully Penetrated" the-
bands to iabotage,power stations
andblow..upbridges:-,q:::..;,,i,;:..??..f!;:group;?that. would make the .,1973 couP and
contact through ' an = intermsediary with
, Two bridges Were blown up thiS was in
nthonities, ?, its leader.." The report said that -the CIA re--
drastic reaction of the. S.andinik
ceived, intelligence reports orithe' coup
who declared a..ZitatiZtif Ternergeri6k. and '
plan-
: -
pended demberatiei.iighti, takes into aceount of July, 'Au-
the
the months
the haunting precedent of American complicity gust and September 1973." The report added
Allende. ? that the agency's efforts :..."went :_
- the, overthrow of ? This means Ws-
beyond the
mere collection of information
citicifitirigpsSingee&rather:.desultdiSr 'effdit. at:
disinformation i:'-,5:::There is no point getting..angrYae.'Kissingeit
.4.
'..??::for.--.trying?tp:Over up these old crimes He is:
:In mtd-September 1970 after Aflende was
merely.' doing; what - expected of him. One
elected president of Chile butbefore his election
Month -after Chile succumbed to the'barbarbUs'
had been ratified by th
,--,-:;?,e):ChIleanz,Congress;-::::k
Richard -Nixon .KISsinger,.;johnMitchell and reign of a Military dictatorship; William Colby,
,forineri,c1A.direetOr:...RichardHeliffs''seCin rno-,10.1eP*director:-.Of the , CIA,told...acongresSional
tJor kSe;Cret-pladtti get.'ilcyo-f.Allende:?.,:',-,7-,f',!::;:-:::g.;Corpmittee:-:.`,,Zfhp:presumptiOn- tinder, vvhich, W;'-HeIrn has e
iNixbrOriStrueted conduct.thi'S..type,of operation is that itis a co".
hPy-f-iti:vplay operation and that the United 5tates'., hand'
tarytcoUp d'eta.t in Chile to preVent,Allendes Is not ito show.'
?
accession to the presidency.",7;:ghiS.praii wasi?e6:.',5,,,.Kissinger'S perfunctory rewrite of iiistor.;/, if:
cleriarned -.Track,,24KiSsinger:blinself- has; Said,?..:L"-.taken seriously. would Merely 'Make it More dif-,
Ttabk 2. Meant ,,,-`en'cOOraging' a. Mciredirect role. .:ficult to -understand ;on temporary ''events in
for thiCLA Kissinger:?. himself :a '16Yal:
rnep, tOig:Inycihog p10.1.bqr of-the ?andinistas', ruling directorate,'
singerMelrnS,arid'tbe CIA:S deputy-director Of ;.!.!..,.-Vyk.i.riay:be7:giii-e:that
gloved hand in the sh6inhiiik, Of tiVO.Nica.
. to ,.the-CIA-w!StatiOri,z-fif4SantiagO:?':'6idering the r raguan bridges
a..R.Ye ?..A214.1;AV;
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ARTICLE yctor Release 2006/0M yg*
2 -FORM-00901R000500150
22 MARCH 1982
ON PAGE ::::kczee# I
WASHINGTON TALK
335-2
STAT
???
77-
--, A Helms Encounter 2
(00
firm
treet scene: Richard Helms, the
career spy, is. strolling down K
Street, watching the world with
- a carefree gaze., ,? , -
"Hi, Dick," a passing acquaintance
--says. The former Director of Central
'-Intelligence appears off on some pas-
toral fantasy; he does not quite regis-
: ter recognition. But then he smiles
;And silently returns the greeting with '
f- a casual and, in his case,,suddenly
',7-1nost suggestive gesture. He uses his.
-hand as though pointing and shooting
:an imaginary gun at the man vaho
greeted him. The friendpasses by ; the
tableau is terminated without
treme prejudice, `, ?
? tz.?;; ???? :
Fr2lIcts XI Clines:-
" Viarti.-..11Weaverjri-
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Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 40.14?'
VFW YORK TIMES
4- MARCH 1982
'000500150035-2
BO-Nil INVESTIGATES ;vjieuslicinghearrwFtioenhdaecdi to n discredit s c r
member eirlirDi
j the Nazi Party.
Mr. Langemann was quoted as saying
-SECURITY OFFICE that he met with Richard Helms, the
former-head of the C.I.A., in Washing-
ton on Feb. 2,1%8, to tell him of the con-
. 1 cern felt in Bonn about the documents.
According to the account, Mr. Helms
directed Mr. Langemann to a man
whose name was given as Mr. Hart, a
C.I.A. employe described as a Nazi ex-
Magazine Says He Persuaded
C.I.A. to Have Nazi Papers
in the U.S. Suppressed
.? By JOHN VINOCUR
- Special toTheNewYorlerlmes
BONN, March 3 ? The chief federal
prosecutor today ordered an investiga-
tion of a West German security officer
described by a magazine as having ar-
ranged with the Central Intelligence
Agency to suppress documents in the
United States about the Nazi connec-
tions of former Chancellor Kurt Georg
Kiesinger. ?
The official was also said by the
magazine to have disclosed that the
West German intelligence agency
sought to recruit an "agent of influ-
ence" to lead President Nixon to think
favorably about West Germany.
The investigation was ordered into
Hans- Langemann, a department chief
in the Bavarian Interior Ministry. A
? spokesman for the ministry said Mr.
Langemann, who worked for the intelli-
gence agency from 1957 to 1970, was sus-
pended frorn his post on Tuesday.
The federal prosecutor, Kurt Reis.'
mann, also announced that an inquiry
was being conducted to determine if the
author of the magazine article, J?rgen
Saupe, had disclosed state secrets. .
Leftist Magazine Konkret
,
The. article, appearing in the leftist
magazine Konkret, involves eight cases ?
in which Mr. Langemann was said to be'
involved. The magazine said it had
eight hours of tape recordings contain-,
ing Mr: Langernarip's disclosures. The
? suspended- official's lawyer insisted,'
? however, that parts Of the recordings
did not originate with Mr. Langemann.
? The magazine said it was told by Mr.
Langemann in 1968 that the intelligence
, "Destroying the documents was out
of the question," the magazine said.
"So another way cut was found. If the
documents could not be destroyed, find-
ing them in the giant microfilm ar-
chives could be made extremely diffi-
cult, practically impossible. ?
"To do so, it was necessary to take the
'Guide to films of captured documents'
out of circulation.It wasclene.n ?
Langemann was quoted as saying
that Mr. Bart turned over 58 volumes of
the so-called guide to German authori-
ties. The magazine printed a copy of
what it said was a telex from the West
German intelligence agency's resident
in Washington reporting this to Mr.
Langemann and suggesting that a spe-
cial note of thanks be sent to Mr. Hart.
The magazine said the agency also
arranged to get an "agent of influence"
close to Mr. Nixon.
? German Points of View
It quoted Mr. Langemann as saying:
"We wanted to get close to Nixon. Not to
get information out of him. Rather we
wanted -- that was the sense of the
whole operation ? to reach Nixon with
German points of view from a friend'
with deep ties and financial relations."
Later, the magazine said, informa-
tion was also sought from the so-called
agent, who was described as an influen-
tial San Francisco Republican.
'Mr. Langemann, who headed a sec-
tion of the Bavarian Interior Ministry
with a staff of 220, was said by his law-
yer as having sought to stop publication
of the account. The photocopies of pur-
ported documents appearing with the
report did not come from Mr. Lange-
mann, his lawyer said, and the maga-
zine declined to disclose how they had
been obtained. 2 I
?
.
agency sought to stop what it thought
would be a series of possible disclosures
by journalists of documents from the
National Archives in Washington that
? .?
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