COURT PAPERS SHOW EFFORT ON PIPELINE PLAN

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CIA-RDP91-00901R000400020005-0
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December 12, 2005
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July 31, 1984
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A R taf cve,rL ~se 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-0090 1R000400020005-0 ON FAGS _LL1 . ~ Court Papers Show Effort on Pipeline Plan Greek arms dealer Basil Tsakos claims to have spent $1. million try- ing to win support in high places for his scheme to build a pipeline across central Africa that would pump Sau- di Arabian oil from the Red Sea to the Atlantic coast. . In a court suit, Tsakos charges that he paid Joe Rosenbaum, an old wartime intelligence buddy of CIA Director William J. Casey, $25,000 to open doors for him in Washing- ton-but that Rosenbaum failed to spend the money to influence offi- cials, as Tsakos had intended. Still, from court documents and inside sources, my associate Corky Johnson has learned that Rosen- baum did get Tsakos something for his money.'For example: ? To lend the effort a proper air of intrigue, Tsakos and Rosenbaum assigned code names to various big shots they tried to interest in the project. In telephone calls and in cables to Tsakos' Geneva headquar- ters, Rosenbaum would refer to Casey as The Visitor"; to former Navy secretary William Middendorf as "The Banker"; and to James Woods, head of the African section of International Security Affairs at the Pentagon, as "The Forest." WASHINGTON POST 31 July 1984 ? Casey was kept regularly in- formed about the project's status. Sources suggested that, because of the pipeline's potential strategic importance, the CIA would have infiltrated the pipeline company if the project ever made it off the drawing board. ? Rosenbaum told Tsakos he needed $50,000 for Bill Gifford, a former Bechtel Inc. executive who, Rosenbaum said, was about to join another Bechtel alumnus, George P. Shultz, at the State Department. Tsakos later brought up the matter in a conversation with Gifford in a men's room at the Kennedy Center, but Gifford reportedly said he had never heard of Rosenbaum and didn't know what Tsakos was talk- ing about. ? Gifford later did work as a con- sultant on the project, and con- tacted Shultz, whom Tsakos met at a State Department dinner. But Tsakos paid Gifford only about $10,000, and was upset because he hadn't pushed the matter with Shultz. Gifford, who now works for General Public Utilities on the Three Mile Island nuclear plant, refused to comment. ? Rosenbaum also told Tsakos he needed $15,000 for Woods, saying the money would go toward the ed- ucation of the Pentagon official's children. Sources said Woods never got a dime. Rosenbaum did arrange for Tsakos to talk with Woods and his boss, Assistant Defense Secre- tary Francis West. Letters and re- ports discussing details of the pro- posed pipeline were later sent to West and Woods. ? A senior Pentagon official con- firmed that there had been several meetings- with pipeline company representatives, and that a memo on the project was sent to Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger. According to the official, the memo recommended that the Pentagon keep informed on the project and help the pipeline company in con- tacting other federal agencies, but should stop short of giving official endorsement to the plan. The official said Rosenbaum and Tsakos repeatedly sought Pentagon approval for the project, and threw out names of government officials who supposedly backed the idea-a standard lobbying technique known as "bandwagoning," intended to en- list support of other officials. -? Rosenbaum also arranged meetings between Tsakos and State Department, officials, including one with Assistant Secretary Chester A. Crocker and his deputy, Frank G. Wisner. ? In September, 1982, Rosen- baum introduced Tsakos to former CIA agent Albert Jolis, now a.New York gem importer. The three had lunch at the Watergate, and Jolis told Tsakos he knew Africa well and could be helpful on the pipeline pro- ject. He said he was on. his way to see Casey at the CIA, and said he would brief him on their discussion. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 Approved For Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP91-00901R0004 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE Tsakos Enlisted Friend of Casey In Pipeline Deal ` Since 1981, when Basil Tsakos came to town to promote a dubious plan to run an oil pipeline across Central Africa from the Red Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, the Greek arms dealer has had occasion to ponder the cynical. rules of the Washington influence game. He spent a bundle, and lived to regret his reliance on a former in- telligence agent who was supposed to be paying off well-connected gov- ernment officials. At least some of the payoffs apparently were not made. My associate Corky Johnson has been investigating the scheme for six months. Here are some of the highlights: Tsakos started off by purchasing a $500,000 condominium in the Watergate complex and spreading word that he had $200 million to spend to promote the project. As I reported last week, Tsakos ,.made a believer of Sen. Mark O. .';Hatfield (R-Ore.), who saw the pipeline as a way to assure access to Middle East crude oil without military action. Tsakos paid at least $40,000 to Hatfield's wife, Antoi- nette, for real estate transactions. WASHINGTON POST 30 Wily 1984 But Tsakos had less success in his dealings with the ex-intelligence official, Joe Rosenbaum, a "venture capitalist" and friend of CIA Direc- tor William J. Casey. As evidence that Rosenbaum had good connec- tions, Tsakos was shown a letter Casey wrote Rosenbaum. The two men's friendship dated to their days in the World War II Office of Stra- tegic Services (OSS), a predecesgor of the CIA. According to court documents and other sources, Tsakos paid Ro- senbaum $250,000 over the next couple of years "to pave the way," as Tsakos put it, for the pipeline project. The first payment of $100,000 was delivered Feb. 12, 1981. That same day, Rosenbaum set up a meeting among Tsakos, Casey, former Navy secretary J. `William Middendorf II and Carl Shipley, Middendorf's attorney and a former member of the.Republican National Committee. Middendorf reportedly said he liked the pipeline idea, but couldn't get involved because he anticipated getting a post in the Reagan admin- istration. He is now ambassador to the Organization of .American States. Casey also responded favorably to the plan, and vouched for Rosen- baum as the man who could carry it out. Rosenbaum and Tsakos then set up the Trans-African Pipeline Co. with Shipley as president. Shipley ME a promoted the project with govern- ment and congressional officials. Over Christmas, 1981, Shipley and his wife were Tsakos' guests at a ski chalet in Gstaad, Switzerland. "He loved it. He loved it. He kissed my bottom," Tsakos said of Shipley, according to court records. But Shipley withdrew when he learned from intelligence docu- ments of Tsakos' criminal record in Greece and his arms deals. Shipley said he was never paid by Tsakos. Rosenbaum drew up a ledger of .influential people he supposedly had on the pipeline payroll. One was Fred Biebel, a deputy chairman of the Republican National Committee and its liaison with the White House. The ledger listed $10,000 in payments to Biebel for "services in connection in dealing with the White House and State [Depart- ment]." Biebel told my associate that he was never paid any money in con- nection with the pipeline deal, and said he was "shocked" when he learned he was on Rosenbaum's list. Biebel said he was paid $2,500 a month by Rosenbaum during the same time period, however, on a matter involving the sale of railroad boxcars in Connecticut. The ledger gave Tsakos the im- pression that he was getting a lot for the money he was giving Rosen- baum. In fact, Rosenbaum did get Tsakos something for his money. And the CIA was definitely inter- ested. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 0901 RO ARpf WVM 2005/W /?,- P-RDP9I TIMES ON PAGE A-) 27 July 1984 Split voiced by CIA, Pentagon on buildup'.. By Jay Mallin Sr THE WASHINGTON TIMES The Soviet acceleration of its ? armed forces combat readiness is causing growing concern among U.S. military and intelligence offi- cials. It has also resulted in a split within military and intelligence :circles over the significance and importance of the Soviet moves. At the center of the controversy is a confidential report by CIA Director William Casey sent recently to President Reagan and top government officials, which ,details steps taken by the Soviet Union and its East European sat- ellites to raise the readiness level of their military forces. Mr. Casey made the report in the midst of rising concern by U.S. offi- cials over the Soviet moves, with some officials apprehensive that the Soviets might be setting the stage for future military activities. The CIA report, it has been learned, tends to downplay the sig? nificance of these developments. The Defense Department yester- day also downplayed any recent increase in the Soviet buildup. "I don't know of any events that have occurred overnight, or in the last 48 hours, or in a short period of time that give us undue concern," said spokesman Michael Burch. The Washington Times yester- day carried a news article, "Russia at high level of battle readiness:' which provoked the following Defense Department comment. "The overall thrust of the (The Washington. Times] article is con- tained in 'Soviet Military Power' (published by the U.S. government] and ... the Chairman's I of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] posture statement and the Idefensel secretary's annual report. I think if you go back through those three that you'll find most of those (buildup] indicators mentioned" The third edition of "Soviet Mili- tary Power" was released in April, the other documents in January. Mr. Burch also said he was not aware of any CIA document. The CIA, as reflected in the report sent recently to Mr. Reagan, in Europe of Pershing II intermedi- ate range nuclear missiles. "We believe that the Soviets have concluded that the danger of war is greater than it was before the INF [intermediate nuclear forcel decision, that Soviet vulnerability is greater and will grow with addi- tional INF emplacements, and that the reduced warning time inherent in Pershing II has lowered Soviet confidence in their ability to warn of sudden attack;' Mr. Casey stated in his report. "These perceptions, perhaps driven by a building defense bud- get, new initiatives in continental defense, improvements in force readiness, and a potentially mas- sive space defense program may be propelling the U.S.S.R. to take national readiness measures at a deliberate pace," he said. The CIA chief then concluded: "These activities by the Soviet Union] may all he prudent precau- tions in a period'of anxiety and uncertainty on the part of the Sovi- ets." Other officials watching the Soviet moves, however, believe it is an error to view the Soviets as solely responding to the introduc- tion of the Pershings. While not dis- counting this as one factor, they insist that prudence requires other possibilities must also be consid- ered. Some defense intelligence experts believe the Soviets have concluded that the Russian mili- tary could win a quick conventional war in Europe. According to the scenario predicated on this Soviet doctrine, Soviet tank-led forces would rapidly speed into Western Europe and overrun the NATO forces there, including tactical nuclear installations. NATO would then have to decide the next step in the ladder of escala- tion, presumably including the use of nuclear weapons. . With the introduction into West- ern Europe of Pershing II missiles. the experts believe, the Russians decided that they must bring their forces much closer to the threshold of readiness if their conventional victory doctrine is to remain valid, and this is what they are doing. apparently believes the Soviets are Speculation on the Soviet inten- responding to the U.S.Apgdppi,edt For Relpais2OOR12L'28a11G1A-RDP91 ? The Soviets want to he in an improved military position vis-a- vis the altered military situation brought about by the introduction of the Pershing missiles. ? The Soviets may be trying to intimidate NATO, perhaps split it, as they have sought to do through their support of the European anti- nuclear movement. ? The military steps may be part of the army's increasing impor- tance within the Soviet govern- ment, a move made easier by the inability of the Communist Party to provide vigorous leadership at the top. ? The Soviets may be preparing for a major military move some- where on their periphery. This, to U.S. officials, is the most worrisome possibility of all. Mentioned as pos- sible areas into which the Soviets might drive are West Berlin or the Middle East oilfields. U.S. officials say that if the Soviets are contem- plating such a drive, they would build up their military readiness in Western Europe in order to deter NATO from taking counter-action. One U.S. official speculated: "Say they launch a military adven- ture somewhere, possibly in the Mideast. Just as they do that, they. take the wraps off all the prepara- tions they've quietly been making in Europe and say. 'OK, NATO, if you try to come at us, this is what you'll be up against.' " That the Soviets and their allies have been trying to conceal their military activities has been proved by increasing restrictions placed on Western military attaches and other military personnel: Pre- viously open areas such as Lenin- grad in the Soviet Union and off-highway zones in East Germany have been placed off limits to West- ei-n military. Officials concerned over a possi- ble Soviet thrust somewhere see the present electoral period in the United Statesasa time of particular danger. The Soviet leadership, they say, may feel that the United States would hesitate and perhaps not move decisively during the election period. Y FT= CLT AP-D7 Aproved a ease zuu5i~ ' Fi ~'T~~'~TyI~tl V O1 26 July 1984 Russia at hi g4 level of battle readihn-ess u t By Jay Mallin Sr. -1 HE WASHINGTON TIMES The Soviet-Union and other com- munist countries appear to be accelerating the upgrading of the level of combat readiness of their armed forces, particularly in Europe, according to Defense Department sources. "The Soviets are moving into a higher and higher state of readiness," according to one offi- cial. "They are increasing their ability to begin a conventional war from a standing start. They have reduced their preparatory time to a very few days," he said. The Soviet Union's increased 'readiness was tote suhyect of a con- fidential report sentv CIA Direc-. to W~'illiam Casey Reagan and other top_goPvensimdeent_ officials rer#ent1S The report, which has triggered concern within the administration, detailed a substantial number of steps, particularly during the past few months, that have been taken to heighten the combat readiness of communist forces, especially in Europe. A significant indicator of the new situation, according to defense ana- lysts, is that military vehicles have been withdrawn from their normal use as support vehicles for the har- vest. Because there are insufficient civilian vehicles to handle wheat and other harvests, the Soviet army has customarily provided vehicles of its own to assist with the crops. In 1968, however, the Soviet gov- ernment abruptly halted this use of of military vehicles. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. In succeeding years the military again helped with the harvests. in March of this year, however, a gov- ernmental directive again hatted military support for'the harvest. In view of food shortages within the Soviet Union and the country's partial dependence of imports, this move was seen as a setback in a critical economic area. The Soviet or military - leaders clearly felt that their military plans now had priority over the needs of the pop- ulation. The stopping of the utilization of military vehicles for cro*PP ?lMcd been one of the steps taken to, increase the readiness level of com- ns rces. Other moves that the analysts point to are:. ? A portion of the Soviet nuclear forces in Eastern Europe have been placed on quick-alert. This appears to be the first time this has 11 occurred in recent years. ? Increased numbers of elite Soviet SPETNAZ'troops have been brought into Hungary. and Czechoslovakia. These Special Forces-type soldiers are used for sabotage, terror. and other activi- ties behind enemy lines. ? In Hungary, a recall of an undetermined number of reserv- ists was begun in May of this year. In Czechoslovakia, the term of ser- vice for draftees with missile experience has apparently been extended from two to three years. In East Germany, it has been reported, men up to 35 years of age have been drafted without consid- eration of their professions or difficulties to their families. ? The Soviets have increased the periods during which troops are rotated on railroads. Such movements interfere with the normal transportation of civil- iaris and economic materials. On occasion trains have brought in more troops than they later took out. To prevent observation of troop movements at the Weimar freight station in East Germany, State Security has occupied homes in the area. ? In a highly unusual civil defense exercise held at Omsk in March, 800 people walked some 40 miles. The Soviet government and press maintain high interest in civil defense. ? The role of the Soviet intelli- gence agencies, the KGB and the GRU, as well as of satellite services has been upgraded. This has often been done at the expense of career diplomats in the various foreign services who have been replaced by or placed under intelligence per- sonnel. ? There has been a reduction in production of commercial aircraft in-favor of military transport. Com- mercial aircraft production dropped ' significantly in' 1983. Soviet airlines are not adding new planes to their fleets; in fact, they are buying back old aircraft from ? At least two tractor factories have been converted to man- ufacture military tanks or parts. One of these plants, at Chelyabinsk, is making tank chassis for the first time since World War II. '? The first new nuclear weapons storage facility to be built in a dec- ade is under construction at Kom- somolsk. ? Floor space for ammunition and explosive plants is being expanded throughout the Soviet Union. The ammunition plant at Luebben in East Germany has been placed on full 24-hour production and has more than doubled its pro- duction. ? The Soviet government is pressing hard to have industrial plants increase their production. At the same time, Soviet assistance to the economies of the satellite coun- tries has been cut back. In Czechoslovakia, state-owned trucking companies have been affected by fuel shortages, and in Poland factories which had been producing civilian goods report- ed[y have been converted to the pro- duction of military supplies for the Soviet Union. Against this backdrop of war- related readiness measures, the Soviets have continued their bellig- erent mood against the United States. Soviet media have contin- ually emphasized the theme that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are bad and dangerous. These relations have been com- pared to those between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany prior to World War II, and the Soviet press reiterates that the Soviet Union will not again be caught by a surprise attack. The Soviets and their allies have also tried to restrict the movements of Western military personnel so they cannot witness communist military moves. In Russia, military attaches have been denied permis- sion to travel to Leningrad this year, an area previously open. In Poland the surveillance of for- eign attaches in the southwest of the country has intensified. There have been three recent incidents in Poland in which NATO attaches have been detained and then forced to drive throughmilitary restricted areas so photos of them violating the restrictions could be taken. East European rl For Release 2009%1 12h : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 Approved For ReleSdt885 /Bl $2!$kA 9itplR Q4~00 24 July 1984 CIA- needs Ameri cans supporti in struggle a ai ~ nst Communism By WILLIAM d: CASEY ,e'd us to acquire advanced technical''.' echnical '. ' All this is overlaid on intense ~- America is confronted with an systems that have brought us new demographic problems. A large and undeclared war by the forces of information-gathering capabilities. rapidly growing percentage of international Communism and rad- Second, we have been able to non-Slavic Soviet. people does not ical Arab states. employ top systems analysts to .. fully identify with the Soviet state Terrorism has reached a stage handle the flow of new informa- or the ruling elite. where the distinction between war tion. In hiring them, we aren't Meanwhile, the CIA is achieving and peace is often obscured. The looking for spies. We're after patri- gratifyiing results in such areas as Soviet Union's KGB is waging con- ots, friends and supporters - .peo-our campaign to curb industrial stant battle against us, using tech- pie who understand the endless espionage. niques of propaganda, disinforma- difference between human freedom Through,KGB operations, Ameri-+ tion and other so-called "active and totalitarianism and, who are ca has often wound up contributing measures," such as stealing or oth- willing to put. themselves on the indirectly to the Soviet buildup - erwise improperly acquiring our line for the things we in America" .the accuracy.and precision of Sovi best technology. believe in. et weapons _ which, in effect, has. The KGB is destabilizing weak Third, we see increasing dissatis- ?_us competing with our own tech- governments, undermining trade faction among the people of Com- _ nology. This has forced us to make and international economies and - munist nations. Over the years; the those budget-busting appropria- providing weapons and training to Communists. were very successful tions to come up with more ade- insurgents who seek to overthrow in supporting guerilla :action and .quate defense forces. non-Communist governments.. destabilizing and overthrowing ; But we now fully.recognize the At the same time, the Soviets seek governments. They came into con- problem, and we in the CIA are do- to build an overwhelming military trol in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua ing a much better dounter- power that can be used to intimi and of course Cuba and Vietnam. espionage job. Last year,. well over gains. others and. force political MORE. RECENTLY, HOWEVER, _ 100 Soviet agents were arrested or they've been encountering sub- kicked out - or defected - around THUS WE IN THE Central Intelli- _ stintial '-unrest. People in those the world. Most of them had been gence Agency have our work cut countries are less > willing to take engaged in stealing technology. out for us. What do we have going Communist oppression. lying down. The . CIA's task of -fighting the in our favor? They are more aware what the undeclared war, is an unceasing First, the benefit of strong sup- Communist bosses are really up to. ',one. For-the nation's: sake, it is im? port from the Administration and The people. are progressively : perative that we ..have the under= Congress for our rebuilding pro- more fed up with the rigidity and '.standing and support of our fellow gram. We have had considerable ineffectiveness of bureaucratic Americans. increases in budget and other re- Communist controls and their neg-. ', William J. Casey. is director of the sources. The.increases have allow- ative economic and social: impact. Central Intelligence Agency. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 AR A- PAW- v4 b9F .ase 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000 ON FAGE__=.._L_? WASHINGTON POST 23 July 1984 Hatfield Aided Greek mho Paid Real. ;Estate Few to Senator's wife By Howard Kurtz Washington Post Staff Writer Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore.) helped a Greek financier try to win government sup- port for a proposed trans-African oil pipe- line in 1982 and 1983 while the man was paying Hatfield's wife; Antoinette,' $40,000 in real estate fees. Hatfield's role in aiding Athens entrepre- neur Basil Tsakos with the $15 billion, 2,200-mile pipeline project was reported today by columnist Jack Anderson. In a telephone interview from Portland, Ore., Hatfield confirmed that he had helped arrange meetings for Tsakos with Energy Secretary Donald P. Hodel and Exxon Corp. President Howard Kauffmann. Hatfield said he also had discussed the project with De- fense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and with President Jaafar Nimeri of Sudan, an African nation along the pipeline route. But Hatfield said there was no connection between ' his wife's real estate work for- Tsakos and his support of the pipeline. "We have maintained very separate and distinct professional careers," Hatfield said. "She has not been involved in my political matters, and I really haven't been involved in her business." Hatfield said he has long been concerned that the United States is "very vulnerable to supply cutoffs in the Middle East" and faces "the great potential for a superpower con- frontation" over Mideast oil. He said the pipeline could defuse the situation by allow- ing Saudi Arabia to avoid the Strait of Hor- muz by shipping oil across central Africa to an Atlantic port for export to the United States and Europe. "That was my one and only interest in this," said Hatfield, who chairs the Senate Appropriations Committee, "I was not qual- ified to make judgments on the economics .. I had always tried to delineate my role in the project to the aspect of promotion. I made no presentations or recommenda- tions." A spokesman for Tsakos, who . is in Greece, said Tsakos hired Hatfield's wife for legitimate real estate services and that "he denies anything improper in that rela- tionship." Approved A series of payments by Tsakos to An- toinette Hatfield is to be detailed in Ander- son's column Tuesday. Hatfield said that in early 1982, Tsakos' wife asked his wife, a licensed real estate broker in Washington, for help in finding an apartment here. He said Antoinette Hat- field helped Tsakos find a : cooperative apartment at the Watergate, which Tsakos bought for a reported $500,000, but that she did not handle the transaction. While there was no formal contract, Hat- field said the $40,000 paid to his wife in- cluded "a commission and finder's fee" for locating the Watergate apartment, consult- ing fees for supervising the apartment's renovation and additional fees for trying to locate investment properties for Tsakos. The senator said the work and payments continued through 1983. Hatfield said that while the pipeline does not require U.S. approval and needs no con- gressional action on his part, the African nations involved were seeking assurances that U.S. authorities would not oppose it. Hatfield said that in 1982 and 1983 he sug- gested that Hodel and other officials "take a look" at the plan and talk to Tsakos. A DOE spokesman said Hodel's staff later decided the proposal was not advanced enough to warrant further DOE involve- ment. Anderson also reported today that Hat- field continued to promote the project after being given a report alleging that Tsakos had a criminal record in Greece. Carl. L. Sh ptgL a _Washi gton_attorn y and former member of the Republican Na- tional Committee, said in an interview that he gave the report to Hatfield and CIA Di- rector William J. Casey at a meeting with them both. Shipley, who had served as president of Trans-Africa Pipeline Co., a firm formed to pursue the project, said he pulled out of the venture about two years ago after questions were raised about Tsakos' background and the source of his financing. Shipley said he had obtained "an intelli- ence report on Tsakos later confirmed fiyour ownLutigence agencies. It showed Anderson said that he had confirmed th renu t independently, that it summarized in ormation from Greek gov _pmment files and that the CIA has -a cOQ According to Anderson, the report said that Tsakos twice has been sentenced to jail in Greece for short periods on theft and misappropriation charges and that he had engaged in "black- market" arms sales through a Geneva com- pany. The spokesman for Tsakos said the finan- cier denies the report and maintains that "he has never been involved in anything of a significant criminal nature in Greece." He said Greek authorities have cited Tsakos only for a traffic infraction and a late social- insurance payment. The spokesman said Tsakos _ has been involved in one or two arms deals through the Austrian govern- ment, but "categorically denies" participat- ing in improper sales. Hatfield also said that he 'confronted" Tsakos with the allegations, but that Tsakos said they were "absolutely untrue" and produced a document that Tsakos said showed that the only charge against him in Greece was for a traffic infraction. "I'm not ready to convict someone on the 'basis of what someone else may say," Hat- field said. Shipley said he withdrew from the plan in part because Tsakos began to "back away" from two conditions for the deal: that Amer- ican investors retain a controlling interest in the pipeline and that Tsakos disclose his European backers. Shipley said that Tsakos' financing sources remained "mysterious" and that he "was refusing to disclose infor- mation" when pressed by State Department officials. Hatfield said that he and Tsakos and their wives see each other socially and that Tsakos recently told him that the project is making progress. he had a long criminal record .... I couldn't turn my back on those intelli,~ence' - "--~ r eports. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0004 020005-0 ? ran n Fr' nM,1 ARTICLE APPEARED ?; FI~CLr_.CJ5 Hatfield Helps Arms Dealer's Pipeline Project 'Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield (R-Ore.), whose reelection effort this year is supported by peace and nuclear- freeze groups, has used his consid- erable influence in Washington to promote an oil pipeline project hatched by an international arms merchant. Hatfield, chairman of the Appro- priations Committee, has continued his helpful efforts even after being warned that the Greek munitions dealer, Basil Tsakos, had a criminal record. In fact, Hatfield's string- pulling occurred at the very time that Tsakos was trying to sell at- tack helicopters to Iran from his Washington office, in apparent vi- olation of U.S. law, according to a document obtained by my associate Corky Johnson. I have also- learned that other well-known Washington figures, including CIA Director William J. Casey; were involved with Tsakos' pipeline,,scheme. . -Hatfield was introduced to Tsakos about two years ago by Carl Shipley, a prominent Washington attorney and former member of the Republican ; .National Committee. Shipley had been working with Tsakos and his American partner, Joe Rosenbaum, a friend of Casey and a former intelligence agent, on the idea of a pipeline across Central Africa from the Red Sea to the At- lantic. This would allow Saudi Ara- bia to ship its oil to the United States without having to send it through the Persian Gulf. Shipley said he disengaged from the project when he learned of Tsakos' alleged criminal record in Greece. Shipley gave Hatfield an intelligence report, contained in CIA files and marked "strictly con- fidential," which summarized ma- terial taken from Greek govern- ment files. Tsakos "was given a sentence of imprisonment for 45 days for with- holding and pilfering of [Greek] government fringe benefits and funds," the report stated. It said he also was sentenced to jail in Athens for the "stealing of foreign funds." The report also accused Tsakos of dealing in "black market" arms through a Geneva company, and of exporting antiques illegally. The re- port also said Tsakos has used 'forged passports for his arms deal- ings in Europe, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Argentina and other coun- tries. None of this, apparently, de- terred Hatfield. The two men and their wives socialized regularly at private dinners in Tsakos' Water- gate apartment and the Hatfield home in Georgetown. In a lengthy interview with my associate, Hat- field said he became interested in the arms merchant's trans-Africa pipeline project as an alternative to possible U.S. military action-in the Middle East. Hatfield confronted Tsakos with the derogatory information. Tsakos reportedly was furious, told Hat- field the report was false and pro- duced a document that showed he had only one minor traffic violation. Hatfield asked his attorney to check out Tsakos, and was told that he was "clean." Meanwhile, Hatfield used his clout on Tsakos' behalf. He phoned Energy Secretary Donald P. Hodel and asked him to give Tsakos.and his pipeline project personal atten- tion. The three men had dinner in the Senate dining room,, according to sources. Hodel saw that the pipe- line project was given careful eval- uation, but the Energy Department staff didn't think it was worth pur- suing. Hatfield also lined up an appoint- ment for Tsakos with Exxon Pres- ident Howard Kauffmann in New York. A company spokesman said that Kauffmann met with Tsakos only because Hatfield asked, and that the pipeline project has not been given serious consideration by Exxon. Last November, Hatfield dis- cussed the pipeline project with the president of Sudan, Mohammed Gaafar Nimeiri, who was visiting Washington. Sudan is where the pipeline would start. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 -COL1JMB-US LEDGER (GA) Approved For Release 2005/1243 I A-RDP91-OO9O1 R00040 Local Former Airman Sues To Void-Secrecy Agreement By Phil Gast Staff Writef H. Glenn Hatfield of Columbus says he was sworn to secrecy by the federal government. Now he's suing to end the agreement, saying he was deceived. His complaint in U.S. District Court paints an intriguing sce- nario: charges of CIA evolvement in the developrnent'a reconnais- sance airplane, his assigned pseu- donym and what he terms were il- legal flights over Soviet territory. Hatfield filed his own complaint as a pauper. Furthermore. Hatfield's com- plaint claims, the spy jet was "ob- solete and unnecessary" and was used "for the purpose of ? .. the en- hancement of personal reputa- tions ... " of the defendants. The former Air Force airman second class' involvement began at Groom Lake (also sometimes re- ferred to as Broom Lake, a south- ern Nevada test site), the suit con- tends. He was given a pseudonym upon his arrival in January 1962 and did "support" work for the de- velopment and testing of the A-11, it says. He would not elaborate on his duties. The CIA is one of 14 defendants in the suit filed last week, including Director William Casey, several agency employees, diplomat Rich- ard Helms, President Reagan, Pratt & Whitney, Lockheed Corp., and offices of the presidency, sec- retary of defense and Air Force chief of staff. U.S. Attorney Joe Whitley in Macon, Ga., said Thursday his of- fice had received the suit, but would make no comment. Spokes- men for the two aircraft com- panies said they had not seen the complaint. Prior to a mission briefing, Hat- field was told to " 'ask no questions - just listen, sign the form and get out ... ' " The plane was designed to take photos over foreign coun- tries, the suit says. Hatfield says he asserted "I thought this was illegal," referring to former President Eisenhower's remarks in 1960 that such flights were suspended. The Soviet Union Approved For Release 2005/12/23 that year had shot down an Ameri- can U-2 spy plane and its pilot. Francis Gary Powers, was held captive. The project director assured Hatfield, now 41, that the plane wouldn't enter Russian airspace and the airman signed a secrecy agreement, the suit says. His bosses' pledge was false, Hatfield argues, and the CIA and Air Force have denied. such inci- dents and said they "were the re- sult of navigational errors." Hat- field, who lives at 5037 Eton Drive, says he can prove the flights were deliberate. . Reconnaissance satellites launched over a three-year period made the A-11 and other aircraft useless and cameras aboard one satellite "clearly revealed airfield runways and/or missile sites in the Soviet Union and China," the com- plaint.states. He's asking the court to issue an injunction prohibiting the destruc- tion of any documents on the A-1 1, which he says is the forerunner of other planes, such as the high- speed and sleek SR-71, also known as the "Blackbird." - A voided secrecy pact would re- store "plaintiff's rights to freedom of speech ..." Hatfield wants $10 million in pu- nitive damages from each defen- dant and $1 million from each for each year that his free-speech rights have "been unlawfully in- fringed upon." Approved For Release 2005/12/23: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 RADIO TV REPORTS, 1~ 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 (301) 656-4I DATE :uly 20, 1984 8':00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C. FRED FISKE: Among the things which I deplore is the willingness on the part of so many people to see conspiracy be- hind many of the dramatic events which occur these days, especially when all the answers aren't immediately apparent. That doesn mean that plots and conspiracies don't exist. And Paul Hen, in his new book The Plot to Kill the Pope, re- constructs the conspiracy behind the attempt to assassinate Pope .John II on May 13th, 1981. Paul Hen; was a key staff member of President Carter's National Security Council, and a top expert on Turkey. Very nice to have you with us. .cam PAUL HEN.SE-Y Thank you, Fred. Good to be here. FISKE: You spent your career in the Foreign Service and with the National Security Council. Is that correct? HEN.': Yes, primarily. I spent nearly 30 years in government by the time I retired, and that was almost four years ago now. I spent about half of that time abroad in quite a variety of places, but Turkey was one of the places where I spent a considerable amount of time. FISKE: And you are fluent in Turkish. r_ E HEN-{mot': Yes, I speak Turkish, and have always managed to keep it up. I go to Turkey quite often and know the country quite well. Approved F~Qqr Rgl~ease 200a5/12/2l3 : CIA-RDP91-00901 RO004000~ 0005-0 FISKE: Now you develop your interest in ur ey and Approved For Release 2005/12/23.: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 t:,N PAGE U.S. Skepticism Fades " "They have wouldn't be able said, referring (nethods that agencies could abroad. WASHINGTON POST 13 July 1984 Aides Agree on Bulgariawrioie In Turk's Shooting; of the Poiue By Charles R. Babcock and Bob Woodward Washington Post Sta.!! Writers Some senior administration aides, including ranking intelligence officials, now agree that the Bulgar- ian secret service aided convicted Turkish gunman Mehmet Ali Agca in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul 11 in 1981, accord- ing to well-placed sources. Senior CIA officials, including Director William J. Casey, were once skeptical of the allegations of Bulgarian involvement in the assas- sination attempt. But they now are said to be impressed by the evi- dence gathered by Antonio Albano, the Italian prosecutor who alleges that the Bulgarians hired Agca to kill the pope. "It looks substantial," said one high intelligence official. "There is too much to be coincidence." An- other senior administration official with access to intelligence reports added: "There's something to it." This is not a unanimous view in the administration. Some State De- partment experts still say the Ita- lians' evidence as to an Agca-Bul- garian connection might be reflec- tive of a drug smuggling operation that Turkish nationals run from Bul- garia. Details from the Italian state prosecutor's secret 77-page report on the case were published last month by The New York Times and The Washington Post. The U.S. government apparently has ob- tained copies of the report which was filed in'Italian court in May and seeks a formal charge and trial of three Bulgarians and six Turks in the alleged plot. No separate U.S. investigation of the shooting has been attempted; the officials said. The Italians have corroborated parts of Agca ,s story done things we to do," one official to investigative U.S. intelligence not easily use . Some State Department officials said they feel the Italians' evidence establishes a substantial relation- ship between Agca and the Bulgar- ians. But they said it does not nec- essarily follow that the contacts were to set up a plot against the pope. Said one official, "It's fair to say there is a good deal of smoke, but there's no smoking gun. I think the Italians can make a persuasive case that there was a Bulgarian connec- tion. Whether that was for the pur- pose of using him [Agra] to kill the pope, we don't know. Maybe they were keeping him paid for some other purpose. He came out of shady circles." Another intelligence official said it also is possible that Agca was an "enforcer in the drug trade" for the Bulgarians. According to this rea- soning, it would be possible that Agca was operating alone when he shot the pope. The Bulgarian role in the drug trade has been documented several times in recent years. Last month, John C. Lawn, the Drug Enforce- ment Administration's acting ,dep- uty administrator, told a House For- eign Affairs? Committee drug task force that DEA information "indi- cates that the government of Bul- garia has established a policy of en- couraging and facilitating the traf- ficking of narcotics through the cor- porate veil of KINTEX," the state trading agency. At least two of the Turks the Ital- ian prosecutor wants to indict, Bekir Celenk and Omer Merson, have been listed as narcotics smug- In addition, Abuzer Ugurlu, a Turk mentioned in the prosecutor's report as having supplied Agca with a false passport, is listed by DEA as an international drug kingpin. He is now on trial in Turkey on smuggl- ing charges. And a May, 1984, DEA report on Bulgaria's role in the international drug trade identifies the Hotel Vi- tosha in Sofia, Bulgaria, where Agca stayed the summer of 1980, as a meeting place for narcotics traffick- ers supported by the Bulgarians. There is no evidence in DEA files that Agca was in the drug trade, sources said. U.S. officials and others following the case said that the Italians ap- parently do not have a wiretap, a witness or other evidence to show that the connections between Agca and the Bulgarians were expressly for the purpose of shooting the pope. Nonetheless, U.S. officials seem to agree than the Italians have amassed an extensive circumstan- tial case based on Agca's move- ments, meetings, phone calls and financial transactions. A public trial that would directly accuse Bulgarians in the assassina- tion attempt would be explosive because of the widely held view in intelligence circles that the Bulgar- ian intelligence service answers to the Soviet Union. Asked if Bulgarian sponsorship of Agca's actions would mean Soviet involvement as well, one senior U.S. official said recently, "I've been led to believe that the Bulgar- ian secret service is controlled by the KGB," the Soviet secret police. Another intelligence official said, however, that there are many mat- ters in Bulgarian intelligence that the KGB "doesn't know diddly squat about." about Bulgari iyt pbq.lq 'cease 205iblii!i to?UA? P91-00901800040 GO CO;omment on the issue phone calls, inc using some from phone booths. ARTICLE APPEARPproved For Relde 70MUIMES CIA-RDP91-00901 R00040002 ON PAGE -,,i g 12 July 198,+ S50 Years of Tending the World's Repair By KENNETH B. NOBLE Seven past -,Chairmen were among Estimate of Savings several thousand S.E.C. alumnni, se- Not surprisingly. Administration spKW to The Pisa York Times WASHINGTON, July 11 - Fifty scholars who gathered here the other light Last August, the? vice Presi- } years ago, in the first days of the day to celebrate the 50th anniversary . dent's Task Force on Regulatory Re- agency that was to remold Wall Arthur Levitt Jr., chairman of the lief said in its final report that S.E.C. Street, the nation's securities mar- American Stock Exchange, said at moves to cut red tape "`will save pub- ;'"kets were moribund and deep in the the banquet, "The S.E.C. stands as a lie corporations and their sharehold- grip of the Great Depression. beacon among Washington agencies $350 million per year, with- Manipulation, fraud and other in terms of protecting the public in- out compromising full disclosure."' questionable practices by market and that. corporate insider3 had been preva- One of the former chairmen Wil- Mr. Shad, by most accounts, has lent and they had involved enormous hats J. iffftsft, ndhv Directbf o C also kept his promise that the agency losses to the public. tral Intelli enced the S.E.C. had would comedown an those accused of "We knew the world needed fixing, illegal insider trading "with hobnail wiw an 'enormous count on boots.,, In his tenure, the commis- and we were part of fixing it," re- Freeman who fresh to the "bounce the American 0=- sion's enforcement divi- called Milton V . , , am is demons ra sion has brought insider out of Columbia Law School, was one w 'chest of the first to join the new agency, the a rest o e world envies. trading ' charges against Securities and Exchange Commis- These days, however, the is 99 people, representing sion, which was intended to prevent a watching a stock market that is almost a third of all such recurrence of the trading practices vastly different from its IBM's coup- cases brought in the that helped foster the great stock terpart. For one thing, the stock mar- agency's history. market crash of 1929. ket's power over the economy has di- These cases are nota- 'It Was a Very Exciting Time' Street was considered the epicenter the volume, but also be- President Roosevelt chose as the commission's first chairman Joseph P. Kennedy, who only shortly before had been cited by the Senate Banking Committee for participating in stock manipulation. Jerome Frank, a later chairman, said the Kennedy appoint- ment was "like setting a wolf to guard a flock of sheep." However, by most accounts, Mr. Kennedy proved to be a successful adminstrator. An- other among the commission's early chairmen was the legal luminary Wil- liam 0. Douglas, and his chief assist- ant was Abe Fortas. Both later be- came Justices of the Supreme Court. "The whole basis of the thing," said Mr. Freeman, who is now a promi- nent lawyer with the Washington firm of Arnold & Porter, "was that uncon- trolled securities sales and markets had resulted in a disastrous failure, and it was time to do something about It." "It was a very exciting time," he added. "The world was being made new.,, Now, 50 years later, the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, both key pieces of New Deal legislation, still provide the framework for regulation of the nation's securities market. And the S.E.C., created to enforce those laWs, is widely regarded as perhaps the country's finest independent regula- tory agency. . of the world's free market. cause, in many cases, of In addition, the targets of the the prominence of the defendants- in S.E.C.'s scrutiny are not only the big January, for example, the S.E.C. Wall street brokers and bankers, but charged former Deputy Defense Sec- increasingly those individual inves- retary Paul Thayer with passing on tors who hope to make a quick profit confidential information obtained by trading on the basis of illegal in- while he was chairman of LTV Corpo- sider information. ration to friends who then traded on Still, said John S. R. Shad, the 61- year-old former vice chairman of E. F. Hutton who became the com- mission's 22d chairman in 1981, "We're got the broadest, deepest and best markets the world has ever seen." In the view of some, the commis- sion is no longer the vigorous market watchdog it once was. Critics contend that the agency, under the leadership of Mr. Shad, has been too zealous in embracing the Reagan Administra- tion's financial deregulation pro- grain- Among other things, the commis- sion has eased the requirements for most companies on data they must disclose to the agency and to share- holders; made it easier, especially it. More recently, R. Foster Winans, a Wall Street Journal reporter and four others were charged with illegally profiting from stock trading based on market-sensitive information leaked by Mr. Winans. Meantime, voices from other quar- ters are more critical of Mr. Shad's policies and performance. They argue that the commission has been lax in carrying out the agency's man- date to provide shareholders with more information about companies and a greater voice in their affairs. Michael Unger, president of the North American Securities Adminis- trators Association, a group of state securities regulators, said. "If you're for small companies, to sell securi- ties; ties; and reduced the minimum capi- tal that brokerage firms must main- tain as a cushion. This last action alone, agency officials say, has freed $500 million for other uses. Such decisions have won praise from many on Wall Street, where the agency's disclosure requirements were once ritually condemned as a burden and a discouragement to capi- tal formation. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 e2. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 talkh g about Setting government off JOSEPH P KENNEDY UM seuunucn UMUOUr ? uo , "s . be 's been succcessful. But I dn't , 1 11 11934-35 think that always inures to the benefit of investors. There will be some peo- ple who will take advantage of the loosening of regulations, and there will be a significant number of people harmed as a result." Perhaps a more genermrs vlew is that of Joel Seligman, a George WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS Washington University law professor a kY `. ' 1937-39 who has been a persistent critic of Mr. Shad's deregulatory efforts. "In the insider trading area," Mr. Seligman said, "and in the S.E.C.'s general program in the tender offer area, there clearly seems to be a ma- turing and moderating of the com- mission within the last two years or so." "He's still a very conservative chairman," Mr. Seligman added, "but he's grown up in the job, and that's to the good." Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 Approved For Release 200544DP91-00901R000 EMPLOYEE BULLETIN DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 13 July 1984 1. In recent weeks I have had to take severe action agaipst several senior persons in the Agency and in industry for indiscretions in the handling of classified material. Actions in these cases have included suspension or revocation of security clearances, termination of employment, and referral to the Department of Justice for legal action. 2. I want to reemphasize the seriousness of the unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information. I also want to stress the dangers of idle gossip and'the confirmation of speculation about classified material with unauthorized persons. 3. Recently, a prominent journalist claimed that Agency employees passed classified information to him. I would like to believe this is not true, and urge all employees to abide by their security obligations. DISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES (1-6) ALL PORTIONS CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901R~-A.A.-d80020005-0 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 ARTICLE APPS D ON PAGE at. . 'Soviets th . ucu yVU reaa em again. Then you read them a i ga n And . then it dawns on you that re ardl f WASHINGTON TIMES 11 July 1984 Bulgarian plot to murder his holiness, are: Ital- ian State Prosecutor Antonio Albano, who has assembled 25,000 pages of evidence; journalist Claire Sterling; NBC reporter Marvin Kalb; Soviet disinformation specialist Arnaud de Borchgrave; and Paul Henze, author of "The Plot To Kill The Pope" (Charles Scribner's Sorr, .1983). ":. In his report, Mr.?Albano writes: "The But garian secret services had a specific political interest in killing Pope John Paul II. The impos- ing rise of Solid i i ar ty n Poland i thu ne smmer.: of 1980 and consequent social convulsions con- -- ,a -A LsL ..states of Eastern Europe. This was perceived as a mortal danger- t .t;_._-_ _,?.. . . _ o how many ess o 5 times you read this quote it still does not m n Lre co- Take, for example, a recent statementiade by Secretary of State George P. Shult -before a conference here sponsored by theathan Institute, a group with headquarters in Jerusa- lem that is named after Jonathan Netanyahu who led and died in the Israeli hostage rescue. missio E n at ntebbe) Sekinb .pag aout the plot to: murder the pop nor.. S . , e hutt authorities unravel the answer` to one of the bloc involvement in th'e' attempt to assassinate the o e?" p p Huh? Now; it's one thing to say there are u nan swered questions about the role of the Soviet Union in thi s the crime of this century. But it defies io rat nal analysis to try and figure out why our secretary of state still speaks :o:.._ ___ . In fact, the attitude of the entire R n eaga administration toward this shootin -f g rom day'one when it occurred _ defie s - a this t e d - a t mpte assassi ns tion happened, various administration officials called background - have thrown cold water on the idea that the Soviets were involved in this l_ hair,.,. s p t At the-end of last month, the New Yo k P s o t r reported that CIA Director William Casey had removed his -- ++~ ,Ut tU Kill th .e DOpe." Senior U S intelligence and e congr s sional sources are, reported as sayin that ,Mr. Ca,ey_derided to o ths after re art fro m lalligar~rsecuto_ rs teat eta evidence of a 8ulian Crvnnot,' n to this assaite ssna tl i all th h , is lout-dragging since. there is so much overwhelmingly convincing ' evidence that point h_ L,_ s t Sofia? ,,,,,, and tneir puppets in Amon those who have per si in great detail connectPirh1 rea e re 1 Moody finger mostly due to the fervid religious faith f t o he population - sustained and helped above all by the first Polish pope in history= the Polish rebellion` might be greatly weakened and frag- mented [by his) physical elimination. "It is easy to see what really happened. In some secret place, where every secret is wrapped in another secret, some political fig- ure of great power took note of this grave situation and, mindful of the vital needs of the Ea t bl c s ern o decidd i ,et was necessary to kill Pope Wojtyla." In his bo k P o aul Henze cnldeh " ,ocus tathis- torical, inferential. circumstantial d l an so id factual evidence all point in the same direction Roman Catholic Church, and h i e s a tireless advocate of freedom of the hum' m an etng to choose his course in life. Says Air. Henze: an spirit and the,rightof the individual hu b GUU?,ur the Soviet rulers. The problem is n ot only that it undermines their control over Pola d U n lti . matelyit threatens their power over their own nennie Cr l:_,_ ___ gi h a out t e popes divisions' has come back to h n t his succes sors ' au -4z~ WIT_ as regards the plot to, murder the pope the aila1 not: Was there Soviet or Soviet-bloc.- } istration officials seem t -?t neagan aamin. o believe this? ea ed a distinct picture of a Soviet. ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 6rD ed For Release 20 'July 1 984 ?1-00901R By Jeremiah O'Leary THE WASHINGTON TIMES President. Reagan has issued a formal directive ordering the Pen- tagon to resume military and naval exercises in Honduras and off the coasts of .Central Atnertcain view~_ of the continuing military' buildup ,in Nicaragua, sustained Sandinista] support for the.rebelsinELSalvac dor and the expected' rebel` offeii=? sive there in September, The Washington Times has Joarned "We don't want our allies in Ceti. --teal America to start jumping ship.. because of erroneous reports that the U.S. is seeking-a direct accom- modation with Managua,". said an, informed - administration- .source. `? "The Nicaraguans would love to have a separate deal because it would weaken us with ourfriends in Central America.-"; He acknowledged that the other Cen- tral Americans are shaky because of the perception that the United States may not stick to the course- charted by President Reagan... . There may be some dis_ agreement at lower.. staff levels but there is no disagreement among top, "policy levels - that it would' lse- a major mistake to negotiate. a sep- arate deal `witFi..-Nicaragua "_an; administration official said yester- day. The president issued a three, apart directive after a meeting of all senior security officials` June 26 at- which Special Ambassador Barry:, ShIaudemanreported on the state iof affairs.1n.-the Central' merican arena. All the presi'dent's, senior advisers, in cluding='Secretarv ofi State George P. Shultz, Defense Sec=: retarv { asoer V3? i~ ein erg~er~ CIAl child-WL 11iai~.LCase;;_-national security advisor Robert C. McFar lane n3-U.N.Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, agreed withPresident .a Reagan on his directive The president ordered f + Continued dialogue with. `.raguawithinthe`frameiathk of the Contadora group- and. adhering- too the, four basic--U.S.- gbjectives regarding the Sandinista:regime.. * All-out support by .all agencies with troop exercises for achieving : congressional and public support for the administra- .tion's ,proposals for funding the Jackson Plan for Central America and specifically the $21 million in funds for. the anti-Sandinista con-. ;tras and the rema}Fii;g$116 million thepresident wants ;Congress. to appropriateInthe;regular supple mental bill, for aid to El Salvador; The president already has signed the $62 million urgent supplemen- tal legislation for support of El Sal- vador. T ,.?. The Pentagon a week ago reacted to this directive by ordering a resumption of low-level military and naval exercises to begin before the expected Salvadoran rebel offensive. This represents a major policy change and senior officials said the resumption of U.S. exer- cises was designed to demonstrate the firm American commitment to its friends and allies in the region. Informed sources said the exer- cises will be 'small-unit maneuvers of short duration, stepped-up secu7 rity assistance to the allies in Cetitral America, increased intelligence efforts about the Nica-. raguan military buildup and a naval presence offshore that officials would not discuss in detail. . The primary reasons for this high-level decision were the expected fall offensive by the Marx- ist forces in El Salvador, the appre- hension in Costa Rica, which has no army, and the nervousness in Hon- duras where there are 15,000 anti- Sandinistas whose future financing' is in the hands of Congress when members return to Washington July 23. In issuing the directive, Mr. Rea-'.' gan emphasized that U.S. objet; ?' Jives remain-,the same. They are- that.Nicaragua must cease export= ing arms and advisers to the Salva= doran insurgents; that Nicaragua must reduce the_size- of?_its_ atively huge military machine; that Nicaragua must cut its ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba; and that Nicaragua must adhere to its prom- ise to the Organization of American. States to conduct free elections. Despite reports of a bitter battle within the administration about make a separate deal with Nicara gua giving the Sandinistas a free hand internally in return for an agreement to cease helping the left- ists in El Salvador, there is a solid':' front against such an accommoda- tion among the president -and all senior officials;; Members of Congress were : given a 35-page, classified report; . recently which states that Nicara guan aid to the Salvadoran rebels continues unabated. The report- states that-the Nicaraguans have completed the . longest runway in Central America at Punta Huete as well as lengthened the airfields at - Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas; . that Bulgarian ships are bringing a continous flow of weapons to Nica- ragua including 120 Soviet tanks, some of them amphibious, 120 armored vehicles, 120 Soviet howit- zers, 24 multiple rocket launchers made in the U.S.S.R., 1,000 trucks and jeeps and 10 Soviet helicopters. Nicaragua also has been given six heavy ferry boats for river crossings. The current estimate'of intelligence sources is that there are in Nicaragua 3,000 Cuban civil- -ians; 200 Soviet officials and hun- dreds of military and civilian advisers from eastern European countries, Libya, North Korea and the Palestine Liberation Organiza- tion. The Sandinista strategy, according to the report, continues to be to exercise command, control and training for the Salvadoran reb- :els and to foment violence in Costa. Rica ?-'. i n,. The administration`is -now look- ing for a means of securing con- gressional authority for the $21 million for the contras, perhaps by attaching it to another appropri- ations bill, and for the rest of the military assistance funds for the ;government of: President Jose. Napoleon Duarte. , "If we don't get the whole pack- age, the Jackson Plan [developed by the Kissinger Commissions for ; ..Central America will windup in the dead letter office," an administra- tion official said yesterday. The White. House expects Senate approval but believes that the Cen- tral American legislation is in trou- ble -in the Democrat-dominated. Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA=RDP91-00901 R0M'b~`1(MSe6entattves._ Continued ARTICLE APWOW&~bd For Releasff /Vb3 P RXJP 01 R ON PAGE 8 July 1984 n COLD WP&OR'S ruffF6QE WTH A WOR.U HE SEES flu. OF D1PES, DECEPTiOCd DSfff3FORMATION.. By EmsEy YoPie RED rnaud de Borchgrave- -still 1 The story is one of classic decline remembers clearly a lunch , and fall barbarians (the Soviets) he had 33 years ago with a from without and decay (a media man he says was a KGB honeycombed with Marxist dupes) agent: de Borchgrave was from within. The' allegations of this only 24 years old at the time plot have not gone unnoticed by some and Paris bureau chief of . in the Reagan administration. At a Newsweek magazine when a Washington book t f M i par y or on mbo Soviet diplomat called with last September, administration fig- i i i "I an nv tat on. n a very ures who showed up included presi- quiet under-stated way, he dential counselor Edwin Meese At- , kept telling me I was al- torney General William French ready one of the world's most impor- Smith, USIA director Charles Wick tant journalists . . . but I could be- and FBI director William Webster. come the world's most famous jour- Because he has spent more than nalist if only I could develop a social. three decades as a reporter, The conscience. Spike and Monimbo aren't seen only "I said, 'How can I go about that?' as novels by de Borchgrave fans, but He said, 'By denouncing the evils of as thinly disguised accounts of what capitalism and the evils of theCIA~; he thinks goes on in the media gulag. and we will help you.'" And because he spent'so many years De Borchgrave rejected that offer of as a reporter, the vision of the world orchestrated success made more than presented in the novels has many for- three decades ago. Today, he is con mer colleagues scratching their heads vinced that such recruiting of journal- about how he came to believe such a fists by the KGB didn't stop with.him. Proposition. He believes there are witting and un- ~- - THE B witting communist dupes within news- ELGIAN-BORN de papers, radio and television who Borchgrave, 57, is small, balding and spread Soviet lies--which de Borch- meticulously groomed. He has an ac- grave calls "disinformation." Such cent of the kind once described as con- . journalists, he says, "spike"- discard -stories critical of the Soviets. In two bestselling novels, The . De Borchgrave (pronounced: duh' Spike (1980) and Monimbo (1983), de Bore-grahv) is one of those people Borchgrave and coauthor Robert about whom stories are told- After a Moss lay out the scenario of this un- tough day covering a war zone, for- derground war, one battled with such eign correspondents at times would subtlety by the enemy that most of us sit around a bar and talk about the , don't even know it's going on. Borchgravian persona. Peter Brae- strup, a former foreign correspondent ; and now editor of The Wilson Quar- ! terly, remembers that de Borchgrave wrote a good first-person account in 1966 of a Marine battalion's battle in Vietnam:: "Arnaud came back to Sai- gon and he had a little arm wound.. He had a bandage on that arm a long time." For de Borch?grave storytellers, there has been a legendary tan, leg- endary self-promotion and legendary access to world leaders. De Borchggrave is no longer a for- eign correspondent, but the persona remains. He still has the tan, al- though at 57 it has permanently mot- tled his scalp. He is still good at making it clear he moves in important circles. In the course of a. 10-minute conversation,. he mentions the names of places in seven countries: ` Fm on my way to South Africa, I've got a speech in Paris on the way back I just had a kidney stone removed in LA ..." He brings up the . names of eight -VIPs: "(John] Vorster was the only head of state who ever denied any- thing I wrote. Be banned me for life from South Africa. When I heard that, I said, My life or his?' Sadat and Hussein had some complaints, but they couldn't deny it. Now, of course, Pm welcome in South Africa I have to go to a reception to- night for Chuck Percy at the French Embassy, which is right down the block ..." Recently he had a lunch with Rich- ard Nixon, and attended a small din- ner party at Clare Boothe Luce's Approved For Release 2005/12/23 CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 Co, , 1. 170ay tinental.? he's from somewhere else, but nothing betrays exactly where. ON PAGE 10, sec. 6 8 July 1984 By George de Lama . and more of a personal interest ever since he had to be briefed for his trip to Managua," said one offi- cial. HARD-LINERS in the National Security un the Pentagon and CIA are re oFf`ed urI in tougher military pressure on the an in - tas, per aps hoping to rovoke Nic- ara a into a m itary move or majo' rplitical bIunderthat could provide an excuse or full-scale U.S. miIicaryanterv enti~on. "There are some people in ~o- vernment who really want nothing short of us taking the Sandinistas out," said a worried State Depart- ment official. ? WASHINGTON-Two months ago, President Reagan went on national television to dramatize what he called an urgent situation in El Salvador. Government troops were running out of ammunition, he said. Some soldiers were said to have but one clip for their rifles. The point, said Reagan, was that without congressional funding, El Salvador was on the brink of falling apart, an easy prey for Marxist guerrillas. After that, he said, Americans would face "the spectre of 100 million people from the Panama Canal to Mexico" falling under Communist rule. Reagan won his funding battle. And under the new leadership of moderate President Jose Napoleon Duarte, El Salvador has not fallen apart. That news has been lost somewhere in the shuffle as the Reagan administration once again turns to yet another crisis, the lat- est in a series of crucial testing grounds in Central America. . QUIETLY, WITHOUT fanfare but with mounting concern, the State. Department, CIA and the Pentagon are focusing once again on Nicara- gua, the fulcrum of a regional triangle of conflict. And unlike El Salvador, where the immediate security situation and official policy are in some re- spects looking up, a convergence of circumstances and new develop- ments are threatening a dismal failure for almost four years of Reagan policy, U.S. officials warn. :."The focus has certainly shifted shortages of basic to Nicaragua again," said one sen- goods and a for State Department official. "El Salvador is once again a sideshow. And all the signs are looking worse and worse in Nicaragua." The problem of how to deal with Nicaragua's leftist Sandinista go- vernment, a question that has bede- viled Washington since Democrat Jimmy Carter was in the White House, is vying for attention with such policy questions as the Soviet Union and the Middle East, sources in the administration say. Secretary of State George Shultz, fresh from a disappointing diplo- matic. foray to Nicaragua last month, is heavily involved in daily deliberations. ` He's taken more The hard-liners- include. Deputy Defense- Secretariesred.kle and Nestor_Sanchez. __Gern_Paul_Gor- _ma.n,commander, of.the U.$. South- . ern_Commandin Panama; CIA Di- rector -'A'illiam Casey; and National Secur_ity_=Tstaffer -Constantine lated-..at. the State Department, Part of the hard-liners' frustra- tion may also stem from a disheart- ening set of facts facing administra- tion policymakers. After three years of an openly hostile policy towards the Sandinistas: ?Qne CIAacked guerrilla force, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force I [FDN), has substantially failed to shake the Sandinistas militarily. The FDN, operating from bases in Honduras, has penetrated deep' into Nicaragua and at times wreak- ed havoc in remote rural areas. It has also helped squeeze the crippled booming black market. The shortages have; helped fuel discontent, but the widespread grumbling has not translated into the anti-Sandinista fervor that CIA analysts had hoped would rock the regime. eThe other major anti-Sandinista guerrilla force, the Costa Rica- based Revolutionary Democratic Alliance [ARDE], has just under- gone a demoralizing period that in cluded a near-successful assassina- tion attempt on its leader, Eden Pastora, and a major Sandinista offensive that has dislbd~ed it from some of its key bases inside Nicara- gua Continued Approved For Release 2005/12/23 :' CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 Pastora, the famed "Commander Zero" who as a Sandinista guerrilla helped lead the fight to overthrow late dictator Anastasio Somoza, was badly wounded in a May 31 bom- bing attemppt that killed three for- eign journalists and several guerril- las. Hobbling on a cane, Pastora emerged here last week to sppeeak instead of peace with the Sandinis- tas, promising . to de-mobilize his 8,000-man rebel force if- the Managua regime makes substantial political concessions to guarantee a free election this November. The Sandinista concessions, ad- ministration analysts say, are not likely. But if Pastora must resume his fight, he will find that Sandinis- ta troops have moved his men out of several of their key bases of operation within Nicaragua. The ARDE forces reportedly suf- fered a sound drubbing,' in early June, just after the bombing at- tempt on Pastora. Their ability to regroup soon is questionable, par- ticularly with their charismatic leader still wounded and unlikely to rejoin the fight soon, "They're the only movement, in Central America built around one guy's mystique," said a U.S. official in the region. "Without Pastora around, it will be hard for them to do' much." AR11 CLAp :d Release 2005/12/23': CIA-RDP91-00901 R ON PAGE All WASHINGTON POST 8 July 1984 ADMINISTRATION SPLIT Pursuit of U.S.-Sandinista Pac is ii-e-o-a By John M. Goshko and Joanne Omang Washington Post Staff Wrltera A proposal that the United States seek direct accommoda?? tion with the leftist government of-Nicaragua reportedly has pro- duced sharp divisions. within the highest levels of the administra- tion. At issue, according to the re- ports, is whether the Reagan ad- ministration should seek a direct U.S.-Nicaraguan agreement that would end American pressure on the Sandinista government and allow it a free hand in internal policies in exchange for Nicara- gua's ceasing aid to leftist guer- rillas in El Salvador. - The alleged dispute has serious implications for President Rea- gan's reelection efforts as well-as for overall U.S. foreign policy.:, The debate has been held so closely that while some senior officials say it is a bitter battle over Central America policy, oth- ers deny that major changes are contemplated. The issue is so sensitive that some senior offi- cials who initially confirmed that ,there are disagreements later contacted Washington Post :re- porters to . minimize. their earlier remarks. At the center of the controver- sy is the negotiating channel jre- cently opened with Nicaragua by U.S. special envoy Harry W. Shlaudeman following _ the, visit to Nicaragua by Sec- retary of State George P., Shultz on June I. In recent days, at least one highly placed administration of- ficial has charged privately that Shultz is leaning toward an ac- commodation with the Sandinistas despite fierce opposition to the idea from Defense Secretary Cas- par W. Weinberger CIA Director 4 lane and U.N. Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. Other senior officials, represent- ing- several government agencies, said that Shultz's trip to Managua and the. decision to have 'Shlaude- -man begin talks with Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco was strongly opposed by the administration's more hard-line fac- tions. Some of these officials also said that the failure of U.S. efforts to produce clear-cut results in Central America is causing dissent within the administration. But, several senior officials who spoke on the condition that they not be identified said it is not clear how high the dissent has reached within the administration or that there is evidence of Shultz advocating a re- versal of existing policy. . Some said reports that Shultz favors trying to make a deal with Nicaragua might represent a "pre- emptive strike" by those who are suspicious of the Shlaudeman mis- sion and who want to kill it or en- sure that it cannot be used in ways that. they' consider detrimental to- U.S. interests. A direct U.S.-Nicaraguan accom- modation would bypass the so- called Contadora process that has involved several Latin American countries in trying to work out a comprehensive peace agreement subscribed. to by all countries in Central America. Current U.S. pol- icy is to support anti-Sandinista "contra" rebels and to isolate Nic- aragua by strengthening El Sal- vador, Honduras and Costa' Rica militarily and economicaliv. The United States has-been de- manding that Nicaragua permit an internal system of pluralistic de- mocracy; sever its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union; halt its aid to the Salvadoran rebels and other leftist insurgency 'movements in the .re- gion, and substantially reduce its large military establishment. These points would be covered under a comprehensive regional agreement that the Contadora ne- gotiations are trying to achieve. For that reason, the United States has been prodding Nicaragua toward participating in Contadora fully and in good faith. The administration has said that Shlaudeman's function is to give the flagging tontadora process "a shot in the arm." Of the four U.S. aims, the issue of "internal democratization" has been regarded as especially impor- tant by policy-makers advocating a tough approach. One senior official acknowledged i that administration dissent centers on that question. The official said "there are some in the Department of State who have the view" that Shlaudeman should pursue an agreement dealing solely with Nicaragua's activities outside its borders. According to this view, Shlaudeman should offer to end U.S. support for the "con- tras" and other incentives like in- ternational funding for Nicaragua's hard-pressed economy in exchange for an end to Nicaragua's support for revolutionaries in El Salvador and elsewhere. William Casey J. , national ecurit affairs a vfser Robert CARP 9r'ed For Release 2005/12/23 CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 AKfI APPEARED HTJMAN EVENTS ON PAGE nnroved For Release 20ti5/4.2i23 5 CAA-RDP91 - Media Intervene Sld &-1-7W In "Contras" Debate. During the. week immediately preceding the critical Senate vote to shelve President Reagan's re-- quest for S21 million in aid to the "Contras" in Nicaragua, the media focused a curious amount of attention on the charges leveled `by former CIA analyst David C. MacMichael that the Administra- tion has "no proof" ,that -the Sandinistas are; .funnelling arms,. ammunitIon aid direction to_th.e_ ill i Ell guerrasn Savador Leading the pack was the New York .Tmes, which promoted MacMichaels a man "in from the cold and hot for the truth." In the Times arti- cle,. MacMichael accused the Administration of . fabricating Sandinista- complicity to- bolster 'sup port, for' its anti-Communist posture -in Central America. "The whole picture that the Administration has presented of Salvadoran insurgent operations be- ing planned, directed and supplied from Nicaragua .is.simply..not. true,''.MacMichacl.said.._`_`.. The-_ Administration and the CIA have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in the sup- ply of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the Nicaragua Government." Within two days of the Times article, two of the three major networks had MacMichael on the air, and the Washington Post, following suit, featured his charges on the front page. Both CIA director William Casey and Secretary. of State George Shultz immediately dismissed MacMichael's charges, . with Shultz telling '50 reporters over a two-hour lunch that the "evidence is everywhere" on the Sandinistas. But the Post, finding it nowhere, bolstered MacMichael's claim, insisting: "Neither Shultz nor Casey provided evidence to refute MacMichael's challenge.- The State Department, which has been asked repeatedly'to make public its evidence that fl- licit arms are flowing,'has not provided such, information." John M. Goshko, a Post reporter who co-wrote the article, told HUMAN EVENTS that the Admin- istration's assertions "have been --a,continuing source of controversy since President Reagan took , p o e office, and the AdA li? 3 rFb ?4La C'0 %12/23 ?. CWR(0P8rlr 09 ?f)0~ ' believe these c arges or to?those viho say they want to see proof to document it." Goshko said;;."Our ..position is, given .past experience going back to. the Vietnam War, that you don't necessarily take things on faith.".If the. Administration refuses to make public CI.4 'docu- ment.ation, Goshko said,,"then they have to. face: the consequences of the fact that.. a large body-of people in this country-do not believe their conten- tions and 'are not convinced." Goshko's position _is'untenable, however" -..Our. intelligence community-precisely because :itt does'n't want to reveal to.theenemy the sources'we rely: on and our methods of obtainuig infor-: oration-must not be required to. "go public with its evidence: . ? - The intelligence community is not a judge unto` itself, moreover. It must convince Congress' -.. through both the Senate and House intelligence panels - that it possesses convincing' evidence. And the evidence it -has. repeatedly laid .out before: those two panels has persuaded. even those liberals; who vigorously oppose theAdministration's.:Cen tral American policies that_the Sandinistas pIay:_a" critical role in El Salvador's insurgency; Thus . the House Intelligence : Com- mittee-chaired by Rep. _Edh'ard Boland (D.-Mass.), -'who'- opposes aid 'to the "Contras :stressed in, a ` report: issued last .. May: "A major portion of the arms and'other material sent by Cuba and other Communist countries to the Salvadorani insurgents trans: Nicaragua with the permission snd assistance: . of the Sandinistas. "The Salvadoran insur~en.ts_:rely:on the ,use of sites inicaragi a, some of'whichare-located'in Managu4 itself;-'for.' comrnutij'cazion's; coiiiriand.' and-control,`and fot? ~: -the'logis__ `' 'd .. .-. tics'{o"C-onduCitfieii financial, material and' pro'p'aganda activitiesTlie Sandinista leadership' sanctions and '.di'rectly facilitates all the above functions." Sen. Danref'Patrick Moynihan (D -N:Y.), a vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence; panel, -entered this considered statement on Sandi nistasupport for' the insurgents on March 29:0'f this Year-just. three months ago: '" ~ ' _ ?. ; : :: ?_ =M. ".What the House Intelligence Committee stated last May' is iii our judgment still true: [The in'-_ -in ' El Salvador] de ends f r 'Alf g, ogst,cs, past three years, responded to those who..:don't~ an d.command-and-control facilities - upon out-. side assistance from'Nicaragua and Cuba." He' also ~ ARTICLE AP ON PAGE ed For Release Tuly 9$4t~901 L policy infl,, h IM-15 refle-ets deep d4lvlsloris By Juan 0. Tamayo Knight-Riddcr Ncns Service WAS= GTON - President Reagan may insist that there are no plans to deploy U.S. combat forces in Central America, but at the same time an Army general is proposing covert use of US. warplanes to strafe Salva- guerrillas. . doran Secretary of State George P. Shultz arranges a surprise June 1 visit to Nicaragua, but. he. hides, his plans frcm other high-level administration officials, reportedly out of .fear that they would veto the initiative.' " . Seen from afar, these discrepancies and myriad others like them have given Reagan policies toward Cen- tral America a tinge of the sinister, hinting at a "secret agenda" that talks of peace but girds for war. ? But up close,. the disharmony shows up clearly for what it is: fall- out from an unremitting struggle between "moderates" and "hard-lin- ers" within the administration; each side prescribing substantially differ- ent policies, for Central America's ills. - A detailed examination of adminis= tration policy shows that it is mainly the result of day-to-day debate, in- fighting and 'lobbying by strong-, willed officials throughout the gov. ernment,.rather than a reflection of a detailed plan set down,in the Oval Office. This picture emerged from dozens of interviews with current and for- mer government officials, many of whom refused to be identified, and many with vested interests. To many of those officials, the situation is so murky that they are not certain ex- actly where US. policy is heading. For instance, one. official who has been privy to inside information at the top levels of the administration said. "if Reagan had to make a deci- sion today on whether to go in with. troops, I think he'd be against it. "'After the elections, I don't know." Moderates like Shultz agree that tie administration must squeeze Nic- aragua's Sandinista government and El Salvador's leftist rebels to force them to sue for peace. But they argue that the United States need not send combat forces to the region. Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the Sal- America was ''"sideshow '... that vadoran rebels are a "cancer" that diverted attention from more impor- trust be cured, through pressure if tant.matters such as the economy." possible, through direct military in- Since then, Baker has been urging tervention if necessary. moderation because of the concern ;Occasionally the bard-liners pre- by top Reagan political aides that the wail, and war fever mounts. Occa- President is perceived by too many sionally the moderates get their way, voters as trigger-happy. gad peace seems within grasp. More This was Haig's first experience Iten, the two. sides compromise. ,with what he described as "the con- "There are two souls in this admin- . slant bugaboo of the administra. itration, and two definitive posi-. tion's foreign policy" - a president tions on virtually all foreign and . who kept his distance from the is; defense policy issues," said a senior sues and gave way to "divided coun- S.ate Department official. "Neither cils, different voices." These would school has a dominant position. become the enduring characteristics Washington veterans say the clash of the Central America debate. as over Central America are the Though Reagan in the early days worst in years. was not ready to make Central Amer- ; Much of the infighting stems from ice an administration priority, his the anticommunist philosophy that policy makers needed something to Reagan brought to -government mollify the hard-line conservatives hen he took office in 1981. who had enthusiastically backed his '.-In Reagan's first 13 months, the campaign: - State Department fired, sent to far- "Haig tried to appease U.S. conser- away posts or forced into early re- vatives by throwing them a bone - tirement at least seven Latin Ameri- Central America," said John Car- can '.experts' that the new baugh, then an aide to conservative i administration saw as tainted by in- Sen. Jesse Helms (R., N.C.) and now a volvement in President Jimmy Car- Washington lawyer with close ties to Per's human rights policies and by administration hard-liners. - the "loss" of Nicaragua -in the Sandi- The administration chose Thomas vista revolution in 1979. 0. Enders as its assistant secretary of Moved out were William Bowdler, state for inter-American affairs. He assistant secretary of state; James had no experience in Latin America, Cheek and John Bushnell, his deputy though be was widely regarded as a I assistant secretaries; Robert White, ? brilliant diplomat mbassador to.E1 Salvador; Lawrence. yezzullo, ambassador to Nicaragua; His credentials as a hard-liner hack Bums, ambassador to Honduras, were impeccable. As the number-two official in the. US. Embassy in and Wayne Smith, head-of the U.S; Phnom Penh from 1971 to 1974, he )interests Section in.Cuba directed the secret U.S. bombing of TTheir replacements had little expe- Cambodia. rience in the region, but, they shared Both administration hard-liners several traits: conservative ideology; and moderates were initially satis- military or intelligence back- fied with Enders. U.S. military aid to grounds; Vietnam "experience, and a El Salvador soared while pressures preference for the nuts-and-bolts of ..eased for agrarian and human rights.. policy rather than the grand design. reform. In Nicaragua, a "carrot and ? First among them was Secretary of stick" policy sought peace talks with State Alexander M. Haig Jr., the re-. the Sandinistas while the CIA fi-. tired Army general.who urged Rea nanced anti-Sandinista guerrillas. gan only two days after his inaugura Enders was finally dismissed in lion to put Central America "on the early 1983, after he proposed negotia. front burner" and "go to the source" tions with the Salvadoran rebels and of the'region's'turmoil ' Cuba. endorsed the regional peace drive t id hi , sa Haig, in his book Cavea s . undertaken by the Contadora Group -ideas drew a nod ffom. Reagan but no - Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and immediate response. White House Colombia His "carrot" and "stick" chief of staff James A. Baker 3d was , which had evolved into the well- fensetners like Und~r ec etal~yy,, or ReleA?~'21009r11 213e`' l `: 3 f "0090.1 ROOOa4fl00 050policy of negotia-. Defense Fred C. Ikle cofit ~ ~t`~h proposals on t e groan a en ra Approved For Release 2005q jg/2 j lA fA 91-OO9O1 ROO ARTICLE APPEARED 4 July 1984 ON PAGE A1P VI AS HI TON TALK Briefing ,A'AttackoranAd? -tration of employing "snore scandal- tinted officials than we've seen since -.Richard Nixon and Watergate," con- ,tjrjues to attract attention. -The 30-second commercial' showed. .pictures of President Reagan and a cumber of his appo.'ntees while it vice observed:. "Ronald Reagan - he said he'd bring a new morality to ,government. But look at the list of charges." With a picture of Edwin ,Deese M, the White House counselor, ,;the voice said, "Sweetheart loans"; -for W William J. Casey, Director of Cen- _ t TnteIligence, "Hidden financial ,national security adviser, "Secret gifts," and so on. Then the voice con. ckuded by saying: "This is moral ,leadership? Vote Democratic." The American'Legal Foundation, a !d nservative press monitor, asked ,the Federal Communictions Commis- ston last week to declare the adver- ,iisement:`a "personal attack" on _Psesident Reagan and.the 16 others ,named. If the commission agrees, any t-broadcaster who wants to run the =fall, would have to notify those men- ;tned in advance and provide them --with a copy of the script and an oppor- tunity to, respond. _ ...: "We sure touched a nerve v ith that ad," said Mark Johnson of the Demo- ctatic Congressional Campaign Conh- mittee, recalling that the total invest- ment was $5,000 for production and -$10,000 for air time. He said the coni- ,,,mittee had not received notice of the ,,F-.C.C. proceeding.. 7 _ :W-arren:Weaver Jr0 Approved For Release 2005/12/23 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 ARTICLE Al ' k , The Other Side of the Coln By The Honorable William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, United States Assessing Soviet science and technology and the potential therein for military and strategic surprise. is perhaps the most critical and difficult challenge i we in the U.S. Intelligence Community face. As of now the U.S. still appears ahead in most of the critical technologies we survey but the Soviets have pulled even in some areas and are out in front in others and our margins of advantage and the lead times we possess, have shrunk. Even more. troubling, however, is that recent assessments show that the ability of the Soviet military-indus- trial complex to acquire and assimilate Western technology far exceeds previous estimates. Just how do the Soviets get so much of our .,technology? First of all this is not a haphazard program but one endorsed at the highest levels in the Kremlin. Significantly, a single organization- the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) -is responsible both for supervising the collection of Western technology and for coordinating all Soviet military research and production. The VPK, therefore, is well positioned to know what the military needs are in the way of Western tech- nology and to ensure that this technology is used effectively. Defectors have told us that the search for Western technology commands the highest prior- ity in the KGB and the GRU. As a result, there are several thousand Soviet-bloc collection officers at work primarily in the U.S., Western Europe and i Japan. In addition to engaging in the more classic forms of espionage, these Soviet agents comb through our open literature, buy sensitive technol- ogies through legal channels and religiously attend our scientific and technological confer- ences. Students sent by the Soviets aftd their allies to study in the West also serve as transmission belts for technological data that is easily obtained. The Soviets also use dummy firms in sophis- ticat d i e nternational operations to divert and steal Western technology. We have identified some 300 firms engaged in diversion schemes operating from more than 30 countries - and there are prob- ably many more. Most diversions occur via Western Europe, which is why we have sought the h el f The Soviefs pinpoint and target small, highly innovative companies in the computer and micro- electronics field not only because they are at 'the leading edge of the technologies that Moscow most needs but also because the security proce- dures at such firms are. usually inadequate to the threat of penetration posed by a determined, hos- tile intelligence service. U.S. micro-electronics production technology is the single most'significant industrial technology acquired by the USSR since World War II. In the late 1970s alone, Moscow acquired thousands of pieces of Western micro-electronic equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars in all of the major processing and production areas. On this basis, the Soviets have systemati- cally built a modern micro-electronics industry. The Soviet equivalent of Silicon Valley, the Zele- nograd Science Center was equipped, literally from scratch, with Western technology. Two Objectives What can we do to stem this tide? We already have had a fair number-of successes in frustrating the Soviet technology search. The West still needs to organize more effectively to protect its military, industrial, commercial and scientific communi- ties. In so doing, we ought to keep two objectives clearly in view. First, the West must seek to main- tain its technological lead over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing know-how. Second, manufacturing, inspection and most importantly, automatic test equipment - which can alleviate acute Soviet deficiencies in military-related manu- facturing areas - must be strictly controlled. Western governments not only have powerful incentives to stop the hemorrhage of their technol- ogy, they also have substantial potential for controlling and restricting its flow. The laws necessary to accomplish this are largely in place - stricter enforcement of the existing laws, however, is needed. To this end greater coopera- tion among states will lead to greater effective- ness. A cooperative intrastate approach - if it is to be successful - must also serve to alert the private businessman to the nature and extent of the prob- lem. Similarly, if the West is to be successful, our intelligence services will also have to increase their joint efforts to meet this challenge. In the final analysis the threat posed by grow- ing Soviet technological absorption will not soon disappear and-certainly not because of any self- induced change of heart by Kremlin leaders. The p o our European flPoc vedrhl? tRglg 12005/12/23: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000400020005-0 July, August, Septemher 198 trade activities. Continued