REMARKS BY VADM STANSFIELD TURNER AT BROWN UNIVERSITY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 76
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Remarks by VADM Stansfield Turner at
Brown University '!Conference, 22 March 1974
._ Mr, Clifford has clearly identified the
fact that the usefulness. of. military forces and the situa
tions in which they are appropriate are quite. different today
than a decade ago.. There.are many complex reasons for this.
Some reasons such as the achievement of nuclear balance by
the Soviets, are almost certainly permanent... Others.such-
as the current mutuality of interest in detente for domestic
and economic purposes may change tomorrow..
The essential ingredient. of today's detente is the. military'
balance that exists. Neither we nor* the Soviets could afford.
detente if we felt vulnerable to military pressure orcon-
% quest. The primary role of our military, forces' today-. is :to
preserve that strategic balance so that detente can flourish,
This balance, is a dyniinic matter. '?- This means that, we must
ccntinuously adapt the size and shape -of our military_-forces
and how we employ them to meet the demands of balance.
In doing this we must first.achieve equilibrium of
strategic nuclear forces. SALT I was an attempt to dampen,
strategic arms competition, but.I do not believe we and the
_yet reached a state of sufficient trust and
Soviets have
confidence necessary to achieve an assuring balance.
Today there may be substantial overkill capacity on both sides.
Yet, overkill or
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over-insurance may be the only practical substitute for mutual
trust and confidence. If it relaxes fingers on the-triggers
of nuclear holocaust it may not be all bad.
be to.en-sure that no such exchange ever occurs.
First and foremost, it_ seems -to/that our primary concern should
me
which contains inherent incentives for avoiding.nuelear war.
For instance, perhaps delibe ate efforts tv~a anslate some
We must search for a new strategy for world security
adventures within ach other's-territory could eventually
put self inter st above fear as the stabilizing factor in"
of our investment in n1rclear 'weapons into joint. economic
super power relaticns..
a& &.cuau" to strategic nuclear bal
should a ._o~ ti.ve one of searching for- steps that. will
Promote -equilibrium and confidence., The result, hopefully
will be a smaller and cheaper } force, but its composition
-%a_r be different from what we have today and
it may cost more to attain.
In--sho=t much as we may wish to adopt a
force-cut y ting
s L-ateg;/ -it may be incompatible with the requirements to
achieve and sustain a nuclear equilibrium in a dynamic
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Just as balance is necessary in nuclear weaponry, so
it is. in (what we label as) general purpose forces. As
enunciated in the Nixon Doctrine, we must rely on our
principal allies for assistance in maintaining enough
warfighting capability to deter aggression. It is, how-
ever, the U.S. military contribution to this common objective
which provides the essential linkage to our nuclear power.
Without that, our allies would be subject to nuclear black-
mail. This does not mean that we must maintain a capability
for sustained warfare in Europe. Our declining. defense:
budget simply does not permit us to do that in any event.
The requested defense budget of.$93 billion in obligation
authority being considered by the Congress today is well below
pre-Vietnam figures in purchasing power.
Chart 1 (Current Dollar)
Let's take a look at what defense expenditures have
been - this chart shows from 1964 to 1974 this amount of
funding authorized by Congress. The dashed lines from 1974 to
1975 indicates the money reguested by the DOD from Congress -
In the last 3 or 4 years the difference between what we asked
for and what we received has been from 1 to 4 B $ less.
Mr. Clifford is correct. $93 billion dollars is the largest
amount ever asked for defense spending. Yes, but it must be
3
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looked at in relation to the changes which have taken place
in the overall cost of living. I'm sure you will all agree
a dollar buys less today than it did a year ago. When the
Department of Defense needs to buy something it is faced with
the same inflationary problem you are as private citizens.
Chart 2 - constant Dollai
Let's look at defense spending in the same way. The
Defense budget is shown here in terms of 1975 dollars. That is
the amounts shown in all other years is adjusted to the purchasing
power of the 1975 dollar. Seen in this light the defense budget
requested for 1975, that is before any Congressional cuts, is
a full return to pre Vietnam.spending levels. The defense budget
for 1975 is virtually the same as the budget for 1964.
Chart 3 -(Retired Pay)
What then has changed? Again, in constant 1975 $'s comparing
the Defense budget from 1964 to 1975, Retired pay has gone from
$2 TO $6 B and at the same time active duty military pay has gone
from 31 to 26 B. The amoung of the budget remaining each year o
operating, maintaining, buying new equipment, has gone conducting
research, etc. from $60B to 61B.
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Chart 4 (Manpower)
This-chart shows the active military people in the
armed forces. The 3.5 shows the Vietnam Peak, as you can
see, in 1975 we will have 600,000 fewer persons in the
military than.in 1964.
Chart 5 (Forces)
With regard to forces, you can see since 1964 we come
down 3 divisions, wings have remained constant, 150 ships less,
replenishment ships.have been cut by 1/3, and we have added
17 airlift squadrons.
However the cost of operating these forces in 1975 is
$6B higher than it was in 1964 even with reduced forces.
This additional money, by and large, is coming out of our
own hide. We've cut.manpower and have had to cut back on
our modernization program.
Indsummary, our, military force structure. and employment
practices must change under these new circumstances, as Mr.
Clifford mentioned. The motivating pressure to achieve this
$must not be an obsession simply to cut forces and defense
dollars. Such-.an approach couldupset the delicate balance
of force which we have sought and which has made the current
steps toward detente feasible. Rather, our purpose should
be to examine continuously what minimum size and shape
military force will best preserve that balance. We have a
responsibility here not only to ourselves, but to all those
others who aspire to freedom and human dignity. While we
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clearly must acknowledge the limits on our power and on the
5
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contribution that our example and support can give to those
struggling for what we have been given as our heritage.
6
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BROWN N U N I V E R S IX Y Providence, Rhode Island ? 02912
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner
President, Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island 02840
Enclosed is the schedule for the Defense Symposium. We
hope to have Clark Clifford's remarks in advance. An
invitation for dinner is en route. Bill Yates will act
as your escort and will be in touch with your office.
Sincerely,
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Professor of Political Science
and University Professor
LBK;egu
Enclosure
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S-%mposium on DEFENSE POT ICY FOR TIc =-`_ TIES
.__1,_-lnae Hall, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02912
FRIDAY, MARCH 22, \8:00 P.M.
Principal Speaker: The Hon. Clark Clifford,-former Secretary of
Defense and Presidential Adviser.
Panelists: The Hon. John Chafee, former Governor of Rhode Island
and Secretary of the Navy.
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President of the
Naval War College.
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., former Deputy Director
of CIA for Science and Technology and Assistant
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Professor Laurence Radway, Department of Government,
Dartmouth College.
Moderator: Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. Brown University.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *.* * * * *
Schedule: Friday, March 22 T
4:30 p.m. Speaker, Panelists and Moderator meet to discuss format.
7 : ''_' r 8 iciest Dona ld os "s ~^^v~';.'l ails Y i!_L?:1e r for
participants.
7:30 p.m. Move from dinner to Alumnae Hall.
8:00 p.m., President Hornig opens meeting and introduces participants
and guests.
8:02 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick presents background material on
the issue.
8:07 p.m. Mr. Clifford
8:30 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick presents each panelist in turn
for a five minute co:ime itarv on Mr. Clifford's talk.
8:50 p.m. Professor Kirkpatrick opens exchange between panelists
and speaker asking i'_r. Clifford for reaction.
0:10 o.m. Professor Kirkpatrick opens questions from the floor.
9:50 p.m. Each participant is. asked for one or two minutes of
final comments.
9:55 p.m_ Professor K irkpatr"_. _: :res summation.
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i"...to 'a.i~ bn , ~~i MIT ccve-~.zr.:` C a-Tl _"le 6 - 1JTE ~T-Te,- Bedford
l' yi ?enne Some~o r to _ imin sine :. s ted above may be modified for TV A
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Inflation at Brown University
1964
1974
% Increase
Tuition
$1800
$3250
80%
Room & Board
$ 950
$1450
65%
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 Budget Authority and Outlays by Function
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in millions or dollars)
F
Budget Authority
Outlays
unction
1973
1974
1975
1973
1974
1975
actual
estimate
estimate
actual
estimate
estimate
National defense*
$ 82,787
$.88,177
$ 95,047
$ 76,021
$ 80,573
$ 87,729
International affairs and finance
3,628
5,322
4,680
2,957
3,886
4,103
Space research and technology
3,406
3,038
3,245
3,311
3,177
3,272
Agriculture and rural development
7,148
6,652
7,411
6,191
4,039
2,729
Natural resources and environment
7,183
2,483
-306
589
609
3,128
Commerce and transportation
10,543
22,822
14,459
13,070
13,521
13,400
Community development and housing
6,093
4,960
6,389
4,132
5,450
5,667
Education and manpower
12,049
13,782
11,489
10,185
10,819
11,537
Health
22,226
26,153
28,022
18,417
23,268
26,282
Income security
79,818
93,015
104,012
73,073
84,995
100,071
Veterans benefits and services
12,783
13,787
14,080
12,0.13
13,285
13,612
Interest
22,813
27,754
29,122
22,813
27,754
29,122
General government
6,007
6,417
6,820
5,480
6,800
6,774
General revenue sharing
8,295
6,055
6,205
6,636
6,147
6,174
Allowances for:
Acceleration of energy research
0
0
809
0
0
461
and development
0
0
625
0
0
600
Civilian pay raises
0
400
750
0
300
500
Contingencies
Undistributed intragovernmental
transactions Approved For Rele
se-26M/1 1
237d.W-RD
8018011054
0037OOO 00
1-3-9.963
-10,717
TOTAL
$276,417
$310,853
$322,141
$246,526
$274,660
$304,445
 Iceland;, Neth.
Argentina.'. .; Haiti
' ".'
Barbados 'i;': -. Honduras
Bolivia Jamaica'
Brazil Mexico
Chile Nicaragua
Ecuador,,,,! .Trinidad-Tobago'.,l
a
EI Salv
dor;' United States
Guatemala ;{`.,, Uruguay
W. GermanyLuxembourg United States
Haiti if r ~' ;: .~,
DokRep
:: Hgriduras` 7,,I+, `;i
--Nicaragua` ;'?i
r-Trinidad-Tobago
Venezuela
Australia
Britain
France ;
New Zealand ;-
Pakistan
Philippines I
Thailand
United States
L .j
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MISSIONS
Clifford: "Defend the United States"
? Sounds simple, but really complex. How
? ABM? Patrol borders? Territorial defense
enough? Is our national life only
endangered by direct military attack?,~
? Recent oil embargo points up US depend-
ence on international trade. If vital
imports cut off U.S. industry would soon
grind to a halt.
? For the USN, means ensuring free use of
the seas (Our first international proble
as a new nation was the Barbary pirates
N. Africa - interfering with our trade.
Problem much the same today.)
i? Defending U.S. territory is useless
if our life lines are cut. Countries are
interdependent. Military ensures the
international freedom/life of the U.S. -
only one way the U.S. is. defended.
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Maintain Int 1 commitments" - (over)
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A.c,;c isitioa C sts of Major Strategic Forces Modernization
and Improvement Programs 1/
Continued Procurement of MINUTEMAN III
Missiles, MI:UT `LAN Silo Upgrading and
Other Related Programs
Preparations for MINUTEAN II Opera-
tional Base Launch (03L) Tests
Conversion of SSBNs to POSEIDON Con-
figuration, Continued Procurement of.
POSEIDON Missiles and Associated
tifort
Development, Procurement and Military
Consruc Lion -- TRIDENT Submarines
and Missiles
evelopmenc of Advanced Ballistic
Reentry Systems and Technology (ABRES)
B-52D Modifications
Continued Development of Neu
Strategic Somber, B-1
Procurement of Short Range Attack
Missile (SIAM)
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1973 FY 1974 FY 1975
Actual
Funding
Planned
Funding 2/
Proposed
Funding
816
730
758
-
-
16
698
313
192
794
1,435
(25)
2.043
93
90
120
46
33
73
445
449
499
203
133
2
Development of the Bomber Launched
aad Submarine Launched Versions of
the Strategic Cruise Missile
Initial Development of Advanced
r/Carzo Aircraft
Strategic Defense
Continued Development of the Over-
the-Horizon (0TH) Sack-Scatter Radar
3
3
12i
Continued Deployment of SAFEGUARD
599
341
61 2
Continued Development of Site Defense
80
110
S
160
Development of Advanced Ballistic
Missile Defense Technology
93
62
91
Development and Acquisition of the
SLIM Phased Array Radar Warning System
-
-
50
Do-aelopment and Procurement of
Advanced Airborne Ce.c and Post
AA:;:: C 2)
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Actual Actual Esti ated
June 30, June 30, June 30, June 30,
1964 1973 1974 1975
Strategic Forces:
Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles:
MINUTEMAN 600 1,000 1,000 1,000
TITAN II 108 54 54 54
POLARIS-POSEIDON Missiles 336 656 656 656
Strategic Bomber Squadrons 78 30 28 27
Manned Fighter Interceptor
Squadrons .40 7 7 6
Army Air Defense Firing
Batteries .107 21 21 0
General Purpose Forces:
Land Forces:
Army Divisions 16 113 13 13 13 1/3
Marine Corps Divisions 3 3 3 3
Air Force Wings 21 22 -. 22 22
Navy Attack Wings 15 14 14 14
Marine Corps Wings 3 _ 3 3 3
Naval Forces: -.
Attack & Antisubmarine Carriers 24 16 14 15
Nuclear Attack Submarines' 19 60 61 67
Other Warships 368 242 186 191
Amphibious Assault Ships 133 66 65 65
Airlift and Sealift Forces: ..,
Strategic Airlift Squadrons:
C-5A 0 - 4 4 4
C-141 0 13 13 13
Troopships, Cargo Ships, and
Tankers 101 53 32 32
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PAY A PPICB I[:CR"ASES 74-75 (in. billions) Cii:1CE 1`: PEPCA?'ITA s"E \D Rw
5 fi (Constants) '68 '75
Subs & Other Allowances .7 Defense $325 $202
2 Public . $693 $900
Private $2,421 $3,055
Inflation on PIirchac_s 5
PAY COSTS & MANPOWER TRENDS (in billions)
FY 64 FY 68 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75
Pay & Allow (Nil & Civ) Pay 21 1 31 37 39 42
Retired Pay
1.2 2.1 4.5 5.2 6
Pay & Allow as % 43% 42% 56% 55% 555,
of Total Outlay
Avg Strength-Mil 3M 3.4M 2.3:1 2.2M 2.2M
Avg Strength-Civil SVC 1D1 11?1 . lit 151 IM
8.3 9.4
42 43
28 29
6.0
29
.19
5.9
23
13
5.9
27
17
B.=.s^line Forces
70/81 77/
82
83/33
+14/+11
MA D
18/18 31/
3
1/1
+.2/+.2
SE Asia
5/6 2/
2
2/2
-3/-4
Re___c?3 Pay
4/5 5/
6 .
6/6
+2/4-1
To r,l TO,
09/93 87/
93
93/93
+12/-.9
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Active Duty Military Personnel,
Civilian Personnel and Reserve Component Strength
(end of fiscal years in thousands)
Direct-Hire Civilian
Army 360
462
333
356
359
Navy 332
419
322
- 326
324
Air Force 1/ 305
331
271
271
270
Defense Agencies 38
75
72
76
75
Total 1/ 1,035
1,287
998
1,029
1,028
Active Duty Military
Army 972
1,570
801
782
785
Navy 667
765
564
551
541
Marine Corps 190
307
196
196.
196
Air Force 856
905
691
645
630
Total 2,685
3,547
2,252
2,174
2,152
Reserve Components (in paid status)
Army National Guard 382
389
386
--383
-372
Army Reserve 346
312
284
280
252
Naval Reserve 132
131
129
120
111
Marine Corps Reserve 48
48
38
37
36
Air National Guard 73
75
90
92
90
Air Force Reserve 67
46
45
56
54
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 NUCLEAR THREAT
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The most impo an anti-U.S. nuc ear capability is USSR.
? better than numerical parity of strategic nuclear launchers.
(bombers & missiles)
? continued extensive threat to Western Europe even after
acquiring massive direct threat to the U.S.
? begun to exploit larger ICBM throw-weight to permit
eventual deployment of up to 7,000 potentially high-
accuracy large yield MIRVs.
? started production of Backfire bomber which could become
an intercontinental threat.
A second important force that we must take into account in our force
planning is the PRC. During the past decade, the Chinese have moved
steadily from development/testing to a deployed nuclear capability.
Estimate that they already have on line a modest number of MRBMs, IRBMs,
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and nuclear-capable medium and light bombers. ICBM-IOC early as 1976.
SLBM later.
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Department of Defense
FINANCIAL SUMMARY
(In Millions of Dollars)
FY 1964 FY 1968 FY 1973 FY 1974!/FY 1975bI
Summary by Functional Classification
military Personnel
12,983
19,939
23,639
24,452
25,898
Retired Military Personnel
1,211
2,093
4,392
5,164
6,014
Operation and Maintenance
11,693
20,908
22,148
24,156
26,596
Procurement
15,036
22,550
18,574
18,653
19,867
Research, Development, Test, & Evaluatio
7,053
7,264
8,020
8,333
9,389
Military Construction
977
1,555
1,464
1,821
2,150
Family Housing & Homeowners Asst. Frog.
602
614
1,009
1,148
1,273
Civil Defense
111
86
82
82
86
Special Foreign Currency Program
-0-
-0-
3
3
3
Naval Petroleum Reserve
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
24
Military Assistance Program
989
588
1,120
3,295
1,279
Summary by Program
Strategic Forces
8,505
7,236
7,253
6,883
7,628
General Purpose Forces
16,406
30,375
25,810
27,899
29,183
Intelligence and Communications
4,378
5,551
5,683
5,949
6,464
Airlift and Sealift
1,044
1,756
860
973
1,053
Guard and Reserve Forces
1,768
2,196
3,897
4,385
4,796
Research and Development
4,813
4,277
6,463
7,003
8,409
Central Supply and Maintenance
4,639
8,422
8,643
8,873
9,330
Training, Medical, Other Gen. Pers. Activ
6,959
12,183
16,361
18,193
20,078
Administration and Assoc. Activities
1,077
1,237
1,719
1,849
2,164
Support of Other Nations
1,066
2,364
3x762
5,098
3,474
Summary by Comacnent
.
Department of the Army
12,275
24,972
21,656
22,096
23,618
Department of the Navy
14,458
20,765
25,425
27,575
29,568
Department of the Air Force
19,958
24,917
24,707
25,523
28,029
Defense Agencies/OSD
1,007
1,519
2,008
2,165
2,649
Defense-wide
1,857
2,750
5,454
6,399
7,350
Civil Defense
111
86
82
82
86
Military assistance Progre
989
588
X120
3,29,
1,279
Total - Direct Program (TOA)
Financing Adjustments
14
1,143
-49
-178
320
Budget Authority (NOA)
50,669
76,740
80,404
86,928
92,899
Outlays
50,786
78,027
73,828
79,500
185,800
a/ Amounts for proposed legislation for the volunteer force, military retired pay,
and flight pay are distributed ($99M).
b/ Amounts for military and civilian pay increases, and military retired pay
reform, volunteer force and other proposed legislation are distributed ($2242i:).
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 ie
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54R00370002000.1-
.f` :~, J_ _. J don
1973
a 1985
E 2000 0
Major reserves: 0 I M 0 A Wv W r
Who .Has the Materials
That. Industry Needs
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RAW MATERIALS
% Imported
Rubber 100%
Manganese 93%
Cobalt 92%
Graphite 92%
Chromium 91%
Bauxite 89%
Tin 78%
Nickel 75%
Tungston 56%
Zinc 51%
Petroleum 28%
Iron Ore 26% (to incr. to +50% over next
10 years)
US has 6% world's pop. uses 1/3 world's
mineral output/yr.
80%' World's copper fm Chile, Peru, Zambia,Zaire
70% World's Tin from Malaysia & Bolivia
95%:World's Bauxite (Aluminum produced) from
Guinea, Guyana, Surinam & Jamaica
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SILT I
Us US`_
ICBm: LAUNCHERS
105'
Deployed & Under Constr.
1618
Recent Constr. Rate
250/yr
105'
Planned '77 s SALT
2000
100x105=*
SALT ceiling
1408-1618*
Depending on whether old ICUs are dismantled/replaced by SLBM's
US USSR
SLBM Launch Tubes
656 Present 580
VON Recent Constr. Rate 128/yr
656 Planned '77 s SALT 1200
710 ** SALT ceiling 950**
** To reach these levels US would have to dismantle 54 old Titan
ICS`1' s.
USSR would have to dismantle 210 old SS-7 & 8 ICBM's.
US USSR
.BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBS
41 Deployed & Under Constr. 52 (apporx)
ALE Present Constr. Rate 7.9/yr
43 Planned '77 s Salt 80-90
SALT ceiling 62*`
~S ABMS USSR
2 sizes SALT ceiling
(100 missiles each)
NOT COVERED BY SALT
-66 St eiic Boob
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Mid-1973 Mid-1974
U.S. U.S.S.R. U.S. U.S.S.R.
ICBM Launchers 1/
1054
1550
1054
1575
SLBM Launchers 2/
656
550
656
.660
Intercontinental
Bombers 3/
496
140
496
140
Force Loadings
Weapons
6784
2200
7940
2600
Air Defense
Interceptors
5/
559
2800
532
2600
SAM Launchers
481
9800
261
9800
A3M Defense
Launchers
-
64
-
64
Excludes launchers at test sites.
Excludes launchers on diesel-powered submarines.
Excludes bombers configured as tankers and reconnaissance
aircraft.
Excludes launchers at test sites.
These numbers represent Total Active Inventory (TAI)
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 cMr. Scoville advocates no change be made to our strategic policy that would
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increase the probability of nuclear war. I AGREE.
GAe further suggests that limited nuclear conflict presents a major risk of
escalating into an all out nuclear war.
I agree to this point too - and that is precisely why a major thrust of the
present strategic program is to improve the entire C2 network and thus
provide decision makers with the resources necessary to hold the level
of conflict in the lowest possible level.
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 7,Lastly, he states that nuclear war might be made less likely if the decision
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to initiate it can be made more difficult rather than easier. I disagree
on this point. Admittedly this idea has virtue in its simplicity, but
it overlooks the necessity of dealing with the many options,open to.hostile
nuclear powers.and the use. of their weapons.. I would suggest that it.is
only-in the process of examining why and how deterrence might fail can
we judge the adequacy of our plans and programs for deterrence. Once
the study begins-it quickly becomes evident there are many ways an.enemy
might be tempted to use his force to gain advantage--or,conces-sions. It
is imperitive that our own strategic forces and doctrine take a wide-range
of possibilities into account if they are to successfully perform their
deterrent functions
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
25 February 1974
MEMORANDUM' FOR VICE ADMIRAL' TURNER '~
r
Subj: Clifford Panel, 22 March.1974
1. Lyman Kirkpatrick gave me the following information on the
Clifford Panel this date:
1700 - Mr. Clifford, panelists and wives meet with Dr. Hornig
for reception and cocktails followed by dinner at the
Hornig's.
2000 - "A Panel Discussion on Defense Policy For The Seventies,"
Alumni Hall, Brown University (Channel 6 TV will cover
live from 2000 to 2200).
- Introductions, Dr. Hornig.
Factual presentation of issues (charts of rough U.S.
vs USSR strength - missiles/ships, etc.) (about 5
m minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
- Address (about 20 minutes) - Clifford.
- Comments (about 5 minutes each) - Panelists.
- Open discussion - Clifford, Panelists, Audience.
- Summary - (5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
- Concluding remarks - Hornig.
1000 - Terminate discussion.
2. Clifford's remarks should be available about 1 week in
advance.
3. Sketch of Laurence I. Radway.
Professor Laurence I. Radway
Department of government
Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755
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ZA
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Radway, Professor Laurence I(ngram), b. Staten Island, N.Y.
Feb. 2, 19; m. 49; c. 4. Government. B.S., Harvard, 40,
I.A., 43, fel, 46-50, A.M., 48, Ph.d., 50; M.P.A., Minnesota,
43; hon. M.A., Dartmouth Col, 59. Tutor, Harvard, 46-50;
instr, Govt, Dartmouth Col, 50-52, asst. prof., 52-57, assoc.
prof., 57-59, Prof, 59- Prof, Nat. War Col, 62-63; lectr,
Am. specialists prog, U.S. Dept. State, 65. Consult, Off.
Defense Mobilization, 52; mem. bd. adv., Indust. Col. Armed
Forces, 58-62; civilian aide, Secy., Army, 62- U.S,.A., 44-46,
Capt. Polit. Sci. Asn; Soc. Pub. Admin. Public administration; ST
foreign and military affairs. Publ: Soldiers and scholars;
Military behavior in international organization; Foreign olic
and national defense, Scott, 68. Address:
Hanover, NH
Very respectfully,
Copy to:
Aide
003
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 Approved For Rel se0/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01.554R003700020001-3
25 February 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL TURNER
Subj: Clifford Panel, 22 March 1974
1. Lyman Kirkpatrick gave me the following information on the
Clifford Panel this date:
Schedule
1700 - Mr. Clifford, panelists and wives meet with Dr. Hornig
for reception and cocktails followed by dinner at the
Hornig's.
2000 - "A Panel Discussion on Defense Policy For The Seventies,"
Alumni Hall, Brown University (Channel 6 TV will cover
live from 2000 to 2200).
Introductions, Dr. Hornig.
Factual presentation of issues (charts of rough U.S.
vs USSR strength - missiles/ships,"etc.) (about 5
minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
Address (about 20 minutes) - Clifford.
Comments (about 5 minutes each) - Panelists.
- Open discussion - Clifford, Panelists, Audience.
- Summary - (5 minutes) - Kirkpatrick.
- Concluding remarks - Hornig.
1000 - Terminate discussion.
2. Clifford's remarks should be available about 1 week in
advance.
3. Sketch of Laurence I. Radway.
Professor Laurence I. Radway
Department of Government
Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH 03755
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01.554R003700020001-3
STAT
.Radway, Professor Laurence I(ngram), b. Staten Island, N.Y.
Feb. 2, 19; m. 49; c. 4. Government. B.S., Harvard, 40,
I.A., 43, fel, 46-50, A.M., 48, Ph.d., 50; M.P.A., Minnesota,
43; hon. M.A., Dartmouth Col, 59. Tutor, Harvard, 46-50;
instr, Govt, Dartmouth Col, 50-52, asst. prof., 52-57, assoc.
prof., 57-59, Prof, 59- Prof, Nat.. War Col, 62-63; lectr,
Am. specialists prog, U.S. Dept. State, 65. Consult, Off.
Defense Mobilization, 52; mem. bd. adv., Indust. Col. Armed
Forces, 58-62; civilian aide, Secy., Army, 62- U.S.A., 44-46,
Capt. Polit. Sci. Asn; Soc. Pub. Admin. Public administration;
foreign and military affairs. Publ: Soldiers and scholars;.
Military behavior in international organization; Foreign policy
and national defense, Scott, 68. Address: ST
Hanover, NH
Very respectfully,
ST
Copy to:
Aide
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CLIFFORD PANEL REMARKS
Mr Clifford is correct. The 1975 budget requests the
largest amount ever asked for defense spending. I.dont
agree that the defense budget is $95B - the amount submitted
to Congress by the President was less than $93B - however,
let us agree that at either;jfigure it's a lot of money.
Chart 1 (Current Dollar)
Let's look at what defense expenditures have been
over the last 10 years. This chart shows the amount
authorized by Congress for Defense from 1964 to 1974.
The dashed line from 1974 to 1975 indicates the amount
requested by the Department of Defense for 1975.
(In the
last 3 or 4 years, the difference between what we asked for
and what we received has been from 1 to 4B $ less).
However, this chart doesnt give us a true picture. It
is important to look at any budget, Federal or private,
in relation to ittapurchasing power. As you all know,
the overall cost of living has changed since 1964. 'A
dollar doesnt buy today what it did 10 or even one year
ago. Well, when the Department of Defense needs to buy
something, be it services or equipment, it is faced with
the same inflationary problem you~are as private citizens.
Chart 2 (Constant Dollars)
Let's look at Defense spending in terms of what a
dollar is worth today. That is, the amounts shown in all
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001'-3
dollar. Seen in this light, the Defense budget requested
for 1975.-.before any Congressional cuts - is a full return
other years is adjusted to the purchasing power of the 1975
to pre-Vietnam spending.
virtually the same
The Defense budget for 1975 is
as-the budget for 1964 in real purchasing
power.. What then has. changed?
has increased by 70% and that our land divisions have
dropped from 192 divisions to 1621 divisions. He didnt
mentionathat we also have 140 fewer combat ships, that
Mr Clifford suggested that our strategic missile force
Chart 3 (Forces)
and that our airlift has increased by a factor of 17 squadrons.
our sealift capacity has dropped from 101 ships to 32,.
There are-also approximately 600,000 fewer
Chart 4 (Manpower)
the military today than there were in 1964.
Why then hasnt the'budget gone down with these personnel
and equipment reductions? It hasnt for exactly the reason
Mr Clifford stated at the beginning of his remarks; because
the world has changed. While our armed forces are smaller, o ww--
1,1 .%S aF 2655
personnel costs have risen -nom ' ' ' .$ (if we include retired
pay, which is payment due for past wars); to operate and
L r__ 6 5 T414^3
maintain the e ~t of. equipment Awe had in 1964 costs
$6B Tev&Dd8rYRd1jOb5A49231rCIA91 P'80BO1554R003700020001-3
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certainly that much fat in the budget - that much unnecessary
to perhaps $70B and kept.there - a constant. There is
reflected the world of today Defense costs could be reduced
that is behind the times. That if that policy truly
But, it is suggested, inflation and added costs are
not the real culprits. The problem lies with a defense policy
force.
Military policy, I submit,has kept up with the times.
Military policy has taken the Vietnam War lessons into
account; the US-USSR dententeinto account; the improving
relations with China into. account. But - military policy
must reflect the reality of National policy. The military
makes no treaties with other governments, enters into no
international agreements. The military's responsibility
is to support and carry out political decisions.
wonder if Mr Clifford's arbitrary budget cut, even
spread over several years, would leave the United.States
with the means of.deterring nuclear attack, asserting tibur
right to freely use the seas for trade, and meet our
overseas commitments? Let's look at one last chart.,
Chart 5 ($70B Budget)
Mr Clifford specified a $70B dafo wo ' at in 1974
/d ars, 66 for simplification let's look at the 1974 budget.
That$87B, budget can be divided almost in half as to use:
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 Approved For Release 20051113 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3"
$45B went for "people costs" and $42B went for everthing else.
To reduce that budget to $70B means cutting it by $17B.
If $17B is taken out of the people costs the m }}itary would
1,
have to be reduced by 1.2 milliop personsr.That would be
the.same as eliminating the we Navy and w]:e Air Force
com may. h~.
If we-take the $17B cut out of everything else other
than people, it would be equivalent to cutting all fighting
forces^in half.
We would all like to see Federal spending reduced.
I would like to see a $70B Defense budget as much as
Mr Clifford, but where will the cuts be made? What
aspect of our National defense are Xau willing to forego?
Certainly our military force structure and employment
practices must change as circumstances change. But the
motivation for this m s't not be an-obsession simply to cut
forces ;^.d defense ollars. The driving force has to be -
what do you exp et your military forces to do? Then, how
much will thacost?
There s a military balance in the world today. It
is bipolar, it is real, it is not measured in how many
mi files we have and how many the Soviets have' - although
this certainly influences it - it is measured in perceptions.
Our perceptions of the Soviets; their perceptions of us; and
how we are both perceived by all other nations. Any precipitous
or careless change in the visible power on ither side of
this equation could upset a balance which, I for one, believe
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made the detente we enjo,,y o ay possible. Our purpose
in structuring forces should be the continuous reappraisal
of what minimum size and shape military force will best
as well as lesser aggressions against ourselves or those
preserve that balance and continue to deter nuclear war,
we h.ave_1edged to-?stand, beside.
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 cu'sition Costs of Major Naval Forces Modernization
and Inorov=meat Programs 1/
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1973 FY 1974 FY 1975
Actual Planned Proposed
Funding Funding 2/ Funding
Aircraft Plato=3
Procurement of CVN-70 Aircraft Carrier -299 657
Design and Procurement of the Sea
AST,; Aircraft
Development and Procurement of S-3A
Carrier-Based ASW Aircraft
Modification of SH-3 Helicopter
Development of the HSX
Continued Procurement of the P-3C
Land-3ased ASW Aircraft
Other Surface Combatants
Procurement of DO-963 Destroyers
Procurement of DLGN Nuclear-Powered -
Frigates
Acquisition of Patrol Frigate
Continued Development cf AEGIS Ship
t Air Defense System
Acquisition of the Light Airborne
Multi-Purpose System (LkM?S)
? v 1o^.nenr and Test __ Surface
Effect Ship4
Acq,_isicion of Patrol Hydrofoil
""ssile Ship
knti-Shio Missiles
;Acquisition of the HARPOON Anti-Ship
"issile
lD Jelconent of Encapsulated HARPOON
618
548
562
9
17
24
-
2
132
202
(50)
152
249
612
464
-
81
256
204
6
437
79
40
67
51
32
34
32
61
58
30
23
108
6o
81
136
12
12
13
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 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-
Anti-Ship Missiles (cont'd)
Acquisition of Active STANDARD
Acquisition of the AN/BQQ-5 Sonar
System. 30 57 72
Continued Development and Procure-
Acquisition of CONDOR Anti-Ship
Missile
Attack Submarines
Procurement of SSN-688 Class
Undersea Surveillance Systems
Development and Deployment of SOSUS
and Improved SOSUS and Development
Underway Replenishment and Support Ships
Procurement of Underway Replenish-
of F-14 Multi-Mission Fighter 628 737 756
Acquisition of PHOENIX Missiles 99 100 100
Na-.-v and Marine Corps Aircraft
Continued Development and Procurement
Development of a New Austere Fighter,
the VFX - - 34
Acquisition and Modification of A-6
Attack Aircraft 241 184 199
Acquisition of A-7E Attack Aircraft 181 150 159
Procurement of A-4M Aircraft 2 116 (58) 67
Procurement of AV-8A hLARRIER Aircraft 125 - 56 -
Development of Navy V/STOL Fighter 11 24 19
Acquisition of EA-6B Aircraft 157 124 129
Acquisition of E-2C Fleet Early-
N;arming Aircraft 175 160 119
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Acquisition Costs of Major Naval Forces Modernization
and Improvement Programs (Cont'd)
(Dollars in Millions)
FY 1973 FY 1974 FY 1975-it
Actual Planned Proposed.
Funding Funding Funding
ix
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SELECTIVE ACTIVE MILITARY FORCES
i964
1974
i975
DIVISIONS
19
16
16
AIR WINGS
39
39
39
COMBATANT SHIPS
41i
261
273
SEA LIFT
101
32
32
AIR LIFT.
0
17.
i7
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z
0
F-
U
0
w
X
O
0
0
LO
Iqj-
VW
Ow
O CO
w
C)
OZ
0 -
O
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0 0
Q) OD
0 0 0 0
OD 1~ tD to
U) N
V' C
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Mr..Cliffords remarks well balanced - thought provoking
Excellent bases our-discussion.
As ,I understand - 2 points
1. Military need to review missions
..2. He. believes we- can fulfill for less
Agree with him on both points
On 1st
Assure - much. thought and effort has gone and is.
going into adaptation of missions to changes in
world environment. . For instance we in military-are
taking incipient detente with Soviets into account.
in our thinking and planning.
Participating - cooperating in SALT and.MBFR
talks. Navy side we have negotiated and.signed
a .Navy - to-- Navy agreement with the Soviets on
preventing incidents at sea.
On 2nd point
Can achieve military-objectives with-less resources.
'Agree to extent that that is precisely what are doing
we have less to spend'today.than prior Vietnam.
Clifford cited a number budget figures,--were not actual.
budget figures - were an . interpretation.or adaptation of
actual numbers. Budgets are subject to interpretation, but
have a chart here shows actual figures so we can all start
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Illustrates rising cost of defense as Clifford points
out 2 facts:
.1. Dotted line - '75 increase assumes Congress
appropriates all that President requests.
Congressional-action in past has been to cut.
May/may not be an increase in '75.
2. Chart misleading - assumes.the value of $ un-
changed in,past l0. years..
No one in room believes
you can: purchase
as much with $ today as 10 years ago...
Just as true for defense $ as personal.
This chart - constant FY 75$ /~~ t.~
Hump for .Vietnam - Long.since behind us.
Just holding our own compared with pre-Vietnam days
Again prior- Congressional action
Even that overstates case
.Two costs.never had incur within basic budget:.
1. Past Wars
Retirement - $1 - $6
2. Artificial subsidy - free good
Draft
Personnel costs
Best Evidence that our real budget is not increasing is
that forces and capability have declined.
Mr. Clifford quite unfairly cited two examples to
prove that some. of our forces have increased in the past 10
years.
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His examples . were strategic missiles and nuclear
powered submarines 10 years ago these were
entirely-new weapons - we were still building
up from zero.
If you look at.-tot al submarines we are down
by 33%. aircraft carriers,. by-40%, total
ships by 45%, for example:
Weapons aside, manpower has got to be
some index of military strength.
Here is the manpwoer.picture - down
22% since 64.
Clifford suggests that'-_hoftetheless $70B
will suffice present needs.`
Let's take a quick look at what $70B
Chart 5 ($70B Budget)
Mr.`?C_`ifford specified. $70B in-1974 purchasing power
so for simplification let's look at the 1974.defense budget.
That was an.$87B budget and it can-be divided almost in half
$45B went for "people costs.".and $42B went for every-
.thing else. To reduce that budget to $70B means cutting
it-by $17B. If $17B is. taken out of the people costs
the military would have to be reduced by 1.2 million
persons.or about 1/2. That would be the-same as
eliminating the entire Navy and entire Air Force.
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If we.should take the $17B cut out of everything else
other than people, it would be-equivalent to. cutting all
fighting forces about in half.
We would all.like to see Federal spending. reduced.::-I
would like to-see.a $70B Defense budget as much-as Mr.:
Clifford, -but, where. will the-.cuts be made?- What aspect of
our Nationale defense are'we.willing to-forego?
There.is:a military balance in the. world today. It is
bipolar,. between us and the Soviet Union, it is real, it is
not measured in how many missiles.we have and how many the
Soviets have - although this certainly influences it -.it is.
mea'sured.in perceptions. Our perceptions .of the Soviets;
their-perceptions of us; and how.weare both perceived by
all other nations. Any precipitous or careless. change in the
visible power on either side of this equation could upset a
balance which, , I. for one, believe made the beginnings of the
detente that we enjoyed today possible,. Our purpose in,-,
structuring military forces.should.be.the cont uous
reappraisal. of. what. minimum size and Shy military force will
best preserve that balance and cont nue to deter nuclear
war, as we Y as lesser aggressions against ourselves or those
to whom we hve made commitmer
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ILLEGIB
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LOT OF TALK OF DETENTE
PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE
DETENTE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT
ONE WANT TO ENCOURAGE
NOT IMPRESSED WITH CLIFFORDS REFERENCE TO "EFFUSIVE CORDIALITY"
OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS.
ILLEGIB
WOULD LIKE TO JUDGE DETENTE BY DEEDS
SOVIET DEEDS DURING MID EAST WAR LAST OCT - SUPPLYING
AND ENCOURAGING EGYPT/SYRIA
TAKE ADVANTAGE OUR WEAKNESSES
SOVIET DEEDS LAST FEW WEEKS ENCOURAGING OIL PRODUCING NATIONS
MAINTAIN THEIR EMBARGO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR VULNERABILITIES
OTHER HAND - SEEMS TO ME SOVIET DEEDS WHEN CONFONTED
WITH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE HEIGHT) OF THE MID-EAST
WAR - DID NOT SEND PARATROOPERS INTO EGYPT ARE MORE
MEANINGFUL.
MOREOVER, BEFORE I RISK TOO MUCH ON DETENTE, WANT TO REMEMBER THAT
IT CAN BE TURNED OFF QUICKLY. WHEN DEALING NATION THAT SUPPRESSES
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, NO WAY TO PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHEN IT MAY
BE TURNED OFF.
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SUMMARY
HEARD A LOT ABOUT WHAT DO NOT WANT OUR MILITARY TO BE READY TO DO.
CLIFFORD
NOT PREPARED FOR WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIE $.
NOT PREPARED FOR WAR IN ASIA.
NOT PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR IN EUROPE.
YET WANTS US TO BE READY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS FRANKLY LEAVES
US IN MILITARY WITH NO CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION.
WE REQUIRE POSITIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE BODY POLITIC
WE NEED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WANT MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
TO ACHIEVE
SUBMIT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE. WANT TO BE
RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC DIRECTION.
WE ARE ACCENTING MORE THATT EVER THE PEACETIME UTILITY OF
MILITARY FORCE AS AN ADJUNCT TO DIPLOMACY.
NO WAY CAN PRECIPITATELY REVERSE HISTORIC INFLUENCE
MILITARY PROWESS HAS HAD ON DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS.
MUST CONTINUALLY STRIVE UPDATE MILITARY POLICIES AND
FORCES SO THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY.
IF WE ATTEMPT TO IGNORE THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND
MILITARY FORCE WE WILL JEOPARDIZE THE VERY PROGRESS WE
ARE MAKING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON VIOLENCE AS AN EXTENSION
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MISSIONS
CLIFFORD EMPHASIZES DEFENSE OF U.S.
S =17"T S S
IMPLE
LINE NOT--ADEQUATE
e.g. U.S. VULNERABLE LOSS OF RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS -
DEPENDENCE SEA-BORNE IMPORTS INCREASING
MUST BE ABLE TO DEFEND FROM ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK
TODAY COMPLEX
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT
ANTI-SHIP MISSILES
NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES
SIMILARLY - CLIFFORD SAYS SUPPORT OUR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
BUT DO NOT BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN ASIA - WHERE HAVE
COMMITMENT
CLIFFORD SAYS WE HAVENT CHANGED OUR MISSIONS -
U.S. NAVY HAS NEW CONCEPT - HI-LO MIX - FEW EACH -
BETTER TAILORED CONDITIONS CLIFFORD HAS DESCRIBED
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INCREASING NEEDS
EASY TO POINT OUT ALL REASONS FOR WHICH OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
FORCE IN PEACETIME IS DECLINING
ARE SOME FACTORS IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION:
1. INCREASING VULNERABILITY THIS COUNTRY TO HAVING ITS
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND ITS WORLD TRADE THREATENED
2. INCREASING RELIANCE OF WORLD ON USE OF SEAS FOR THE
GROWING AMOUNTS OF COMMERCE, FOR NATURAL'; RESOURCES
SUCH AS OIL AND MINERALS, FOR FOOD, FOR RECREATION::
MUST AVOID TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE
SHATTERED PEACE ON LAND OVER THE CENTURIES.
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF NEAR PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE
SOVIET UNION OPENS NEW DANGERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
CONFLICT ON A LOWER SCALE.
4. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ISRAEL AND
HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IS';INCREASING NOT DIMINISHING.
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71
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
FIRST STRIKE NOT ACHIEVABLE EITHER SIDE.
1. SUBMARINES
2. COORDINATION AGAINST TRIAD
LOW CONFIDENCE LEVEL
MUST RECOGNIZE STRATEGIC WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE MAD INVENTED
OVER 2 DECADES AGO
SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY
NUMEROUS TECHNOLOGIC CHANGES
MUST CONSIDER WHETHER UPDATING NESSARY.
CLIFFORD SAYS WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE
REDUCED FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TOO HORRIBLE TO.
CONTEMPLATE.
CONTENDS MUST TRY TO CONVINCE OTHER WORLD LEADEFcS THAT WE WOULD
RESPOND TO ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE NOT
CREDIBLE. MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOMETHING ELSE.
MUST LOOK AT IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PRESIDENT.
IDEA THAT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IS THE WAY TO REDUCE
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR IS INGENIOUS BUT NOT PLAUSIBLE
IF WE LOOK AT HISTORY.
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WHAT ABOUT SMALL ATTACKS?
ALL OUT RESPONSE? FIND IT ON ACCIDENT/UNAUTHORIZED
NO RESPONSE - ONLY TO FIND IT PART OF A GRADUAL EMASCULATION.
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The most important. nuclear capability facing the United
States is that of the USSR. As we engage in.our own, planning
we need: to understand better than we now do why this. cap-
ability:is evolving at such.a rapid rate and what the
Soviets.. hope to gain-by such large expenditures and such
ambitious-.progr.ams.:. Only. -with an improved understanding can
we decide-Judiciously what impact this capability should have
on our own choice of strategic programs.
We must take. into account the fact that the Soviets
have:
~fr acquired better. than numerical parity with the
United.:States in.terms of strategic nuclear-
launchers (counting bombers.. as well as missiles);
continued their extensive threat to-Western
Europe even after having acquired.a. massive direct
threat to the United States;'
/o begun to exploit the larger throw-weight-of their
ICBMs:so as to permit-the eventual-deployment of
as many.as 7,000 potentially high-accuracy MIRVs.
with,large yields;
moo: started production of the.Backfire bomber which
could well evolve into-an intercontinental threat.
The Soviet strategic capability no longer is the only
one that we must take into account'in our-force planning.
A second. important force. from the standpoint ~-f.the United
States is that of:the Peoples'. Republic of. China (PRC).
During the past decade, the Chinese-have.moved steadily from
a program of development and testing to a deployed nuclear
capability. We now estimate that.they?already have on line
a modest.number.of-MRBMs, IRBMs,.and'nuclear-capable medium
and light bombers. ICBM-IOC early as 1976. SLBM somewhat
later.
Primarily. at issue-arethe answers to'two major questions..
To what extent have the `Soviets simply responded to and
tried to counter U.S. initiatives? And to what extent have
they sought (and do they continue to seek) something.. more
ambitious than a capability for second-strike massive
retaliation against the United States?
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Need for Options (Strategic)
President Nixon underlined:the drawbacks to sole
reliance on assured destruction in 1970 when he asked:
"Should a President-, in the event of a nuclear
attack, be left with the single.option of order-
ingthe mass destruction of enemy civilians, in
the fade of-the certainty.that it would be followed
by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the
concept of . assured. destruction be narrowly
defined and should. it. be the only:measure of our
ability to deter the variety of.-threats we may
face?"
Today, a. massive retaliation against. cities, in-
response to anything-less than-an all-out attack.on the
U.S. and its cities,- appears less-and less credible.. Yet,
.deterence can fail in many-.ways. What we.need.is a-series
of measured responses to aggression which bear.some
relation to the provocation; have prospects of-terminating
hostilities before general.nuclear war breaks out, and
leave some possibility for restoring deterrence. It has.
been this.problem'..of:not having sufficient options between
massive response and doing-.nothing-,. as the Soviets
built up their strategic forces,.that has prompted the
President's concerns and those of our Allies.
il~
I should point out in this connection that the critics
of options.cannot have the argument both ways. If the
before cities are struck. Damage may thus be limited and
further escalation avoided.
challenges.. But if deterrence fails, we may be able to bring
a11'-but the largest nuclear conflicts to a rapid conclusion
although I regard the probability of such an attack as close
to zero under existing. conditions... To the extent that:we
have selective response-options-.-smaller and more precisely..
.focused than. in-the past--we.should be able to deter such
indeed, some observers believe that. this is precisely what
would happen should..a major.war.break out in Europe. .111-
informed .or cornered and desperate leaders might challenge
us to a nuclear test of wills. We cannot even totally
preclude the massive surprise attack on our forces which
we use to - test.the design of.our second-strike forces,
occur, especially if nuclear proliferation. should. increase.
Conventional conflicts could escalate.-into nuclear. exchanges;
Flexibility of response. is essential because, despite
our best. efforts,. we cannot guarantee that deterrence.. will
never fail; nor can we forecast-the situations that would
cause it to fail. Accidents nds,.unauthorized .acts. could.
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nuclear-balance is no longer delicate and if substantial
force asymmetries are quite. tolerable, then the.'kinds of changes
I have been discussing here , will. neither perturb the balance
nor stimulate an arms race. If, on the other hand,
asymmetries do matter :(despite the existence of some. highly
survivable. forces), then-the-critics themselves should
consider seriously what responses we should.make to the
.major programs that the Soviets currently have underway
to exploit their advantages in numbers of.missiles and-
payload.-.-Whichever Whichever argument. the critics prefer, they
should recognize that:-
inertia is hardly an appropriate. policy for the
United States.in these vital areas;
We have..had some large-scale pre-planned options
-.other than attacking cities for many years,
...despite the rhetoric 'of assured destruction;
.adding more selective, relatively small-scale
options is'-not'hecessarily synonymous with
adding forces, even though we may-wish to
change their mix and improve:our command, control
and communications.
The.real issue is how muchhard-target-kill capability
we need,.rather than the development of, new. combinations of
accuracy'. and yield per-se. Resolution.of .the quantitative
issue depends . di=rectly. on the. further. evolution of the
Soviet strategic offensive-forces. and on progress in the_
current phase of the Strategic. Arms. Limitation Talks.
In some circumstances a set of hard targets might..be
the most appropriate'objective.for-our retaliation, and
this I realize.is a subject fraught with great emotion.. Even
so, several points about. it need to be made...
binedeffects-of accuracy, nuclear yield, and the
number of warheads applied-to the target.
The destruction of a hardened-target-is:not simply
a function of accuracy;.it results from the com-
Both the United States and the Soviet-Union
already have the. necessary.combinations.,of
are they in any position to acquire such a cap-
accuracy,yield, and numbers in.their missile
forces to provide them with some hard-target-
kill capability, but it is not a particularly
efficient capability.
.Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
now has,a disarming first strike capability, nor
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ability in the foreseeable future, since each
side has ..large numbers of: strategic offensive
systems that remain untargetable by the other
side., Moreover, the ABM Treaty forecloses a de-
fense against missiles. In addition, they have
many other nuclear. forces. Any reasonable cal-
culation- would'demonstratef I believe, that it
is'not.possible for.us even to.begin to eliminate
the city-destruction potential . embodied. in
their ICBMs, let alone. their.SLBM force."
.In summary with a.reserve capability for threatening
urban-industrial targets, . with offensive' systems capable.
of increased flexibility and. discrimination in targeting,
and with. concomitant improvements in sensors,..surveillance,
and command-control, we could implement response options
that cause far less civiiian damage than would now.be the
case. For-those who consider such.: changes potentially
destabilizing because of their fear that the options might
be used, let. me emphasize .that without. substantially more.
of an effort.in other directions. than we have:any intention.
of proposing,, there is simply no possibility of reducing
civilian damage from a.large-scare nuclear exchange
sufficiently to make it.atempting prospect for'any sane,
leader-'But-that is-not what we are talking about:here.
At the present time, we are acquiring selective and dis-
criminating options'that...are intended to deter another power
from exercising any-form of nuclear pressure. Simultaneously
we and our.allies are improving our."-general purpose forces,
precisely so as to-raise'the threshold against the use of
any nuclear-forces.
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DEFENSE POLICY FOR THE SEVENTIES
President Hornig, Professor Kirkpatrick, Distinguished Members of
the Panel, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Our nation's policy regarding its national security is of such
vital significance to all of us that it should be the subject of widespread
discussion and debate. If war is too important to leave to the generals,
then defense policy is too important to leave to officials in Washington.
It is you, the public, who must make your views known. It is your
lives that are affected, your futures that may be imperiled, and you are
the ones who have to foot the bills.
It is my hope that you will find this evening's discussion
sufficiently provocative and challenging that you will choose to enter
the controversy on this subject that is now just beginning to emerge in
Washington.
The major thrust of my remarks tonight is that (A) the world
has changed; and (B) the United States' defense policy and defense budget
have not. I cannot state the problem more simply.
As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to
a halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total transformation.
In this transformation, we will find the guides for reshaping our defense
policies and budgets.
During the Cold War era, faced with an aggressive USSR, what
we took to be Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist effort to be
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involved in every significant conflict over the future of any nation --
those responsible for our nation's policies, including the state of our
military forces, felt that the United States had to plan its military forces
with the real expectation that they might, at any moment, be called upon
to resist militarily, and directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe,
and perhaps in both simultaneously.
On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the
need for a constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear
weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to build
a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable surprise Soviet
attack, in addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear strength to protect our
allies, we deployed literally thousands of nuclear weapons throughout the world.
This image of the world on which our military forces were premised
is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of early 1974.
First, our relations with the USSR have changed. To be sure,
profound differences between the social and political systems and the inter-
national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union remain. None-
theless, the relationship of the two superpowers simply can no longer be
described as one of general and unrelenting confrontation. We-have seen
two United States-Soviet summits marked, by effusive cordiality,~and a third
is promised for this spring. There has been a strategic arms limitation
agreement which, whatever its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides
that there is no real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability
and opens the way for the current talks on further agreements. We hear
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intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the
United States and the Soviet Union.
The European security conference and the negotiations on force
reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship between the
Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may portend more
basic settlements in the long run.
By contrast, relations between China and the USSR have so
deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sino-Soviet Bloc" but a memory. Even
as the USSR and China remain openly hostile to each other, the United
States and China have opened a process of reestablishing communications
and contact. Domestic government upheavals in China -- or one might
add in the United States -- are unlikely to change the foundation of that
process, which is a recognition that however different we are from China
and she from us, the real points of conflict between our important interests
are few indeed.
And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact
that we are involved no longer in direct combat in the war in Indo-China.
Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the international
scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that the
United States has lost its economic domination of the international scene,
even while retaining its vast military strength.
From these profound changes in the international setting, one
would expect profound changes in American military policy and military forces.
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For it is, of course, to serve our international policy that we create military
forces, however often it may seem that the relationship is reversed.
Yet, despite these changes and the much-advertised winding
down of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend more,
not less, on military force. The Administration has asked Congress this year
for more dollars than have ever been spent on defense in our history. Even
in today's inflated dollars, the amount is still staggering -- approximately
$95 billion in new appropriations for the Defense Department, after adjusting
the stated figures to reflect more accurately funds properly attributable to
the coming year.
That represents an increase of $13 billion over the 1974 budget.
LLEGIB
And that increase is by no means due only to inflation. The growth in the
defense budget exceeds pay and price increases by more than $7 billion
dollars -- which means an increase in real terms of more than 8 percent.
What a contrast to past post-war budgets -- not a cut in spending, but a big
increase! What kind of forces would the Administration be asking the
American people and the economy to support if international relations had
remained essentially the same? And What would we be told we required if
relations with China and the Soviet Union had worsened?
These profound changes in the world setting are not reflected in
our defense policies. Instead, we maintain and we are being asked to pay
more in the future to continue to maintain, essentially the forces that were
created to meet what we felt to be the needs of the height of the Cold War.
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 ILLEGIB
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When we look at the forces today and compare them with the forces of the
early 60's, it is evident that it is simply incorrect to proclaim, as
Administration spokesmen sometimes do, that in demobilizing the forces
created to fight in Vietnam, we have also made significant cutbacks_.in_the_
pre-Vietnam "baseline" force.
Of course, there are differences between our 1975 forces and
those of 1964, but it is striking how similar they are. To be specific:
-- We have 70 per cent more strategic missiles than in 1964,
more than compensating for the decline in bombers.
-- We maintain the same number of tactical air wings -- 38 --
as in 1964.
-- The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and 3 1/2
times as many nuclear submarines. The Pentagon itself explains the decline
in the number of surface war ships as due to retirement of "marginally effective"
ships.
-- The number of ground divisions has declined from 19 1/3 to
16 1/3, while there have been major increases in firepower and equipment.
This modest reduction reflects, one would assume, such facts as the Berlin
buildup included in the 1964 force, the vastly increased cost of manpower
relative to equipment, and the abandonment of plans to fight major land
wars simultaneously in both Asia and Europe.
And, these are crude comparisons of numbers only. Qualitatively,
the 1975 forces are vastly more powerful than those maintained in 1964. To
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give just two examples, the 1964 missiles mounted about 1 , 000 warheads,
while the force planned for the end of 1975 will have approximately. 7,000
warheads. The number of helicopters attached to Army units has increased
from about 4,000 in 1965 to well over 8,000.
Moreover, the missions assigned these forces seem to be essentially
the same as those of 1964 -- deep interdiction by the Air Force of enemy
supply routes as part of a prolonged war in Europe or on the Asian continent;
a sustained anti-submarine effort by the Navy in the North Atlantic and
carrier air support for sustained shore combat; for the Army, a long land
war in Europe, and, to judge from the deployment and numbers of ground forces,
also a sustained land battle on the Asian continent.
The future cost of maintaining such a force for the indefinite future
regardless of international events can only climb constantly upward. The
time has come to look critically at our military forces and to bring them into
line with our real needs for the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Certainly nothing in very..recent events, dramatic as they may be,
can justify the large increase in funds for defense which are proposed, or
continued adherence to our Cold War defense policy.
Our nation's current economic difficulties may, it has been
responsibly suggested, have led to the inclusion of as much as $5 billion
extra in the defense budget to "help the economy. " Such a load factor for
pump priming makes a mockery of the argument that this huge budget is
dictated by real national security needs. When we face such immense
inflationary pressures, this kind of wasteful spending will not help the
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ILLEGIB
economy but do the reverse. Nor is increased spending on unproductive
and unnecessary weapons of war a sound way to avoid unemployment when
there are so many truly vital projects crying out for funds.
This has been the year of energy. In a period when increasing
energy prices and shortages of fuel may have a serious adverse economic
impact, we should cut back the costs of government wherever we can,
including in the defense area. At the very least, the energy shortage suggests
that our true national security in the long term would be better served by
taking some of the excessive funds allocated to defense and putting them into
an effort to improve our sources and uses of energy.
Nor does the renewed fighting in the Middle East furnish any excuse
for ignoring the need to reexamine our defense policy in the light of changed
world conditions. Far from the October War showing the world to be a highly
unstable place in which relatively small differences in military power may
make a crucial difference, I believe that the war shows the reverse. The
sharp fighting between the Israelis and Arabs did not draw the United States
nd the USSR into conflict, despite the important interests of each side involved.
Of course, a basic adequate U. S. military force is an essential
)art of effective diplomacy, and maintaining such a force is not in dispute.
~ut, for me, the lesson of the recent Mid East crisis is that military gestures
that are but dangerous window dressing, far from being crucial aids, may be
a serious interference with the process of diplomacy and negotiation which
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ILLEGIB
offers the best hope of a solution to this long-standing problem.
Nor does the American concern for the security of Israel justify
either an increase in defense spending, or the permanent maintenance of
our present force. We can meet our obligations and commitments to Israel,
like those to our other allies, at a significantly more economical force level.;
In short, a critical item on our national agenda remains to bring
our defense establishment and budget into line with world realities-- to give
us a defense policy for the world as it is, not as it used to be.
Substantial savings can be made simply from greater efficiency,
particularly in use of manpower, in curtailing our propensity for excessively
complex weapons, and in restraining ourselves from procuring nuclear weapons
which may, actually lessen our security by making the nuclear balance less
stable. But we must go beyond these steps to a more fundamental reexamin-
ation of the missions and structure of our military forces.
We must ask "What military missions make sense in this decade
of the twentieth century?"
First, of course, to defend the United States itself. Indeed, we
see how large our military has become by realizing how small it could be if
defending the territory of the U. S. itself were the only mission. For that
an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum conventional forces, costing
perhaps a third of our current budget, would be enough.
But despite the changes in the world, it remains true that America
in her own self-interest also needs military forces adequate to support her
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ILLEGIB
,international commitments jointly agreed upon by the Congress and the
,In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deterrent.
But we must not expect more of our nuclear forces than deterrence. For all
their frightfulness, the political and military use of nuclear weapons beyond
the deterrence of their use by others is limited indeed.
The recent proclamation of a strategy of increased "flexibility" for
our nuclear forces must not be allowed to lead us astray from absolute
deterrence of nuclear war as our-objective. It may be desirable that we should
have some response to a nuclear attack other than a world-destroying spasm,
horrible as even the smallest such a strike would be. However, we can have
all the choice of response to a nuclear attack any one would want without any
significant change in our present force.
It seems to me useful also to say what we do not need our military
forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential opponents in
every possible category merely to avoid the supposed stigma of not being
"number one" in everything. We do not need to be ready to intervene
everywhere in the world on short notice. We do not need to maintain forces
prepared to fight in contingencies -- such as the so-called war at sea or a long
conventional war in Europe -- which are not only remote but would provide
the warning of a radical change in the political setting.
For strategic forces we need sufficiency; we do not need to be
frightened of disparities in crude force levels or destructive power which
measure only how many times over each side can utterly destroy the other.
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ILLEGIB
We do not need to accumulate "bargaining chips" which in fact make
negotiations on arms control more difficult by fostering responsive programs
by the Soviets and creating vested constituencies on each side for the
preservation of weapons. We may need to offer the President a greater
range of horrible choices should nuclear war occur; we do not need the
missile accuracies or other technology which might give our opponents
cause to fear that we were seeking the choice of a first strike.
If we proceed from these goals, both positive and negative, and
not from the habits of the past or the pressures of bureaucratic and service
interests-, it is clear that substantial cuts can be made in our defense
budget and in our forces, while fully meeting our real national security needs.
I do not favor that the kind of cuts we need be made precipitately
all in one year. Smaller reductions spread over a period of years would have,
less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in defense industries,
and upon the attitude of other countries.
However, I do believe that far from a $7 billion real increase in
defense spending, we should begin in fiscal 1975 a process of cutting back
on real defense expenditures. I have proposed annual cuts of about $4 billion,
to stabilize at a budget of around $70 billion in four years -- all stated in terms
of constant 1974 purchasing power. In this period, therefore, under the plan I
recommended, we would, in round numbers, have instead of a current budget of
some $95 billion -- likely to grow in the future -- a budget stabilized (in real
terms) at $70 billion a year in 1979.
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This is not the occasion, nor.have I the time this evening, to
1LLEGIB
ILLEGIB
present in detail the specific cuts to reach this objective. I can indicate
some general areas in which changes should be made.
The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for Asian.con-
tingencies can be cut back sharply or eliminated, to reflect the tragically
hard-learned lesson that we should not and need not fight land wars in Asia.
We should start bringing some troops back from Europe now.
Bringing our NATO forces up to date gradually and in close consultation
with our allies will not, as is so often claimed, unbalance the deterrent in
Europe, destroy the alliance, or foredoom arms control possibilities in Europe.
In our strategic nuclear and our conventional weapons, in our
tanks, in our airplanes, in our missiles, in our ships, we must put a stop
to the technologically-driven process of buying systems which are inordinately
complex and expensive, and which represent little if any real advance in
terms of real combat capability over existing systems, or over more combat-
wise alternatives. And we must determine the design of such forces, and
their numbers, with a view to the most likely, not the most remote contingencies.
We must make more efficient use of military manpower, both
uniformed and civilian. Some 55 percent of the defense dollar now goes for
pay and allowances for personnel. This huge part of the defense budget --
like the massive support costs area generally -- has only recently been
subjected to intense public analysis. Those analyses demonstrate that
very significant cuts can readily be made.
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I emphasize that such cuts will leave us with a military estab-
lishment fully adequate for our own defense, for meeting our commitments
to our allies, and for providing the necessary underpinning for our diplomacy.
Indeed, by reducing the costs to a level we can sustain, they will strengthen
our economy and the overall confidence and unity of our society, and with
that they will increase our true national security.
For the debate is not between proponents of military' strength and
advocates of deliberate weakness, but over what military posture will give
us the strength we need at a price we can afford.
Let me urge you to take part in this debate. It is our younger citizens
who have the greatest stake in the determination of these questions. The
decisions made now will have an impact on your entire life.
Get in the struggle. Keep in mind, if you will, a quotation of
"It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out
how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could
have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually
in the arena; whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood;
who strives valiantly; who errs and comes short again and again;
who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions and spends
himself in a worthy cause, who at the best knows in the end the
triumphs of high achievement; and who at the worst, if he fails,
at least fails while daring greatly; so that his place shall never
be with those cold and timid souls who know neither defeat
nor victory. "
Thank you.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
-12-
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
SUMMARY
HEARD A LOT ABOUT WHAT DO NOT WANT OUR MILITARY TO BE READY TO DO.
CLIFFORD
NOT PREPARED FOR WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES.
NOT PREPARED FOR WAR IN ASIA.
NOT PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR IN EUROPE.
YET WANTS US TO BE READY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS FRANKLY LEAVES
US IN MILITARY WITH NO CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION.
WE REQUIRE POSITIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE BODY POLITIC
WE NEED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WANT MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
TO ACHIEVE
NO WAY CAN PRECIPITATELY REVERSE HISTORIC INFLUENCE
MILITARY PROWESS HAS HAD ON DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS.
MUST CONTINUALLY STRIVE UPDATE MILITARY POLICIES AND
FORCES SO THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY.
IF WE ATTEMPT TO IGNORE THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND
MILITARY FORCE WE WILL JEOPARDIZE THE VERY PROGRESS WE
ARE MAKING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON VIOLENCE AS AN EXTENSIDN
OF POase
Approved For Re e LIT ~OS5/11/23: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
EASY TO POINT OUT ALL REASONS FOR WHICH OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
FORCE IN PEACETIME IS DECLINING
ARE SOME FACTORS IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION:
1. INCREASING VULNERABILITY THIS COUNTRY TO HAVING ITS
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND ITS WORLD TRADE THREATENED
2. INCREASING RELIANCE OF WORLD ON USE OF SEAS FOR THE
GROWING AMOUNTS OF COMMERCE, FOR NATURAL-.RESOURCES
SUCH AS OIL AND MINERALS, FOR FOOD, FOR RECREATION-..
MUST AVOID TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE
SHATTERED PEACE ON LAND OVER THE CENTURIES.
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF NEAR PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE
SOVIET UNION OPENS NEW DANGERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
CONFLICT ON A LOWER SCALE.
4. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ISRAEL AND
HER ARAB NEIGHBORS`IS INCREASING NOT DIMINISHING.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/~l~R;~DP80B01554R003700020001-3
LOT OF TALK OF DETENTE
PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE
DETENTE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT
ONE WANT TO ENCOURAGE
NOT IMPRESSED WITH CLIFFORDS REFERENCE TO "EFFUSIVE CORDIALITY"
OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS.
WOULD LIKE TO JUDGE DETENTE BY DEEDS
SOVIET DEEDS DURING MID EAST WAR LAST OCT - SUPPLYING
AND ENCOURAGING EGYPT/SYRIA
TAKE ADVANTAGE OUR WEAKNESSES
SOVIET DEEDS LAST FEW WEEKS ENCOURAGING OIL PRODUCING NATIONS
MAINTAIN THEIR EMBARGO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR VULNERABILITIES
OTHER HAND - SEEMS TO ME SOVIET DEEDS WHEN CONFONTED
WITH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE HEIGHTH OF THE MID-EAST
WAR - DID NOT SEND PARATROOPERS INTO EGYPT ARE MORE
MEANINGFUL.
MOREOVER, BEFORE I RISK TOO MUCH ON DETENTE, WANT TO REMEMBER THAT
IT CAN BE TURNED OFF QUICKLY. WHEN DEALING NATION THAT SUPPRESSES
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, NO WAY TO PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHEN IT MAY
BE TURNED OFF.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE
FIRST STRIKE NOT ACHIEVABLE EITHER SIDE.
1. SUBMARINES
2. COORDINATION AGAINST TRIAD
LOW CONFIDENCE LEVEL
MUST RECOGNIZE STRATEGIC WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE MAD INVENTED
OVER 2 DECADES AGO
SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY
NUMEROUS TECHNOLOGIC CHANGES
MUST CONSIDER WHETHER UPDATING NESSARY.
CLIFFORD SAYS WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE
REDUCED FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TOO HORRIBLE TO:`
CONTEMPLATE.
CONTENDS MUST TRY TO CONVINCE OTHER WORLD LEADERS THAT WE WOULD
RESPOND TO ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE NOT
CREDIBLE. MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOMETHING ELSE.
MUST LOOK AT IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PRESIDENT.
IDEA THAT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IS THE WAY TO REDUCE
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR IS INGENIOUS BUT NOT PLAUSIBLE
IF WE LOOK AT HISTORY.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
WHAT ABOUT SMALL ATTACKS?
ALL OUT RESPONSE? FIND IT ON ACCIDENT/UNAUTHORIZED
NO RESPONSE - ONLY TO FIND IT PART OF A GRADUAL EMASCULATION.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
CLIFFORD EMPHASIZES DEFENSE OF U.S.
SEEMS SIMPLE
BUT NEED RECOGNIZE FORTRESS AMERICA DEFENSE ON SHORE-
LINE NOT ADEQUATE
e.g. U.S. VULNERABLE LOSS OF RAW MATERIAL IMPORTS -
DEPENDENCE SEA-BORNE IMPORTS INCREASING
MUST BE ABLE TO DEFEND FROM ATTACK OR THREAT OF ATTACK
TODAY COMPLES
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT
ANTI-SHIP MISSILES
NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES
SIMILARLY - CLIFFORD SAYS SUPPORT OUR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS
BUT DO NOT BE PREPARED TO INTERVENE IN ASIA - WHERE HAVE
COMMITMENT
CLIFFORD SAYS WE HAVENT CHANGED OUR MISSIONS -
U.S. NAVY HAS NEW CONCEPT - HI-LO MIX - FEW EACH -
BETTER TAILORED CONDITIONS CLIFFORD HAS DESCRIBED
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
FIRST STRIKE NOT ACHIEVABLE EITHER SIDE.
1. SUBMARINES
2. COORDINATION AGAINST TRIAD
LOW CONFIDENCE LEVEL
MUST RECOGNIZE STRATEGIC WORLD HAS CHANGED SINCE MAD INVENTED
OVER 2 DECADES AGO
SOVIETS HAVE ACHIEVED PARITY
NUMEROUS TECHNOLOGIC CHANGES
MUST CONSIDER WHETHER UPDATING NESSARY.
CLIFFORD SAYS WE ARE NOT WILLING TO CHANGE
REDUCED FEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF USE. OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS?
CONSEQUENCES EVEN OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE TOO HORRIBLE TO.'
CONTEMPLATE.
CONTENDS MUST TRY TO CONVINCE OTHER WORLD LEADERS THAT WE WOULD
RESPOND TO ANY NUCLEAR ATTACK WITH EVERYTHING WE HAVE NOT
CREDIBLE. MUST BE PREPARED FOR SOMETHING ELSE.
MUST LOOK AT IT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF PRESIDENT.
IDEA THAT LACK OF PREPAREDNESS IS THE WAY TO REDUCE
LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR IS INGENIOUS BUT NOT PLAUSIBLE
IF WE LOOK AT HISTORY.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
WHAT ABOUT SMALL ATTACKS?
ALL OUT RESPONSE? FIND IT ON ACCIDENT/UNAUTHORIZED
NO RESPONSE - ONLY TO FIND IT PART OF A GRADUAL EMASCULATION.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/10,tT.O$DP80B01554R003700020001-3
LOT OF TALK OF DETENTE
PLACE IN PERSPECTIVE
DETENTE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT
ONE WANT TO ENCOURAGE
NOT IMPRESSED WITH CLIFFORDS REFERENCE TO "EFFUSIVE CORDIALITY"
OF U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETINGS.
WOULD LIKE TO JUDGE DETENTE BY DEEDS
SOVIET DEEDS DURING MID EAST WAR LAST OCT - SUPPLYING
AND ENCOURAGING EGYPT/SYRIA
TAKE ADVANTAGE OUR WEAKNESSES
SOVIET DEEDS LAST FEW WEEKS ENCOURAGING OIL PRODUCING NATIONS
MAINTAIN THEIR EMBARGO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OUR VULNERABILITIES
OTHER HAND - SEEMS TO ME SOVIET DEEDS WHEN CONFONTED
WITH OUR MILITARY STRENGTH AT THE HEIGHTH OF THE MID-EAST
WAR - DID NOT SEND PARATROOPERS INTO EGYPT ARE MORE
MEANINGFUL.
MOREOVER, BEFORE I RISK TOO MUCH ON DETENTE, WANT TO REMEMBER THAT
IT CAN BE TURNED OFF QUICKLY. WHEN DEALING NATION THAT SUPPRESSES
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, NO WAY TO PREDICT IN ADVANCE WHEN IT MAY
BE TURNED OFF.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
EASY TO POINT OUT ALL REASONS FOR WHICH OUR NEED FOR MILITARY
FORCE IN PEACETIME IS DECLINING
ARE SOME FACTORS IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION:
1. INCREASING VULNERABILITY THIS COUNTRY TO HAVING ITS
SUPPLIES OF RAW MATERIALS AND ITS WORLD TRADE THREATENED
2. INCREASING RELIANCE OF WORLD ON USE OF SEAS FOR THE
GROWING AMOUNTS OF COMMERCE, FOR NATURAL-.RESOURCES
SUCH AS OIL AND MINERALS, FOR FOOD, FOR RECREATION::
MUST AVOID TYPE OF TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT HAVE
SHATTERED PEACE ON LAND OVER THE CENTURIES.
3. ACHIEVEMENT OF NEAR PARITY IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE
SOVIET UNION OPENS NEW DANGERS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
CONFLICT ON A LOWER SCALE.
4. NUMBER OF POTENTIAL TROUBLE SPOTS SUCH AS ISRAEL AND
HER ARAB NEIGHBORS ISIINCREASING NOT DIMINISHING.
Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
 Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3
HEARD A LOT ABOUT WHAT DO NOT WANT OUR MILITARY TO BE READY TO DO.
CLIFFORD
NOT PREPARED FOR WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES.
NOT PREPARED FOR WAR IN ASIA.
NOT PREPARED FOR PROLONGED WAR IN EUROPE.
YET WANTS US TO BE READY TO FULFILL OUR COMMITMENTS FRANKLY LEAVES
US IN MILITARY WITH NO CLEAR SENSE OF DIRECTION.
WE REQUIRE POSITIVE INSTRUCTION FROM THE BODY POLITIC
WE NEED DISCUSSION OF WHAT WANT MILITARY PREPAREDNESS
TO ACHIEVE
SUBMIT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO CHANGE. WANT TO BE
WE ARE ACCENTING MORE THAN EVER THE PEACETIME UTILITY OF
MILITARY FORCE AS AN ADJUNCT TO DIPLOMACY.
NO WAY CAN PRECIPITATELY REVERSE HISTORIC INFLUENCE }
MILITARY PROWESS HAS HAD ON DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS.
MUST CONTINUALLY STRIVE UPDATE MILITARY POLICIES AND
FORCES SO THAT THEY WILL BE EFFECTIVE TOOLS OF DIPLOMACY.
IF WE ATTEMPT TO IGNORE THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND
MILITARY FORCE WE WILL JEOPARDIZE THE VERY PROGRESS WE
ARE MAKING AWAY FROM RELIANCE ON VIOLENCE AS AN EXTENSION
Approved ForWe~ease 05/11/23 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003700020001-3