STRATEGIC FORCE TRENDS AS SEEN BY SOVIETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01554R003300120064-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: July 8, 1980
• Content Type: MF

SECRET NOFORN
Approved For2elease 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO155 003300120064-7
8 July 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Strategic Force Trends as Seen by Soviets
1. Attached is a recent article by General Milshteyn. It presents U.S.
military and particularly strategic force trends as seen from the Soviet
viewpoint. In view of the fact that Milshteyn is one of the Soviets' more
sophisticated observers of the strategic scene, this may have some credibility.
(C/NF)
2. Thinking about our discussion on an NIE 11-3/8 volume especially for
the President, I wonder if a review of how the Soviets see the evolution of
our strategic: forces might not be worthwhile. At least for the first edition
it could be rather modest in length. (S/NF)
3. The Pentagon has been pushing us in this direction anyway and I think
they're right. (C/NF)
STAN ELD T ER
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
SECRET NOFORN
 Approved FoFIease 2005/09/28: CIA-RDP8,
III. 23 May 80 2 USSR
ANNEX
Milshteyn Sees Counterforce Option Trend; Diktat, Expansionist Policy
[SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 5]
Hearing Investigates Soviet Abuse of Psychiatry
[London THE GUARDIAN 16 May]
-0-
MILSHTEYN SEES COUNTERFORCE OPTION TREND; DIKTAT, EXPANSIONIST POLICY
LD221445 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 5 Signed to Press
10 Apr 80 pp 9-18 --FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[M.A. Milshteyn article: "Some Characteristic Features of Present Day U.S. Military
Doctrine"]
[Text] Historical experience shows that when American imperialism is experiencing
difficulties or suf ring defeats in particular directions of i s expansionist foreign
policy, the aggressive and interventionist features characteristic of U.S. mils ary
doctrine appear particularly sharply and prominently. As L.I. Brezhnev noted in his
speech at the voters' election meeting in Moscow City's Baumanskiy Electoral Okrug, "the
more imperialism's opportunities' to dominate other countries and peoples decrease,. the
more fiercely its most aggressive and shortsighted representatives react to this" (Note
1). (PRAVDA 23 February 1980).
That is what is happening now. This is finding expression not only or not so much in the
bellicose phraseology so characteristic of Washington's present administration, or in the
Just what specific forms are the most characteristic features of U.S. military doctrine
and military policy now taking? Above all these are finding expression in the sharp
increase of military spending. Thus U.S. military spending in fiscal 19 1 will to a
$161.8 billion (in today's dollars), which is an increase of more than $20 billion over
the military appropriations originally requested by the administration for fiscal 1 .
Military spending will be increased more than 5 percent in real terms. The
growth of "real" (that is, tarcing inflation into account) military spending at more
than 4.5 percent per year is envisaged for subsequent years. It has already been
announced that in 19 2 spending will amount to $18 3. billion (in today's dollars),
will then rise to $205.3 billion and $228.3 billion in the next 2 years, and in 1985
will reach the astronomical figure of $253.2 billion. If you take it into account
that the budget for fiscal 1979/80 totals more than $130 billion, it turns out that the
United States is spending $1.2 trillion on military purposes over 5 years. It is
characteristic here that record U.S. military spending has been proposed by T. Carter,
who only a little more than 3 years ago, when he wasleekin^ election to the country's
presidency, publically promised voters he would reduce the Pentagon's spending by $5 billion-
7 billion, ner year.
However, even this 'kind of increase in military spending seems inadequate to many people
in the United States. In an article in the New York TIMES F. Ik3e, former director of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under G. Ford's administration, now a consultant on
national security questions, advocates that the U.S. military budget be not $161 billion,
nor even $250 billion, but no less than $1 trillion. "The sooner this sixfold increase
in our defense effort is implemented," he writes, "the more effective it will be" (Note 2).
(the New York TIMES 5 February 1980). American physicist E. Teller, another champion of
the arms race, also claims (in FORBES magazine for 18 February 1980) that the 5-percent
increase in the military budget is not enough.
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 Approved Fo lease 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80B01554i3O03300120064-
III. 23 May 80 3
It should be taken into account that the Pentagon earmarks more than $40 billion from its
budget for purchasing various military equipment, from spare pars for exis ang weapons to
extremely complex new systems. This naturally means an opportunity to make very high
profits for the military industry. It is no accident that people in the military industrial
complex are predicting "a boom in the U.S. military industry" (Note 3) (See, for instance,
NEWSWEEK for 4 February 1980). The shares of giant Pentagon contractors such as the Boeing,
General Dynamics and United Technologies Corporations are rising steadily on the New York
Stock Exchange, and other companies large and small are also hatching plans for expanding
military production.
Simultaneously with this the United States is. at an increased pace, improving the existing
and creating a new generation of strategic offensive weapons. Iis primarily a question
of increasing the number of nuclear warheads. And claims that the United States long ago
ceased building up the numerical strength o its strategic nuclear forces whereas the Soviet
Union is allegedly constantly increasing them have a wide currency. Only one thing is true
about these claims: Over the past decade the number of American delivery vehicles has
remained at the same level. However, the number of nuclear warheads on ose ae ive y
vehicles is growing constantly, and it is r el the nu ,.per of warheads and their yie d
tl_iat determine the effective status of strategic forces. Taus while in 19 9 the American
missile forces had 1,710 nuclear warheads, at present the total number of nuclear munitions
that can be delivered by all vehicles is about 10,000 units (Note 4) ("Arms Control Today,"
April 1970 p 1; "SIPRI Yearbook 1977," Stockholm 1977 p 24; "Department of Defense Annual
Report f.y. 1981." Washington 1980 p 77). And although the number of delivery vehicles,
as already mentioned, is remaining almost constant, the number of nuclear warheads has
increased by approximately 1,000 units per year over the last 10 years (Note 5) ("SIPRI
Yearbook 1977"; J. Collins "American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile
Crisis." Washington 1978 pp 113-114).
Along with the buildup of the quantity of nuclear munitions their yield is increasing.
For instance, Minuteman- -missiles, w is each have three 200-kiloton warheads, are being
refitted with nose cones that will carry three 370 kiloton warheads, which considerably
increases their potential destructiveness (Note 6) ("The Military Balance 1978-1979."
London 1978 p 3).' A new generation of ICBM warheads with components ensuring that they can
be maneuvered and guided during the terminal phases of their trajectory (the so-called
? RV system _is a .so ein,a inuensiv y developed.
From next year the, United States will start producing cruise missiles. The missile sub-
marine fleet will receive new systems of the lrlaen Hype. e first such submarine has
already been launched, and the second is to be launched by summer 1980. The unit of
Poseidon submarines is getting new Trident 1 missiles with a range of more than 6,000 km,
and by 1984 all Poseidon nuclear submarines are to be equipped with Trident 1 missiles
with increased accuracy (Note 7) ("The Military Balance 1979-1980." London 1979 p 3;
"The Military Balance 1978-1979." London 1978 p 3).
In September 197_ the U.S. President decided to expedite the devrelopment production and
sleolovment of the new mobile MX land-based ICBM, designed to replace the Minuteman-3
missile. It is considerably heavier as a comparison, the r~IS weighs 95 tons and the
Minuteman-3 39 tons), will have 10 MIRVed warheads instead of the 3 on Minuteman-3s and
a considerably greater payload, and, which is extremely material, it will be considerably
more accurate (it may be equipped with the MARV system). One of the main differences will
be the basing system. The existing launchers for the Minuteman -3 missiles are permanently
housed in deep silos constructed beforehand--that is, at permanent-basing sites. The new
system will consist of 200 MX missiles mounted on transporter-erector-launchers and will
have 23 horizontal-type shelters for each transporter-erector-launcher and missile.
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 approved For` (ease 2005/0/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554WO3300120064-7
ill. 23 May USSR
ANNEX
Thus the missle can be launched from the installation mounted on the transporter either
from any point along the track or from a shelter. The constant movement of the transporters
and the existence of 23 shelters makes it impossible, in the opinion of the system's creators,
to i a the missiles simultaneously in the event of a nuclear exchange. According to the
most modest caloul ations, the cost of this sytem is estimated at $41, billion (Note 8)
(NEWSWEEK 4 February 1980 p 41). The new missiles may enter service in the second half of the
eighties, and experts of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, the U.S. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and others believe that in view of. its invulnerability, 'accuracy,
potential destruct3.veness and number of warheads, the new missile system cane ec iv
be regarded as ai (Note 9) ("Strategic Survey." London 1977 p 11 ;
M. Callaham, B. Field, E..Hadjimichael, K. Tsipis. "The NNiX Missile. An Arms Control Impact
Statement." Boston 1978 p 20). It is in this context that the December (1 979) NATO Council session's decision to accept
the American offer to produce and deploy in Europe 108 Pershing II ballistic miss i es nd
.464 grout.-launch cruise missiles with a range of more than 2,000 km should be consi a ed;
some of these weapons can carry not one but several nuclear charges. ? If it is implement ed
this decision may lead to a qualitative and quantitative change in both the balance of forces
in Europe and the strategic balance as a whole, and to the disruption in NATO's favor o e
military equilibrium-in Europe. It should be taken into account here that the decisionto pro-
duce and deploy new nuclear armaments is part of a broad NATO plan adopted un er e
at the Washington (May 1978) NATO Council session. This plan envisages lucreasangappropri -
tions for military purposes by many tens of billions of dollars over and above the already
swollen military budgets, the adoption of new programs for developing (razvertyvaniyeIthe
NATO Armed Forces covering decades ahead, and the reequipping of those forces with increasingly
devastating types of mass-destruction weapons.
The emergence of highly accurate nuclear missile weapons --in considerable quantity, what
is more -has in the United States promp ed e revision in an extremely dangerous direction
of a number of fundamental strategic military concepts, especially those considering
possible consequences of nuclear war and the procedure for the use of nuclear missile weapons
in such a war,_ It is essentially a matter of the fundamental, the most vital problems of
nuclear strategy, for instance: Can nuclear weapons be used effectively in the interests of
resolving foreign policy tasks? Or: Can there be victory in nuclear war and what would be`
the cost of such a victory? In other words, to speak more directly, the question is this;
I: there to be nuclear war, or not?
It is well known that for a long time a widespread opinion in the United Rtat;ps was that
nuclear war was unthinkable, that there could be no winner in such -a war that a world
nuclear war would mean th e end of civilization and whoever unleashedi would be committing
suicide. Nuclear forces were regarded, at least in official declarations, not as a means of
waging war but merely as a means of deterring and averting it. American official documents
and verbal statements by administration spokesman repeatedly stressed that the huge U.S.
nuclear arsenal served, so to speak, as a terrible warning to the other side that in any
circumstances the United States had the permanent potential for a mighty retaliatory strike
capable of inflicting irreparable losses on the other side's populationandeconomy. This
is the essence of the concept of "assured destruction" first proposed by R. McNamara back
in the sixties.
Time passed. Presidents came and went, the names of the American doctrines changed--
"flexible response," "realistic deterrence" --but the concept of "assured destruction"
remained the basic, fundamental concept in the scheme t~,a rt r,; i;t~ry~octr~ne
The "assured destruction" section of the U.S. defense secretary's annual report to Con-
gress for fiscal 1979 said, in particular: "It is important that we always retain the
possibility of inflicting unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union, including the des-
truction of at least 200 major cities of the Soviet Union" (Note 10) ("Department of
Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1979." Washington 1978 p 55).
ApprovedxFor Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
^?!+xnm'oMHV'.'G.'MR. Ir.JFRdfSiM1F.]f,~^..'FGSt?fi94C.?4~+Sll13'YV~~"~.C~AG4Mi+[a'~H%cH. Y9.':.w+iw. 1VU.1?M.x..p.:;'yti~q~w~Ye.x
 Approved FoRelease 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80B015W003300120064-
III. 23 May 80 5
It is believed that, since acknowledged p~ rity in strategic forces exists, the other
side has a similar potential for "assured destruction" and, as it were ,an objectively
existing situation of "mutual assured destruction" is established between the two
sides. .1n American specialists? opinion, this meant: mutual deterrence; acknowledgement
of the inad_mias ility of nuclear war; that the use of nuclear weapons is fraught with
tremendous potential danger tb the United States itself,
But it would be naive to believe that everyone in the United States agreed with this in
the past, or so agrees now. On the contrary, the whole history o e eve opmen of
U.S. strategic military thought shows that there has been and is in that country a
constant guest for * niicie2r weapons of ble" and to ensure the
utilization of the huge ar9enaT-`oT--rF-t-c-1-e.Tr weapons as a means of resolvir international
problems in its own favor without running the risk of sustaining "unacceptable losses."-"
Of course, this -
quest and these studies have proceeded and still do proceed behind.
closed doors, in profound secrecy, and it is only occasionally that the American public
leans of them.
The "assured destruction" concept'-:? choice of big targets such as cities and industrial
centers as the main objectives for attack was no accident. It was explained largely
by the fact that current strategic offensive forces were extremely inaccurate. Thus,
according to American figures, the Titan missile, which entered service in 1962, and the
first Polaris missiles, which entered service in 1966, had a mean probable error of
about 1 km, and the Mimatteman-2 a mean probable error of 0.6 km (Note 11) (ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, April 1979 p 9. The Americans define accuracy in terms of the so-called
"average circular error probable"r-that is, the radius of a circle around the target in
which 50 percent of the targeted warheads may fall). The gradual improvement in missiles,
accuracy brought into being new strategic nuclear char es asrai>~t a sx nnmb4lr of
militarv targets. That was how the concept of "limif,Pd trategic still known
under the name of the Sc es~nger oc rine at the time he was U.S. defense seeretary),
emerged; since 197 it has been an integral part of American military doctrine (Note 12)
(For more details, about this concept, see SSHA: IICONOMIK, POLITIKA, IDEOLOG a No 11
for 1974, pp 3-12). T'ne accuracy of rtirntteman 3 missiles with the Mark 12A warhead,
adopted in 1979, is three times that of the Minuteman-2 misail, the Poseidon naval..
missile (1971) is twice as accurate as the Polaris and the Trident missiles t wz enter
service in .981 are almost four times as accurate a? the Polaris (Note 13) (ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, April 1980 p 9; "The Military Balance 1979-1980" p 3).
American strategists were again faced with illusory hopes of making effective use of their
nuclear arsenal in the interests of implementing a "position o strength" policy.
Criticism of the "assured destruction" concept began in all directions. H. Brown's
7report for fiscal 1980 was already saying: "However, unfortunately a strategy based only
on assured destruction cannot be regarded as tahol~v correct. Many Americans are questioning
whether we should subscribe to such a strategy" (Note 14)
("Department of Defense Annual
Report F.Y. 1980," Washington 1979 p 75). The year before, H. Brownts report had noted:
"Of course, we want our forces to be capable not merely of surviving a strike and
penetrating the enemy defenses... A sufficient number of guided si_ssiles and bombers
must be used to deliver hi h
eurqtp it with both large and small
yields. And these forces must be eff tive against a broad spectrum of targets, including
small hardened targets" (Note 15) ("De artment of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1979" p 59).
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 Approved Fo lease 2005/09/28: CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
III. 23 May 80 6 USSR
ANNEX
In 1977 and 1978 studies appeared--including on the official level--which considered the
posstbi
view of the improvements in accuracV (Note 16 ) (off ic'ial s udies of the "counterforce
concept include the following: "Planning U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces for the Nineteen
Eighties," Washington 1978; "U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces. Deterrence Policies and
Procurement Issues," Washington 1977; "Retaliatory Issues for the U.S. Strategic
Nuclear Forces," Washington 1978; "Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear
Forces," Washington 1978 (all are publications of the Congressional Budget Office).
Newspapers and journals published articles urging the need to revise all the conceptual
postulates of American strategy. "... There is a critical need to revise American
Strategic and doctrinal concepts," the prestigious journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS said in one
article on this theme, for instance. Moreover, it transpired that the revision "has
already been started, is being analyzed in detail and is being carried out by the U.S.
Defense Department" (Note 17) (FOREIGN AFFAIRS April 1978 p 562).
However, it is acknowled ed tha debate over strategic problems
developed in the United States in 1979. .This is largely explained by the fact t
that was the year of the start of the extensive SALT II debate in the United States
during which vital questions of nuclear strategy were broached, and as a result 1979
became, as American academic (C. Grey) predicted, "the-year of the most intense debate
over fundamental doctrinal problems since the wrongly predicted ?missile gap' between
.the USSR and the United States of 1959-1960" (Note 18) (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer
1979 p 54).
Two "schools,"two directions of
the discussion. One of them con roues to"~S~rhsr_rihe to the former co-ncebt of l? ss d
gestrtct; on" (that is, "deterrence through punishment") whereas the other "school" sees
(Note 19) (ibid p 73). ,mod, (C. Grey)
believes, there are not consistent adherents of the former concept of "assured destruc-
tion" among the American nilitaLX (Note 20) (ibid p 72). For the first time in many
years supporters of this "school" are now speaking openly of the need to devise a con-
cept envisaging not "deterrence" but fi YLitin and winninr~ a nuclear war,
The ideas of these a ted in their most concentrated form in the book
by Lt Gen D. Graham, former director of the U.S. Defense Department Military as publIs ed]
Intelligence Agency, bearing the pretentious title "Shall America to Defended?" here re
some of the most typical remarks: "Many 'outsiders? (he is referring to himself and those
like him--that is, people who currently hold no official position- N.M..) believe that
...America can and must be defended. Moreover, they believe that unless the United
States is prepared for war, for survival and victory in a nuclear war, the Soviet Union,
fearing nothing, will start such a war." "In order to gain access to efficient... counter-
force weapons and to active and passive defense, the United States in 1.82 0 will have to.
conclude wcr is possible and preparations for fighting that war must be begun"
(Note 21) (D. Graham. "Shall America Be Defended? SALT II and Beyond." New York 1979
pp 9, 240).
These remarks show just how dangerous a direction current American military thinking is
moving in, and all the evidence is that they are typical not just of "outsiders" but of
those responsible for devising U.S. military strategy. The Carter administration, the
New York TIMES wrote recently, "has revised its stragegy for deterring nuclear war and has
adopted a concep envjZ;aving the availabilit of stratemi.c forces capable of hitting o z L
military targets on a large scale, with the simultaneous capacity for a retaliatory
countercity strike" (Note 22) (The New York TIMES 10 February 1979). The newspape- adds
that the new strategy, the result of months of debate in the Pentagon, represents a signi-
ficant departure form the concept of nuclear deterrence long regarded as officially
recognized, which envisaged a retaliatory strike against cities.
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 Approved Forlease 2005/09/28: CIA-RDP80B01554003300120064=
In his report to Congress on the fiscal 1981 military budget Defense Secretary H. Brown
admits that the ~' ntarron " ecently corn le American strategi
policy" (Note 23) ("Department of Defense Annual Report F.Y. 1981" Washington 1980 p 6).
The name of the new strategy might be provisionally translated from the English as "com-
pensated" or "balanced strategy" (Note 2++) (in English: "countervailing strategy" (op cit
p 65). What is meant is that American nuclear strategy envisages various versions of or
scenarios for nuclear war and that in contract with the .Last .fiha rrnit~~, r, tats,
have the nuclear potential not just to hit cities and industrial targets. "Therefore
we must, H. Brown declares, "have glans for del no, stri p$ het would create
more serious threat than strikes against Soviet industry a nicities. Theme se plans must
1 include delivering strikes against targets constitnt nc the military and political
structure of the USSR..." (Note 25) (op cit p 66).
as the fun amenca concept for a use of strategic forces. At the same time its adop-
So it is obvious that the United States is moving toward adopting the "counterforcel`
concept, which will receive further development and material support in the eig ries,
report to Congress says that the "U.S. and NATO strategy takes into account the possi-
bility of f rst use of nuclear weapons, if this should prove necessary." It is stressed
here that high combat readiness must be maintained not only for defense purposes, but
also to "mount offensive operations" (Note 26) ("Department of Defense Annual Report
F.Y. 1980," Washington 1979 pp 86, 112).
disarming--strike, since e cons an s riving o increase accuracy and the adoption
of invulnerable mobile systems lead to the material support of the concept. Thoosseare
certain trends--and extremely dangerous ones--in the development of current strategic
thinking in the United States
targets can in essence potentially be regarded as the concept for a first--
The new concept envisaging the use of t tear" offenslye forces mainly against military
In highlighting other characteristic features. of present-day American military doctrine
one cannot help noting that in essence the United States has returned to the "ore-
Vietnam" strategic concept of using its armed forces outside their American Continent
as a world policeman and is creating a large grouping of armed forces to implement this
concept. One would think that the Vietnam war, which was unleashed by the United States
and which cost it a huge number of lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, ought to
have provided plenty of lessons, especially for those who plan military and foreign
policy in Washington. But it is less than 5 years since this shameful war for the
United States ended, and despite the lessons of Vietnam these people are again seeking
to control the course of world events exclusively by military means and to implement a
"position of strength" policy by claiming the role of international policeman.
To all appearances, the only lesson certain figures in the United States would like to
derive from the Vietnam war is to learn to ensure Mat -m interference is not as pro-
tracted as it was in Vietnam. Gen A. Goodpaster, former NATO supreme a11~ea cornet 371,
and S. Huntington, former National. Security Council staffer who took part in planning
U.S. foreign policy measures, wrote in their book "Civil-Military Relations": "The next
Vietnam will most likely last 7 weeks, not 7 years .... The United States will use over-
whelming forces to achieve s aims rapidly and resolutely. The emphasis will be on
limiting the means" (Note 27) (A. Goodpaster and S. Huntington. "Civil-Military Relations,"
Washington 1977 pp 21-22).
There is more. Washington's present military doctrine devotes special attention to
creating so-called it gL~7~C~-motion forces for interventionist operations
in
regions
where there are no military blocs of which the United States is a member.
In
other
words, we are tal4cing about mob; rces for armed interference in the internal azfairs
of other countries, especially Near Eastern. nsian and Latin American countries.
paragraph cqrb%Vb1d For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80B01
 Approved Forrijelease 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO15540003300120064-7
USSR
ANNEX
And the Pentagon's plans to form these forces vie---e learned of back in August 1977--that
is, long before the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran and the Afghan events.
The President's 1980 "State of the Union" Message to Congress says this about these forces:
"We will systematically enhance our ability to respond rapidly to emergencies outside
the NATO sphere wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are
threatened. The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarly flexible:
They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations numbering 100,000
men, together with the requisite supporting subunits. Our forces will be prepared. for
rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance" (Note 28) (the Washington POST
23 January 1980).
These forces' primary task is to strengthen U.S. positions in the Persian Gulf. They will
er pore y e base on uni s of r Me Ist and ?larine divisions, an and
101st Airborne divisions (Note 29) (TIME 4 February 1980 p 9). The forces will be sup-
ported by 16 special floating bases. It is planned that these floating bases, with re-
serves of heavy armaments and ammunition on board, could be anchored in strategically
event of "emergencies." At the same time it is planned to buy, to supplement the existing
aircraft fleet, about 50 of the latest CX transport aircraft, designed to transport tanks
and other heavy armam ents over great distances. A present the aircraft fleet is based
on 77 C-5A transport planes produced by the Lockheed Corporation. Each such airplane is
capable of transporting two tanks. The forces' composition and support are being planned
with the intention that they should be able to conduct combat operations for 60 days
without reinforcements or resupply in 'theaters remote from the United States For nstance,
in the Near East). According to preliminary es ima es, the o a cos of t e forces '"''
will be 10 billion.
According to the Baltimore SUN for 6 February 1980, the formations the Pentagon is planning
to transfer to bases in the Near East primarily include the following: 1 or 2 fighter
squadrons; a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division (1 , 00 men , a marine battalion ,300
men), a marine landing detachment (2,200 men) a marine landing group (10,000-12,000 men),
a ground forces mechanized brigade (8,
According to Pentagon calculations,
from a few days to a fortnight; in addition
Pentagon has elaborated plans and scenarios
other than NATO's sphere.".
54 tanks and 126 armored personnel c
er of all "these iorces may take anything
to this, the same newspaper repo:?ts, the
for using tactical nuclear weapons "in regions
It is not hard to guess just which regions are meant. It is well known that J. Carter's
administration singles out three extremely important regions of the world--Nest Europe,
the Far and Near East, and the Persian Gulf--as regions in which the Uni e S aces as
vital interests and which it intends to defend, snow r. it e eeme necessary, y
employing military force, tactical nuclear weapons included. The American press has also
disclosed a secret Pentagon report envisaging the possibility of using tactical nuclear
weapons "in the event of an invasion of Iran" (Note 30) (The Chicago TRIBUNE 9 February
1980). - - -
Thus Washington has gone considerably further in planning the use of tactical nuclear
weapons than in the "pre-Vietnam period" and is promising pretty lavishly and recklessly
to use nuclear weapons on foreign territories without considering the consequences of such
a move for the United States itself.
No can one fail to mention that Washington is changing its lic on armed forces manning
levels and is t ' g e ua return to compulsory military service. Those
,n m are certain characteristic features of present-day U.S. military doctrine and ml tart' policy.
What is the explanation of the sharp intensification of the most extreme trends in U.S.
'military policy and what aims is the United States pursuing in steering this course?
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 Approved For lease 2005/09/28: CIA-RDP80BO155 03300120064-7
"Soviet military tthreat, which is widely fueled and circula e in e coup ry y
available means. Tla_us the building of themilitary budget is justified chiefly by the
claim that the Soviet Union is constantly increasing its military spending. n ac ual
i'act the Soviet Union has not increased its defense spending, and this year even re u ed
it, confining its defense budget to the interests of security alone. The decision to
expedite t t MX mobile missile is being justified,
iri particular, by the claim that the Soviet Union, b improving its heavy missies, s
acquiring afirst-strike potential and therefore the U.S. land-based missiles are beeom g
vulnerable. However, it is well known--and the Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated this--
that the USSR is opposed to the concept of a "first strike" and does not seek to acquire
the potential for such a strike. It was also on the pretext of the "Soviet military threat"
and under U.S. pressure that NATO took the decision to produce medium-range missiles and
deploy them in West Europe. Therefore the "Soviet military threat" myth is used extensively,
constantly and at every level as the main motif to justify the measures and actions envisaged
recently by U.S. military doctrine and military policy.
The real reasons for the new and more dangerous trends in U.S. military doctrine and military
policy lie elsewhere. They are determined above all by the E~o-4-- nhanoa tr,*,^ra Of diktat end pxeyan inniem in the U.S. foreign policy course as a whole. There is a sharp
turn toward militarizat on, whereby it is proposed to achieve any foreign policy solu ioo
merely by means of military force--the threat or actual use of force. In an interview with
CBS-TV G. Kennan, former American ambassador to the USSR, stressed in this connection: An
extremely disturbing phenomenon can now be observed in the United States, which could be
defined as a kind of "militarization of thought" that finds expression in the fact that
administration strategists are approaching every aspect of Soviet-American relations with
a military yardstick.
And the United States is usin this yardstick in approaching not only Soviet-American
relations, but also relations with many other countries, Amrican- ranian re ations in-
cluded. The circles prevailing in the sphere of military policy in the United States
are those representing chiefly the interests of militarism and the military-industrial
complex, which have long militated for a sharp buildup of American military might and -have
always sought opportunities to break out of the state of equality, hoping to establish
military superiority over the Soviet Union with the aid of further spurts in the arms race
and the retardation of arms limitation talks.
Thus it is a matter of attempts to gain the opportunity in the military sphere to pursue
a "position of strength" policy on both a regional and global scale on the basis of military
superiority.
A certain role has been played here by the interests of the election campaign. To please
rightwing circles, J. Carter is fueling war hysteria in the country so as to avoid accusations
from the right that he is "disregarding U.S. national interests and security." Historical
experience shows that on the threshold of presidential elections the~countryls politicians
cannot avoid the temptation to make political capital out of the temporary and largely un-
justified sentiments of certain circles in the country by acting counter to national
interests. It is also certain that the "Soviet military threat" myth has been malevolently
exploited by U.S. aggressive circles to pressure Congress to accept new military programs.
A special danger is represented by the trends in U.S. military doctrine aimed at acquiring
a counterforce
USSR
ANNEX
weapons and at adopting highly accurate and mobile mclear missile sys
Approved For Release 2005/09/28 : CIA-RDP80BO1554R003300120064-7
 Appravet :Far..$e~ears 2005/Q~/ 8 :? 1 -F E #3EiB~~5 q$0033091,20064r7
,;USSR.
'`ANNEX - .,..
The dangerousness of the a forementioned.trends.isfurther increased by the dissemination
in.the -United S tates of ideas-of the acceptability of nuclear war and the possibility
of winning such a. war. Under these conditions it is not impossible that some people in
the United States might be tempted to switch .overtly ?'or covertly to the concept of a
disarming :first
e same time many sober=m3.ndedpoliticians in Washington are well aware that a new
surge in the a rms race will add nothing to the safe arding of U.S. security; whatever
the pretext on which it is carried out, and they-believe that any attempts o sec
military superiorit can onl destabilize .the situation and sharply increase the?danger
f th
tb
k
4o
e ou
rea
of nuclear war. They realize- that-there is: no further ra Iona pa in ,the
arms race and that_ the '! common: interests that initially prompted thecourse, of,. detente
are now just as real as-they were before A. unilateral weapons buildup,no matter how
all-embracing, no"matter what astronomical amounts.[razmery] it takes, will neve
e
r
nsure
U.S., national security (Note 31) (The CHRISTIAN 'SC IENCE- 140NITOR 1]. February;, 1980) The
extent of 'these circ ' influence can-be udged only- from'Washinton's-future policy, taking.
taking into ,account the fact that the balance of forces in the United States between
jfaggressive militarist forces and the forces of realism and restraint is extremely complex
and often changes not in the latter's favor.
HEARING .INVESTIGATES SOVIET AB