SECRET AND NONSENSICAL
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01350R000200220006-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 15, 2007
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 13, 1972
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP88-01350R000200220006-4.pdf | 95.31 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP88-01350R0002 (
T IE TIMES (LONDON) LITERARY SUPPLEME
13 October 1972
FOIAB3B
ecret and nonsensical .- . ~
it. HARRIS SMITH 1 Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and, later, sulti--such a5 the fiasco at the By
QSS Director of the Central Intelligence of Pigs,
Agency. Mr Smith's 'villains include not
458pp. University of Calkfornia R. Harris Smith's OSS, however; only the Germans, Japanese and
Press (IBLG). ?3.95? is evidence that Bedell Smith was Italians, but the British intelligence
displaying his usual horse sense. The services, any official who seemed to
General Walter Bedell Smith once picture of the OSS during and doubt the OSS's competence and its
startled a postwar dinner party by immediately after the Second World right to order the political end of
Suggesting the war might have been War is a depressing one. Its SUCCCS the war as'it saw fit, and, of course,
won much earlier had the United sor, the CIA, has its faults. But the all "colonialists ", The style is an
States diverted the time, money and. OSS, as depicted in this book, was a extraordinary mixture of, exaggera-
inen expended on the Office of Strate- mixture of idealism, naivety, in- tion and parochiahism.
gic Services "and the rest of that competence and intrigue seldom
danin secret nonsense " to the regular matched in the annals of govern- Mr Smith writes that the British
forces." tt was a singular speculation. meat in America or anywhere else. Army s took a respite of several
tot r man who had been General months from the war against Hitler
Mr Smith',; wide reading and to suppress the revolt " of the LAM-
extensive research have not saved the EL.AS partisans in Greece. This was
book from ingenuousness and error. the period when Second Army was
lie begins by labelling his work fighting bitterly in North-West
" the secret history " of the organi- Europe and the Eighth Army was
zation, but there is little of note in it heavily engaged in Italy.
that has not been written before and Perhaps the best chapter in the
often much better, He gets things b I ' 11, t cirVoted to the O55
s
it tl A erir Navy, oo. r,
wrong. was ie m car o
erations in Yugoslavia-best, be
J
not Inc Royal Navy, th.rt was
responsible for landing General Pat- . cause it provides a fairly clear
ton's forces in Morocco in 1942, picture of the bewildering situation
The Purple Gang operated in Dc- that arose from the presence of two
fruit, not Philadelphia. Stephen resistance movements and of the
riaivcty of ?OSS officers. One of
Bailey is not, nor has Ile been, these was confident that Tito " was
" Pre
Which ichi h Syracuse
a chancellor. UnivUniversity planning no Communist revolution
Which is s headed by
Mr Smith s main problem seems for his. country turtly ". the hook is weakest
to be his tendency to write about the' Surprisingly, it sinIl ,th the k OSS in China
OSS and its operations in North when Africa, Europe and the Far East in during and after the war and with
absolutes. Men and organizations American intelligence operaiions,in
are heroic or dastardly, faithful or Algeria in 1942-43. In both cases Mr
treasonable. The story is told in Smith tends to adopt the easy expla-
blacks and whites, whereas the dirty, nation of what happened and a
dangerous l;anlc played by the OSS somewhat austere attitude towards
is best described in varying shades those officers whose standards dif-
of grey. ,fered from his. Association with a
m- York law firm or bank did not
p
'lion's, the assumption was, then they a good, although incomplete, picture
11
Nor does Mr Smith pay enough
attention to one of the more impor- necessarily sour an operator's judg-
tant decisions taken at the outset. by 17ent. In retrospect the 055 prob
General William " Wild Bill " Dono- ably got more from this type of man
van, the founder and director of th, that it (lid from the wild-eyed left-
OSS. I-fe was determine(] to consoli- overs from the Abraham Lincoln
date within the organization all op- .Brigade in Spain.
erations--eu;rionage, sabotage, assis- . There are some bright, spots ; how
tance to guerrilla movements. ']'his often Winston Churchill cut through
was an error. The OSS planned , the red tape to save a promising
operations based on intelligence re- operation ; a good story about Gen-
ports produced by the OSS. There oral Donovan and David Bruce in
was little objective study of these' Normandy ; the gradual profession-
reports ! if they were the organiza- alization of some members of OSS ;
must be accurate. They often were of Allen Dulles, who is clubbed the
not, and the operation failed. Oddly, master spy ". But these are not
the CIA, despite the sorry record of sufficient to save?the book. The OSS
its predecessor, has continued this imust. wait for a more objective and
:.......
iir-g,rnVaflotl, Willi"c7cj~hdssiirl;" `rc- sophisticated chronicler.
Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP88-0135OR000200220006-4