SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 1, 1982
• Content Type: REGULATION

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SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF
PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED
INFORMATION (SCI)1
(Effective 1982)
Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee, minimum secu-
rity policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of
U.S. Goverment civilian and military personnel, government con-
sultants and employees of government contractors who have, or who
have had, access to SCI.
1. Purpose
This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possi-
ble compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, ex-
ploitation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated above) by
hostile nations or groups.
a. Defensive Security Briefings--formal advisories which
alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, prov-
ocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual ex-
perience when available, and include information on courses of
action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal. con-
sequences.
b. Hazardous Activities--include assignments or visits to,
and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix.
Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in com-
bat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place,
duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or
against h tile action. ,4r 44.1- ? ate`
c. Risof Cast e Briefings--f ' mal advisories whi alert
personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to
force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured
or detained and of suggested courses of action they should follow
to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include in-
structions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate
explanations of duties and background.
1 This policy statement supersedes DCID No. 1/20, effective 6
June 1978.
CLASSIFIED BY:
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CONFIENTAL
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d. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOIC)--
for the purposes of this policy statement, SOICs are defined as
the heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community,
as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated repre-
sentatives.
e. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)--all information
and materials requiring special community controls indicating
restricted handling within present and future community intelli-
gence collection programs and their end products. These special
Community controls are formal systems of restricted access estab-
lished to protect the sensitive aspects of sources, methods and
analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The term
does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public
Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
3. Policy
a. Unofficial Travel. Persons granted authorization for ac-
cess to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on
foreign intelligence sources or methods of SCI incur a special
security obligation and are to be alerted by their SOIC to risks
associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the
countries listed in the Appendix hereto. The SOIL concerned
should advise that unofficial travel in the listed countries
without official approval may result in the withdrawal of ap-
proval for continued access to SCI for persons with specific and
extensive knowledge of the following categories of extremely
sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources or methods:
--Technological structure, function, and techniques of sensi-
tive intelligence collection or exploitation system/methods.
--Designated system targets or sources.
--Method and purpose of target selection.
--Degree of success of collection or exploitation system/
method.
--Collection or exploitation system/method capabilities and
vulnerabilities.
b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial
travel to or through countries listed in the Appendix hereto
must:
(1) Give advance notice of such planned travel.
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(2) Obtain a defensive security briefing from a
specified official before traveling to such countries.
(3) Contact immediately the nearest U.S. consular,
attache, or Embassy official if they are detained or subjected
to significant harassment or provocation while traveling.
(4) Report upon return from travel to their SOIC any
incidents of potential security concern which befell them.
(5) Be reminded annually of the. foregoing obligations
through security education programs..
Failure to comply with the provisions of (1) and (4) above may be
cause for withdrawal of SCI access authorization.
c. Official Assignment/Travel.. No person with access to SCI
will be assigned to or directed to participate in hazardous ac-
tivities until he or she has been afforded a defensive security
briefing and/or risk of capture briefing as applicable. (Due
consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed
by U.S. officials having diplomatic status.)
d. Individuals with Previous SCI Access. Persons whose ac-
cess to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of
the risks associated with hazardous activities as defined herein
and of their obligation to ensure continued protection of SCI.
4. Responsibilities
a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the
SOICs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk
bearing on this policy (see Appendix). The Security Committee
will coordinate required support including source material con-
cerning these risks.
b. SOICs will issue implementing directives concerning
travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or
agencies. Such directives will include the overall policy,
definitions, and criteria set forth herein and will provide for:
(1) Preparation and provision of defensive security brief-
ings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments
or agencies.
(2) Institution of positive programs for the collection of
information reported under the provisions of paragraph 3b(4), above.
(3) Ensuring that new information obtained by their de-
partments or agencies on harassments or provocations, or on risk
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of capture situations, is provided to the DCI and to other inter-
ested NFIB agencies. (Where warranted by new information, changes
to the Appendix hereto will be made. Recommendations with sup-
porting justification may be made for either addition or dele-
tion of countries.)
5. Classification. As this directive sets forth security policy
for persons with access to SCI, it merits and warrants the overall
classification of CONFIDENTIAL in its totality. Selected para-
graphs may be excerpted for use at the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY level
by SOICs, their designees, or SCI Special Security/Control Of-
ficers, when considered appropriate.
Appendix:
Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment
are Considered to be a Hazardous Activity
PAL
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COUNTRIES AND AREAS IN WHICH VISITS, TRAVEL, AND ASSIGNMENT
ARE CONSIDERED TO BE A HAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
Appendix
25X1
5X1
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Revision of DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20
_
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
C/PPG
DATE
9 November 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1
Attached are the draft
DD/P&M
e~
1t
~q
&
versions of DCIDs 1/7 and 1/20.
-
Vote sheet action before
2.
~
12 November 1982 has been
DD/SEC
lp Nfl 2
I
11-7
C,
requested by the Chairman,
Office of Security
SECOM
.
3.
D/SEC
10 Nov
15 Nov
18f32
elements have reviewed both
documents
.
Concerning DCID 1/7, PSD/PTAS
commented that what constitutes
"ori
inal form" document is
an
g
left open to question. The
Special Security Center does
re this concern and PSD
ot sh
n
a
6?
has, as a result, withdrawn
their comment.
7?
PSI comments regarding
DCID 1/20, that EAB/OS conducts
s
vel Briefin
Tr
e A
f
i
D
g
rea
a
ens
v
e
8.
to include information about
hazardous areas. Risk of Capture
-
not been
v
h h
fi
B
i
-
a
e
ngs as suc
r
e
9
given for at least three years.
Since DCID 1/20 allows either
-
o
s
f b
i
fi
-
ng, we c
n
e
type o
r
to
the Agency to be in compliance.
h
d
d
h
e
t
at t
e
It is recommen
11.
Director of Security concur and
that he sign the vote set.
12.
13.
t
~
r-
14.
1
15.
FORM 61 O USEDPTEVIOUS
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