SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190016-4
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 4, 2005
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 6, 1978
Content Type: 
REGULATION
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP87B01034R000500190016-4.pdf233.15 KB
Body: 
Approved For Rel h fl I A L P87B01034P2000500190016-4 SECURITY POLICY CONCERNING TRAVEL AND ASSIGNMENT OF' PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI)' (Effective 1982) Pursuant to the provisions of the Director of Central Intel- ligence Directive (DCID) on the Security Committee, minimum secu- rity policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of U.S. Goverment civilian and military personnel, government con- sultants and employees of government contractors who, have, or who have had, access to SCI. 1. Purpose This policy is based upon the need to protect SCI from possi- ble compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, ex- ploitation, or entrapment of personnel (stipulated above) by -hostile nations or groups. 2. Definitions a. Defensive Security Briefings--formal advisories which alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, prov- ocation, or entrapment. These briefings are based on actual ex- perience when available, and include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal con- sequences. b. Hazardous Activities--include assignments or visits to, and travel through, countries listed in the attached Appendix. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in com- bat zones or other areas where hostilities are taking place, duties behind hostile lines, and duties or travel in isolated or exposed areas where indivduals cannot reasonably be protected against hostile action. c. Risk of Capture Briefings--formal advisories which alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and of suggested courses of action they. should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include in- structions/advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate explanations of duties and background. I This policy statement supersedes DCID No. 1/20, effective 6 June 1978. CLASSIFIED BY: DECLASSIFY ON: OADR Approved For Approved For Rel A At87BOl 6 1 Mr 0 Bel 71 d. Senior Officials of the intelligence Community (SOIC)-- for-the purposes of this policy statement, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within -the intelligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated repre- sentatives. e. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)--all information and materials requiring special community controls indicating restricted handling within present and future community intelli- gence collection programs and their end products. These special Community controls are formal systems of restricted access estab- lished to protect the sensitive aspects'of sources, methods and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence programs. The term does not include Restricted Data as defined in Section II, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. 3. Policy a. Unofficial Travel. Persons granted authorization for ac- cess to certain categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources or methods of SCI incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted by their SOIC to risks associated with unofficial visits to, or travel through, the countries listed in the Appendix hereto. The SOIC concerned should advise that unofficial travel in the listed countries without official approval may result in the withdrawal of ap- proval for continued access to SCI for persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following categories of extremely sensitive information on foreign intelligence sources or methods: --Technological structure, function, and techniques of sensi- tive intelligence collection or exploitation system/methods. --Designated system targets or sources. --Method and purpose of target selection. --Degree of success of collection or exploitation system/ method. --Collection or exploitation :system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities. b. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to or through countries listed in the Appendix. hereto must: (1) Give advance notice of such planned travel. Approved For 7Tai (4i3 ~ `j