THE SOVIET AIR SHOW - - AS TREATED IN THE McNAMARA REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE BRIEFING OF THE STENNIS SUBCOMMITTEE, AND THE JCS CABLE TO MAJOR COMMANDS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 2, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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Copy 1
2 August 1961
MEMpRAI~DUM FOR THE. DIRECTOR
SUBJECT ;
The Soviet Air Show -- As Treated in the
McNamara Report to the President, the
Briefing of the Stennis Subcommittee, and
the JCS cable to Major Commands.
RIiF'ERENCES;
1.
Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense
to DCI, dated 2~ July 1961 (Report to
.President of 1~- July, attached) .
2.
Report of Hearing before the Preparedness
Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Armed Services, 18 July 1961.
General
3.
JCS Message 99963, 26 July 1961 (DA IN 129730)
1. Many differences in these three accounts of the Soviet
Air Show of 9 July stem from two basic factors; (a) the pur-
pose for which they were prepared, and (b) timing. The .JCS.
report is lengthier and far more detailed, reflecting the
requirements of its military recipients. .The McNamara report
to the President and the Stennis briefing, both. tailored for
civilian policymakers, concentrate upon highlights of the show.
The JCS report also benefits from the fact that it was prepared
some 8 to 12 days later than the other accounts, by which time
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code-names had been selected for the aircraft., some addi-
tional facts were available, and intelligence evaluations
had firmed up somewhat.
2. However these factors do not explain the difference
in tone between the McNamara report to the President and
.the other two accounts. The McNamara report is couched in
terms of surprise; this is mitigated, however, by the cover-
ing letter to the President, which does not convey an, impres-
sion of alarm. The other reports indicate that despite the
display of a number of new or modified aircraft, there were
few surprises. Succeeding portions of this memorandum will
note major differences in the reporting on the more important
combat aircraft and in the conclusions of the three reports.
Strategic Bombers
3. All three. reports are in general agreement as to
the range and speed charaeteristi~s of the supersonic "dash"
medium bomber, BLINDER, and note that one of these was
carrying an air-to-surface missile (.ASM). Thin is identified.
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as a new A,SM in the JCS report and the Stennis briefing,
and the existence of such a missile is suggested by a
sentence on modification of BADGER in the McNamara report.
The new A.SM, not previously estimated, is larger than the
100 n.m. A.S-2 and. smaller than the 350 n.m. AS-3; this is
the first evidence of its development. The statement in
the McNamara report that the display of 10 BLzNDERs "indi-
cates a buildup in operational units greater than
currently estimated" is contradicted by NIE 11-8_61 (7 June
1961) which estimates that "about 30 have been produced to
date" (Para. 86) and. that a few "probably have now entered
service" (par's. 85). These estimates were included in the.
Stennis. briefing.
~+? ~'he equipment of BADGERS and BEARS with A.SMs is
noted in all three reports. The Stennis briefing and the
JCS report indicate that these are the previously estimated
AS-2 (100 n.m.) and A.S-3 (350 n.m.) missiles. Modifications
to the BEAR to accommodate these missiles are noted in all
three reports, and JCS suggests that the aircraft so modified
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possibly do not have an alternate bombing capability. The
McNamara report concludes on the basis. off' the extensive
modification of REAR- and BADGER that "the Soviet emphasis
on air-to-surface missiles was not entirely antici-
pated " and in an opening paragraph expresses the ,judgment
that "there are . indications of developments beyond.
present estimates in the coupling of air-to-surface missiles
with aircraft." Similarly the JCS report states that the
increased use of air-to-surface missiles was forecast. "though
not to the extent indicated." Whatever these statements may
mean' the subject of air-to-surface missiles is covered
extensively in national estimates. For examples NIE 11-5-61
(25 April 1961) describes the development and characteris-
tics of AS-1~ AS-2~ and AS-3 (pares. 69-7'9 and Table II).
NIE 11-~+-60 (1 December 1960) notes the deployment of ,ABMs
to Naval Aviation (para. 89) and to Zong Range Aviation (para.35).
NIE 11-8-61 (7 June 1961) estimates actual numbers of ABMs now
operational (pares. g6-97).
5. The three reports identify BOUNDER as a prototype.
However,, the Stennis briefing and the JCS. report describe the
shortcomings of this design in some detail. The McNamara
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report refers only to its development potential, a matter
concerning which there is no agreed estimate within the
intelligence community
Attack Aircraft
6. All three reports note the display of the super-
sonic FIREBAR, described as an "attack type" aircraft
(McNamara), a "fighter-bomber" (.JCS), and a "tactical
fighter bomber or light jet bomber" (Stennis briefing).
Z`he statement in the McNamara report that aircraft in this
category had not been specifically estimated, is correct.
We: can. find no support in the recent national estimates for
-the JCS. statement that "we had expected such aircraft but
had no reliable evidence on which to base a forecast." The
display of nine FIREHARs was cited as evidence in the Stennis
briefing that this aircraft is operational.
Fi ters
7? Both the JCS report and the Stennis briefing identify
~'IDDI,ER as an all-weather, long-range interceptor, reflecting
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~~~
the current views of the intelligence community. Aevelop-
went of an interceptor aircraft of this type had not been
previously-estimated. The description of this aircraft as
a light bomber in the McNamara report apparently reflects
an earlier view.' The JCS report and the Stennis briefing
note that FIDDLER is armed with a new, large air-to-air
missile, but estimate that this aircraft. could be adapted
to tactical use.
8. The three reports note the display of another all-
weather interceptor prototype, FLIPPER. The-,JCS report
states that "our estimates included an all-weather inter-
ceptor of this type," However, the McNamara report states
that "performance indicated is considerably above that
estitt~.ted for future Soviet fighters." Actually, estimated
characteristics of this aircraft are quite similar to-those
estimated for the next generation of Soviet interceptors in
NIE 11-3-CQ and NIE 11-3-61. (Soviet aircraft which have
been estimated. but not actually observed are not given nick-
names by Western intelligence.)
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Conclusions
9. The threo reports are in general agreement on
the propaganda motivations involved in. the air show.
They also agree that it provided evidence of continued.
Soviet development of manned aircraft systems. However,
there is some disagreement as to the extent of Soviet pro-
gress in this field. The McNamara report holds that
"certain qualitative progress was beyond that estimated
by the US" and that "intelligence estimates had not anti-
cipated this continued improvement to the extent shown."
The JCS report asserts that the air show "confirmed the
estimated continued comprehensive Soviet research and
development program in aircraft and aircraft armament" and
that "these aircraft do not represent any advance in state--
of-the-art," but rather "the result of continued steady
development." This was also the tone of the Stennis brief-
ing, which. characterized the air show as a "pretty tangible
demonstration of abroad spectrum of development in manned
systems" and 'apart of a mixed force the Soviets seem to be
pursuing." The views in the Stennis briefing and the JCS
~~ ~~w ~ iu. ~e
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report more correctly reflect the current national estimates.
Although one or two aircraft types represent unexpected
directions in Soviet research and development, we would
caution that aircraft displayed in previous air shows have
not always been selected for production and operational use.
25X1
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Assistant Director
National Estimates
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INTELLIGENCE STATUS pF SELECTED EQUIPMENT DISPLAYE77 IN SOVIET AIR.SHbW
In The McNamara
Report
BEAR
(Equipped with AS-3}
Extent of ASM.equip-
ment not foreseen.
BADGER:
(Equipped with. AS-2)
New.ASM
(Carried by BLINDER)
FIDDLER
(Long-range interceptor)
New .AAN!
(Carried by FIDDLER
Extent of ASM equip-
ment not foreseen.
Display of 10 indicates
buildup greater than
estimated.
Not noted -- suggested
by modified BADGER.
D:eseribed as "light
bomber".
FLIPPER Says not estimated.
(A].1,-weather interceptor}
FIREBAR
(Supersonic fighter-
bomber}
Says not estimated.
In The National
Estimates
Known (NLE 11-5-61,
NIE 11-~+-60} loo AS-3=.~
estimated operational
(NIE 11-8-61}.
Known. (NIE 11-5-61,
NIE 11-~+-60) 50o AS-1
and AS-2 estimated
operational (NIE 11-8-61).
A few estimated opera-
tianal and about 30
produced (NIE 11-$-61).
Not known -- future ASM
of longer range estimated
(NIE 11-5-61}.
Development not estimated.
Tot specifically estimated --
development of new AAM6
foreseen (NIE 11-5-61}.
Development estimated
(NIE 11-3-60 and NIE
11-3-61).
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In The McNamara In The National
Rep?rt Estimates
FLASHLIGHT B Not specifically noted. Known-since 1956 but
not estimated opera-
tional.
MAIL Not specifically noted. Known -- characteristics
(Turboprop flyin.~ boat included in NIE 11-~+-60.
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