NSC ON CENTRAL AMERICA/CUBA -- UPDATE FOR DCI MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG, WEEK OF 27 APRIL 1982
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP84B00049R000300480001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 19, 2006
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 23, 1987
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP84B00049R000300480001-1.pdf | 96.86 KB |
Body:
_n________l r___r~_~____ nnnninninw _ i+~n r~r~r~n Ar~nnn wnr~nnnnnn wnnnnw w
MEMORANDUM FOR: TSC_-
11*4r C-C-01M? vt~ I , s j e..c
~p Sty. J
CC:1 -L
FORM 5-75 101 USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
Date 2-'2 /~ 4, j ~ Z
Approved For Release 2006/02/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000300480001-1
Approved For Release 2006/0:SMEi4A-RDP814B00049R000300480001-1
23 April 198?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT : NSC on Central America/Cuba -- Update for DCI Meeting with
Secretary Haig, Week of 27 April 1982
NSC Meeting and Strategy Paper on Central America
The latest State draft (copy attached) of the NSC paper on policy toward
Cuba and Central America has been much improved over previous versions. No
date for an NSC meeting has been set.
I have been told that ARA leadership is questioning whether an NSC
meeting is needed and even whether a formal NSC strategy paper is useful.
You might make the following points on Central America/Cuba to Secretary
Haig:
1. There should be an NSC meeting and strategy paper -- in order to have
clear guidance for a comprehensive and offensive strategy;
2. Military and intelligence pressure on the extreme left in El Salvador
should be maintained and increased -- we must not make the 1981
mistake (as in fact has already partially occurred since March 28) of
a lull which lets the guerrillas regroup and increase their strength;
3. "Peace initiatives"/negotiations -- by whatever name, require NSC
agreed upon objectives and a process where we inform our friends to
keep Castro from using covert actions to divide the regional anti-
communist forces; CIA views these negotiations as no more than tactics
for Cuba and the communist groups to gain time, therefore a strict
time limit for each negotiation should be set by the NSC;
4. Negotiation objectives limited to:
For FMLN/DRU in El Salvador - amnesty, disarmament, guarantees of
personal safety and future electoral
participation (as in Venezuelan success
in 1960s);
For Nicaragua -
ending export of subversion;
implementing OAS June 23, 1979
resolution on free elections, trade
unions etc. (not now a part of the US
Eight Points); in return US and
international economic aid;
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2006/02/01 :CIA-RDP84B00
*9R000,10048666 1 -
Approved For Release 2006/02/01: C tB00049R0003004800011 25X1
SECRET
ending export of subversion; reduction
in military forces, Soviet links; in
return, US economic aid.
Att: (1)
cc: DDCI, C/NIC, D/ALA, C/LA/DDO, SA/DCI/IDA
25X1 All portions are SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/601E:T
25X1 Approved For Release 2006/02/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000300480001-1
Next 11 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000300480001-1