POWER POLITICS IN THE RIO DE LA PLATA BASIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00825R000300210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Power Politics
in the Rio de la Plata Basin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
0300210001-7
25X1
Confidential
No Foreign Dissent
Confidential
BGI RP 74-17
May 1974
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Summary .
Introduction
Key
The
The
The
The
CONTENTS
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Economic Region .
Treaty of the Rio de la Plata
Hydroelectric Potential
Joint Projects
Controversy .
Legal and Political Issues
Engineering Considerations
Environmental Impact
Flooding
Water Quality . .
Effects on Navigation
Disease
Fishing
Climate
Earthquakes .
Conclusions
Appendix A:
Appendix B:
Appendix C:
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Basin
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Treaty of the Rio de la Plata Basin
(Summary) ? ?
The National Programs
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Binational Projects
Itaipu
Yacyreta-Apipe
Corpus
itati
Salto Grande
Argentine-Brazilian Uruguay River Project
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Summary
A dispute smoldering between Argentina and Brazil
over construction of the giant Itaipu hydroelectric plant
may surface again at the Sixth Conference of the Foreign
Ministers of the Plata Basin Countries to be held at
Buenos Aires on 10 June 1974. Argentina claims that the
Itaipu plant, a joint Brazilian-Paraguayan project designed
to have the largest installed generating capacity in the
world, will preclude optimum development of the hydroelectric
potential downstream along the Argentine section of the
Parana River.
The controversy is rooted in conflicting economic
and political interests of the two traditional rivals,
although the arguments are couched in terms of international
law and environmental impact. Argentina contends that Brazil
and Paraguay are obligated to consult with her before com-
pleting their plans for the dam since, she claims, its
construction will adversely affect her use of the river
downstream. She maintains that the Itaipu facility will
reduce the hydraulic head available, destroying the economic
feasibility of a proposed joint Argentine-Paraguayan hydro-
electric plant at Corpus, and asks that the Itaipu design
be modified.
Argentina has gained support for her position at
international conferences, and the United Nations Economic
and Social Council has passed an Argentine-proposed
resolution calling for consultations among neighboring
countries before any party exploits "common resources."
Her four sister Plata Basin countries did not, however,
support this resolution. Brazil can still point to the
"Declaration of Asuncion," unanimously adopted at the
Fourth Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Plata
Basin Countries, which states that "in the case of inter-
national rivers with successive courses and on which there
is no joint sovereignty, each state may exploit the water
in accordance with its needs and provided it causes no
important damage to another state in the basin."
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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The Argentine claims of adverse environmental
impact appear largely unfounded; even if they were sound,
they would unquestionably apply with equal force to her
own proposed hydroelectric projects. On the other hand,
her position is valid that the Parana River can be de-
veloped more rationally through joint planning, with a
greater accrual of economic benefits to the region as a
whole. It also appears that the design modifications
Argentina requests at Itaipu are technically feasible,
although they would reduce the generating capacity by
about 15 percent.
Brazil and Paraguay are unlikely to accept
Argentina's view on prior consultation and include her
in the Itaipu decision-making process. The prospects
are for a continuation of planning and subsequent con-
struction on a binational basis, but perhaps with some
ad hoc agreement tying modifications in Itaipu design
to allocation of Corpus electricity to the Itaipu system
to compensate for the loss in Itaipu generating capacity.
If a compromise agreement is not reached, Argentina and
Paraguay may choose another -- but less desirable --
damsite in place of Corpus for their joint hydroelectric
project. Garupa, about 65 kilometers downstream, has
been mentioned in the press as a possible alternative.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1974
POWER POLITICS
IN THE RIO DE LA PLATA BASIN
1. The traditional rivalry between Argentina and
Brazil has again surfaced in a bitter dispute over plans
for the joint Brazilian-Paraguayan Itaipu hydroelectric
plant on the Parana River (Rio Parana), designed to have
the largest installed capacity in the world. Argentina
claims that the Itaipu facility, planned without prior
consultation with her, will preclude optimum development
of the hydroelectric potential further downstream and will
have adverse effects on the environment. She has raised
the issue of her rights to prior consultation in the United
Nations and other international forums. Although the
arguments are couched in terms of legal principles and
environmental impact, the real controversy is rooted in
conflicting economic and political interests.
2. Itaipu is one of several joint hydroelectric
projects being undertaken in the Plata Basin under binational
agreements. Although permissible under the Treaty of the
Rio de la Plata Basin (1969), these binational agreements
tend to frustrate the stated goal of the treaty to facilitate
integrated economic development of the Basin -- including
development of its enormous hydroelectric potential.
Note -- This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Basic
and Geographic Intelligence and coordinated within the
Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and questions may
be directed to
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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Key Economic Region
3. The Rio de la Plata Basin of southern South
America includes a high proportion of the continent's
industrial capacity and prime agricultural land, along
with its two largest urban areas (Map A). The economic
activities within the Basin account for more than half of
the aggregate income of the South American nations.
4. The Basin covers one-sixth of the continent,
encompassing all of Paraguay and large parts of Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia; and its rivers link the five
nations. Navigation is now limited by natural obstacles
and seasonal fluctuations in water level, but when further
developed, the river network will provide an important com-
munications system, fostering both intraregional and inter-
regional trade (Map B).
5. The population of the Basin is concentrated
on its eastern and southern fringes, with the densest zones
of settlement centering on Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires--the
largest metropolitan areas. Together with Montevideo,
these cities account for 30 percent of the Basin's total
population. The sparsely settled areas, in general, lie
west of the Parana River, particularly in the Chaco of
Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia, and in the Brazilian state
of Mato Grosso.
6. The natural resource base is broad but not well
diversified. Although a relatively small percentage of
the arable land is presently under cultivation, agriculture
is a significant part of the economy, with coffee, corn,
cotton, rice, soybeans, sugar, and wheat all in important
roles. Forestry is a major income earner in Brazil and
Paraguay and has a good potential for further development.
7. Industry in the Basin is presently highly
concentrated in the state of Sao Paulo, Brazil, and in the
province of Buenos Aires, Argentina. The industrial base
is large and relatively sophisticated, ranging from steel
and chemicals to a wide variety of finished consumer goods.
Mineral and fuel resources are of more than passing significance
but are unevenly distributed within the Basin. Brazil has
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Map B
BRASILIA
achoeira Dourada
liha Solteira
Darn
Sa do Urubupunga
Jupia Dam
Rio
undo
ASUNCION
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illio
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ATLANTIC
OCEAN
MONTEVIDE9 Rio de la Plata Basin
NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS
70
502205 4-74
60 L., ASS Tv CPR ES
A
Rio de
Janeiro
30
Continuous Seasonal
Navigable by oceangoing vessels =-==
(more than 10ft. draft)
Navigable by medium draft vessels = ==
(8-10 ft. draft)
Seasonally navigable by shallow draft
vessels (less than 8ft. draft)
==== Seasonally navigable by small river
boats, barges, rafts, etc.
/52?811" Area of shoals, rapids, or narrows
0 100 200 300 400 Miles
0 100 20,0 300 400 Kilometers
510
40--
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substantial deposits of iron ore, manganese, and bauxite;
and Bolivia possesses significant petroleum, natural gas,
and iron ore reserves. Bolivia's petroleum is exported
to both Paraguay and Argentina, and a natural gas pipeline
to Argentina has been in operation since early 1972. An
agreement is being worked out with Brazil to exchange nat-
ural gas for assistance in developing an industrial complex
in southeastern Bolivia.
8. One of the most important assets of the Plata
Basin is its great potential for hydroelectric power in
an otherwise energy-poor region. Proximity of the Basin's
hydroelectric resources to the heavily populated industrial
areas on its eastern fringes is a major factor in their
development (Maps C and D). For at least the next decade
water power will play the key role in the development of
energy in the Basin.
The Treaty of the Rio de la Plata Basin
9. The need for intraregional cooperation and
development of the Rio de la Plata Basin has long been
recognized. As early as 1898, at the Inter-American
Conference in Mexico City, plans for utilization of the
region's natural resources were being formulated. In 1941,
representatives of the five Basin countries met in Montevideo
to hammer out joint resolutions and to plan regional pro-
jects, but few of these efforts led to concrete results.
Not until 1966 did the possibility of serious efforts towards
cooperation for regional development begin to look promising,
when the foreign ministers of the Plata Basin Countries
met in Buenos Aires and agreed to establish an Intergovern-
mental Coordinating Committee. The Committee was set in
permanent session in Buenos Aires under the chairmanship
of the Argentine foreign minister and with the participation
of the ambassadors of the other member states.
10. Five conferences of the foreign ministers of
the Plata Basin Countries have been held since establishment
of the Intergovernmental Coordinating Committee. At the
third and most fruitful, in Brasilia in April 1969, the
foreign ministers signed the Treaty of the Rio de la Plata
Basin and continued the work of the previous two meetings
in reviewing the efforts of the Intergovernmental Coordinating
Committee and presenting new proposals for its action.
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Map D
BRASILIA
A
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VIDEO
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Rio de la Plata Basin
SELECTED POWER
TRANSMISSION LINES
50 BOUNDARY 1,SPREsENTA1ION IS
INOT NECESSARILY AU I HORITATIVE
o 190 200 300 400 Miles 40-
0 100 200 300 400 Kilometers
50
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11. The Treaty of the Rio de la Plata Basin, which
entered into force 14 August 1970, calls for cooperation
and integrated regional development among its signatories --
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. (See
Appendix 1 for a summary of the treaty articles.) The
Act of Brasilia, drawn up after the signing of the treaty,
lays out guidelines for future work of the Intergovernmental
Coordinating Committee and establishes principles to
safeguard national interests.
12. One of the main objectives of the Basin Treaty
is to increase regional commerce through the improvement
of transportation and communications facilities and the
provision of economical sources of energy, adequate markets,
and production centers. Its focus is on the creation of
an economic infrastructure sufficiently strong to permit
a greatly expanded flow of goods.
13. The treaty has, to some degree, facilitated
economic coordination efforts that previously were handled
only by ad hoc and bilateral arrangements. Of particular
importance, the treaty provides a mechanism through which
the five Basin countries can work jointly with international
aid givers interested in supporting regional projects.
The member countries are free, however, to conclude bilateral
or multilateral agreements for development projects outside
the treaty mechanism.
14. A number of projects were already underway
by the time of the Brasilia Conference. Studies had been
made by the Inter-American Development Bank for the con-
struction of Puerto Busch, Bolivia, a port on the Rio Paraguay,
and of railroads to link it with the existing network.
Hydrometeorological studies and an inventory and analysis
of basic information on natural resources in the Basin had
been carried out by the Organization of American States.
Various other projects involving fishing resources, naviga-
tion, and electric power grids were in the planning stage
and have subsequently been initiated.
The Hydroelectric Potential
15. The three main rivers and hundreds of tributaries
in the Plata Basin have a potential for hydroelectric power
development that is among the highest in the world. Although
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data are incomplete, its estimated potential of more than
60,000 megawatts is probably exceeded only by the Yangtze
basin (217,500 megawatts) and the Congo basin (more than
100,000 megawatts). If developed, this would be enough
power to meet the major part of increased electric power
demands of the Basin states for at least the next decade.
Less than five percent of the potential has yet been tapped,
mostly in Brazil (Maps C and D). Plans for energy production
through the 1980's call for the construction of a host of
national and joint hydroelectric projects as well as the
development of nuclear power. (See Appendix 2 for the
national programs.) These two energy sources will eventually
reduce the present heavy reliance on thermally generated
power.
16. Eighty-five percent of the total Plata Basin
hydroelectric potential is in the Parana sub-basin, located
mainly within Brazil. The Itaipu site on the Parana, below
the Guaira Falls (Salto del Guaira), is thought to have
the largest hydroelectric potential of any single site in
the world, and the output from the planned Itaipu plant
will nearly double Brazil's current production when com-
pleted.
17. Approximately 13 percent of the total Basin
potential is in the Paraguay sub-basin. This will probably
be difficult to realize, however, because of problems of
excessive silting and low gradients on the main river and
unregulated currents on some of its tributaries. Only 2
percent of the total potential falls within the Uruguay
sub-basin, wholly accounted for by the Uruguay and Negro
Rivers.
The Joint Projects
18. A rash of joint project agreements have been
concluded in the past few years as countries jockeyed for
position in the hydroelectric power scramble (Map E).
Paraguay has been in a particularly good position, with
both Argentina and Brazil vying for her cooperation. She
has concluded agreements with Brazil for construction of
the giant Itaipu facility and with Argentina for the
Yacyreta-Apipe project. Paraguay and Argentina have also
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authorized a feasibility study for a project to be located
along the Corpus sector of the Parana River, between the
Itaipu and Yacyreta-Apipe sites; and mention has been made
of still a third potential damsite at Itati, near the
confluence of the Parana and Paraguay Rivers. In addition,
planning is progressing on joint development projects on
the Uruguay River: bidding has been opened for construction
of the Argentine-Uruguayan Salto Grande Hydroelectric Plant,
and preliminary studies authorized by Argentina and Brazil
have revealed a potential damsite for joint development
near Garruchos. (See Appendix 3 for background data on each
of the joint projects.)
19. Of the several joint projects, only the plans
for Itaipu have been challenged. The present design calls
for a single high dam and a powerplant that will have an
installed generating capacity pf 10.710 mawatts--the
largest in the world (Figure ii lIt will operate
Figure 1. Artist's sketch of the planned Itaipu Hydroelectric Facility.
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Figure 2. The Parana Gorge, about 500 kilometers (300
miles) long, has a tremendous hydroelectric power potential.
as a base load plant and will generate approximately 56
billion kilowatt hours per year.* The site selected for
the dam, 165 kilometers (100 miles) downstream from the
A recent report Ind-icatee that the final feasibility study
wiii recommend increasing the capacity to 12,600 megawatts
by installing 18 turbogenerators of 700 megawatts each
rather than 14 of 7(-I megawatts.
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Guaira Falls, takes advantage of the hydraulic head available
from the waterfalls plus the additional hydraulic head that
exists within the gorge between the base of the falls and
Itaipu (Figures 2 and 3)1 Thus, at the damsite a gross
head of 120 meters (394 feet) can be realized in the drop
from the reservoir surface, at an elevation of 220 meters
(722 feet), to the tailrace below, at an elevation of 100
meters (328 feet). The fourteen turbogenerator units will
be larger than any previously built. It is unlikely that
any individual company will have the capability to produce
them; a consortium of manufactures will probably be needed.
Figure 3. Guaira Falls, at the head of the Parana Gorge,
will be obliterated by the Itaipu Reservoir.
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The Controversy
20. As plans for the Itaipu project progressed,
a dispute developed between Argentina and Brazil over the
use of rivers that flow in succession from one country to
another. According to the Argentine interpretation of
international law, Brazil and Paraguay are obligated to
consult with her before finalizing plans for Itaipu since,
she claims, the project will adversely affect Argentine
use of the river downstream. Brazil maintains that the
project will not affect Argentine use of the river adversely,
and that in any case there is no legal obligation for prior
consultation. She agrees, however, to provide information
about the project to Argentina and recognizes the principle
of a posteriori indemnity for damage done by one state to
the environment of another state. The controversy thus
involves legal and political issues as well as engineering
and environmental considerations.
Legal and Political Issues
21. Most riparian states would probably agree that,
ideally, hydroelectric development of international rivers
should be carried out only with the concurrence of all the
governments concerned; but legal rights in this regard are
not clearly defined. Hydroelectric projects vary widely
in their effects on rivers, and no single legal pattern
applies in every case. Even for such ancient uses of rivers
as irrigation and navigation, modern techniques have pro-
duced new legal problems for which precedents cannot be
found. The lack of legal precedents, combined with national
rivalries and jealousies within the Plata Basin, has set
the stage for protracted international disputes, running
contrary to the aim of regional cooperation embodied in
the Rio de la Plata Basin Treaty.
22. Much of the current bickering over use of the
Rio Parana can probably be traced to Argentina's fears of
being completely outstripped economically by Brazil, her
traditional rival for continental leadership. Argentina,
with a generally higher standard of living, may still be
ranked as the more advanced, but Brazil is narrowing the
gap. Brazil's rapid industrial expansion contrasts markedly
with the slow pace of the Argentine economy.
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23. The three smaller states of the Plata Basin --
Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia -- are perennial targets
for the competing influence of their two more powerful
neighbors. Even in colonial times Uruguay was a bone of
contention between Spain and Portugal; later it served as
a battleground for Argentina and Brazil. Its very existence
as an independent country was brought about largely by the
need for a buffer zone between the two big powers, and its
turbulent early history was molded by conflicting external
pressures. Recent decades have been comparatively calm.
Relations between Uruguay and Argentina have been improved
by amicable settlement in November 1973 of a longstanding
boundary dispute on the Rio de la Plata and by progress
in their joint development of the important Salto Grande
Hydroelectric Project on the Rio Uruguay. Uruguayan ties
with Brazil have been strengthened by sizable Brazilian
loans to help ease Uruguay's serious economic difficulties
and by improvement of highway facilities linking the two
countries.
24. Paraguay, situated in the heart of the Plata
Basin, has also served as a buffer betweenArgentina and
Brazil. In 1870, at the conclusion of the bloody War of
the Triple Alliance (Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay against
Paraguay) only the jealousy between the two big powers
saved Paraguay from complete obliteration. Both the larger
countries did, in fact, slice off broad tracts of Paraguayan
territory. (Argentina acquired all of present-day Missiones
Province.) Since that time Paraguayan policy has generally
been to avoid antagonizing Argentina or Brazil by veering
too far to one side or the other. Now, as Brazil's partner
in the construction of Itaipu and supporter of that country's
position regarding "prior consultation," Paraguay seems
to be shifting away from Argentina. Paraguay has, however,
also signed a treaty with Argentina for the construction of
a dam at the Yacyreta-Apipe site on the lower Parana and
has an interest in a similar project in the Corpus area.
To further strengthen relations, President Juan Peron of
Argentina has promised an official visit to Paraguay sometime
in 1974.
25. Bolivia is on the periphery of the Basin's
electric power development squabbles but has strong motives
for maintaining friendly relations with Argentina and Brazil.
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She is negotiating with both countries for the exploitation
of energy and mineral resources and for the development
of her vast eastern lowlands. Bolivia has had occasional
border disputes with Brazil, but relations between the two
countries improved with Brazilian agreement to aid in the
establishment of Puerto Busch, a Bolivian port on the
Paraguay River. Bolivian attitudes toward the use of
waterways are influenced by the fact that Bolivia herself
controls the upper reaches of a number of international
rivers.
26. As negotiations between Brazil and Paraguay
proceeded during the 1960's on joint development of the
hydroelectric potential of the Parana River in the Guaira
Falls sector, Argentina became increasingly concerned about
possible adverse downstream effects of the project. Several
sites were under consideration for the dam, ranging from
the Guaira Falls to the Itaipu rapids, located 165 kilometers
(100 miles) downstream and within 24 kilometers (15 miles)
of the Argentine border.
27. When Itaipu was finally selected as the damsite
in early 1972, Argentina expressed strong criticism of the
project, claiming that it might upset the ecological balance
and adversely affect agricultural production downstream.
She voiced her concern at the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm in June 1972,
and was successful in focusing international attention on
the planned power project. During the conference, the
Argentine delegation insisted that Brazil consult with
Argentina prior to construction; Brazil objected on the
grounds that compulsory prior consultation would be an in-
fringement of national sovereignty. The Argentine position
was supported by a large majority of the nations attending
the meetings, and an amendment was proposed to the Conference's
Declaration of Principles that reflected their views on
the requirements for "prior consultation." In order to
avoid an embarrassing confrontation, the Uruguayan delegation
successfully moved that the controversial amendment be
referred to the United Nations General Assembly for resolution.
28. Brazil and Argentina then launched intensive
diplomatic campaigns to gain support for their respective
positions before the issue was raised in the General Assembly.
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But again a compromise, the New York Agreement, was worked
out and a draft resolution composed which contained language
acceptable to both sides. The words "prior information"
were substituted for "prior consultation." The resolution,
2995 (XXVII), was accepted by the General Assembly on
15 December 1972, but its wording is still ambiguous, and
the New York Agreement has subsequently been denounced by
Argentina.
29. In addition to objecting to the Itaipu project,
Argentina protested to the chairman of the Intergovernmental
Coordinating Committee in March 1973 that Brazil had not
given prior information (as required by UN resolution 2995)
before closing the floodgates at the new Brazilian dam at
Ilha Solteira on the upper Parana. The Brazilians replied
that they had lived up to their obligations fully by announcing,
officially and publicly, the closing of the dam. This ex-
change pointed up the susceptibility of the UN resolution
to differing interpretations and reinforced Argentina desires
for more clear-cut international rules on "prior consultation."
30. President-elect Hector Campora of Argentina,
in April 1973, tried to obtain Paraguay's consent to a delay
in the signing of the Itaipu treaty with Brazil until after
his inauguration in May. Campora's appeal was not based
on environmental considerations but on the possible harmful
effect of Itaipu on future Argentine-Paraguayan dam projects
downstream. In spite of Argentine protests, accords for
construction of the Itaipu complex were signed on 26 April 1973.
31. Argentina next carried the issue of prior
consultation to the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, which passed an Argentine-proposed resolution on
27 December 1973 calling for consultations among neighboring
countries before any party exploits "common resources."
In Argentina this was considered a major diplomatic victory
over Brazil, directly related to the Itaipu controversy.
But Paraguay and Bolivia, as well as Brazil, voted against
the resolution, and Uruguay abstained. Therefore, Argentina,
while scoring a success of sorts in the world forum, is
still isolated at the regional level. Brazil can point
to the "Declaration of Asuncion," unanimously adopted at
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the Fourth Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Plata
Basin Countries in 1971: it provides that "in the case
of international rivers with successive courses and on which
there is no joint sovereignty, each state may exploit the
water in accordance with its needs and provided it causes
no important damage to another state in the basin."
32. The Sixth Conference of the Foreign Ministers
of the Plata Basin Countries, originally scheduled to be
held in Buenos Aires in December 1973, was postponed --
more or less by mutual consent and largely to avoid renewing
debate on the Itaipu issue. The conference is now
scheduled to take place in June 1974.
Engineering Considerations
33. Argentina contends that the Itaipu facility
will limit the generating capacity that can be developed
downstream, that it may adversely affect navigation, and
that it may cause flooding and catastrophic ecological im-
balances. In particular, she claims that the potential
head at the Corpus damsite will be reduced to such an extent
that construction of the proposed Argentine-Paraguayan
hydroelectric plant will no longer be economically feasible.
Argentina attributes the reduction in head to the Brazilian-
Paraguayan decisions to: 1) locate the plant at the Itaipu
site rather than farther upstream at the Guaira Falls,
and 2) to set the normal tailwater level* at 100 meters
(328 feet) rather than at 125 meters (410 feet) or higher.
34. Although Argentina apparently accepts the
decision on site location at Itaipu as irreversible, she
contends that, in the interest of optimum development of
a regional resource, the Itaipu normal tailwater level
should be raised to 125 meters This would permit
construction of a facility at corpus witn a reservoir
water level of 120 meters (394 feet), a gross head of 35
meters (115 feet), and an installed generating capacity of
*
The water surface elevation immediately downstream from
the powerhouse.
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5,000 megawatts. (Argentina would, of course, prefer to
have the reservoir level even higher, at 130 meters (427
feet), in order to attain the maximum generating capacity
for the plant.)
35. Argentina admits that raising the Itaipu tail-
water level from 100 meters to 125 meters will reduce the
Itaipu generating capacity by an estimated 16 percent.
(Other estimates range from 10 to 25 percent.) She suggests,
however, that this loss to Brazil and Paraguay can be re-
covered by them through allocation of an equivalent amount
of the power generated at Corpus. According to Argentine
figures the Corpus plant would still, after the allocation,
generate a net balance of about 25 billion kilowatt-hours
per year for Argentine and Paraguayan use, giving the region
at least 40 percent more power generation than if Itaipu
alone were built.
36. Brazil has not commented officially on the
Argentine proposals, although she has questioned the reli-
ability of the studies on which they were based. The
Brazilian press has held to the theme that there will be
sufficient head at Corpus to make construction of the
plant economically feasible and suggests that Argentina
is, in effect, battling for additional head that nature
did not grant her. It concludes that it is unreasonable
to expect Brazil to reduce the capacity of a power plant
already planned and scheduled in order to safeguard the
ideal capacity of a plant for which studies have yet to
be made. The Brazilians point out that the highest Corpus
reservoir level suggested by Argentina -- 130 meters --
would not only greatly reduce the Itaipu capacity but
would also back up the waters of the Acaray River (Rio
Acaray), reducing by about one half the power now being
generated by Paraguay's only hydroelectric plant.
37. From a strictly technical point of view the
Itaipu and Corpus projects do not appear incompatible. The
ouput of power at Itaipu would probably be reduced by about
15 percent if the normal tailwater level were raised to
125 meters. The effect of the higher tailwater level could
be partially offset, if desired, by raising the Itaipu
reservoir 5 to 7 meters (16 to 23 feet) higher than planned.
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Turbine efficiency would not be significantly affected by
the tailwater change since the turbines are designed for
operation at levels ranging from 92 to 138 meters (302 to
453 feet). (Present Itaipu plans call for a maximum normal
tailwater level of 125 meters and a maximum flood tai'vni
level of 138 meters.)
38. Construction of a reservoir at Corpus would
benefit the Itaipu plant in one very important respect by
obviating the need to maintain a minimum river flow down-
stream for navigation. Freed from this requirement, the
Itaipu plant would gain the operational flexibility to engage
in peaking operations*. This option would improve its
capability to respond to changing consumption demands and
would compensate, in large part, for the overall cut in
generating capacity.
Environmental Impact
39. Argentine warnings that construction of the
Itaipu project is likely to cause flooding and catastrophic
ecological imbalances appear to be greatly exaggerated.
On balance, the project is likely to improve the character-
istics of the river downstream.
Flooding
40. In designing the Itaipu complex the flooding
characteristics of the river were given careful consideration.
The spillway was designed to pass the probable maximum floods
with safety, and provision was made for a flood surcharge
capacity in the reservoir and for floodworks to protect
the turbogenerators from a rise in tailwater level at flood
stage. The flow of water that will be passed downstream
will certainly not exceed the normal flow of the river at
flood stage, and it is expected to be less because of the
smoothing effect of the reservoir.
In peaking operations, the turbines are operated only
during peak load hours. By allowing the pool to build up
to a daily maximum, a "maximum" head is available for the
few hours of peak load operation. As presently planned,
Itaipu will operate only as a base load plant.
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41. The construction of the dam at the Itaipu
site will, however, affect the backup of water in the
Parana when its tributary, the Iguacu River (Rio Iguacu),
floods. Fortunately, flooding in the Iguacu sub-basin
normally occurs when the Parana River is low. Never-
theless, when the Iguacu flood crest enters the constricted
Parana Valley, it backs up on the main river well beyond
the Itaipu site to Porto Mendes. The Itaipu Dam will
block this normal backup, causing the river to rise higher
than normal below the dam. Although hydrologic gauging
data are unavailable for the Iguacu River mouth, an
analysis of data available for other stations* indicates
that rise in water level stemming from Iguacu backwater
should not bring the main river to flood stage unless
an abnormal flood occurs on the Iguacu.
42. From the mouth of the Iguacu downstream nearly
to Posadas, Argentina, the Parana flows through a gorge,
and at flood stage its waters are confined and cause little
damage. Downstream from Posadas the valley broadens, and
flooding of low areas occurs locally during higher than
normal flood peaks. Considerable flood damage has occurred
only when peak flows have exceeded 25,000 cubic meters per
second; and flood crests on the Iguacu River would be most
unlikely to increase the main river flow to this extent.
43. Argentina's claims that the Itaipu project
will cause downstream flooding appear unfounded, but the
Corpus reservoir proposed by Argentina would, on the other
hand, inundate considerable land in Paraguay and some in
Brazil if filled to the maximum proposed elevation of 130
meters. The acreage inundated will be considerably less,
however, if the lower level of 120 meters is agreed upon**.
Gauging stations on the Parana River at Guaira and
Posadas, and on the Iguacu River at Salto Osorio.
**
Accurate, large-scale topographic maps are not
available from which to compute the exact amount of
land that would be inundated at either of the specified
reservoir levels.
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44. The Itaipu reservoir will completely submerge
the scenic Guaira Falls, and the Corpus reservoir will cover
the lower part of the famed Iguacu Falls (Saltos do Iguacu).
At a reservoir elevation of 120 meters, the average drop
of the Iguacu Falls will be reduced from 72 meters (236
feet) to 60 meters (197 feet); and at a reservoir elevation
of 130 meters, it will be further reduced to 50 meters
(164 feet).
Water Quality
45. Argentina has voiced fears that the Itaipu
project will adversely affect the quality of water down-
stream as well as the quantity. In particular, she has
indicated that the potability, salinity, and sediment
content may be altered unfavorably.
46. The riparian population downriver from Itaipu
is sparse along the Brazil-Paraguayan sector and gradually
increases in density along the Argentine-Paraguayan sector.
The first large centers are Posadas, Argentina, and
Encarnacion, Paraguay. Most of the small settlements are
situated on high banks and depend upon groundwater or rain-
fall for potable water. The costs of river intakes, piping,
and water treatment have appeared excessive relative to
consumption needs, and only Posadas and Encarnacion draw
water directly from the river. None of the towns along
the river, not even Posadas and Encarnacion, have sewage
treatment facilities. The river water is not presently
suitable for consumption without treatment, and in the
Posadas area the bacterial contamination is too high for
safe swimming or water skiing.
47. Obviously, the danger of pollution will increase
if large numbers of people are attracted to the region by
the planned development projects. Environmental impact
studies were made as part of the overall feasibility studies
for both the Itaipu and Yacyreta-Apipe projects, and it
is generally agreed that sewage treatment facilities will
be required as part of any development along the reservoir
shores. Since Brazil and Paraguay are considering estab-
lishing the Itaipu reservoir area as an international park --
with boating, fishing, and swimming activities as well as
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wildlife and forestry reserves -- it would not serve their
interests to disregard pollution controls. Argentina and
Paraguay also plan recreational use of the Yacyreta-Apipe
reservoir. The one industry mentioned in the Itaipu develop-
ment plans that may cause pollution problems, if approved,
is a wood pulp factory to be located near the dam on the
Paraguayan side.
48. Since irrigation is of very minor importance
in the Itaipu development plan, the flushing of salts from
irrigated land will not affect the salinity of the river
downstream. As a conservative estimate, less than
0.2 percent of the average river flow at the Itaipu site
will be used for irrigation. The acreage planned for
irrigation in Argentina and Paraguay in conjunction with
the Yacyreta-Apipe project is much more extensive than at
Itaipu, yet its likely effect upon salinity is considered
negligible by Argentina.
49. Finally, the impact of Itaipu on river sediment
downstream is expected to be insignificant. Within the
Plata River system, the Paraguay River contributes 94 percent
of the 100 million tons of silt entering the Plata Estuary
annually. Only a small amount enters from the upper Parana
River, and the minute reduction in silt content (and nutrient
materials) will have negligible impact on the estuarine
fisheries.
Effects on Navigation
50. Argentina has been particularly concerned that
the Itaipu facility will alter the river flow in such a
way as to restrict navigation along the middle and lower
reaches of the river, either by decreasing the water depth
or by increasing the deposition of silt--both of which would
reduce the draft limit for navigation. A wave effect from
peaking operations might also hamper navigation -- partic-
ularly in areas of rapids along the middle reaches.
51. The Itaipu facility will not cause a reduction
in flow; in fact, the minimum flow in the low-water period
will be increased. The Itaipu plant is planned for base
load operation, and the continuous release of water will
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exceed the minimum requirements for navigation downstream.
During the initial filling of the reservoir and during
periods of power plant shutdowns, the required minimum
flow will be assured by eight sluices near the base of the
dam. Existing Brazilian reservoirs have raised the minimum
monthly flow at Posadas from 3,134 to 5,293 cubic meters
per second, and the Itaipu dam and reservoir are expected
to further raise the minimum flow to 6,230. The pattern
of silt deposition may be changed somewhat along the river
course, but the overall silt load carried by the river will
be reduced, and the amount of silt deposition in the estu-
ary and in the Buenos Aires harbor will not be altered
appreciably.
52. Since Itaipu is not planned as a peak load
plant, fears that peaking operations will create a wave
effect downstream affecting navigation appear unfounded.
Peaking operations may become feasible eventually, however,
if the Corpus Dam is constructed. In that event, the
Corpus Reservoir will dampen out any waves generated by
peaking; the Corpus Dam, in turn, will regulate flow down-
stream into the Yacyreta-Apipe Reservoir; and the latter
will completely submerge the Apipe Rapids (Rapido de Apipe)
improving conditions for navigation.
Disease
53. Argentina has also indicated concern regarding
the likely effect of the Itaipu reservoir upon the spread
of waterborne diseases to the area. The creation of a lake
provides new breeding grounds for the vectors or alternate
hosts of diseases such as schistosomiasis, malaria, yellow
fever, river blindness (onchocerciasis), and filariasis.
54. Schistosomiasis is of particular concern.
It is not now endemic within the area, but the species of
snail that act as hosts to the Schistosoma blood fluke
larva are present. The creation of the reservoir could
lead to a marked increase in the snail population; and an
influx of infected humans from endemic areas could introduce
the blood fluke into the reservoir via untreated sewage.
Once infected, it is extremely difficult to remove the
snails or disinfect a reservoir. Since an endemic focus
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has already become established about 400 kilometers (250
miles) from the site in Parana State, Brazil, the danger
of infecting this area is real. Project planners are
aware of the problem and have indicated that careful,
pre-employment health screening must be carried out for
construction workers on the project.
55. The other diseases of concern are spread by
mosquitoes or flies. Although the creation of a reservoir
will multiply the breeding sites for these insects, open
water is a less satisfactory breeding habitat than marsh-
land, since surface-feeding fish consume the insect larva.
Malaria is endemic to the Itaipu area, but planners believe
that the aquatic stage of the mosquito can be controlled
by maintaining a balance of surface-feeding fish in the
reservoir. Yellow fever is not known to be endemic to the
area, but should it become established, the disease is
preventable by a single vaccination every ten years.
Filariasis is rare within the area; however, the species
of mosquito and black fly that act as vectors are all
present, and the disease is reported in Ponta Grossa,
Brazil, about 440 kilometers (275 miles) away. River
blindness does not occur in the Parana Basin but has es-
tablished itself in Mexico and Guatemala, and unconfirmed
cases have been reported in Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Surinam. The black fly insect vector for the disease is
abundant in the Itaipu area and, since it breeds in the
water, particularly on submerged tree trunks, is likely
to increase in number with construction of the reservoir.
However, the spread of these diseases to various parts of
the Basin is likely with or without construction of the
Itaipu reservoir. Extensive areas of marshland, natural
breeding habitats for the disease vectors, occur within
the Basin, and many other reservoirs have already been
constructed.
Fishing
56. Argentine warnings of potential damage from
Itaipu include adverse effects on both river and estuarine
fishing that would allegedly stem from a reduction in river
flow, a change in river sediment content, a change in
salinity, and interference in the movement of migratory
fish to spawning areas upriver. As indicated above, the
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planned operation of the Itaipu power plant will not
reduce river flow downstream and will have a negligible
effect on the silt content and salinity of the river
downstream. The movement of migratory fish upstream
has always been blocked by the Guaira Falls, and the
Parana River below the falls to the mouth of the Paraguay
River is not a significant spawning area for estuarine
fish and does not include any commercial fishing areas.
Construction of the Itaipu Dam will therefore not alter
the situation appreciably.
57. A marked change can be expected in the fish
population in the Itaipu Reservoir itself. This phenomenon
is common to all reservoirs in the region and can be
anticipated in the Yacyreta-Apipe and Corpus Reservoirs
as well. Turbulent waters rich in oxygen will be replaced
by deep, quiet waters with lowered oxygen content. The
water will no longer be a suitable habitat for swift-water
species such as the dourado, and the ecological balance
will be tipped in favor of quiet-water, bottom-feeding
species such as carp and piranha. The latter, which
inhabit the quiet waters along the margins of natural
rivers, are normally held in check by their natural enemy,
the dourado. In a reservoir, however, the piranha popula-
tion frequently explodes -- unchecked by natural enemies.
It is hoped that, with careful planning, the overall fish
population can be increased in a balanced manner as the
Itaipu reservoir is filled and becomes stabilized. In the
meantime, Brazilian officials are seeking new methods for
selective control of the piranha.
Climate
58. Although the establishment of any reservoir
will change the microclimate of the immediate area, there
appears to be no basis for vague Argentine warnings that
Itaipu can cause both uncontrollable rains and tremendous
droughts.
Earthquakes
59. The possibility of earthquakes' being generated
by the giant Itaipu complex has also been suggested.
Occasional earthquakes do occur as a consequence of tectonic
readjustment of the earth's crust under the increased weight
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of a dam and reservoir. Geologic studies of the Itaipu
area, however, indicate that the conditions conducive to
this type of earthquake do not exist. The geologic
structure of the reservoir area is uniform, and there
is no evidence of major regional faulting.
Conclusions
60. Argentine claims that the construction of
the Itaipu project will cause flooding and catastrophic
ecological imbalances downstream appear unfounded.
Certainly the dire predictions apply equally to the
Yacyreta-Apipe and Corpus projects that Argentina approves.
The Argentine position appears to be based on economic
and political rather than purely environmental considerations.
Her position that the Parana can be more effectively de-
veloped through joint planning, with greater economic
benefits for the region as a whole, is certainly valid in
theory. It appears that it is technically feasible to
make the Itaipu and Corpus projects compatible. However,
for design changes to be acceptable to Brazil, the trade-
off of less power generation at Itaipu for increased power
generation at Corpus presumably must include a compensatory
transfer of part of the power generated at Corpus to the
Itaipu binational company.
61. Although Brazil and Paraguay may be willing
to consult with Argentina on an ad hoc basis, it is unlikely
that they will accept Argentina's view on "prior consultation"
and include her in the Itaipu decision-making process.
The prospects are for a continuation of project planning
and execution on an essentially binational basis, but per-
haps with some agreement tying acceptable modifications
in Itaipu design to allocation of part of Corpus output
to the Itaipu system. If a compromise agreement is not
reached, Argentina and Paraguay may opt for another -- but
less desirable -- damsite in place of Corpus for their
second joint hydroelectric project. Garupa, about 65
kilometers (40 miles) downstream from Corpus, has been
mentioned in the press as a possible alternative.
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Appendix A
Treaty of the Rio de la Plata Basin (Summary)
1. The first article is an agreement by the five
contracting parties to pool their efforts to promote the
development and physical integration of the Plata Basin
by rational use of water resources; conservation of plants
and animals; improvement of transportation, telecommunications,
and electric power facilities; cooperation in matters of
education, health, and disease control; and other projects
of common interest.
2. The second article stipulates that the foreign
ministers will meet once a year to set policy guidelines
and to adopt measures necessary for the implementation
of the treaty. All decisions made at the meetings require
the unanimous vote of the five countries.
3. The third article recognizes the Intergovern-
mental Coordinating Committee as the permanent body responsible
for promoting, coordinating, and following the progress
of the programs and of carrying out the decisions of the
foreign ministers. The Intergovernmental Coordinating
Committee is overned by bylaws approved in 1968. These
may be amended only by a unanimous vote of the foreign
ministers.
4. The fourth article states that national
commissions set up pursuant to the Joint Declaration of
Buenos Aires (1967) shall serve as advisory bodies of
the governments and may establish bilateral contracts
subject to the policies and practices of the countries
concerned.
5. The fifth article specifies that collective
action undertaken by the contracting parties shall be
initiated without prejudice to national projects and
undertakings they decide to carry out in their respective
territories that are consistent with respect for inter-
national law and in accordance with good practices among
neighboring friendly nations.
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6. The sixth article declares that nothing in the
treaty shall prevent the contracting parties from concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements on developing the Basin.
7. The seventh article states that the treaty shall
be called the Tratado de la Cuenca del Plata and that it
shall be of unlimited duration.
8. The eighth article indicates the effective date
of the treaty and stipulates the proceedings for denouncing
the treaty, noting that one year after denouncement proceedings
have been completed the treaty will cease to have effect for
the denouncing party.
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Appendix B
The National Programs
Argentina
1. Electric power in Argentina is administered
by the Secretary of Energy through Aqua y Energia Electrica
(AyEE), an autonomous state company created in 1947. AyEE
is responsible for the development of hydroelectric re-
sources, flood control, and the unification of the ten
regional power grids. Also, AyEE, in conjunction with four
electric power producing and distributing entities, operates
approximately 95 percent of the country's power system.
2. Although Argentina's hydroelectric potential
is estimated at 10 million kilowatts, hydroelectricity
accounts for less than 2 percent of installed power.
Remoteness of water resources from areas of consumption,
loss of electricity in transmission over long distances,
the expense of constructing high-voltage lines, and
seasonal fluctuations in stream flow have inhibited the
development of water resources. However, increasing
demand and a desire to conserve petroleum reserves will
direct Argentina's future electric power development
toward hydroelectricity, supplemented by nuclear plants:
tentative plans call for hydroelectric and nuclear
power to meet 30 percent and 15 percent, respectively,
of the national energy needs by 1980.
3. Most of Argentina's present hydroelectric
plants are outside the Rio de la Plata Basin in the
provinces of Mendoza, Rio Negro, and Cordoba. Presently
under construction within the Basin, near Salta, is the
120-megawatt Cabra Corral facility, which should begin
operation in 1974. Its primary purpose is not electric
power generation, however, but irrigation and flood
control. In conjunction with the present 13.2-megawatt
plant at Corrallito, it will supply Salta and San Miguel
de Tucuman. Construction of a 200-megawatt, low-velocity
plant is tentatively planned at Cayasta, on the Parana
River.
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4. The major emphasis of Argentine hydroelectric
development planning is on joint projects on the Parana
and Uruguay Rivers. The Yacyreta-Apipe plant has been
approved for joint construction with Paraguay, and plants
have been proposed with Paraguay at Corpus and Itati. A
plant is now under construction with Uruguay at Salto
Grande, and a feasibility study is underway with Brazil
for development of a segment of the Uruguay River.
5. The 319-megawatt Atucha nuclear plant near
Buenos Aires, South America's first nuclear facility, came
into operation in early 1974. A 600-megawatt nuclear plant
is planned as a backup facility for three hydroelectric
plants on the Rio Tercero.
Bolivia
6. Electric Power in Bolivia is regulated by the
Direccion Nacional de Electricidad (DINE). Two companies
produce electricity -- the Bolivian Electric Energy Company,
a Canadian-owned company; and the Empressa Nacional de
Electricidad (ENDE), a semi-autonomous state company. The
Bolivian Electric Energy Company supplies the cities of
La Paz and Oruru and the northern group of tin mines, and
ENDE supplies all other areas.
7. Bolivian power is 85 percent hydroelectric.
Most of the hydroelectric facilities are located outside
the Plata Basin in the mountains surrounding La Paz and
Cochabamba. Within the Basin are two areas of hydro-
electric development -- a complex of seven small plants
that supplies the Sucre-Potosi region with approximately
40 percent of its needs, and two plants on the Rio Tarija
that generate more than 70 percent of the power consumed
in Tarija. Although the total hydroelectric potential for
the country is estimated to be as high as 7,000 megawatts,
present plans for development within the Basin are modest.
Brazil
8. The Brazilian electric power program is admin-
istered by an autonomous corporation, Centrais Electricas
Brasileiras, S.A. (ELECTROBRAS). It is responsible for
programming and coordinating development activities among
the various state, municipal, and private electric power
companies, as well as its own subsidiaries.
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9. Brazil's hydroelectric potential, the
largest in South America, is estimated at 150,000
megawatts. More than a third is within the Plata
Basin, about 45 percent within the Amazon basin, and
the rest in the Northeast and along the coast. Only
10 percent of the total potential has been developed,
mostly on tributaries of the Parana River. As the
hydroelectric potential close to consumption centers
has been utilized, the country has turned to sites on
the Parana River itself.
10. The largest hydroelectric facility in
Brazil, with an installed capacity of 1,400 megawatts,
is at Jupia, on the Parana. The Jupia plant and the
new Ilha Solteira facility, 65 kilometers (40 miles)
upstream, form the $1-billion Urubupunga complex, which
will have a total capacity of 4,600 megawatts when fully
operating by 1978. This complex will guarantee electric
power to the heavily populated and booming industrial
region of the Southeast until the giant Itaipu complex
is completed. Other projects planned on the Parana
River include Porto Primavera and Ilha Grande, with a
combined capacity of 4,600 megawatts. Large plants on
tributaries of the Parana include Sao Simao, Itumbiari,
Marimbondo, and Furnas, each with a present or planned
capacity of more than 1,000 megawatts.
11. Demand for electricity in Brazil is growing
at an annual rate of 11 percent. To meet the projected
needs through the end of this decade, the country will
continue to rely heavily on hydroelectric resources with-
in the Plata Basin; present plans do not call for
large-scale development of the hydroelectric potential
of the Amazon Basin. Nuclear power will play an increasing
role in the national energy program, since by 1990 most
of the hydroelectric potential in the Southeast will have
been fully utilized.
Paraguay
12. Electric power production in Paraguay is
under the control of the government-owned Administra-
tion Nacional de Electricidad (ANDE).
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13. Paraguay's hydroelectric potential, estimated
at 2,200 megawatts, accounts for virtually all its energy
resources. The country's energy requirements are modest,
and for many years thermally generated electricity supplied
the bulk of its needs. ince late 1968, however, most
power needs have been met by the Rio Acaray Hydroelectric
Plant. The present 90-megawatt capacity of this project
is scheduled to be doubled by 1976, and a planned water
control dam upstream will raise total hydroelectric capacity
to 240 megawatts. In its initial phase, the Acaray plant's
main purpose was to replace the Asuncion thermal unit and
to supply electric power to 43 interior towns, of which
31 had been electrified as of September 1972. In phase two,
the facility is providing badly needed foreign exchange
through the sale of power to Argentina and Brazil.
14. Paraguay's joint projects -- Itaipu with
Brazil, Yacyreta-Apipe with Argentina, and possibly Corpus
and Itati with Argentina -- constitute the major thrust
of national development efforts, and the export of electric
power should become an important future source of foreign
exchange.
Uruguay
15. Electric power production and distribution
in Uruguay is administered by the Administracion General
de las Usinas Electricas y los Telefonos (UTE), which is
responsible for coordinating both national and joint hydro-
electric projects. Although the country's hydroelectric
resources are large relative to other energy sources,
hydroelectricity accounts for less than 50 percent of the
total installed capacity. UTE's largest power installations
are two hydroelectric plants on the Rio Negro: the 128-
megawatt Rincon del Bonete station and, a few miles
downstream, the 108-megawatt Rincon del Baygorria station.
The reservoir behind the Bonete plant, called the Embalse
del Rio Negro, is the largest manmade lake in South America.
The national power grid, whose main function is to carry
power from the Bonete and Baygorria plants to Montevideo,
encompasses only the southwest quarter of the country but
interconnects 90 percent of the installed capacity.
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16. A new government authority, Comision Mixta
de Palmar (COMPAQ, was established in mid-1973 to
coordinate planning and construction of a third Rio Negro
plant at Palmar. Completion of the 400-megawatt project
is planned for 1977 and will help ease the energy deficit
which Uruguayan officials say will peak about then.
Uruguay's largest undertaking will be the Salto Grande
project, being developed jointly with Argentina. When
completed, this hydroelectric plant on the Uruguay River
will supply 1,620 megawatts to both countries.
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Appendix C
Binational Projects
A. Itaipu
1. The signing of accords by Presidents Medici
of Brazil and Stroessner of Paraguay on 26 April 1973,
followed by Congressional ratification in each country,
formalized plans to construct a joint hydroelectric
facility on the Parana River at Itaipu. A binational
company, "Itaipu," was created to carry out the design
and construction of the project. The company is comprised
of Centrais Electricas Brasileiras, S.A. (ELETROBRAS)
and the Administracion Nacional de Electricidad CANOE),
the respective Brazilian and Paraguayan government-owned
power companies.
2. If constructed as initially planned, the
Itaipu plant will have the largest generating capacity
of any hydroelectric plant in the world -- 10,710 megawatts
to be generated by 14 turbogenerator units. Each country
will own 50 percent of the power output, and Brazil will
have preference in the purchase of that part of Paraguay's
share allocated for export. Since Paraguay's anticipated
domestic requirements are minimal, Brazil will have prac-
tically the entire output at its disposal to meet the
rapidly increasing energy requirements of the Sao Paulo
industrial region and the southern states. Although a
firm schedule has not been established, present plans call
for initial output in about 1982.
3. The site for the dam is in the rocky gorge
of the middle Parana River (Figure 2). When the reservoir
is eventually filled, its waters will extend 165 kilometers
(100 miles) upstream, completely covering the spectacular
Guaira Falls (Figure 3). Justification for the project
is based almost entirely on the generation of low-cost
electrical energy, although there will be other uses of
secondary importance. Operating as a base load plant,
Itaipu will generate approximately 56 billion kilowatt
hours per year.
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4. One unresolved problem stems from the fact
that Brazil uses 60-cycle current, whereas Paraguay uses
50-cycle. Paraguay reportedly has asked that its half of
Itaipu energy output be 50-cycle to be compatible with its
internal system. Designing the turbogenerators to operate
at two different speeds in order to produce electricity
at either 50 or 60 cycles will increase the cost of the
equipment and reduce the operating efficiency somewhat.
Brazil would prefer that Paraguay convert to 60 cycles
and has reportedly offered to pay for the conversion.
An unconfirmed report received in mid-March, 1974 states
that agreement has been reached for installation of static
conversion equipment on one turbogenerator unit.
5. The facility was not designed for flood
control since the constricted valley lacks the space
necessary for any massive storage of floodwaters; but
operation of the dam will even out the annual flow
somewhat by reducing the peak flow at flood stage and
increasing minimum flow during the dry season. Assuming
that operation of the Itaipu facility will be integrated
with operation of other major facilities located upstream,
the cumulative effect should be an appreciable lowering
of flood crests downstream from Itaipu.
6. The design for the Itaipu dam incorporates
features that will enable later installation of a lock
and canal system enabling vessels to move between the
middle and upper reaches of the river. Navigation is
now blocked by the Guaira Falls and associated rapids.
The dam will also afford some immediate benefits to
navigation along the middle reaches now partially
obstructed by rapids and narrows, especially at low
water level. The anticipated increase in minimum river
flow will extend the period of navigation for shallow-
draft vessels.
7. Although irrigation has not figured as an
important design consideration, an abundance of water
and low-cost power for pumping will be available. Only
about 99,000 acres of land in the project area are con-
sidered suitable for irrigation farming. Normal rainfall
in the area is generally adequate for agricultural needs,
and irrigation water is needed only to supplement rains
in water-deficient months.
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8. Plans call for developing the reservoir's
potential for both commercial fishing and sport fishing.
Establishment of an international park is also being
considered. The park would include both the reservoir
and its surroundings, and zoning regulations would be
established to ensure balanced development for recreational
and non-recreational uses.
B. Yacyreta-Apipe
9. A treaty providing for a joint Argentine-
Paraguayan hydroelectric project at the islands of
Yacyreta and Apipe on the Parana River was signed on
3 December 1973 and later ratified by both countries.
A binational agency, consisting of the state power
companies of both countries, will build the hydroelectric
power facilities and improve river navigability within
the project area. The power plant, scheduled to begin
operation by 1981, will have an installed capacity of
4,050 megawatts rom 30 turbogenerators and a guaranteed
capacity of 3,391 megawatts at load centers. The
average annual output to load centers will be about
17 billion kilowatt-hours, to be divided equally between
the two countries with each having preferential rights
for purchase of energy not required by the other for
domestic consumption. In practice, Paraguay will sell
most of its share to Argentina.
10. The site for the main dam is about 130
kilometers (80 miles) downstream from the gorge of the
middle Parana near the Apipe rapids -- a major obstacle
to navigation in this sector. Here the river meanders
through a broad valley among low islands via a network
of interconnecting channels. Considerable diking will
be required on the Paraguayan side of the reservoir to
avoid inundating valuable land. A re-regulating dam,
to be constructed about 90 kilometers (55 miles) farther
downstream at Ita-Ibate, will ensure that power plant
operation does not impede navigation. Since the main
reservoir will be used for daily pondage only, peaking
operations at the power plant will cause daily fluc-
tuations in turbine discharge. The re-regulating
reservoir will even out fluctuations in water level and
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velocity and maintain the minimum flow required downstream
for safe navigation. Hazards to navigation between Ita-
Ibate and Corpus will be eliminated, and both dams will
have locks usable by vessels with a 12-foot draft. Provisions
are made for future expansion of locks when justified by
increasing river traffic.
11. The project will have negligible value for
flood control because of the small volume of the main
reservoir. Provision can be made, however, to divert
flood crests from the reservoir to the extensive Ibera
Swamps on adjacent Argentine territory, which would then
serve as a temporary ponding area until the waters drain
into the Corrientes River (Rio Corrientes).
12. Irrigation intake structures will be incor-
porated in the main dam to facilitate future diversion
of water to potentially arable land in both countries.
Proposed development would entail drainage and irrigation
by gravity of up to 200,000 net acres of land in Paraguay
and about 15,000 net acres in Argentina.
13. Fish ladders and passing facilities will
be provided at the main dam and the re-regulating dam,
and the main reservoir will serve as the basis for developing
a large fishing industry with potential yields on the order
of 8,000 metric tons per year. The fish-passing facilities
are designed to control undesirable species, such as piranha
and carp, moving upstream. Sport fishing will be a tourist
attraction. Of particular interest will be the opportunities
for dourado fishing in the swift water of the tailrace.
14. Although water sports facilities are planned,
the quality of the Parana is presently below standards
suitable for swimming, and sewage treatment facilities will
be required for towns around the reservoir. In the meantime,
techniques such as zone chlorination can be used to provide
safe aquatic recreation conditions.
15. Provision has been made for construction of a
highway across the main dam and its lateral dikes. It
will connect Argentina Route 12 with Paraguay Route 1.
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C. Corpus
16. Much publicity has attended Argentinian
claims that construction of the Itaipu Dam will jeopardize
their plans for a dam on the Parana River at Corpus.
It was not until 13 September 1973, however, after years
of talk and little action, that the Paraguayan-Argentine
Joint Commission for the Parana River agreed to call for
bids for a feasibility study.
17. Although only sketchy preliminary studies
have been made, figures have been released indicating
the general characteristics of the proposed facility.
The most frequently mentioned site for the dam is in the
gorge of the middle Parana in the vicinity of Pindoy
Island and the Corpus Rapids. Projections of the maximum
normal water level of the reservoir range from 100 to 130
meters (328 to 427 feet); if 120 meters (394 feet) is
accepted as a likely compromise, the reservoir will extend
upstream to the Itaipu Dam. In order to maintain maximum
head for hours of peak demand, the reservoir will be used
for daily pondage and will not store water for flood con-
trol purposes. It is anticipated that the power plant
will have an installed capacity of 5,000 megawatts and
an annual output of 35 billion kilowatt hours. Presumably
the dam will include navigation locks, and the reservoir
will be navigable to the Itaipu Dam.
18. Recently, another site has been mentioned
in the press as a viable alternative to Corpus should
Argentina fail to persuade Brazil and Paraguay to modify
the Itaipu design to be compatible with requirements for
the Corpus facility. The alternative site is near Garupa,
about 65 kilometers (40 miles) downstream from Corpus.
D. Itati
19. A third location on the Parana River, at
Itati, has been mentioned as a potential damsite for a
joint Argentine-Paraguayan project; however, no detailed
studies have as yet been made. The hydraulic head would
be low at this site, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) from
the confluence of the Parana with the Paraguay River.
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A hydroelectric plant would not have a large capacity,
and any project planned for the site would presumably
be multipurpose. In conjunction with dams at Yacyreta-Apipe,
Corpus, and Itaipu, a dam at this site would ensure year-
round navigation on the Parana River from the mouth of
the Rio de la Plata into south-central Brazil.
E. Salto Grande
20. A loan has been made by the Inter-American
Development Bank, and bidding has been opened for
construction of the joint Argentine-Uruguayan Salto
Grande Hydroelectric Plant. This project, located on
the Uruguay River about 11 miles upstream from Concordia,
Argentina, has been on the planning boards since 1946.
21. Plans call for installation of twelve
turbogenerators with a total installed capacity of 1,620
megawatts. The plant will be run-of-the-river type, and
during periods of low river flow energy will be generated
only at peak load hours of the day. It will supply power
to a 285,000 square-kilometer (110,000 square-mile) area
in northeast Argentina and Uruguay. The plans provide
for construction of a highway along the crest of the dam
and for construction of a lock on the Argentine side of
the river to handle river craft of nine-foot draft.
22. The Soviet Union has been awarded the
contract for the turbines for the project. It has been
estimated that the first power will be generated about
five years from the time that construction work is
initiated.
F. Argentine-Brazilian Uruguay River Project
23. In March 1972, an agreement was signed
between the state power companies of Brazil and Argentina
authorizing studies and surveys of the hydroelectric
potential of the Uruguay River and its tributary, the
Pepiri Guazu, along the international border. Preliminary
geological, hydraulic, and meteorological studies carried
out by a consortium of Argentine and Brazilian engineering
consultant firms indicate that the best site for a dam and
power plant is on the Uruguay River near Garruchos
(28?111S, 55?39'W). The potential capacity at this site
is estimated to be between 3,000 and 4,000 megawatts.
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Rio de la Plata Basin: Hydroelectric Plants
(Capacity greater than 10 mY . )
Capaci ty ( i n !T .
ER AZ IL
2?. Furnas
In
Under Planned and
30. Graminha
River
operation
construction potential
31 . Ibitinga
32. Icarapava
ARGENTINA
33. Iiha Grande
34. Ilha Solteira
1. Ca bra Corral
Pa saj9 o Juramen to
120
35. Itumbiara
2. Gaya s
Parana
200
39? Itupararanga
3. Corral i to
Corral i to
13.2
37. Itutifiga
4. Inn. Casa ffousth
Tercero
17.28
38. Jacui
5. Ing. Fitz Simon
Tercero
10.2
39. Jaguara
6. Inc. Reolin
Tercero
38.4
40. Jaguari
41. Jupid
ARGENTINA -PARAGUAY
42. Limoeiro
43. Lucas Garcez
7. Corpus
3. Itati
Parana'
Parana'
5,000
3,000
44. Mariimbondo
45. Vaua
9. Yacyreta-Apipe
Parana'
4,050
46. Miguel Stefano
47. Mimosa
ARGENTINA-URUGUAY
48. Nova PIonte
49. Parana
10. Salto Grande
Uruguay
1,620
50. Para napanema
51. Peixotos
ARGENTINA-BRAZIL
52. Passo Fundo
53 . Porto Colombia
11. Garruchos
Uruguay
3-4,000
54. POrto n6is
55. POrto Primavera
ERAZ IL
56. Promissao
57. RasgA
12. Aqua Vermel ha
Grande
900
480
58. Salto Grande
13. Alvaro de S. Lima
Ti ete
124
59. Salto Santiago
14. Americana
Ati ba i a
30
60. Sao Simib
15. Armando A. Laydner
Paranapanema
85
61. Volta Grande
16. Armando S. Oliveira
Pardo
28
17. Avanhanda va
Ti ete
30
PARAGUAY
18. Earra Bonita
Ti ete ,
122.4
19. Ca choeira Dourada
Para na ba
420
62. Acaray
20. Camargos
Grande
45
21 . Capim Branco
A ra gua ri
420
PARAGUAY-BRAZIL
22. Capiva ra
Paranapanema
600
23. Curucaca
Jordijo
5.2
10.4
63. Itaipu
24. Cha vantes
Para r,lapanema
400
25. Edgard de Souza
Ti ete
16
URUGUAY
26. Es trei to
Grande
700
350
27. Eucl ides da Cunha
Pardo
94.92
64. Palmar
28. Foz do Chopim
Chop mm
44
65. Rincon del Baygorr
66. Rincon del Bonete
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In
Under Planned and
River
operation
construction potential
Grande
990
330
Pardo
85
Ti et
114.48
Grande,
240
Parana
3,640
Parana ,
3,200
Paranai ba
2,080
Sorocaba
60
Grande
50
Jacuii
150
Grande
424 212
Jacuari
12
Parana
1,400
Pardo
28
Paranapanema
61.2
Grande
1,200
Ti bagi
18
Ti et
14.4
Pardo
30.6
Quebra -Anzol
350
Corumb4
25.5
Paranapanerra
11.2
Grande
475
P. Fundo Erechirn
220
Grande
3E0
Ti ete,
10.5
Parana
960
Ti ete
200
Ti et
14.4
I gua su
15.2
I gua cu ,
450
Paranai ba
2,500
Grande
400
Ac a ray
90
90 60
Parana
10,710
Negro
400
Negro
103
400
Negro
128
Map C
51
2
1453
56311361342:2?:s2.930
37
20
43 18 24:14.40
0 is4 57
24
-25 .Rio de
046 ?
36 ulo Janeiro
e
023
sa
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
30
BUENO
AIRES
MON EVIDEO
Vo,
Rio de la Plata Basin
.