WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT ELEMENTS OF NO-COMMUNIST POLITICS IN LAW

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Elements of Non-Communiii Politics in Laos
Secret
N2 43
31 December 1970
No. 0403/70A
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Among the consequences of the war in Laos has been an understandable disinclination
on the part of Western observers-and Lao leaders-to devote much time to comprehending
or seeking to influence the course of Lao politics. It has been in part a matter of priorities.
The endless military crises over the past seven or eight years have left little time, energy, or
resources for other pursuits. But there is also an element of diffidence. Who, even among the
Lao, is so arrogant as to think that he is so thoroughly familiar with the arcane arts of Lao
politics, that peculiar play of personality, custom, and greed, or is so ambitious as to
attempt to alter fundamentally the way Laos is governed? Nobody, except perhaps the
Communists. Even Souvanna Phouma, who has been prime minister for eight years and who
has recognized the need for organizing and unifying Et least the non-Communist factions,
has made little or no progress in changing the regional and familial basis of Lao politics. The
sad fact is that the time won by the last eight years of warfare has not been well spent, and
that Laos is not much more of a nation state today than it was when the unholy coalition
government was formed in 1962.
The war has of course been the main culprit. Not only has it placed a great strain on
the physical energies and resources of the Lao, but it has also tended to distort the
perception of political realities in Laos. The war has been raging so long and its end seems so
distant that it has become difficult for all but the most perceptive Lao to keep a firm fix on
what the fighting is all about and what the problems and potentialities will be if peace
actually comes to the country. The problems associated with the war have been so dominant
that politics among the Lao has been considered something of a mischievous game played by
unreconstructed politicians: as long as it does not interfere with the more important
pursuits-that is, as long as the game does not threaten to upset the status quo-it is suffered
with forbearance.
But insofar as Laos is important, so too are the fundamentals of Lao politics. Not only
do they directly and sometimes importantly affect the conduct of the war against the
Communists, but these politics persistently threaten
the country's fragile political stability. Even more impcrtant is the fact that unless there is a
military solution in Laos, unless the Communists by force of arms overthrow the Souvanna
government and its rightists and neutralist supporters, or unless the Lao Communists are
either militarily defeated or are effectively bottled up in the mountainous areas of eastern
Laos, then at some time in the future the contest for _aos will be fought in the political as
well as in the military arena. The significance of the recent talks between the government
and the Communists is that both sides still seem to recognize that the political dimension of
the struggle may once again become important. It is impossible to say when that may
happen-in large part because the fate of Laos depends so heavily on developments
elsewhere in Indochina-but if it does, the personalities and factors at work on the
non-Communist side will once again become of paramount importance in determining the
direction of Laos.
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Laos remains today the weakest and least
developed of the four Indochinese states that
emerged from World War Il. It is ethnically and
linguistically one of the most complex areas in
Asia, and its population is largely illiterate. These
factors, compounded by the rough terrain of the
country's valleys and high mountains, have made
difficult the growth of any real sense of national
identity.
Although Laos has many of the trappings of
a modern state, in reality the Provisional Govern-
ment of National Unity masks a semifeudal so-
ciety in which political life revolves around family
and regional interests. The traditional forces of
Lao politics are changing only slowly under the
pressures of foreign assistance, 25 years of in-
ternal war, and exposure to the modern world.
The current leadership is drawn from a nar-
rowly based elite, the "great families" of Laos,
which, though closely related, are neither united
nor national. They are divided on regional and
ethnic lines. Within these major groupings there
are splits between the military and the civil serv-
ice.
Shifting and unstable coalitions of indi-
viduals from these groups have banded together
on occasions to form political parties. If the non-
Communist elements in Laos are to have any
success in political competition with the Commu-
nist-dominated Lao Patriotic Front in the future,
they must necessarily close ranks again.
For much of its history Laos had been an
amorphous grouping of separate, dynastic states
that, in addition to fighting each other, were
threatened and often subjugated by their more
powerful neighbors in Thailand and Vietnam.
French colonial intervention in the 19th century
stopped the absorption of these kingdoms into
Thailand and Vietnam, added a veneer of French
culture for a small handful of the Lao leaders, but
did little to unify the country. It was only in
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1946 that the various parts of French-controlled
Laos were brought under a centralized administra-
tion. The country has lacked the ethnic and cul-
tural homogeneity that has helped hold together
the peoples of Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Out of this has come contemporary Laos, and the
present Lao Kingdom, which adopted its current
constitutional form in 1947 and gained full inde-
pendence only in 1953.
Regional identity, on the other hand, is
fixed, and local loyalties to traditional leaders are
well established. In national elections where
choices have been offered, local people have
voted, almost without question, for the men and
names they know-the local members of the
"great families" of Laos. Similarly, it has been the
practice to appoint representatives of the local
families to leading positions in the government
services. This practice simply recognizes and ac-
cepts the realities of political power.
The influence and control of regional leaders
comes, as in all traditional societies, from their
social status in the community. This status, which
is difficult to attain, depends most heavily on
inherited family standing, supplemented by edu-
cation, administrative or manipulative skills, and
wealth. Although wealth as such is not the most
important measure of status in Lao society, al-
most all great families are engaged, directly or
indirectly, in commerce.
The military leadership, which has emerged
as a new element in Lao politics, is still tied to the
traditional sources of power. Its loyalties, al-
though often more national than those of some
civilian leaders, are still largely regional and
ethnic, and senior officers are largely drawn from
the great families of Laos.
Another challenge to the present leadership
of Laos is again coming from within the elite
itself. This is evident in the discontent of the
middle-level civil and military officers, who view
themselves as better trained and more competent
than their seniors, and also from the younger
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men, fresh from overseas educational experiences.
These men are frequently impatient and scornful
of the competence of their immediate seniors.
The maneuvering of these elite elements has al-
ready brought about some changes in leadership,
particularly in the National Assembly and junior
Cabinet offices, but none in the basic orientation
of Lao politics.
The Great Families of Laos and their
Bases of Operations
For Lao national unity, the two most im-
portant groupings within the politically conscious
elite are closely related and regionally based in
the northern areas of Luang Prabang. The first is
that of the King, Savang Vatthana, and the im-
mediate royal family. The second is that of the
cadet, or junior, branch of the royal family,
which is outside the direct line of descent. The
latter is currently headed by Prince Souvanna
Phouma, who is prime minister of Laos. Although
national in their activities and viewpoint, both
these men are representative of regional interests,
and would have little or no power without the
base.
The royal family of Luang Prabang is not
wealthy, but exercises influence almost entirely
on the basis of tradition and prestige. In recent
decades it has produced no important political or
military leaders, and few of its members appear to
be particularly talented. It is, however, by agree-
ment among the other great families of the coun-
try, the only royal family of Laos. Thus far all
political elements in Laos, including the Commu-
nist-dominated Lao Patriotic Front, have ac-
cepted the monarchy as necessary to Laotian
continuity.
The King plays his ceremonial role with
some skill. Although well informed on domestic
and foreign affairs, he has shown some reluctance
to be drawn into the day-to-day problems of
national administration. This detachment is
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King Savang Vatthana and Queen Khamphoui...they
reign but do not rule.
traditional with a Lao king, and is undoubtedly
the wisest course because, in competition with
other political forces in the country, the King has
limited capital and few means of replenishing it.
The present King is not entirely passive,
howeve. He has weighed in on military matters,
particularly those relating to the security of his
home area in north Laos, and when it has ap-
peared that his influence was essential to national
stability. For example, when Kong Le seized
Vientiane in 1960 and attempted to install Sou-
vanna as prime minister, the King withheld his
approval. He did the same thing in 1964 when
General Kouprasith attempted a coup-this time
to sustain Souvanna Phouma's government. Again
in 1966 when the National Assembly passed a
"no confidence" resolution against the govern-
ment of National Unity, the King stood firm
against most of the great families of central and
south Laos-but with the ambassadors of the
great powers-to prorogue the assembly and sus-
tain the prime minister.
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The royal family's limited wealth is drawn
primarily from an annual grant in the national
budget. It is supplemented, however, by income
from real estate, two large farms, and a royal teak
forest. It may also benefit from the illegal arms
and opium smuggling of the Lao commander in
chief, General Ouan Rathikoun, with whom the
King maintains close personal ties.
The royal family's influence is quite natu-
rally felt in the major decisions of government
inasmuch as changes cannot be made legally,
without royal approval. This has meant, among
other things, the generous placement of the
King's close relatives in positions of importance in
the national service. These include the com-
mander of Military Region I (Luang Prabang),
Brigadier General Tiao (Prince) Sayavong, the
King's half-brother, and his deputy, Brigadier
General Tiao Vannaseng Sayasane, a member of
the royal family who is married to the King's
cousin. In addition, Tiao Khammao, half-brother
of the King, serves as ambassador to Great
Britain.
Important though these and other posts held
by the royal family may be, it is probably more
significant that the King has been able to develop
close relations with his major military com-
manders. First, he is naturally identified with his
commander in chief, General Ouan, who is from
Luang Prabang, and with his own half-brother,
General Sayavong, the military commander of
Military Region I. In addition, he appears to have
sought out commanders who have held the confi-
dence of US officials, and has developed ties with
General Vang Pao, the Meo military commander
of Military Region Il and with General Phasouk
Somly, the commanding general of Military
Region IV. These personal associations could
prove useful in confrontations between the royal
family and the powerful families of Vientiane and
of the south.
primarily on the basis of the political skill and
administrative competence of its leading mem-
bers. Although its members are rich and well
educated, it does not compare in wealth with the
great families of Vientiane and of south Laos. Its
prestige is subordinated in the north to the King's
immediate family, and its members are no longer
in line for succession to the Lao throne. It has,
nonetheless, provided five of the nine prime minis-
ters who have served Laos since 1946 and three of
the country's most highly regarded postwar lead-
ers-the deceased Prince Petsarath, founder of the
Lao Issara movement; Prince Souvanna Phouma,
the recurrent and present prime minister; and
Prince Souphanouvong, the titular head of the
Lao Patriotic Front.
For more than a century and a half, until the
1940s, the senior member of this branch of the
royal family served as the "second King," or
viceroy of Luang Prabang-and in this position
carried on the actual government of the country.
The prime minister, Prince
Souvanna Phouma...the in-
dispensable man, at least
in the eyes of the great
powers.
The King, as the spiri-
tual leader of the
realm, reigned but did
not rule. Although this
post has not been
filled since Petsarath's
death, its duties have
devolved upon the
prime minister's office,
and it has been quite
fitting that for the
most part it should be
a cadet leader who per-
forms that function.
Souvanna himself
is responsible in con-
siderable measure for
the present influence
of the family. Ever
since his return from
his engineering education in France in 1931 he
has devoted himself to a career as an engineer and
as a nationalist and government leader. He has
The cadet or
junior branch
of the
royal emerged as a man of dedication and integrity.=
25X6
family looms large
on the Lao
political
scene
F
he is
25X6
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considered honest. He is frequently disliked for
his personality and his policies-especially, per-
haps, his continued efforts at reconciliation with
the Lao Patriotic Front and his advocacy of Lao
neutrality-but he is trusted. Often at odds with
the King in Luang Prabang, the na Champassaks
in the south, and the Sananikones in Vientiane,
he is nonetheless the one man on whom the
competing factions in the kingdom can agree to
represent them as prime minister.
Perhaps the overwhelming factor that gives
Souvanna power in Laos has been his foreign
support. Traditionally, Lao leaders have risen and
fallen on the basis of their foreign backing,
usually by the Thai and Vietnamese, but cur-
rently Souvanna appears uniquely essential in the
eyes of all major foreign powers concerned with
Laos. So long as this remains true, the relative
weakness of his branch of the royal family in its
competition with the other power centers is not
as significant as it might otherwise be.
The future influence of the cadet branch is
clouded. In a changed political atmosphere-if the
Communists were to gain the upper hand-Prince
Souphanouvong, as leader of the Lao Patriotic
Front, might succeed his half-brother to the
prime ministership. He holds the title of Deputy
Prime Minister at this time, though he no longer
uses it. It is difficult to imagine that conservative
elements of the Lao society would accept him
under any circumstances, but there apparently is
no other member of the cadet branch with
enough stature to succeed Souvanna. Souvanna's
own children, although they have been playing a
part in Lao politics and in the military, hold dual
citizenship and appear to be more at home in
France than in Laos.
The na Champassak Family of South Laos
First among the regional powers of Laos-
and third in protocol rank behind the Crown
Prince-stands Prince Boun Cum na Champassak.
Although his national prestige is less than that of
either of his cousins, the Kingand the prime minis-
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ter, his wealth and regional power clearly sur-
passes both, and no national decision can be
effectuated in south Laos without his approval.
An important part of the na Champassak
prominence is based on tradition. Like the royal
THE THREE PRINCES.
Prince Boun Oum na Champassak (left), major
leader of south Laos and the political right, to-
gether with Prime Minister Prince Souvanna
Phouma (center) and Prince Souphanouvong
(right), leader of the Lao Patriotic Front.
family and its junior branch, the na Champassaks
are descended from the last great king of Laos,
who reigned in the 17th century. Prince Boun
Oum, patriarch of the family at 58, is the grand-
son of the last king of Champassak who reigned
before the French arrived. Boun Oum gave up his
claim to that throne only in 1946, at the behest
of the French, in return for the post of Inspector
General and, it is reported, a large personal sub-
sidy.
Another important basis for the current na
Champassak power is money. As a family, oper-
ating in close association with the Chinese busi-
ness community, the na Champassaks are identi-
fied with virtually every important economic
activity of the south, from trucking to smuggling
and gambling. Their activities in these areas are
beyond the control of the central government in
Vientiane or, for that matter, of its nominal
representatives in the region, the military com-
mander of Military Region IV, or of the pro-
vincial governors.
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Military Regions in Laos
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The Dynastic Principalities of Traditional Laos
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On the basis of their inherited prestige and
contemporary wealth, the na Champassaks hold
positions in the cabinet and the civil service. The
most prominent family members are Boun Oum's
younger brother Boun Om and a nephew Sisouk
na Cham assak.
oun Om serves,
Tr of religion.
Sisouk, on the other hand, is one of the
most important, influential, and able members of
the cabinet. As minister of finance, acting minis-
ter for national economy and, most importantly,
as de facto minister of defense, Sisouk has been
mentioned as a potential prime minister. He has
gained these positions on the basis of compe-
tence. Such points as he gains for competence,
however, he loses on personality. He is considered
arrogant and is personally disliked by most of his
colleagues. The target of frequent criticism in the
National Assembly, he has been singled out by
powerful northern families from Luang Prabang
and Vientiane as their chief southern enemy. On
top of all this, he gets along poorly with his
relatives in the south.
It is small wonder, then, that the spokesman
in Vientiane for the na Champassaks is neither
Boun Om nor Sisouk, but Deputy Prime Minister
Leuam Insisiengmay. And this illustrates the tech-
nique by which the na Champassaks have in-
creased their influence. They have formed effec-
tive working alliances with the other great,
though not princely, families of the south. Their
chief allies have been the I nsisiengmays and the
Nosavans, who dominate the commerce of Savan-
nakhet city and province and are, as a result,
wealthy and powerful.
The same pattern of cooperation and per-
sonal alliances has strengthened the na Cham-
passak position in the military where, thus far,
there are no na Champassaks in senior positions.
For a time General Phoumi Nosavan was the
military leader for the na Champassak interests. It
was Phoumi's military-action that brought Boun
Qum to the prime ministership in 1960 and made
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him one of the "three princes" signing the
accords that set up the current Government of
National Unity.
With Phoumi now in exile, Boun Oum's
major military associates are Generals Phasouk
Somly and Bounpone Makthepharak, com- 25X1
manders respectively of Military Regions IV and 25X1
Ill. Both are related by blood and marriage to the
na Champassak family, as are a number of
younger, less prominent members of the officer
corps in the south. Bounpone is
pec e ot engaging in commerce with the Lao
Patriotic Front. Phasouk, on the other hand, has
had the reputation of being one of the more
honest and public-spirited generals in Laos. His
probity has been tarnished by the involvement of
his brothers in trade with the Communists, how-
ever, and his military reputation has been severely
undermined by the losses of Saravane and At-
topeu to the Communists. As a result, his over-all
influence may have been sharply reduced.
Prince Boun Cum's southern base of support
is personal and therefore fragile. Since his first
term as prime minister, from 1949 to 1950, Boun
Oum has not concerned himself particularly with
activities in the north, so long as they did not
affect his family interests in the south. Thus, he
has exercised less influence nationally than he
might have. Also, he has not been able to 'find a
satisfactory heir to run clan activities. Aside from
Sisouk, who appears uninterested in the post, the
most likely candidate is Tiao Sith na Champassak,
Boun Oum's 36-year-old half-brother, who is cur-
rently a major on General Phasouk's staff. Popu-
lar and promising though he is, his succession has
not yet been assured. Thus it is quite possible that
when Boun Oum leaves the scene-his health has
been bad for years-the na Champassaks may
break up into family factions feuding over their
commercial interests. If this should occur, the na
Champassaks, though wealthy, may decline in in-
fluence and play a less prominent role in Lao
national politics than they do now.
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Whatever the limits on na Champassak influ-
ence at the national level, the power of the family
at the regional level is very substantial. General
Phoumi's coup effort of 1965 was staged as a
southern attempt to regain influence in Vientiane.
Although this try failed, it emphasized the na
Champassak willingness to take action where the
northern, or national, policies appeared to
threaten southern interests. The continued
rumors of a return of Phoumi from his exile in
Thailand are a sign of the restiveness of the na
Champassaks because any comeback effort would
need their support.
Also, as southern regional loyalties and
identity remain strong, the na Champassaks be-
lieve they could, if necessary, pull out of the
Kingdom of Laos and re-establish their own king-
dom. Boun Oum, expressing his distrust of Luang
Prabang and Vientiane, has reminded Western
observers that there are "two Kings in Laos."
Through informal meetings with the Thais and
the South Vietnamese, as well as approaches to
Lon Nol in Cambodia, Boun Oum has been de-
veloping a de facto independent foreign policy for
south Laos. He still talks about secession, espe-
cially when it appears that the Communists are
about to carve up Laos anyway, but the seri-
ousness of such heretofore idle talk is open to
question. Although the government in Vientiane
could do little to keep the south in the fold, Boun
Cum recognizes that the south would need the
support or at least the acquiescence of the major
foreign powers, particularly the US.
Unlike the leading families of Luang Prabang
and of the south, the Sananikones of Vientiane
and central Laos can make no claim to royal
ancestry. Vientiane was the capital of a tradi-
tional kingdom, but its ruling family died out
after a disastrous defeat by the Thais in the
1820s. The Sananikone family's rise to power has
been based on business acumen.
The family is headed by Phoui Sananikone,
former prime minister and currently president of
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the National Assembly. Within the government
Phoui's younger brother, Ngon Sananikone, serves
as minister of public works. Because of these
government positions and the family's over-
whelming importance in the territory surrounding
Vientiane, the Sananikones have found their way
into many middle-level positions in the civil serv-
ice from which they are likely to play important
roles in the future.
The Sananikones also hold major positions
in the military establishment. Oudone Sananikone
is chief of staff to General Ouan Rathikoun for
the whole of the Royal Lao Army. General
Kouprasith Abhay, whose mother and wife are
both Sananikones, is the commander of Military
Region V, which controls the capital of Vien-
tiane. Kouprasith, who was raised in the Sana-
nikone family from childhood, nevertheless has
maintained relations with the Abhay home terri-
tory on the commercially important Khong Island
in the south and has developed an alliance, to
increase the power and influence of both, with a
locally influential family there.
Kouprasith and the Sananikones need each
other, but conflicting interests, particularly
Kouprasith's ambition and sense of self-
importance, have led to tensions. Kouprasith,
who would like to succeed to the leadership of
the Sananikone interests, has been frustrated and
embittered by Phoui's preference to pass on the
control to a Sananikone male rather than to a
mere in-law. The present alliance could therefore
break up.
The military has exercised influence in Laos
only through cooperation with the great families
and traditional leaders of the country. As in other
emerging countries, however, the military may
well become powerful in its own right. Its control
of arms, transport, and men, its relative discipline
(as compared with that of the civilian elite), and
its access to large quantities of foreign aid give it a
potentially overwhelming advantage over the civil-
ian leadership, with which it currently cooperates.
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The power of the military leaders in national
politics was well illustrated in the National
Assembly elections of 1967. Along with other
traditional forces on the Lao scene, the com-
manding generals in the military regions and
Commander in Chief Ouan, who was active in the
Luang Prabang area, each sponsored slates of
candidates. Forty-six of the fifty-nine elected
delegates came from the military slates.
Despite the military leadership's increasing
political strength, however, the Lao armed forces
are not truly unified or national. There is not, as
there is in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia, one
commander of such national stature that he can
replace or give clear-cut orders to each of the
regional military commanders.
In times of military crisis, such as the Pathet
Lao threat to Thakhek in 1965 or the attack in
the Bolovens Plateau last summer, it has been
possible to move troops from one region to
another. These, however, have been the excep-
tions to the general rule that the Lao Army,
although national in name, is essentially a regional
force. It has required extensive US pressure to
prevail on the officers, and the soldiers alike, to
serve outside their home territories. At the same
time, except in such crisis situations, local mili-
tary commanders do not welcome the intrusion
of out-of-area forces. They are jealous of their
prerogatives and fearful of competition from both
the national level and their colleagues in neighbor-
ing regions.
As a result the military leadership remains,
like its civilian counterpart, fundamentally
autonomous and regional. It can block efforts of
the central government, but it is either unwilling
or incapable of taking over the direction of the
national administration.
General Vang Pao exemplifies the strengths
and weaknesses of the Lao military as a semi-
autonomous regional force. He is on all counts
one of the most vigorous and effective of the
country's military leaders, but his successes are
derived from special relationships, which are not
easily transferrable. He has a special status with
his ethnic colleagues as a Meo tribal chieftain, but
he also is associated with the most respected Lao
princely family of the area-that of Tiap Say
Kham, descendant of the royal family of Xieng
Khouang. In addition, he receives special military
and economic assistance from the US.
Skillfully playing on these assets, Vang Pao
has steadily increased his traditional ceremonial
and moral influence in the area-as well as his
modern military and economic power-to the
point where he is the dominant leader. He is even
sought out by such influential leaders as the King
in the north and General Prasouk in the south as
allies, and has developed a special relationship
with each.
Influential and powerful though General
Vang Pao has become in his own area, there is a
General Vang Pao...for
once, the medals are
earned.._a tribal chieftain
of the Meo minority and
the most aggressive mili-
tary leader in Laos.
Special Report -to-
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limiting regiona? and
personal quality to his
power. His basic claim
to distinction is as
leader of the upcoun-
try minority, the Meo.
He is thus an outsider
to most Lao, and this
limits his influence in
non-Meo areas. In ad-
dition to being an able
military commander-
something in short
supply-Vang Pao's
strength lies in his rela-
tionship with the US,
and in the particularly
important role that his
home area of MR I
has played in the war.
If his forces were de-
cisively beaten, or if
the US ceased to give
him the kind of
symbolic support he now gets, Vang
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Pao would be little more than an important Meo
figure in Lao politics.
The limitations on the power of the Lao
military leaders is further illustrated in the various
coup attempts that have occurred since 1960.
They have all been regional or local in appeal, and
have lacked national sympathy. Kong Le was able
to take over Vientiane temporarily, even as
Phoumi Nosavan was able to oust Kong Le from
Vientiane and install Prince Boun Oum as prime
minister-temporarily. General Kouprasith staged
an attempted military take-over in 1964-and he
very nearly succeeded. (The Lao Patriotic Front
now cites this Kouprasith effort as the de facto
end of the Government of National Unity, in
which its members held cabinet posts.) Phoumi in
1965 attempted to topple the government and
recoup his political fortunes and those of south
Laos. These attempts all failed, however, because
of a combination of disunity within the military
leadership and the united opposition of the over-
riding, non-Lao component of the Lao political
equation: the foreign great powers.
Other Factional and Fragmenting Factors
in Lao Politics
As stated previously, the major forces in Lao
politics-military and civilian, Lao and ethnic
minority, national and regional-run the society
through a series of alliances and personal relation-
ships. All these are fragile, and all are strained by
frictions and irritations within the cooperating
cliques. The King distrusts his prime minister's
politics. There is a smouldering struggle for dom-
inance within the Sananikone-Kouprasith com-
bine. The na Champassaks are disappointed in
Phasouk's military prowess, and Phasouk is dis-
turbed by the commercial activities and corrup-
tion-including trading with the Communists-on
the part of some of his na Champassak relatives.
Similar stresses and irritations within the elite
alliances can be found throughout Laos-limiting
the effectiveness of each group.
Special Report
Within each element of the alliances, too,
there are similar frictions and strains. Most of
these seem to show up as attributes of age dif-
ferentials in three relatively clear-cut, although
arbitrary, groupings: the senior leaders, men 55
and older, who received their training prior to
World War I I and served as the early leaders of the
nationalist movement; the middle group, from 40
through 55, that gained its education and experi-
ence in the war years and the period just prior to
the withdrawal of the French; and the under-40
group, which is generally better educated-abroad
in France and other European countries-but has
had only limited practical political experience
when compared with its seniors. In general, each
of the younger groups is impatient and rather
scornful of its seniors.
In the military, where there is less open
expression of dissidence, this impatience was
most clearly displayed in 1967 when some 60
junior officers signed a petition callin for the
shake-up of the military command
Among civilians, discontent is more open
and some changes have already brought younger
men more rapidly to the fore. I n the 1967 elec-
tions, for example, one half of the previous mem-
bers of the National Assembly were unseated and
the new Assembly emerged with one third of its
members under 40. Earlier, at the beginning of
the 1960s, it was the members of today's middle
group, civil and military, that in the form of the
Committee for the Defense of the National In-
terest (CDNI) challenged and ousted the govern-
ment of Souvanna. Today, two major youth
groups, the Groups de Jeunes (GDJ)-or Young
Lao-arid the Mitasone-the young educated Lao
or Returned Student Group, or Party-have be-
come political forces to be reckoned with.
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There is, of course, considerable competence
and skill within all these groups, and the great
problem in non-Communist Laos has been to
bring them together in some form of effective
political organization or party. Lao leaders, and
particularly Prime Minister Souvanna, recognize
this need and have spent considerable effort to
create at least one or two viable political parties-
preferably one neutralist and one rightist-that
would be able to compete with the Communist-
dominated leftists in the future. Thus far, un-
fortunately, none of these efforts has been effec-
tive. Parties have been organized, flourished
briefly, and then subsided into paper structures.
Despite all efforts to the contrary, in non-Com-
munist Laos these have remained, like all other
political groupings, fragile alliances bound to-
gether by personal rather than ideological com-
mitments.
All these competing and cooperating forces
of Lao politics operate in the shadow of the
military struggle with the Lao Patriotic Front and
its North Vietnamese Communist sponsors. Here
there is one area on which all groups can agree:
foreign assistance is required to combat the Com-
munist forces.
The center group, or neutralists, of the Gov-
ernment of National Unity are convinced that the
only hope for Laotian survival is through non-
involvement in international disputes, through
reconciliation and accommodation with the Lao
Patriotic Front, and through the acceptance of an
international guarantee against inroads from ag-
gressive neighbors. This group dominates the na-
tional government and is led, of course, by Sou-
vanna Phouma. It is perfectly clear that in a
strictly Laotian political confrontation the prime
minister and his program of accommodation
would be overwhelmed by the combined opposi-
tion of the rightist and regionalist political leaders
in the country. Souvanna and the neutralists stay
in power largely because they have the support of
the foreign powers.
The rightists differ little from the neutralists
so far as political and economic ideology are
concerned. Both are essentially traditionalist in
outlook. The right simply does not believe that
accommodation with the Lao left is possible or
that, over the long run, neutrality will work. It is
convinced that the only hope for Lao survival is
through military alliance with like-minded foreign
powers. Because the rightists have been unable to
develop sufficient foreign support, however, they
continue, reluctantly, to accept the leadership of
the neutralists. But they watch with suspicion and
concern the prime minister's efforts to reach a
negotiated settlement in Laos.
It is in this atmosphere that Souvanna has
attempted a national settlement. Concessions
must, of necessity, be made on both sides in a
series of negotiations-but, so far as the rightists
are concerned, not at the expense of their re-
gional interests. The royal family is clearly unwill-
ing to concede interests in northern Laos, even
though the King and the prime minister might be
more willing to make accommodations in the
southern panhandle. Conversely, the na Champas-
saks, the Sananikones, the Nosavans, and the In-
sisiengmays hold little brief for the territorial
interests of north Laos, but are deeply concerned
for their holdings in the south. Likewise for Gen-
eral Vang Pao, the prime concern is with the
well-being of the Meo minority, which is of less
consequence to the other rightists, who are ethnic
Lao.
For most rightists, regional interests are nar-
rowly discerned, and as a result, competition has
been the rule. The Sananikones and the na Cham-
passaks have agreed in principle on the direction
in which the government should move, but have
rarely been close enough in practice to cooperate.
It has only been in time of crisis, such as foul owed
the Kong Le coup, that cooperation has been
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achieved and then this cooperation has lasted the 1960s. He stands in the wings, ready to be
only briefly. called back into action at any time the southern
rightists decide they can no longer accept Sou-
General Phoumi Nosavan, a one-time deputy vanna's efforts at national reconciliation with th
prime minister now in exile in Thailand, is the left.
embodiment of rightist successes and failures in
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