WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT CHILE BETWEEN ELECTIONS

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• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Chile Between Elections
Secret
N2 43
3 July 1969
No. 0377/69A
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CHILE BETWEEN ELECTIONS
Chile's next presidential election will be held in September 1970. Political parties
already are assessing their positions, and the important ones probably will choose their
candidates some time this summer. Their decisions will be influenced to some extent by the
results of congressional elections held last March, which provided some evidence of political
sentiment in the country and underscored the division of forces within some of the parties.
President Frei's Christian Democratic Party will be running on the administration's
six-year record. Some members of the middle class, which provided the bulk of Frei's
support in 1964, have seen their economic position erode under the impact of continuing
inflation. Leftists within the Christian Democratic Party, and in other parties as well, believe
that the pace of economic and social reform should be accelerated. They hope that the state
will increase its role in the economy and advocate the "noncapitalist" way to economic
development. The Christian Democratic candidate, whoever he may be, will have a difficult
time reconciling the conflicting currents within his party.
Composition
of
Chilean
Congress
(PDC) Christian Democratic (PS) Socialist
(PCCh) Communist
(MPI) Minor parties (PR) Radical
& independents (PN) National
CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
150 Seats
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THE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
President Frei's Christian Democratic Party
(PDC) went into the elections last March hoping
that a heavy victory would carry it into the presi-
dential campaign next year with promising
momentum. Most successful Christian Democratic
candidates ran on a platform that more or less
strongly supported the administration's program
of economic and social reform, but many candi-
dates emphasized their desire for more forceful
action along these lines. The PDC received almost
30 percent of the vote, and remains the largest
single party in Chile. Its showing was less than it
had hoped for, however, and the party lost con-
trol of the Chamber of Deputies. On the other
hand, its Senate representation nearly doubled
because of some hold-over seats.
The most interesting aspect of the congres-
sional elections was the strong showing made by
the conservative National Party, which emerged
from near-oblivion to become the second-largest
party in the country. In large measure this result
reflected a return to the right by voters who had
chosen Frei in 1964 as the only alternative to
Marxism and had since become disillusioned with
his actions. In addition, the party was associated
in the minds of voters with former president
Jorge Alessandri, who is a popular, relatively con-
servative political figure.
The leftist parties-the Communists and
Socialists-maintained their position with almost
30 percent of the vote between them. They will
be able to conduct spoiling actions in Congress
and will continue to frustrate Frei's programs.
The congressional elections saw the demise
of several splinter parties, and only five major
ones remain. This development is salutary for
Chilean politics, which has been plagued by an
overabundance of parties and politicians. Already,
however, some splintering of these five is occur-
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Jorge Alessandri
ring; several leftists have resigned from the PDC,
and there is disaffection between the leadership
of the formerly second-ranking Radical Party
(PR) and its grass-roots strength.
All parties except the PR, which dropped
from second to fourth position, claimed a victory
of sorts in the elections. The realignment of
strengths will have a strong bearing on the candi-
dates nominated for the presidential election.
THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
For several years the PDC has been split into
three groups, with some blurring around the edges
of each. To the right is the "officialist" group
that strongly backs Frei's administration and as a
rule can be counted on to support his programs in
Congress and his proposals within the party. It is
from this group that many cabinet ministers and
other government officials have been drawn, thus
depriving the party of some of its ablest leader-
ship. To the left is a "rebel" group that often
takes positions closer to those of the Communist
Party than to those of President Frei. The rebels
believe that Frei has compromised the
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revolutionary ideal, and they had hoped to form a
unity of "popular forces" for the presidential
election next year. Between the two is a "third"
position that supports changes in Frei's program
but wants to work within the party and the
government to implement them.
Following the PDC's disappointing showing
in the congressional elections, the various mem-
bers of the party tried to outdo each other
in fixing blame for the results. A Junta Nacional,
or national directorate meeting, was held from I
to 3 May to form a coherent program for the next
18 months. The most important question to be
considered was whether to form an alliance with
other leftist parties or to run a candidate under
the PDC banner alone in 1970.
When Frei took office in 1964 he had prom-
ised that his administration would not follow the
Chilean tradition wherein parties are "elected by
the left to rule with the right." He eschewed all
alliances and depended on a series of ad hoc
arrangements for enactment of his legislative pro-
gram. This policy was responsible for some of
Frei's problems, because the other parties
adopted an irresponsible obstructionist attitude
to many of his proposals. The idea of operating
independently of alliances with other parties is
opposed by some segments of the PDC, however,
and helps explain the bitterness aroused by the
rebels' desire to work closely with the Marxist
left.
At the junta meeting, Frei's supporters were
organized to an unusual extent and managed
barely to win a victory on the proposal to run
alone in 1970 by a vote of 233 to 215. As a
result, several leftist senators and deputies, as well
as leaders of the Christian Democratic Youth
group, resigned from the party. They have organ-
ized a movement, which they claim is not a politi-
cal party, and plan to cooperate with the Marxist
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left in a "popular unity" campaign in 1970. They
may hope that the Communists and Socialists in
1970 will support a candidate from their group
who has left the PDC. Although the resignations
are small in terms of actual numbers, some of the
most dynamic members have left the party,
making it more difficult for the PDC to select a
candidate who will appeal to a wide spectrum of
voters.
There is at present no prospective Christian
Democratic presidential candidate who is the
overwhelming choice of the party. Radomiro
Tomic, former ambassador to the US, has for
years been considered Frei's heir apparent. He
remains the one PDC candidate who could unite
its factions and galvanize its waning strength. Last
spring he stated that he would not run without
the support of the Marxist left, which has since
rebuffed him. He has indicated more recently,
however, that as a "disciplined PDC militant" he
would accept the party's nomination if it were
offered. Even if Tomic could unite the PDC be-
hind his candidacy, the party would still need the
cooperation of another major party to have any
Radomiro Tomic
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chance of winning the presidential election in
1970.
Of several candidates who have emerged
from the "officialist" wing of the party, the most
important is the former minister of interior,
Bernardo Leighton. Leighton, who in March was
elected to the Chamber of Deputies, is probably
Frei's first choice. Although Leighton would have
some appeal to the right, he is beginning to make
statements that could appeal to the left. In one
such statement he said he favored some reintegra-
tion of Cuba into the inter-American system.
Other possibilities are former defense minister
Juan de Dios Carmona and former housing minis-
ter Juan Hamilton. Both were elected to the
Senate in March, and both at this stage must be
considered dark horses.
Another government official promoting his
own candidacy is Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes.
Early in the Frei administration Valdes was a
strong proponent of making Chile a force in the
"third world" of developing nations. Although
Chile has not renewed diplomatic relations with
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Cuba, Valdes has often stated his desire to see
Cuba reintegrated into the inter-American system.
He clearly fancies himself the grand diplomat who
could achieve this goal. He makes no secret of his
preference for Europe over the United States and
has tried to weaken US influence in inter-Ameri-
can affairs.
The PDC's choice of a candidate, which
probably will be known by the end of the sum-
mer, will give a strong indication of how the PDC
intends to pitch its campaign. The party may
conclude that the conservatives from whom it
drew much of its support in 1964 will no longer
be willing to back its social and economic re-
forms, and that its candidate may be forced to
rely on drawing votes from the left in order to
perpetuate the PDC in power.
THE LEFTIST PARTIES
The most important leftist parties in Chile
are the Communist Party (PCCh) and the Socialist
Party (PS). There are several small extremist
groups, but none has any widespread following. A
breakaway faction of the Socialist Party was all
but eliminated from the political scene in the
March elections, retaining one hold-over senator
and electing another.
The Communist Party of Chile has been legal
since the 1930s except for a ten-year period from
1948 to 1958. It works within the parameters of
Chilean democracy and opposes large-scale vio-
lence as a means to political power. The PCCh is
one of Moscow's strongest supporters within the
international Communist movement and has been
active in organizational work for international
meetings of Communist parties.
The PCCh can count on strong discipline on
the part of its members and therefore is a valuable
ally to other parties in electoral compensation
agreements. In the congressional elections of
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March 1969 the PCCh polled 15.7 percent of the
vote. It now holds six seats in the Senate and 22
seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
In the past two presidential elections, the
PCCh has formally supported pro-Castro Socialist
Salvador Allende as the candidate of the Popular
Action Front (FRAP), in which the PCCh is
aligned with the Socialists. The party would prob-
ably support Allende again if he were nominated
by the Socialists. There is some evidence, how-
ever, that the Communists would prefer a broader
grouping, possibly behind a Radical candidate or
a breakaway Christian Democrat. PCCh Secretary
General Luis Corvalan has said that if the left
cannot agree on an acceptable candidate the Com-
munists might run their own man simply to put in
an appearance. Such a move would lose the sup-
port of voters who cannot bring themselves to
vote for a Communist but who have no hesitation
about voting for a candidate from another party
who is supported by the Communists.
The Communist position in the presidential
election will be determined in large part by the
nominee selected by the Socialist Party (PS). The
PS is in general more extremist than the PCCh,
and PS leaders often travel to Cuba for visits with
Castro. Allende himself recently visited Peking,
Hanoi, Pyongyang, and Moscow. Despite the loss
of some support due to the split-off of one fac-
tion, the Socialists received 12.2 percent of the
vote last March and now hold four seats in the
Senate and 15 in the Chamber of Deputies.
Salvador Allende retains a strong chance of
being renominated by the Socialists. His respecta-
ble background would appeal to traditional ele-
ments of the population as well as to the Marxist
parties' usual constituency. The party is con-
fronted, however, with deciding whether to sup-
port the Communist call for "unity of the left"
by pushing a non-Socialist candidate, or to main-
tain its "ideological purity" and run its own can-
didate. There are at least two factions within the
PS besides Allende's supporters, and Allende has
alienated some Socialists because of his recent
two-month absence from Chile.
Some of Allende's opponents within the
party favor the violence that has increased in
recent weeks. Police have discovered a "guerrilla
training school" in the Santiago area and an arms
cache farther south. Bombs, weapons, and maps
of military bases and other strategic locations
were found at both sites.
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The MIR has been
implicated in violence m antiago and in Con-
cepcion before, and in general eschews political
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action, preferring armed struggle. There is some
reason to believe that the MIR and the PS may be
linked, with the MIR acting as the paramilitary
apparatus.
The security forces, although capable of
handling most violence, are becoming apprehen-
sive about the increase in violence in Chile. The
carabineros in particular act as the first line of
defense against street riots and other manifesta-
tions. Should there be any prolonged rioting, the
army might have to be called in to assist them.
OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES
Much of the vote for the National Party
(PN) in the March elections resulted from public
identification between the PN and former presi-
dent Jorge Alessandri. Alessandri is a 73-year old
independent who has avoided being tied to the
partisan affairs of the PN. The PN has capitalized,
however, on his relative conservatism, and most
PN candidates tried to use his name in their
campaigns.
Alessandri is almost certain to run next year.
He would appeal not only to conservatives, but
also to portions of the middle and lower classes
that are disillusioned with President Frei. Many
political observers believe that if the presidential
election were held today, Alessandri would be the
victor.
The National Party itself has relatively little
political strength. It is doubtful that the party
will grow unless it manages to revamp its image
and loosens its ideological ties with the propertied
classes. It is in the mainstream of Latin American
nationalism and therefore is not averse to actions
that may be against US interests.
The Radical Party (PR), a traditional, op-
portunistic middle-class party, may hold the key
to the political picture for 1970. For several years
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the PR machinery has been under the control of a
left-wing group that has cooperated with the
Communists and the Socialists in Congress and in
congressional by-elections. This policy has alien-
ated some of the traditional support of the party,
however, and in March the PR dropped to fourth
place. It received 12.9 percent of the vote and
now holds nine seats in the Senate and 24 seats in
the Chamber of Deputies.
The Radical Party leadership wants FRAP to
agree to throw Marxist support to a leftist Radical
candidate. Such a candidate probably could hold
much of the PR behind him and would run a
strong campaign in a three-way race against, for
example, a Christian Democrat and the independ-
ent, Alessandri. The Communists have indicated a
willingness to participate in such an arrangement,
as they did in the 1930s and 1940s during the
period of Chile's Popular Front. A leftist unity
candidate would draw support away from the
Christian Democratic candidate.
The Socialists, however, condemn the PR as
a "bourgeois" party and are reluctant even to
support Radical congressional candidates. Because
the Communists do not want to destroy FRAP
completely, Socialist intransigence could provide
an insuperable obstacle to a broad-based leftist
alliance. Even if the Radical leadership should
decide to support a Socialist, much of the rest of
the party probably would vote for another can-
didate.
If the Radicals do not get Marxist support
for their candidate in 1970, the campaign will not
present the relatively clear-cut, left-center-right
choice that a leftist Radical, a PDC man, and
Alessandri would provide. Whether the Radicals
would draws votes primarily from the left or the
right depends in large part on the identity of the
candidate.
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OUTLOOK
Political maneuvering is certain to increase as
the parties get down to the serious business of
choosing their nominees and drafting their politi-
cal programs. In Chile politics is never forgotten
for long, and a presidential election such as the
one coming up is sure to arouse the passions of
the electorate.
The Christian Democratic Party, after its
stunning victories in 1964 and 1965, is threatened
with becoming merely another Chilean party,
rather than a new wave of hope showing the way
for the rest of Latin America. Unless Frei can
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soon restore some of the lost glamour, his party is
likely to have a difficult time retaining the
presidency.
The keys to the race remain Alessandri's
health and the unity (or disunity) of the leftist
parties. Although Alessandri seems to be in good
shape, his age makes his condition naturally un-
certain. The leftist parties will be under strong
compulsion to work together because by so doing
they could well capture the presidency. It is not
unlikely, however, that existing animosities,
personal qnd ideological. will prevent such co-
operation.
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