WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S BALANCING ACT ENTERS NEW PHASE

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A007100060003-7
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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Dominican President's Balancing Act Enters New Phase
Secret
N2 37
13 June 1969
No. 0374/69B
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CRE
DOMINICAN PRESIDENT'S BALANCING ACT ENTERS NEW PHASE
For the past three years, President Joaquin Balaguer has presided over
the longest period of calm in the Dominican Republic since Rafael Trujillo's
assassination in 1961. Political necessity and Balaguer's personal : style, how
ever, have precluded any rapid movement toward real reform, and stability
has largely been invested in the man. The country's economic position,
while, improving, ishighly dependent on foreign assistance.
Balaguer'_s political support has suffered some erosion as a result of
pressures generated by the approach of presidential elections in May, 1970,
although he is the strongest potential candidate. The prospect of increased
militant action by the left, which is united only in its opposition to a second
term-for Balaguer, may force the President to rely increasingly upon the
military. Coup plotting by rightist elements is bound to increase as the
elections near:
BACKGROUND
Since his inauguration in 1966, President
Balaguer has made effective use of all the preroga-
tives of his office to maintain stability without
resorting to outright repression and has emerged
as an accomplished political tactician. At various
times he has courted both the right and at least
the moderate left and helped to keep both off
balance and divided. He has installed personally
loyal officers in important military posts and neu-
tralized others. The so-called constitutionalist mil-
itary-those who fought on the rebel side in
1965-have been largely purged or exiled to posts
abroad.
Balaguer's generally conservative policies
have maintained the backing of such essential
power elements as the military, business groups,
and the bulk of his right of center Reformist
Party (PR). The stability under his rule, following
the turbulence of the first several post-Trujillo
years, has wide appeal among Dominicans. An-
other plus factor is the general recognition that
the US strongly supports his administration.
Special Report
Balaguer's main accomplishment has been to
blunt challenges from both left and right and to
sustain himself in office. He has been less success-
ful in promoting economic or social progress. His
emphasis on personal loyalty rather than com-
petence in key appointments has contributed to
the government's lack of administrative skills and
technical expertise. In addition, Balaguer's own
cautious approach to reform has made his regime
resemble a holding operation rather than one
designed to alleviate the country's ills.
THE PRESIDENTIAL STYLE
Balaguer, a diminutive, greying, 62-year-old
bachelor, does not project any of the qualities so
intimately associated with the caudillo image of
past Dominican rulers. He does, however, possess
an ability to be many things to many people, to
hold himself above the political fray, and to es-
cape identification with the more unsavory as-
pects of rule. Despite Balaguer's long association
with Trujillo-he was the dictator's puppet presi-
dent in the closing days of the regime after serv-
ing in various governmental posts for nearly three
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decades-he was never popularly identified with
Trujillo's excesses. Even today, perhaps partly as
a result of Balaguer's own self-effacing political
style, repressive or unpopular government tactics
are frequently blamed by the public on forces
beyond the President's control.
Balaguer himself frequently cultivates such a
popular attitude, and deflects criticism from him-
self, by picturing one or another government in-
stitution currently under fire as a semiautono-
mous body which will be "investigated." This
disclaimer of responsibility has an element of
truth in military and police activities where head-
strong commanders may hold sway, but is less
than convincing in an administration where deci-
sion making has tended to become centralized in
the president's office. Although this tactic has
largely proven effective, Balaguer has frequently
appeared insensitive to the accusations, and in
some cases the just grievances, of his political
opponents.
The approach of the 1970 elections points
up one of the major weaknesses inherent in the
Balaguer style-the failure to build political insti-
tutions that would provide the groundwork for
future stable growth. The President's personalistic
and centrist style of governing has inhibited the
development of the judiciary and the congress,
for example. Government policies have prevented
the growth of any viable trade union movement.
Balaguer has neglected his own Reformist
Party as well and has largely ignored lower level
organization. Partly as a result of his insensitivity,
Balaguer faces a prospective split even in his
party. Dissident factions are maneuvering to block
his nomination at the upcoming, although still
unscheduled, national convention. The dissidents
have been encouraged by the maneuverings of
Vice President Lora, who desires the Reformista
nomination for himself.
Special Report
BALAGUER AND T-IE REFORMIST PARTY
The Reformist ;Party, however, owes its
existence to Balaguer'~ presidential career. It was
founded in 1963 by three small party groupings
after Balaguer, then in exile, had been denied the
opportunity to run in the 1962 elections on an
electoral technicality., It existed chiefly to pro-
mote his return to the country and his candidacy
in the next election. Balaguer said that he in-
tended to develop an enduring party organization,
but few steps have been taken in this direction.
The Reformist Party has served as Balaguer's cam-
paign vehicle but little else, and the President has
depended more on his personal political strength
than on the party.
President Balaguer, whether wooing the voters or
trying to cement relations with the military and
labor, never neglects the personal touch.
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Balaguer's independence was perhaps never
more obvious than on 27 February of this year
when he publicly appealed to "the people" to
guide his decision on re-election and indicated he
would not be swayed by petty political leaders or
members of his own party. Since 1966, dissatis-
faction has increased over Balaguer's inattention
to party matters and over his failure to build the
party through generous use of government pa-
tronage and funds. Balaguer enjoys a reputation
for personal honesty, and he has not been overly
charitable in handing out posts to party hacks.
Many of the President's supporters are consider-
ably more authoritarian and conservative in their
outlook than he and have probably resented even
his infrequent overtures to the left.
The growing disenchantment has found
voice in the presidential aspirations of Vice Presi-
dent Lora. An unimaginative but loyal party bu-
reaucrat, Lora has been waging a determined cam-
paign to secure the party's nomination. The first
Special Report
few months of this year witnessed a proliferation
of pro-Lora, ostensibly Reformist Party - allied
organizations. Lora is well aware of Balaguer's
strength and has attempted to keep these organi-
zations at arm's length, hoping to avoid an open
break with his chief. On the other hand, he is
almost sure to give at least tacit support to fur-
ther efforts to secure the nomination in the ex-
pectation that Balaguer may at some point re-
nounce re-election. The relationship between the
two men, never close, is likely to deteriorate
further.
Balaguer's speech on 27 February, hinting at
his own candidacy, has had some effect on Re-
formist Party dissidents. The solidly pro-Lora
mayor of Santo Domingo, for example, has pub-
licly indicated he will su ort the President if he
The relationship between the two men, never close,
is likely to deteriorate further
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Balaguer's tendency to place himself above
the party and Lora's own maneuvering offer the
possibility of a party split, but the majority of
rank-and-file Reformist Party supporters appear
to be Balagueristas first and Reformistas second.
Barring a major political upheaval or a complete
rejection of the party by Balaguer, they appear
more likely to follow the President's lead than to
risk their share of the political pie.
MILITARY SUPPORT
Balaguer has had to expend considerable ef-
fort to retain the essential backing of the military.
The ongoing purge of the so-called constitutional-
ist officers and the cashiering of even enlisted
troops with suspected political ties on either the
left or right, has assured the President of at least
surface unity in the armed forces. A military
reorganization shortly after he took office in
1966 helped to break the strength of powerful
unit commanders, and officers presently in key
positions are considered personally loyal to Bala-
guer. The President has maintained a delicate bal-
ance between contending military factions, and
there has been relatively little bickering. What
little discontent has surfaced has been directed at
high-ranking officers and not at Balaguer person-
ally-in part a tribute to his political manipula-
tions. Balaguer has not pressed for any extensive
military reform, undoubtedly reluctant to arouse
his key supporters. The security forces' swollen
ranks have remained largely intact, and local com-
manders have proved ingenious in circumventing
streamlining and personnel cuts.
The military probably believes it owes Bala-
guer some debt for thwarting demands for a wide-
spread military purge in the reaction in 1961
against everything associated with Trujillo. Bala-
guer undoubtedly profited from military support
in 1966 when he opposed the distrusted leftist
candidate, Juan Bosch. As President, he has not
neglected opportunities to improve his personal
Special Report
relations with the military. Visits to military es-
tablishments are commonplace, and Balaguer fre-
quently presents promotions to both officers and
enlisted men individually in lengthy ceremonies.
At least over the short run, military unity is
further reinforced 6y the memory of the ruinous
debacle of 1965 when the military quickly split
into two warring factions.
The military is not completely at the Presi-
dent's beck and call-he has been unable, for
instance, to curb completely a penchant for harsh
repression and ext>allegal activities. During April
when student disorders and assassinations of secu-
rity forces personnel led to pleas from the mili-
tary for a free hand, Balaguer only partially suc-
ceeded in reigning in military plans for reprisals.
Many of the military commanders are to the right
of Balaguer and have chafed under the restraints
which have prevented them from vigorously at-
tacking Communist forces. Some of them were
probably also unhappy when Balaguer cashiered
the chief of police on 20 April, seemingly in
response to the political outcry over harsh police
methods.
Balaguer's political opponents will be at-
tempting to exploit these largely latent dissatis-
factions. Vice President Lora, if he chooses to
oppose Balaguer, ill be cajoling military com-
manders with promises of less restrictive policies
and more lucrative opportunities in new posts. At
this time, however, the military appears ready to
support Balaguer in preference to any other
potential candidate.
THE RIGHT
The far right 'remains a potent, if amor-
phous, political force. It probably poses a greater
potential threat to I a.laguer than the left because
of the possibility that it might secure military
backing. The President has been relatively success-
ful, however, in blunting the right's traditionally
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strong influence. Balaguer's astute handling of the
military has been partly responsible for this; his
caution in implementing reforms has helped
assure its neutrality. The economic and social
elite, often not a cohesive group, has appeared
relatively satisfied with the state of affairs. Right-
ist politicians have remained disorganized and
unable to influence policy significantly; some
have joined the government team.
The chief party on the right, the Democratic
Quisqueyan Party (PQD), is a prime destabilizing
factor although of secondary electoral impor-
tance. It was spawned by supporters of General
Wessin y Wessin, leader of the regular military in
1965 and a fanatical anti-Communist. Wessin, an
avowed presidential candidate, returned from
exile in early 1969 and quickly became a strident
administration critic. The PQD is alleged to have
been involved in conspiracies with almost all ele-
ments of the political spectrum. Although the
PQD's military support is probably quite limited,
some factions on the left are probably encouraged
by the hope of obtaining military backing
through an alliance with Wessin.
Tentative con-
tacts and rumors o plotting are i ely to increase,
especially as long as Balaguer remains in the race
and a broad antire-election front remains at least
a theoretical possibility.
RELATIONS WITH THE LEFT
The strength of the left has ebbed since
reaching its zenith during the 1965 rebellion. The
major party on the non-Communist left, the
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) of Juan
Bosch, has been dealt a series of defeats. The
Communists have fragmented, and their influence
in labor has waned. Only among students has
leftist extremist sentiment remained undimin-
ished. Under present circumstances, the left pos-
sesses the capability to provoke significant
Special Report
disorder and unrest, but as long as those forces
presently arrayed with Balaguer avoid divisive
infighting, it probably cannot challenge the gov-
ernment effectively either at the polls or in the
streets.
THE PRD
A succession of setbacks has eroded the
PRD's popular strength since the overthrow of
Juan Bosch in 1963. Attendant frustrations have
prompted an increasingly radical policy. Bosch
himself is embittered by the past. From his self-
imposed exile in Europe, he courts an extremist
following with his thesis of "dictatorship with
popular support," which disdains any electoral
solution. The rhetoric of some party leaders has
also assumed an increasingly radical tone. In May,
PRD Secretary General Pena Gomez, Bosch's
delegated party chieftain, put the US on notice
that if "42,000 marines were needed in 1965,
then 100,000 would be needed in 1970" if Bala-
guer were re-elected.
Even in a country where inflamed polemics
are standard, such extreme positions help Bala-
guer isolate the party by identifying it with the
Communists. This hardens the military's attitude
even further and seriously reduces the party's
chances to participate as a responsible opposition.
The PRD parliamentary bloc-the only legislative
opposition-has been boycotting congress since
April, when it charged the government with "po-
litical repression." Rank-and-file members seem
to lean to an even more militant stance, with
some undisciplined elements cooperating with
Communist terrorist groups on a limited scale.
An influential moderate element, however, is
firmly opposed to Bosch's policies and has
pressed for participation in the next elections in
preference to violent, revolutionary opposition.
Official PRD youth groups, too, have resisted
efforts to stampede them into an extremist
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The Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) is faced with a prospective
moderate-radical split.
stance. While Pena is more of a political realist
than Bosch, his subordinate position often forces
him to try to lead both party factions rather than
attempt a reconciliation on his own initiative.
The PRD's future course, given the often
quixotic stance of its "maximum leader," Juan
Bosch, and the general reluctance of any lesser
figure to disagree publicly with him, is likely to
undergo further twists and turns, responding both
to internal party quarrels and external events. As
long as Balaguer seems to be in the race, the party
will continue to use the threat of its abstention
and the specter of another civil war to induce him
to withdraw. Despite the PRD's theoretical com-
mitment to revolutionary ideology, practical con-
cerns will prompt some search for a compromise
in 1970. The intense debate in inner party circles,
however, suggests that the differences will not be
resolved by a majority vote, and the PRD's elec-
toral support may be further splintered.
OTHER LEFTIST PARTIES
The Revolutionary Social Christian Party
(PRSC) is the only other established party on the
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left that is likely ~o have a significant role in the
election. Since 19166, when its radical policies and
an alliance with Bosch proved an electoral disas-
ter, it has generally tried to stake out a position
of more constructive opposition. It participated,
for instance, in the 1968 municipal elections,
when the PRD abstained.
A pre-national convention in May selected
party leader Alfonso Moreno as its 1970 standard
bearer, apparently subject to confirmation in
November. The convention agreed "in principle"
to contest the elections, although the party even
hinted at one point that it might support a coup.
The Social Christians, like the PRD, will probably
hedge on participation as long as Balaguer remains
in the race. It is, however, likely to participate
chiefly to establish itself as a national political
force, especially irk' the event of PRD abstention.
The only other group on the left which gives
promise of developing into a major political force
is the National Conciliation Movement (MNC),
prompted by the prospective candidacy of Hector
Garcia-Godoy. The' former provisional president
(1965) and recent ambassador to the US-he re-
signed in May to return home to participate in
politics-may well be the most popular candidate
the left could putforward. The MNC has been
established only to', serve as the personal-electoral
vehicle for Garcia-Oodoy, who is seeking to pro-
mote a coalition Of moderates and leftists. He
would still need al! significant vote split among
center-right candidates in order to have much
chance of winning.
Should he somehow win, his prospects
would be greatly c]duded by military enmity. The
military considered him overly lenient toward the
extreme left, and it still resents his exiling of
certain members of the regular forces. In addi-
tion, his relatively progressive views are probably
somewhat suspect by the right.
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The frustrations of the left stem partly from
Balaguer's success in managing two sectors that
could provide them with considerable support-
students and labor.
STUDENTS AND LABOR
The national university, a stronghold of left-
ist extremist sentiment, has provided Balaguer
with a prickly, but not unmanageable political
problem. This year, the semitraditional student
demonstrations, sparked by a request for an
increase in the government-controlled budget,
continued for months. Balaguer did not hesitate
to use the armed forces to intervene when campus
disorders flared last year and he would probably
react forcefully if the students seriously threat-
ened public order. Given the highly politicized
student body, demonstrations could well flare up
again soon. Government policies, however, have
not been overly harsh, and Balaguer has largely
maintained public backing for his moves.
Labor has largely been brought to heel.
Labor dissent has been kept within fairly well-
defined limits, and Balaguer has generally suc-
ceeded in divorcing labor from politics and forc-
ing extremist union leaders out of the influential
posts they gained after Trujillo's death. The
government's paternalistic and restrictive prac-
tices have rendered the three major labor federa-
tions relatively ineffective politically. Private
employers have adopted a similar outlook, and
labor agitation in the independent and unaffili-
ated unions has been held to a minimum. Bala-
guer does not neglect the personal touch, even in
the labor field. During the traditional May Day
labor celebrations, he personally greeted some
2,000 guests at a palace reception.
The administration's practices have had obvi-
ous drawbacks. Perhaps the most serious is the
stunting of any responsible trade union growth,
making possible the emergence of extremist lead-
Special Report
ership in a time of crisis. Unemployment remains
high, and the wage freeze is unpopular with rank-
and-file labor elements. In part, this accounts for
Balaguer's lack of support in the cities, where the
austerity program has hit the hardest.
The Social Christian Labor Federation
(CASC) has recently risen to greater prominence
with a more politically oriented and antigovern-
ment line. Its bid for leadership has included, at
least temporarily, an alliance with the Commu-
nist-dominated labor federation. Despite its
appeal to the more potentially volatile sectors-
youth and the unemployed-CASC has yet to
show evidence of attracting widespread support.
THE CHURCH
There have been some surface indications
that the Catholic Church's tacit allegiance to Bala-
guer is flagging. Since early this year, influential
members of the clergy have publicly voiced their
dissatisfaction with the slow pace of reform,
especially in the agrarian field. A pastoral letter
from one of the country's six bishops, critical of
the campesinos' plight, and several supporting
declarations from a substantial number of parish
priests have all made headlines. Although the
clergy was initially careful to avoid attacking the
government directly, its pronouncements have
been interpreted as political criticism, and leftist
forces have made haste to welcome their newest,
albeit somewhat hesitant, ally.
THE EXTREME LEFT
Orderly campaigning could well be inter-
rupted by terrorism perpetrated by elements of
the splintered Communist movement, but only a
grossly excessive government reaction or inability
to cope with the level of violence would be likely
to offset the present political trends. Although
the 1,300-odd Communists, grouped in six differ-
ent parties and various sub-factions, are capable
of launching isolated guerrilla attacks or
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prompting disorders and terrorism in Santo
Domingo, the security forces could contain their
efforts. Even if the disparate elements were recon-
ciled, they would not pose a serious threat with-
out the support of the non-Communist left.
The Dominican Popular Movement (MPD)
has been the most active Communist group in
recent months, assassinating some armed forces
personnel, apparently willing to risk military
reprisals. In February and again in March its
rumored plan for an "armed uprising," quickly
aborted in the face of government countermeas-
ures, was sufficient in itself to prompt a wide-
spread reaction. The incident illustrated the Com-
munists' weakened position, but also reflected the
potential danger that they still pose.
The government's precautionary measures
made obvious the futility of any attempted coup;
yet the rumors generated concern. In the charged
Dominican political atmosphere, rumor is often
considered fact. An overreaction from the secu-
rity forces, who often do not differentiate be-
tween the Communist and non-Communist left,
could prompt moderate and extremist elements
to make common cause. Additional provocations
by the extreme left, probably with the aim of
fostering violent agitation and laying the ground-
work for a reaction that could lead to a coup, are
likely.
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
Balaguer's economic policies have been an
extension of his political style-cautious and com-
mitted to reform more in name than in fact, with
the real emphasis on stability. His aversion to
technocrats and his emphasis on personal loyalty
rather than expertise have proven to be additional
impediments to rapid reform. The relatively con-
servative policies that Balaguer has followed, how-
ever, probably do not reflect so much his political
philosophy as his assessment of short term
priorities.
Special Report -8
The administration faced a formidable eco-
nomic task in 1966.; As a result of the insurrec-
tion in 1965, GNP in constant prices dropped 14
percent from 19641 to 1965, and investment
expenditure dropped by nearly 50 percent. Con-
currently, the rate of unemployment, already one
of the highest in Latin America, rose further.
Immediately upon assuming office, Balaguer
imposed an austerity program, freezing wages in
both the public and private sectors. Import con-
trols were instituted, especially on consumer
goods, and the government cut back current
expenditures; central bank credit was similarly
limited. In general, these policies have helped to
maintain internal price stability and to contain
the trade deficit.
Partly as a result of these restrictive meas-
ures, however, economic recovery has been slow.
During 1967-68 the increase in GNP barely
matched the annual $.5 percent population rise,
and unemployment is still estimated at between
20 and 30 percent of,the work force. In addition,
the economy has be, highly dependent on
foreign assistance. In FY 1966-68, US and other
external assistance averaged $60 million annually.
The large Dominican share of the US sugar quota
is another major prop for the economy.
The Balaguer government has been reluctant
to push programs that entail substantial political
risk. Despite lip serrlce to agrarian reform, for
instance, there has been little or no action. A
recently proposed agricultural incentive law is
generally vague, contains no mention o land ten-
ure reform, and appears inadequately financed.
Currency devaluation, to help curtail imports and
boost exports, has been rejected partly because of
opposition from economic interests.
On the plus side? the government has trans-
formed an unwieldy and graft-plagued public
enterprise system into an at least manageable
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Economic Indexes (1960 = 100)
structure. Balaguer has tried to promote private
investment through enactment in 1968 of an
industrial incentives law and the establishment of
two free trade zones-areas where raw goods for
manufacture and re-export are exempt from
export and import taxes. Such policies have
helped to control the severe balance of payments
deficit Balaguer inherited.
Economic prospects for 1969 are mildly
encouraging, although dependent on a number of
external factors. Recovery from the 1967-68
Special Report
drought and an improved export outlook, along
with a related upturn in industrial and commer-
cial activity, point to a growth in output of about
6 percent. This is contingent, however, on a con-
tinued high flow of foreign aid, maintenance of a
liberal sugar quota, and continued political
stability.
1970 ELECTIONS
The elections are bound to reveal many of
the latent frustrations stemming from 1965. The
unsettling presence of Wessin and the prospective
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return of individuals like Hector Aristy, a leading
figure in the short lived "constitutionalist cabi-
net," are bound to resurrect old grudges and
inject new uncertainties into an already uneasy
situation. The gradual tendency for political
parties and individual leaders to vacate the politi-
cal middle ground may increase during the cam-
paign period.
The issue of Balaguer's re-election is the
focal point for dissent. The opposition parties
have denounced re-election, linking "continu-
ismo" (extended one-man rule) to the odious
practices of Trujillo. Despite the political ammu-
nition provided by the issue, there is no evidence
that it has yet had a significant impact outside of
those groups that might normally be expected to
oppose Balaguer.
In the meantime, it is increasingly obvious
that Balaguer is moving toward a second run at
the presidency. His continued hectic pace and
characteristic weekend politicking as well as his
seeming desire to place his personal stamp on
Dominican politics as a sustained relief from
instability argue that he may well make the
attempt. Despite Vice President Lora's campaign,
the Reformista majority in congress passed a reso-
lution last month calling _ on Balaguer to seek a
second term. General Perez y Perez, head of the
armed forces and one of the more political figures
to hold that post, has publicly termed re-election
a "national necessity." Whether Balaguer is stage
managing a groundswell or whether it stems from
the actions of associates anxious to curry future
political favor, it will heighten the opposition's
fears and harden positions. Acts such as the con-
gressional resolution, which smack of political
impropriety and arm twisting, will help give sub-
stance to charges of "neo-Trujilloismo."
Balaguer's political strategy undercuts the
campaigns of two of his most formidable prospec-
tive opponents. Vice President Lora is finding it
difficult to garner support as long as politicians
must keep a wary eye on Balaguer's intentions.
Garcia-Godoy is billing himself as the peoples'
united front candidate, but faces the prospect
that Balaguer, in casting for support outside his
own party, may follow, the same tactic. In addi-
tion, it allows Balaguer, whatever his ultimate
decision, to deal in coming months from a posi-
tion of strength, rather than as a lame duck.
PROSPECTS
If Balaguer announces for re-election, he is
likely to face increased, instability. Elements on
the left would be more firmly committed to force
his ouster. Factions within the President's own
party are dissatisfied, and the various campaign
strategies, in a country where personal loyalties
run far deeper than party affiliations, could easily
prompt splits. Any further critical Church pro-
nouncements, while they probably would not
seriously erode Balaguer's campesino support,
would raise the political temperature. Despite
these liabilities, Balaguer's reservoir of political
credit is deep, and at this point he must be
considered the favorite should he run.
The left faces increasing political frustra-
tions. Disorganized and weakened, it is con-
fronted by the prospect of a rightist victory in
1970, but is unlikely to be reconciled to the role
of a passive opposition. As a consequence, the
sporadic terrorism that, has plagued Balaguer is
likely to increase. In the short run, however, the
left's dwindling base of support makes it likely
that the government will be able to maintain its
uneasy stability through a combination of polit-
ical acrobatics and milijtar muscle, as long as it
avoids major blunders.
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Special Report _10-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927A007100060003-7
 Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100060003-7
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100060003-7