WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT SENEGAL: SENGHOR REGIME FACES FURTHER UNREST

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Senegal: Senghor Regime Faces Further Unrest
Secret
N9 44
23 May 1969
No. 0371/69B
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SENEGAL: SENGHOR REGIME FACES FURTHER UNREST
The serious student and labor agitation that shook Senegal a year ago marked
the end of a relatively peaceful political era and the beginning of a period of
domestic unrest. The degree of discontent revealed by strikes and demonstrations
caught the moderate, pro-French government of President Leopold Sedar Senghor
by surprise. During the past year, the government has dealt with student and labor
turbulence on a crisis-to-crisis basis, unable to formulate a comprehensive approach
to dealing with the country's ills.
Serious economic problems underlie both the popular grievances and the
government's difficulty in coping with them. Senegal's agricultural economy is
stagnant and shows little prospect for reviving. The government's already precarious
budget has been further strained by the recent costs of trying to buy domestic
tranquility, and even if Senghor were to attempt needed reforms, he would be
handicapped by a severe lack of funds.
At this time, Senghor's opposition is still fragmented and pursuing divergent
goals, and there is no discernible political alternative to his rule. The forces for
change in Senegal are clearly growing more insistent, however, while the major props
of the regime are eroding. In this volatile atmosphere, any spark could ignite an
explosion, and Senghor can no longer fully count on French military support to
bolster him.
BACKGROUND
Senegal became independent in 1960 with
better short-term prospects for stability than
many of its African neighbors. During the lengthy
colonial period, widespread dissemination of
French culture coupled with extensive Islamiza-
tion had blurred tribal lines and had helped to
create a relatively homogeneous society. Senegal
was the first foothold of the French in Africa,
and its capital, Dakar, served for many years as
the administrative, commercial, and economic
center of France's West African colonial posses-
sions. The country developed a sophisticated,
Western-oriented political elite that easily as-
sumed the reins of leadership upon independence.
Moreover, with the breakup of the French West
Africa Federation, Senegal inherited a trained,
although inefficient and unnecessarily large, corps
of functionaries to staff the new government
bureaucracy.
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Special Report
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23 May 1969
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President Senghor, a moderate pro-French
intellectual who is internationally known as the
poet-apostle of African and Negro dignity, estab-
lished himself in the years before independence as
Senegal's pre-eminent political leader. During this
period, he founded the forerunner to the ruling
Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS), building pri-
marily on a rural base composed of the country's
traditional aristocracy-local clan and Muslim re-
ligious leaders-and the peasants. He also gained
the support of a coalition of middle-class and
minority groups. In 1960, he became the coun-
try's first president.
An intraparty factional hassle in 1962-63
cost the party many of its most progressive mem-
bers and left Senghor more dependent than ever
on the most conservative elements of society.
Aware that this dependence severely limited his
options, he set out to broaden his base of sup-
port, and his new policy of national unity was at
least superficially successful. By the end of 1967,
the President had neutralized the country's small,
illegal, Marxist-oriented parties and had gathered
all significant opposition parties and factions un-
der the UPS umbrella.
Senghor undoubtedly considered his unop-
posed re-election in February 1968 as a popular
mandate to continue the policies of his adminis-
tration. He was shocked, therefore, by the depth
of discontent revealed in the student and labor
demonstrations that shook his government only a
few months later. There had been some signs of
growing unhappiness-resurgence within the ranks
of the labor movement and continuing agitation
at the often-turbulent University of Dakar-but
little indication that an antigovernment mani-
festation of such dimensions was brewing. Its
outbreak at that time was primarily a result of the
psychological impact of similar demonstrations in
France, which has retained a dominant influence
in Senegalese political, economic, and cultural
affairs since independence.
Special Report
The first clear-cut indication of cracks in
Senegal's facade of national unity came on May
Day, 1968, when the country's major labor organ-
ization, the National Union of Senegalese Work-
ers, broke its shaky alliance with the government
and party to stage an independent and strictly
worker-oriented demonstration instead of its
usual, government-sanctioned parade. The union's
leaders, personally discouraged by their failure to
secure nominations to the party slate for the
February elections, were also responding to pres-
sure from their constituents, whose purchasing
power had steadily declined since independence.
Several days later, the union presented a compre-
hensive list of grievances to the President.
Student troubles erupted at the end of May
when a radical student group's month-long cam-
paign against changes in government scholarship
policy culminated in a general strike at the uni-
versity, and sympathy strikes in many secondary
schools. The union was initially reluctant to join
the students because of Senghor's promise to con-
sider labor demands, but it called a general strike
several days later when security forces intervened
to quell the student disorders. The strikers were
also joined by youths from Senegal's large body
of unemployed, which numbers some 50,000 in
Dakar alone. Senegalese troops were deployed to
quell the looting and rioting that accompanied
the strike, and troops from the 1,200-man French
Army garrison in Dakar were deployed to guard
strategic facilities. By the time order had been
restored, a number of students, as well as many
prominent labor leaders, had been arrested.
This crisis sharply illustrated Senghor's con-
tinuing failure to satisfy the more progressive,
urban elements of society. The concessions that
the government has since been forced to grant the
dissidents, in order to gain time to deal with the
country's other pressing problems, have also
tended to demonstrate the benefits of militancy
to other, less-politicized elements of society.
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Moreover, the crisis has pointed up the bank-
ruptcy of the party structure, particularly in
urban areas.
THE DISSIDENTS
Labor: The events of May and June served as
a rallying point for the labor movement, which
throughout most of its brief history has been
badly fragmented by factional, ideologically influ-
enced conflict. There were some refusals to heed
the strike call by moderate leaders outside of
Dakar, the locus of union power and the leftist
stronghold, but the strike was fairly effective. In
the wake of the crisis, Senghor, more sympathetic
to the grievances of the laborers than of the
students, quickly negotiated an agreement that
satisfied several significant union demands, and he
agreed to consider others.
Senghor's concern over the new-found unity
of the labor movement was probably heightened
by the realization that the unions might be able
to step in to replace the party as the locus of
urban power. To reduce labor's potential as an
autonomous political force, Senghor gave tacit
support to leaders who had opposed the general
strike, and he worked within the ranks of the
more militant leaders to win their cooperation. In
November, he proposed that the union renew
relations with the party in exchange for minis-
terial and other top government posts. The union
leadership, probably aware of the difficulty of
maintaining its independent posture when the
government was going out of its way to satisfy
worker demands, opted for the political spoils
and agreed in principle to the proposal.
The formula for participation in the govern-
ment and party that has been officially endorsed
by all factions of the union follows the general
format outlined by Senghor, although at least for
bargaining purposes it calls for greater union con-
trol of its representatives than the President in-
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tended. The major stumbling block to final agree-
ment on participation has been Senghor's insist-
ence that the union first hold a national congress.
Labor leaders are certain that Senghor will try to
manipulate such a congress to ensure the election
of progovernment leaders, and that this would
lead to a resplintering of the movement. They are
therefore anxious to have an agreement in hand
to present to the congress for ratification. The
congress,which had been tentatively scheduled for
June 1969, apparently has now been postponed.
Despite their present limited detente, an-
other rupture between government and labor is
possible. There have been indications of militant
leftist opposition within labor to the cooperation
proposal. In addition,, differences between moder-
ates and leftists have also reappeared in connec-
tion with the current student unrest, in which the
union has thus far participated only as a medi-
ator. Any violence by the government in dealing
with the volatile student situation. could force the
union moderates to heed leftist calls for greater
support to the students.
During the past few months, moreover,
rank-and-file union members have begun to doubt
whether the government will meet its commit-
ments to them and to fear that only the union
leadership will benefit by participation in the
government and party. In recognition of this dis-
affection, students have recently begun to direct
their appeals for support directly to the workers.
If plans for the national congress do eventually go
forward, union leaders may increasingly feel the
need to resume their militant, antigovernment
posture to assure their re-election at the congress.
Students: Senghor has had more difficulty in
making peace with the students than with the
union. Although last year's strikes were tied to
the issue of government scholarship policy, they
were more accurately a condemnation of the
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whole French-structured educational system and
of the spreading political and economic malaise
that educated Senegalese youth identify with
Senghorism. Youth has generally looked to gov-
ernment and politics as the only avenues for
transforming the country. Students find, how-
ever, an inflated government bureaucracy and a
system in which political activity is effectively
stifled by the existence of only one legal party
directed by long-time, firmly entrenched political
hacks. Thus, the students are apt to believe, with
reason, that there is little room for them in politi-
cal circles. Senghor has been unable to convince
them that they can play a significant role in their
country's future.
Senghor has displayed little sympathy to-
ward student dissidence. Generous university
scholarships afford the students a comfortable
life, and Senghor apparently has been annoyed by
the intransigence displayed by this privileged
elite. During the disorders in May, 1968, he used
force to end the strike after the university stu-
dents reportedly rejected an offer to negotiate
with the government. His announcement the fol-
lowing month that the university would remain
closed for a year so that reform could be accom-
plished may have been intended as a punishment
as much as a concession to the students.
Continued student agitation, new expres-
sions of support for the students by labor leaders,
and pressure from the French, who have provided
between 80 and 90 percent of the university's
funds, forced Senghor to back away gradually
from his adamant position. In September, he ne-
gotiated an agreement with the hitherto unrec-
ognized leftist student group that had instigated
the spring disorders. In return for a promise of
student peace, the agreement provided for the
reopening of most of the university, abandon-
ment of the government's controversial new
scholarship policy, and student-government
negotiation over future educational reform.
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Student agitation resumed in March of this
year, however, when secondary school students
went on strike to protest a disciplinary action at
an agricultural school and an alleged government
failure to meet scholarship payments. Despite
their agreement with Senghor, the university stu-
dents quickly gave their support to the protest.
Union leaders have thus far refused to back up
the students, and, in the absence of labor support,
the strikes have not been fully effective. At pres-
ent, the government appears to maintain the
upper hand.
Although a commission on university reform
was set up in January, it has not yet sent its
recommendations to the government. It has been
unable to overcome differences on the degree to
which Africanization should be undertaken to
replace French educational methods, and may not
have met since March. The leaders of the drive for
basic educational reform include the university's
French rector and many French faculty members
as well as several liberal Senegalese officials. Op-
posed to this reform group have been the stu-
dents, their parents, and the union, who claim
that any reform under such auspices will merely
be a cover for continued French hegemony. An-
other segment of opinion is made up of
proponents of the status quo, including many of
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the African professors at the university, who fear
the loss of their present privileges, under the
French university system and conservative French
Government interests. Senghor reportedly has
stated that if an agreed reform program is not
presented by July, which seems unlikely at this
point, he will impose his own ideas.
OTHER DISSATISFIED ELEMENTS
The discontent with French domination of
Senegalese life that has been evident in both the
labor and student unrest has been an underlying
theme of dissatisfaction in other elements of so-
ciety. For example, Senegalese small businessmen
met in June 1968, under the patronage of Presi-
dent Senghor, to form an organization dedicated
to pursuing their interests. It quickly became evi-
dent that the primary goal of the new group
would be to seek Africanization of the economy
and that the organization was too anti-French
and, by open implication, too anti-Senghor to suit
the President. Two months later, Senghor spon-
sored the formation of a rival organization of
more moderate hue, the Federal Council of Sene-
galese Economic Groups (COFEGES). With the
support of the government, and-at Senghor's
behest-the French business community,
COFEGES has since absorbed most of the mem-
bers of the initial group. Despite Senghor's ef-
forts, however, the businessmen have recently be-
gun to demand again the rapid Africanization of
the private sector of the economy.
In recent months, discontent has also been
expressed by other, usually neutral forces in the
Senegalese political equation. Members of the
generally complacent government bureaucracy are
becoming more dissatisfied over their inability to
find jobs in the administration for their relatives.
More important, high-level civil servants who owe
their positions to Senghor have openly indicated
that they think the President is losing his grip on
the country. Senghor recently blessed the forma-
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tion of a new group, the Nation and Development
Club, composed of members of the intellectual
and governing elite. The organization, which has
been nicknamed "the civil servants' COFEGES,"
is to discuss national problems and recommend
solutions to the President. Although Senghor ap-
parently had hoped that it would provide a con-
structive outlet for the frustrations of the Sene-
galese officials, the club has already taken an
aggressive nationalistic and anti-French stance,
and there are indications that Senghor is now
attempting to dilute its growing influence.
SENGHOR'S SUPPORTERS
Throughout the difficulties of the past year,
Senghor has found it increasingly hard to number
his supporters. His political party proved com-
pletely ineffective in countering the crisis last
year, and Senghor's recent efforts to revitalize it
have been unsuccessful. The party's decline in
vigor since independence has probably been ac-
celerated by a lack of competition, internal divi-
sions, and, more recently, by a growing awareness
among local clan leaders of Senghor's decreasing
ability to dispense the spoils that they have come
to expect in return for their support. Moreover,
there have been recurring, although unconfirmed
rumors of renewed opposition activity, possibly
including support for student dissidents, by mem-
bers of the former African Regroupment Party-
Senegal (PRA), a once-legal opposition group
absorbed by the ruling party in 1966. At least
partially in response to these rumors, Senghor
made a goodwill visit in March to the traditionally
restive Casamance region, which is a former
stronghold of the PRA as well as the most iso-
lated and economically neglected area of the
country.
At present, Senghor appears to rely most
heavily on three props: the army, the French, and
marabouts-powerful traditional religious leaders.
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The army has been generally apolitical and com-
mitted to upholding the legal government. Al-
though there have been indications of friction
between Senghor and the armed forces com-
mander, General Diallo, over the past year, Sen-
ghor reportedly is making an effort to accommo-
date Diallo's complaints. The general, who dis-
counts the political ambitions sometimes attrib-
uted to him, can probably be counted on to
support Senghor. There have been reports of dis-
sent among the ranks of the junior army officers,
particularly over the government's failure to deal
more forcefully with the dissident students, but
this has not yet reached such proportions as to
cast doubt on the army's loyalty. The army might
be reluctant, however, to intervene on Senghor's
behalf in a general political upheaval.
Senghor's relations with the marabouts are
less certain than they were a year ago. The mara-
bouts, leaders of the economically and politically
powerful Muslim brotherhoods to which some
two thirds of the Senegalese population belong,
exert an enormous influence on the social be-
havior and mores of their followers and are thus
probably the most politically powerful figures in
Senegal. The two major brotherhoods, the
Mourides and the Tidianes, have competed for
political influence and financial support from the
government, and much of Senegalese post-inde-
pendence politics has hinged on the activities and
rivalries of these brotherhoods.
During the 1968 student-labor crisis, Sen-
ghor was able to call upon the leader of the
Mourides to provide visible and effective support
to his government. Since then, however, that
leader has died and the loyalty of his successor is
open to question. The Tidiane leaders, who have
been less favored with handouts, have generally
been willing to provide lip service rather than
active support.
Special Report
Although Senghor has attempted, apparently
with some success, to mend his fences with the
brotherhoods, he is handicapped by his decreasing
ability to give the leaders the favors that have
secured their support in the past. Furthermore,
the marabouts are coming under increased pres-
sure from their followers, who have just had their
worst crop in years and are beginning to wonder
if Dakar, rather than Allah, is responsible for their
troubles. A severe drought-caused food shortage
has contributed to peasant unrest.
The resignation of French President De
Gaulle places some doubt on the extent to which
France can be counted on to bail Senghor out of
his troubles. France's official relations with Sen-
egal have been closely bound up with the personal
ties between the two leaders, and Senghor has
exhibited nervousness about his relations with a
France minus De Gaulle. It seems unlikely that
the change in Paris will result in an early French
military or economic disengagement, but it could
well mean a decrease in French willingness to
support Senghor in the face of a concerted do-
mestic challenge.
THE STAGNANT ECONOMY
Underlying most of Senegal's ills are eco-
nomic problems for which no easy solution is
evident. The economy is dependent on the for-
tunes of a single crop, peanuts, which accounts
for 78 percent of Senegal's exports. Peanut pro-
duction had been artificially encouraged and sup-
ported by French subsidies until December 1967,
when France's preferential price system was ter-
minated under the provisions of association be-
tween the EEC and 18 African states. Although
the loss of the subsidies has been partially offset
by the European Development Fund of the EEC,
revenues from the crop have also been affected by
a sharp decline in the world market price for
peanut oil and by a third consecutive poor
harvest.
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The poor peanut harvests
Peanuts Awaiting Shipment
--_.,.
had
on all sectors of the economy.
Gross domestic product ac-
tually declined in 1967, and
growth in industrial produc-
tion was barely perceptible. In saw
spite of the government's re-
ceptive attitude to foreign in-
vestment, and an advantageous
investment code, the lack of
any known resources and the
small domestic market militate
against large inflows of foreign
capital.
Barring the discovery of
exploitable mineral resources,
Senegal's economic future looks bleak. Even with
perfect weather conditions, another mediocre
peanut harvest is expected because of a decrease
in the use of fertilizers by the financially hard-
pressed peasants. A significant increase in the
world market price for peanuts is unlikely, and
efforts at crop diversification have thus far not
been notably successful. Moreover, there is an
ever-increasing migration of the peasants to the
city and, often, to unemployment. Senegal is
hardly able to meet the costs of its operating
budget, over half of which supports its cumber-
some civil service, and economic development will
remain largely dependent on the continued inflow
of foreign assistance. Although economic cooper-
ation with neighboring countries could provide
the larger market for which Senegal's now under-
utilized industries and transport facilities were
originally designed, Senghor's continuing efforts
to promote regional cooperation are unlikely to
be effective in the near future.
OUTLOOK
With little respite from its economic prob-
lems in sight, Senegal's political future is uncer-
Special Report
tain. Even if he undertakes reform of the educa-
tional system, Senghor will not reach the roots of
student unhappiness and is likely to face con-
tinued unrest. Further labor agitation is also prob-
able. In such volatile situations, any incident
could trigger a chain of events that eventually
could lead to his removal.
Although the past year has shown just how
ineffective his carrot-and-stick approach is in deal-
ing with the various elements of Senegalese so-
ciety, Senghor is unlikely to'undertake the drastic
reforms, such as streamlining the large and cor-
rupt government bureaucracy? that would help to
ease the country's ills. Moreover, aware of the
continuing need for French' economic assistance,
he is not likely to make more than gestures to-
ward reduction of French influence. Yet, despite
the growing disenchantment with Senghorism,
there is at present no visible political alternative.
There are increasing indications that Sen-
ghor, although publicly exuding optimism, is
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wearying of his task. Among these is the recent
suggestion, probably made at Senghor's behest,
that Senegal return to a parliamentary govern-
ment in which he presumably would retain his
position as a world figure but pass on his do-
mestic problems to a prime minister. Senghor is
also experimenting with new organizational struc-
tures, possibly hoping that they will replace the
worn-out party mechanism. If the present regime
is not swept away in a revolutionary upheaval,
Senegal's future leadership may emerge from
these new structures, either under Sen hor's tute-
lage or of its own momentum
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