WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT RUMANIA'S SECOND GENERATION COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Rumania's Second Generation Communist Leadership
Secret
ARCHIVAL RECORD
Af;
SASE nrru4n TO 23 May 1969
Ar"ENCY ARCKNE$ No
0371/69A
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RUMANIA'S SECOND GENERATION COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
The Rumanian party and government are now under the command of "second
generation" Communists, to a greater degree than all others in Eastern Europe. This
new generation's leader, party Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu, since coming to
power in March 1965, has revitalized the party and government by bringing in
younger, better educated men who want to bring controlled change to a conservative
hierarchy. Ceausescu's approach has been piecemeal and gradual; he has eased the
old guard to the sidelines rather than purging it and has expanded rather than
reduced the size of party and state agencies.
The leadership is young, united and competent. Party careerists dominate the
elite bodies of the party and government, but the leadership makes wholesale use of
technical and administrative personnel, both to serve its own interests and to
broaden its popular support.
The "new" leadership has in recent years slowly begun to substitute discussion
for ceremony, innovation for repetition, and inquiry for rationalization. It seems
intent on shifting attention from exclusive preoccupation with the performance of
individuals to shortcomings in the system itself. Moreover, it is using its new-found
popularity at home, stemming in large part from its firm opposition to the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, to promote increased contact with its people.
CEAUSESCU'S GUIDING HAND
Circumstances gave Ceausescu the reins of
his party at a fortuitous time. As Gheorghiu-
Dej's chosen successor, he assumed power only
after Dej had set Rumania firmly on the path to
greater economic and political autonomy. Sig-
nificantly, however, Ceausescu assumed power
just before the ninth party congress at which
party statutes were revised and the new constitu-
tion approved. Thus from the beginning Ceau-
sescu was able to influence the country's eco-
nomic and political policies along lines reflecting
his own background, personality, and goals.
Guided by idealism in his ideology and puri-
tanism in his personal life, Ceausescu is deeply
committed to national Communism. He appears
to believe that Communist tenets provide a work-
able base for a society that can satisfy its citizens.
He has repeatedly stumped the country calling for
an improvement in attitudes toward everything
from eliminating ethnic prejudices and increasing
work discipline to giving greater honor to mother-
hood. Although the practical results of such ex-
hortations are difficult to measure, he has estab-
lished at least a civic consciousness which has
narrowed the traditional gap between the
provinces and central authority in Bucharest.
THE NEW GENERATION
Ceausescu has assembled a body of sub-
ordinates of his own generation, outlook, and
inclination. They are for the most part men from
small towns and of peasant stock, more
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CEAUSESCU AND HIS TOP SUBORDINATES
Age 51 years
Titles Secretary General of the RCP; Presi-
dent, Council of State; Supreme Com-
mander, Armed Forces; Chairman,
Front for Socialist Unity
Member : Party Presidium, Secretariat, and Execu-
tive Committee
Age - 67 years
Titles Premier
Member - Party Presidium and Executive
Committee
Responsibility : International Relations
Remarks - Most important carryover from Dej
era; highly effective representative
of regime's national Communist
course at international forums;
likely to retire soon
Age : 46 years
Member : Party Presidium, Secretariat, and
Executive Committee
Responsibility : Leading ideologue; also oversees
culture and agitation-propaganda
Remarks : Close to Ceausescu; very effective
representative of party in interparty
contacts and meetings
Age
Title
Member
44 years
First Deputy Premier
Party Presidium and Executive
Committee
Responsibility Maurer's alter ego; also state admin-
istration
Remarks Like Niculescu-Mizil, Verdet has
had a meteoric rise in party and
state complex
Age : 53 years
Titles : Chairman, Economic Council; Vice Pres-
ident, Council of State
Member : Party Secretariat and Executive Com-
mittee
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Age 53 years
Member - Party Secretariat
Responsibility Security and military affairs
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nationalistic in attitude than the holdovers from
the older generation.
These new, younger officials escaped the
strict discipline imposed on Dej's generation by
the Soviet-led Comintern. Moreover, they do not
owe their accession to authority directly to the
Soviet Union as did Dej, who assumed power
when Soviet troops occupied the country. Most
of them have not studied extensively at higher
party schools in the USSR; the majority acquired
their ideology from Rumanian teachers.
His own background enabled Ceausescu to
make sound choices. He had, for example, been
working extensively with youth organizations and
the party cadres. This gave him the opportunity
to size up promising personnel, and later to
further the careers of many whom he has since
promoted to prominent positions on the national
level. He also had extensive experience with
minority groups in Rumania, notably the Hun-
garians, from whom he acquired insights about
their problems useful for formulating policies
once he took over the reins of power.
Ceausescu has favored technicians, special-
ists, and administrative types in his appointments,
particularly in the economic area, but lie has
carefully controlled their influence by bringing
into the party apparatus officials who came up
through the party ranks. Within the party's elite
agencies-the Permanent Presidium, Secretariat,
and Executive Committee-17 officials are men
who have spent their entire careers in the party.
Three are economists, and one is an attorney.
In contrast, the Rumanian governmental
structure at the ministerial level includes 18
engineers, seven economists, four attorneys, and
two social scientists. Thus technical expertise is
readily available to carry out the regime's pro-
grams to develop the country's industrial base.
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Rounding out the ministerial level personnel are
13 party types, some with technical expertise,
who are in a position to use their party and
technical experience in the governmental sector.
This presumably is part of Ceausescu's policy to
fuse party and government responsibilities.
HAND-PICKED YOUTH
Ceausescu's emphasis on youth is reflected
in the sharp decline in the average age of party
elite during the past four years. In the Presidium,
the party's policy-making body, the average age
of new members is 44.3 years; in 1965 the
average age was 55.4 years. In the Party Secre-
tariat, the average has dropped to about 45 from
about 48 years. Average ages of new members
also have declined in the Executive Committee,
the party's largest elite body, even though it was
formed as recently as 1965.
A more youthful central committee also
seems in store. As a result of a recent reshuffle,
15 of 27 new members of the expanded Council
of State are not yet members of the central com-
mittee, but they probably will be raised to this
level at the party congress expected to convene
this year. Also five of the 14 persons either
promoted or shifted to new ministerial slots on
the Council of Ministers can expect to be elected
to the central committee. The same trend is
discernible among first secretaries at the county
levels.
The average age of officials in national-level
governmental positions, on the other hand, has
risen. This in part reflects Ceausescu's method for
dealing with some "old guardists" whom he has
removed from policy-making positions in the
party to less influential posts in the government.
At the executive level of the Council of State, for
example, the average age of office holders has
increased from 54.6 in 1965 to about 59 now.
Significantly, Ceausescu also has placed several
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Special Report
Rumania: Changes in Leading Party Bodies
Since Ninth Party Congress, July 1965
July 1965 PERMANENT PRESIDIUM
(Established July 1965)
AGE
47 CEAUSESCU, N., Chmn.
52 APOSTOL G.
54 BIRLADEANU,A.
61 BODNARAS, E.
52 bRAGHICI, A.
63 MAURER,.I.G.
57 BTOICA, C.
SECRETARIAT
AGE
51
46
43
44
65
67
56
61
47 -EAUSESCU, N., Gen. Sec. 51
48 DALEA, M. 52
52 DRAGHIC.I, A. 53
49 MANESCU, M. 46
51 MOGI 1OROS, A. 53
42 NICULESCU-MIZIL, P. 41
49 PATILINET, V. 43
65 RAUTU, L. 48
42 NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.
51 RADULESCU, G.
06 RAUTU, L.
61 STOICA, C.
96 VOITEC, S.
47 CEAUSESCU, N.
12 APOSTOL, G.
89 BORILA, P._
41 BOONARAS, E.
12 DRAGHICI,A,
S DRAGAN, C.
44 BIRLADEANU, A.
41 MOGHIOROS, A.
1 SALAJAN, L.
10 MAURER, I.G.
May 1969
Estimated
Career Status
CEAUSESCU N.
NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.1
T$OFIN, V. I
VERDT, I.! 40*
BODNARAS, E.
MAURER, I.G.
APOSTOL,S.
STOICA, C.
CEAUSESCU, N.
DALEA, M.
MANESCU, M.
PATILINET, V.
POPE SC U, D. 2
TROFIN, V.
GERE; M, 2
STOICA, C.
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Established July 1965)
43 LUPU, P.
40 VERDET, I.
5$ VILCU, V.
3,111 BANC, I.
43 BLAJOVICI,P.
lII3 COLIU, D.
43 BERGHIANU, M. Alternates
44 GERE, M.
DANALACHE, F.
311 FAZE KAS, J.
DANALACHE, F.3
DRAGAN, C.
MAURER, I.G.
VILCU, V. 3
APOSTOL,G.
RAUTU, L.
STOICA, C.
STOICA, G.
VOITEC, S.
BANC, 1.
URAGANESCU, E.4
POPA 1:5,
POPESCU, D.$
BLAJOVICI, P.
GERE, M.
COLIU, D.
1. Strong supporters of Ceausescu promoted into party's top policy-making body
2. Backers of Ceausescu added to Secretariat
3. Supporters of Ceausescu advanced from alternate to full membership
4. Ceausescu "comers" who have acquired alternate membership
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CEAUSESCU,N.
FAZEKAS. J.
LUPU, P. 3
MANESCU, M.
NICULESCU-MIZIL, P.
RADULESCU, G.
TROFIN, V.
VERDET, 1.
BERGHIANU, M.3
BODNARAS, E.
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younger men in the Council, in order to have a
majority to which he can turn if need be.
The trend toward increased influence for the
younger generation also is evident in the compo-
sition of parliament, a unicameral body consisting
of 465 deputies. In the new parliament elected
last March, 16 percent of the members are less
than 35 years old, 58 percent are between 35 and
50, while only 26 percent are more than 50. The
Rumanian parliament is one of the youngest in
Eastern Europe.
Ceausescu has brought a number of new
men, almost all under 50, into the middle levels
of the party and government apparatus. They
share a number of characteristics: unusual ability,
the outlook of administrators with technical
expertise, and loyalty to Ceausescu rather than
party seniority.
PARTY RANK-AND-FILE
Since 1965, there has been a notable in-
crease in party membership, from about
1,300,000 in July 1965 to more than 1,860,000
at present. The party has never expanded so
rapidly, and rarely, if ever, has the average age of
members been as low. The purpose of this drive
has been to rejuvenate the party, to broaden its
popular base, and particularly to win greater
backing from peasants and intellectuals, as well as
from the minorities which have been the most
alienated from previous regimes. There are efforts
to flesh out the party organization in the country-
side in order to meet the increased demands
there. By appealing to intellectuals, the party
obviously wants to enhance its prestige as well as
attract into the party-state apparat those persons
having skills needed to achieve regime goals.
The effort toward making the party more of
a mass organization is an indirect expression of a
more liberal policy by the younger leadership
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toward the population at large, but there has, as
yet, been no other genuine manifestation of
liberalization.
UNITY
Party unity remains a hallmark of Ceau-
sescu's even though he has shunted aside the older
leaders, and the Soviets apparently have tried,
both before and after the Czechoslovak invasion,
to subvert his leadership. Ceausescu has adroitly
used the threat of invasion to popularize his poli-
cies. In May 1967 he sharply, albeit indirectly,
criticized the Soviets for "contacts outside the
organized framework." He said that "under such
circumstances, each party is fully entitled to take
every measure it considers necessary so as to
ensure its political and organizational unity, the
implementation of its political line." Last August,
Ceausescu again drove home this message of a
united party and government by having all party
and government bodies unanimously endorse a
resolution condemning the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia and reaffirming the right of national
sovereignty.
Ceausescu remains fully in charge. Differ-
ences that do emerge within the hierarchy reflect
conflicting views on degree, tactics, and timing
rather than on major substantive matters. There is
no reliable evidence that any individual or faction
opposes Ceausescu, even on such thorny issues as
the Arab-Israeli war, the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia, Rumania's role in the Warsaw Pact or in
the bloc economic organization, CEMA. These
issues have subjected the unity of the leadership
to a series of severe tests, all of which it weath-
ered intact.
This apparent absence of sharp differences
attests to the unity and homogeneity character-
izing the Rumanian party since 1957. It also
attests to the deftness with which Ceausescu has
nudged aside the "old guardists" in favor of his
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Changes in Rumanian Government Since August 1965
OLD Government
AGE
NEW Government
AGE.
57
STOICA, Chivu
President
51
CEAUSESCU, Nicolae
50
CRACIUN, Constanta
Vice President
65
SODNARAS, Emil
44
GERE, Mihai
Vice President
53
MANESCU, Manse
59
BORILA,Petra
Vice President
63
PETRESCU, Dumitru
63
MURGULESCU, G.
Vice President
63
PETERFI, Stefan
63
MAURER, Ion G.
Premier
67
MAURER, Ion G.
52
APOSTOL, Gheorghe
First Deputy Premier
44
VERDET, 1.
61
BODNARAS, Emil
First Deputy Premier
(not applicable)
54
BIRLADEANU, Alex.
First Deputy Premier
(not applicable)
39
BANC, losif
Deputy Premier
43
BANC, losif
47
GASTON?MARIN,G.
Deputy Premier
DRAGANESCU, Emil
39
FAZEKAS, Janos
Deputy Premier
43
FAZEKAS, Janos
42
BLAJOVICi, Petra
Deputy Premier
51
MARINESCU, Mahati
40
VERDET, Ilie
Deputy Premier
48
PATAN, Ion
50
RADULESCU, G.
Deputy Premier
55
RADULESCU, G.
(not applicable)
Deputy Premier
59
RAUTU, Leonte
BOABA, Alex.
CIOARA, G.
AGE
ALMASAN, Bujor
DRAGAN, Const.
DUMITRU, A.
GIOSAN, Nicolae
LEVENTE, Mikhail
MANESCU, Corneliu
MARINESCU, Mihai
MARINESCU, Ion
MOSORA, Dumitru
BALAN, Stefan
FLORESCU, Mihai
MACOVEI, P.
MARINESCU, Voinea
MOLDOVAN, R.
SALAJAN, L. Gen.
SCHIOPU, Bucur
SENCOVICI, Alex.
SIMULESCU, D.
SUDER, Mihai
VIJOLI, Aural
DRAGANESCU, E.
ONESCU, Cornel
AGACHI, Nicolae
ALMASAN, Bujor
AVRAM, Ion
BERGH IANU, M.
40 to 50 BLAJOVICI, Petie
BOABA, Alex.!
BOZDOG, Nicolae
GIOSAN, Nicdlae
GROZA, Octavian
LUPU, Petro t
MOSORA, Dumeru
APOSTOL, G.
BALAN, Stefan
BUGHICI, Simion
DANALACHEI F.
50 to 66 DUMITRIU, A.
GASTON-MARIN, G.
IONITA, Ion Geri.
MACOVEI, P.;
MANESCU, Cornel
MOGA, Aurel
SUDER, Mihai
VILCU, Vasile
BAICU, Ion
Age BALANESCU,IM.
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CHACIUN, Ind
GHIGIU, Metal
MURGULET, N.
ONESCU, Corbel
PIRVU, Virgil I
STANESCU, In
1OADER, Nicolae
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younger generation men. Moreover, for all his
alleged impulsiveness, Ceausescu apparently
makes an effort to obtain the views of everyone
before making a decision. He also stresses ac-
countability among the party leaders for actions
taken at policy-making sessions.
Moreover, Ceausescu seeks to prevent poten-
tial conflict in the party and government hier-
archy by warily bypassing technocrats in forming
the power elite. He studiously avoids overde-
pendence on technocratic-intellectual elements
lest this generate pressures for change that would
be anathema to his leadership at this time. Thus
the party jealously guards its prerogatives, in-
cluding the economic sector, where technicians
have come to the fore in other countries. There
has been little decentralization of economic deci-
sion making in Rumania. Even the economic
"reform" program, approved late in 1967, was
modestly conceived and, unlike those of many of
the other Eastern Europe countries, was not
drafted under pressure to resolve immediate eco-
nomic problems. Rather, it seeks to deal with a
long-range slowdown in the currently high rate of
industrial growth.
The new leadership also has been trying to
reduce the potential for conflict between party
and government officials. Ceausescu laid the
cornerstone for this policy at a national party
conference in December 1967. That conference
authorized a wholesale revamping of the national
administrative structure involving the fusion of
party and governmental positions at various
levels. Specifically, the conference approved the
principle that "a single comrade in the leadership
should take care of a specific field of activity in
both the party and state spheres," and that in
each of the 39 then newly constituted counties
the posts of the party first secretary and chairman
of the People's Councils should be held by the
same person.
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COMMITMENT TO CONTROLLED CHANGE
The new generation leadership has developed
a style of ruling which mirrors the conservatism
of Rumania's political heritage and takes account
of its geographical setting, but nevertheless allows
controlled political change. Committed to the
primacy of the party, the leadership, however,
does not insist on maintaining the political status
quo or reluctantly dole out concessions only
because of popular or other pressures. Its views as
to relinquishing or retaining internal political con-
trols change with the circumstances.
Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
for example, the regime established a new "mass"
organization, the Front for Socialist Unity, which
may in time gain a political significance of its
own. It already offers an avenue for political
consultation and discussion within a single na-
tional organization in the image of Yugoslavia's
mass organization, the Socialist Alliance. In
practical terms, it could act as a lightning rod for
the party, providing a device through which the
population could discuss fully as many opinions
and views as possible before the draft laws, and
especially the draft plans, are sanctioned by
constitutional organs.
The party's commitment to restricting
sharply the powers of the secret police, stream-
lining the state and economic apparatus, and
liberalizing cultural and educational standards to
some degree meets popular aspirations for a more
relaxed relationship between the regime and the
people. These aspirations, on the other hand, are
not uniform, nor are they expressed with continu-
ous vigor. Moreover, the leadership's task in
maintaining centralized control is simplified by
Rumania's lack of a democratic tradition.
The roles assigned to governmental institu-
tions are, however, changing. The Council of
State, which Ceausescu has headed since
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December 1967, is fast taking on the power that
the constitution assigns to it as the supreme body
of the state. A party central committee plenum
last March and a session of parliament a few days
later drove home the message of an enlarged role
for the Council. The Council has since been
expanded from 19 to 27 members, and it has
been made more representative of the body
politic; it now includes the chairmen of the
German and Hungarian nationality councils and
the president of the Union of Writers.
As the authority of the Council of State has
increased, however, the role of the Council of
Ministers, traditionally the locus of governmental
power, has correspondingly diminished. Shorn of
its authority over the Economic Council, which is
now a superagency responsible both to the central
committee and the Council of State, the Council
of Ministers' prerogatives were further curtailed in
March by the formal creation of the Council of
Defense. The establishment of this body, also
headed by Ceausescu, presumably reduces the
Council of Ministers' role in defense policy.
At the same time, Ceausescu has moved to
beef up the role of the Grand National Assembly
by expanding from six to ten the number of its
standing parliamentary commissions. The election
of strong, predominantly Ceausescu men to head
up these commissions and the expanded member-
ship now authorized for these commissions con-
tributes to the increased role for parliament.
DECISION-MAKING
Ceausescu controls a majority of members in
the central committee, which meets about every
two months to formulate and to endorse tactical
policy. Policy decisions during the periods be-
tween its meetings presumably are made either in
the Presidium or the Executive Committee. In
addition, the power elite convenes en masse at
least twice a year-usually in July and January-to
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thrash out general policy guidelines. These latter
sessions often are followed by speeches or state-
ments by Ceausescu or, by someone else speaking
for the party and government. These pronounce-
ments seem designed to "clue in" the party's
rank-and-file, the Rumanian populace, as well
as the other Communist ;parties.
The orchestrated , deployment of personnel
comprising the party's elite bodies is a hallmark
of Ceausescu's leadership. During frequent trips
to the provinces, particularly to minority areas,
Ceausescu invariably includes in his entourage
leading party figures who came from the areas
visited. Janos Fazekas, a deputy premier and an
ethnic Hungarian, often is a companion of Ceau-
sescu when the latter ventures into Transylvania,
while Premier Maure> frequently accompanies
Ceausescu to Germanic sections of the country.
Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he
dispatched to the provinces virtually the entire
party elite, to give speeches whipping up support
in the hope of deterring like actions against
Rumania. On earlier occasions there was some
skepticism over this practice but the invasion
greatly helped Ceausescu's effort to develop rap-
port with the provinces.
OUTLOOK
Ceausescu will continue to try to make
Rumania an efficient and modern state through
the creation of an integrated and centrally
oriented party and state apparatus. He un-
doubtedly sees this as the best way of ensuring
the nation's independence in the wake of the
invasion of Czechoslovakia and the implicit threat
posed by the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of
"limited sovereignty."
The leadership is aware that its ability to
sustain its national Communist course depends in
large part on maintaining a solid front internally,
and policies are shaped accordingly. Youth and
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Party or Government
Initiated
Character of the Action
19 June
20-21 August
Government
Government
Draft constitution proclaims Rumania a "socialist republic" and stresses
independent approach to national Communism
Parliament adopts new constitution and approves changes in govern-
ment personnel
27-28 June 1966
Party
P. Niculescu-Mizil and 1. Verdet, proteges of Ceausescu, promoted to
party presidium
3 January 1967
26-27 June
30 October
6-8 December
9 December 1967
Government
Government
Party
Party
Government
Verdet promoted to first deputy premier
Ministry of Internal Affairs is reorganized
Ceausescu cautiously encourages "cultural thaw" that he started in May
1965
Party national conference approves territorial-administrative changes,
economic reorganization, and further promotion of Ceausescu sup-
porters
Parliament approves fusion of party and government at national and
local levels
6-8 February 1968
21-22 March
6 April
22-25 April
Government
Party
Government
Party
Draft legislation liberalizes higher education
Ceausescu announces 30-percent cut in salaried party positions
Draft penal code emphasizes "socialist humanism"
Party ousts Alexandry Draghici from leading party and government
posts, continues to rehabilitate "nationalists," and openly denigrates
Gheorghiu-Dej for "misdeeds"
11 March 1969
14 March
August 1969 or
later
Party
Government
Party
Central committee plenum further strengthens Ceausescu's hold on
party and state complex
Parliament formally establishes the Council of Defenses with Ceausescu
as chairman
Tenth party congress slated
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ability in the party and state apparatus, will con-
tinue to be emphasized, but prerequisites will also
include loyalty to Ceausescu, dedication to party
supremacy, and nationalism.
For now, Rumania has rejected the concept
of a pluralistic society that is gaining ground in
other countries of Eastern Europe and Bucharest
jealously preserves both its control over and its
responsibility for nearly all organized activities.
The future trend was clearly set by the reorgani-
zation last March when it became more evident
than ever that the party's elite agencies will con-
tinue to direct the four most important spheres of
the country's life-ideology, foreign affairs, de-
fense, and the economy. In less important sectors,
however, the party leadership more and more
takes the position that, on a pragmatic basis,
control can be shifted to the state apparatus.
The Rumanian leadership appears stable and
committed to its present course. When changes in
the composition of the elite bodies take place,
they probably will strengthen the forces of the
younger, better educated technical and party
elements, who are among the most enthusiastic
champions of Rumanian independence.
The Ceausescu regime is highly nationalistic,
but it is not an ultraconservative force such as
that which controlled the country during the
1930s. The regime instead avoids encouraging the
revival of old national and ethnic rivalries and is
increasingly responsive to the major needs of the
country.
This quest for independence is foremost in
the expansion of the Rumanian's ties with the
non-Communist world. These political, eco-
nomic, and cultural ties increasingly expose
Rumanian officials and the Rumanian people to
other ways of doing things and will inevitably
make a lasting impression. What is more, the
promotion of these ties seems likely to expose, as
never before, political and economic contra-
dictions in the Communist system that a younger
generation will find increasingly difficult to deny
and to which it will have to find a means to
reconcile itself, a not impossible task.
F
Special Report _10-
SECRET
23 May 1969
I ovve For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100030002-1
 Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100030002-1
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/08/24: CIA-RDP79-00927AO07100030002-1