CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: 1959-1968

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Cuban Subversive Activities in -Latin America: 195~~~(~
1~:_~Flrri}CAF Cii.~iC:: ID ?1CICC,Cf , iCa
-1 C.
Secret
N?_ 1115
16 February 1968
Nn. n007/Fi8A
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CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: 1959-1968
The essence of the Castro regime's policy on
armed rebellion in the hemisphere-was established
in the early months of the regime's existence and
has not materially changed since then. The record
shows that "export of the revolution" has been a
dominant ambition of Castro's next to maintaining
his own firm grip on power at home. Indeed, the
Cuban leader is a ?'compulsive revolutionary"; a
man who sees himself as another Simon Bolivar,
destined to bring a new ?'freedom and unity" to
Latin America.
Castro has been consistent in this dream,
although he has pursued it with varying degrees
of intensity since 1959. Moreover, he has shown
himself capable of modulating his overt and covert
support for revolution in Latin America, depend-
ing on his assessment of the factors governing
the situation. The evidence is overwhelming that
Cuba made special adventuristic efforts in 1967
to establish "other Cubas and Vietnams" in Latin
.America.
Castro has been singularly unsuccessful, how-
ever, in achieving any real breakthroughs in the
hemisphere. Despite nine years of effort, no
guerrilla group in Latin America constitutes a
serious threat to any government today. The demise
of the Guevara-led venture in Bolivia proves that
even when Cuba puts its "first team" into a coun-
try, it will be doomed to failure in the absence
of real popular support-for the guerrilla cause.
On the other hand, while these harassments a.re
minor and containable, they pose expensive chal-
lenges to the Latin American governments involved,
and force them to tie up resources that are badly
needed elsewhere.
Early Years
Castro waged his revolution
during 1957 and 1958 as an in-
digenous Cuban movement. Once
he assumed power, however, it
became evident that he had set
for himself the-goal of "liber-
ating Latin America from US
domination." The earliest
public manifestations of this
revolutionary mission were the
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armed expeditions that set forth
from Cuba to such Caribbean coun-
tries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua,
and the Dominican Republic during
the first eight or nine months of
1959.
In private statements during
this period, Castro made it known
that he looked upon his success
in Cuba as merely the first stage
in a continent-wide effort. For-
mer Venezuelan president Romulo
Betancourt said that Castro came
to Caracas in January 1959--
scarcely three weeks after as-
suming power--to enlist coopera-
tion and financial backing for
"the master plan against the
gringos."
Castro sounded the keynote
for Cuban subversion on 26 July
1960, when he said, "We promise
to continue making Cuba the ex-
ample that can convert the cordil-
lera of the Andes into the Sierra
Maestra of the American continent."
The following September, he is-
sued his ringing "first declara-
tion of Havana," which unmistak-
ably showed that he looked upon
the Cuban revolution as the van-
guard of a general Latin American
political upheaval.
The Cuban subversive effort
gradually became a more carefully
organized endeavor far different
from the first hastily organized
and ill-conceived raids of 1959
and early 1960. By 1961-1962,
Cuban support began taking many
forms, ranging from inspiration
and training to such tangibles
as financing and communications
support as well as some military
assistance. Mechanisms for
conducting subversive operations
were established at home and
abroad. Radio Havana's inter-
national service was inaugurated
on May Day 1961, and has beamed
an increasing stream of propa-
ganda to the Americas ever since.
During this period, the
Cuban agency for foreign espio-
nage and subversion, the General
Directorate of Intelligence (DGI},
was established within the
Ministry of Interior. The DGI
benefited from the advice of at
least five Soviet intelligence
experts from the very beginning.
This organization sent over
$1 million in US currency to
the Venezuelan insurgents alone
between 1961 and 1964, and over
US$200,000 to Marco Antonio Yon
Sosa in Guatemala in 1963.
From late 1961 through
1963, the Cuban regime stepped
up the tempo of its foreign oper-
ations. The most spectacular
event during this period was
the discovery of a cache of
three tons of weapons on a
Venezuelan beach in November
1963. The weapons included
light automatic rifles and
submachine guns definitely
identified as among those
shipped to Cuba from Belgium
in 1959 and 1960. There were
also mortars, bazookas, re-
coilless rifles, and ammunition
of US manufacture. The motor
of a small boat found near the
cache site was one of several
Cuba had earlier acquired from
Canada.
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Communist documents seized
by the Venezuelan authorities
shortly after the discovery of
the cache indicated that the
equipment was intended for the
paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan
Communist Party for Plan Caracas--
aimed at disrupting the presi-
dential elections in December of
that year.
During this period, Cuban-
trained guerrillas also tried to
initiate operations in southern
Peru and in Argentina. Cuban
agents in La Paz tried to stimu-
late Bolivian groups to take up
armed action against the Paz
Estenssoro government. Finally,
Cuban financial assistance was
sent to Brazilian subversive
elements seeking to establish
guerrilla training camps in the
state of Goias, as well as to
peasant leader Francisco Juliao
and then-governor Leonel Brizola.
After Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's
son, Raul Roa Kouri, was appointed
ambassador to Brazil in April
1963, he served as a channel for
Cuban funds and guidance to
Brazilian subversives. At one
point Roa described Brizola as
"the Brazilian with the greatest
revolutionary potential. I'wo
Cuban couriers were on their way
to Brazil with clandestine funds
earmarked for Brizola and his
associates when President Goulart
was overthrown in April 1964.
In short, during this peak
period of Cuban subversive efforts,
Castro encouraged in an almost
haphazard fashion a wide variety
of extremist groups in many coun-
tries to begin the armed struggle.
At least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin
Americans received either guer-
rilla warfare training or polit-
ical indoctrination in Cuba be-
tween 1961 and 1964.
Disagreement with the
USSR, 1964
By 1964, Castro's indis-
criminate subversive efforts
had brought him into disagree-
ment with Soviet leaders and
into conflict with leaders of
most of the principal orthodox
Communist parties in Latin
America. During a secret meet-
ing in Havana in November 1964,
the Soviets helped to work out
a secret compromise agreement
which called for support to
insurgency efforts in a few
Latin American countries, but
specified that in all cases
the local Communist Party should
determine whether violent or non-
violent means were to be pursued.
As a result of this meet-
ing and setbacks in Venezuela,
Panama, and Brazil during
1963 and 1964, Castro muted
his revolutionary exhortations
for about a year and narrowed
his focus to three countries--
Venezuela, Guatemala, and
Colombia--where bona fide guer-
rilla bands were in the field
and actively engag_Lng govern-
ment security forces.
The Cubans began chipping
away at the edges of the agree-
ment with the Soviets during
1965. At the Tri-Continent
Conference in January 1966,
Castro issued a more general
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call for insurgency in Latin Amer-
ica. Cuban propaganda returned
to the more strident pitch noted
in 1963. The operational empha-
sis, however, in comparison with
the earlier years, changed to
the selected list of target coun-
tries--Venezuela, Guatemala,
Colombia, and Bolivia. Elsewhere,
the Cubans sought more general
opportunities that would lend
themselves to foreign exploita-
tion.
Current Sup o~ chanisms
in those countries
where there is no significant
insurgency under way, the Cubans
have been developing a support
mechanism while they wait for
a suitable opportunity and ade-
quote assets. Moreover, there
is evidence that. Castro has cre-
ated a special 60-man intelligence
and commando unit--an arm of the
DGI--to promote and support armed.
clandestine penetrations in var-
ious Latin American countries.
Cuba's fishing vessels are ap-
parently at the disposal of this
unit, which was first identified
following its involvement in a
landing last May in Venezuela.
The DGI, which manages all of
Cuba's espionage and subversive
activities, was formed in 1961
following a general reorganiza-
tion of Cuba's internal security
and foreign intelligence ser-
vices. Its director general is
Manuel Pinei ro--known as "Red
Beard"--who has been closely
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
CUBAN STATIONS OR
LEGAL CENTERS IN EMBASSIES
DEPARTMENT OF
INFORMATION SERVICES
Information Se ctian
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Colonial Bureau
(Foreign Residents)
SOVIETADVISORS ~~.e~..DGIHEADQUARTERS
Deputy Director
(Illegal Agents)
Section A - Europe
Section B - Central Amerie
Section C -South Americ
DEPT. OF TECHNICAL
OPERATIONAL SUPPCMT
Chemical Laboratory
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~ (Guerrillas, Sabotage)
GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEPARTMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION SPECIAL SCHOOLS ILLEGAL CENTERS
Workshops
Administra
For Depart
Technical
tion Sectiore
ments
Operational Support, LegalCenters.
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Information Services
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associated with Raul Castro since
1957 and has been working with
Cuban foreign intelligence since
1959. Under his leadership and
the tutelage of several Soviet
advisers, the DGI has been
molded into a highly profes-
sional intelligence organization
along classic Soviet lines.
The DGI is divided into
three operational units. These
are a department of "legal
centers," an "illegal" depart-
ment, and a department of
"national liberation." The de-
partment of legal centers con-
ducts operations by handling
its agents through Cuban diplo-
matic missions--in Latin Amer-
ica these exist only in Mexico
and Jamaica. The illegal de-
partment handles agents sta-
tioned permanently in countries
with which Cuba does not have
diplomatic relations. This is
done directly from Havana by
a complicated system of com-
munications. The national
liberation department is per-
haps the largest in the DGI
and is responsible for pro-
moting and directing revolu-
tionary activity in Latin Amer-
ica and other areas of the
world. These three units are
backed by various support
elements.
The DGI's methods of
selecting, training, and as-
signing foreign agents reveal
a high degree of professional-
ism. There are two basic cat-
egories of these agents: one
is a deep-cover clandestine
group--recruited, trained, and
subsequently "run" by the il-
legal department--charged with
collecting information as well
as penetrating local governments.
The second group is recruited and
directed by the department of na-
tional liberation to guide and
support revolutionary activities.
Guerrilla warfare training
for the latter group is conducted
in national units ranging in size
from three to 25. Courses usually
last three to six months, although
in special cases they may last as
long as a year. Training covers
all aspects of guerrilla warfare,
including weapons handling, ex-
plosives, sabotage, demolition,
military tactics, combat engineer-
ing, and means of countering anti-
insurgent ~.ctivities. At least
2,500 Latin Americans are known
to have gone to Cuba for such
training since 1961.
This number by no means
represents a maximum figure for
the guerrilla potential. Many
of these trainees, for instance,
have in turn trained others when
they returned to their home coun-
tries. Some, however, probably
became disillusioned with the
difficulties of initiating armed
revolution, and left the field
to more enthusiastic Castroites.
Tine only international coopera-
tion among these trainees appears
to involve those whose countries
are neighbors.
In the last year or so,
Havana has demonstrated an im-
proved capability to correspond
clandestinely with its agents
abroad. This ability has not
yet been translated into a
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noticeably more successful sub-
versive effort, at least partly
because the Latin American gov-
ernments have become increasingly
aware of the danger. Presumably
for the same reason, there has
been less evidence of. Latin Amer-
icans traveling to Cuba for train-
ing, and there have been fewer
and fewer reports of Cuban ef-
forts to-fund Latin American revo-
lutionary groups.
service and propaganda machine,
Cuba has been able to bring about
limited international cooperation
of national movements and parties
in some areas. This has helped
to create or strengthen infrastruc-
tures upon which future revolu-
tionary activities may b_e built,
by making it easier to channel
funds, move agents and leaders,
transmit communications, and
obtain false documents.
Other support and propa-
ganda mechanisms include Radio
T3avana, which today i.s beaming
approximately 170 hours a week
in Portuguese, Spanish, and even
Creole, Quechua, and Guarani to
Latin America. It also trans-
mits open code messages to Cuban
intelligence agents. Cuba's
literature distribution appara-
tus provides the glossy magazine
Cuba, the theoretical monthly
Critical Thought, speeches by
Cuban leaders in pamphlet form,
and the economic review Panorama
Latinoamericana. Havana's of-
ficial press service Prensa
:Latina has stringers and re-
porters throughout the world.
Its employees function as an
intelligence gathering and sup-
port mechanism. At the present
time, Cuba is also supporting
several local Communist news-
papers and periodicals--the most
recent example being the Uru-
guayan radical left daily news-
paper Epoca.
In addition to the con-
struction of this support
mechanism and the growth and
improvement of its clandestine
Two groups providing such
support to the Venezuelan move-
ments were uncovered in Colombia
in 1966, and one of the Colombian
movements has chosen the Vene-
zuelan border region as its area
of guerrilla operations. Thus
it can support Venezuelans moving
either way across the border, and
its members are in position to
cross into Venezuela themselves.
The Salvadoran Communist Party
has provided Salvadoran documen-
tation to Guatemalans for travel
to bloc countries, and also pro-
vided sanctuary for Guatemalans
and Hondurans.
The Current Situation
As is evident, Castro's be-
havior in advocating and assist-
ing revolution has not always
been logical and realistic. He
usually has been canny enough,
however, to keep his risks low.
The form and extent of his ef-
forts, vocal and material, have
varied with changing circumstances
but his essential theme continues.
He insists that revolutionary vio-
lence is necessary to bring about
any meaningful change in Latin
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America. Moreover, he claims that
guerrilla units, when boldly led,
can take to the field, sustain
themselves there, and precipitate
the conditions that will assure
their eventual success.
'?Che?? Guevara's ill-fated
efforts in Bolivia and Cuban in-
volvement in the insurgent land-
ing in Venezuela last year are
excellent examples of Castro's
theories in action. His activi-
ties during 1967 and his oft-re-
peated pledges--as recent as
12 January 1968--to "fulfill his
duty of solidarity" with revolu-
tionaries throughout the world,
clearly demonstrate his determina-
tion to spread his revolution.
Despite his declaration of
November 1964 that he would not
support would-be insurgent groups
which were not under the control
of the orthodox pro-Moscow Com-
munists, Castro has continued to
give moral, material, and finan-
cial support and training to se-
lected groups. Furthermore, he
made it clear in speeches during
1967 that he does not feel bound
by the 1964 agreement and repeated
his persistent thesis that violent
revolution is necessary to bring
about any meaningful political
or social change.
Furthermore, on two occa-
sions he flung accusations of
cowardice and betrayal at the
orthodox Communist parties in Vene-
zuela and Colombia, which do not
give full support to dissident
guerrillas. He appeared particu-
larly irked that a Soviet delega-
tion had been trying to improve
relations and expand trade in
Colombia and Venezuela. He com-
plained that members of the Commu-
nist camp--obviously the Soviet
Union--who deal with oligarchies
in countries where insurgents are
active are betraying the revo-
lutionaries.
His statements during 1967
reflected his intense disillusion-
ment with the urban based pro-
Moscow Communist parties in gen-
eral. This same theme was pro-
pounded by his theoretical ad-
viser, Jules Regis Debray, who is
now languishing in a Bolivian jail
for his role in the insurgency
there. Debray's thesis, which
merely reflects Castro's and Gue-
vara's own thinking, is that Latin
America needs a dynamic, offen-
sive, rural-based guerrilla action
in which the basic guerrilla group
takes precedence over the urban-
based party and, in fact, becomes
the "authentic" party.
In his speech in March 1967,
Castro keynoted these ideas by
stating: "If, in any nation,
those who call themselves Commu-
nists do not know how to fulfill
their duty, we will support those
who--even though they do not call
themselves Communists--behave like
real Communists in the struggle."
Again, on 12 January 1968, Castro
referred to the Latin American
parties by implication when he
spoke of some parties being in
the "rearguard" of the anti-im-
perialist struggle.
The Significance of LASO
The first Latin American
Solidarity Organization conference
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(LAS O) closed on 10 August 1967
with a major ideological state-
ment on Cuban foreign policy and
a blueprint for solidarity with
Latin American guerrillas by
Castro. Although he made an ef-
fort to pay homage to pro-Soviet
Communists by stating that "in
some countries violent revolu-
tion may not be an immediate,
but a future task," he left no
doubt that Guba views "armed
struggle" as the only valid course
to achieve "national liberation."
He also indicated that Cuba was
prepared to advance this doctrine.
The conference and Castro's
return to a militant foreign pol-
icy widened still further the
policy differences between Cuba
and the pro-Soviet Communist par-
ties, and caused discontent among
the Soviets themselves. This
challenge to Soviet influence in
the Latin American Communist move-
ment and Castro's calculated af-
fronts to Moscow, however, have
not prompted the Soviets to re-
taliate by economic aid cutbacks.
On the other hand, the Soviets
will probably continue to give
private encouragement to their
friends in the Communist world
to persuade Castro to change his
radical policies. They can also
be expected to continue efforts
to build diplomatic, commercial,
and other contacts with Latin
America, despite Castro's rant-
ings.
Current Targets
For the past year, therefore,
Havana's effort has been to lay
a solid foundation for future
revolutionary action, to attempt
to unite feuding factions of the
extreme left under one leadership,
to extol revolutionaries who are
willing to take up the fight, re-
gardless of whether they are bona
fide Communists, and in Venezuela
and Bolivia actually to send in
trained Cuban Army officers and
central committee members to ad-
vise and lead insurgents.
In Bolivia, the Cubans made
a real effort to translate their
revolutionary theories into prac-
tical guerrilla action by sending
Ernesto "Che" Guevara and other
high Cuban officials to dominate
the guerrilla movement and to be-
gin a continent-wide armed move-
ment to start "other Vietnams."
The all but complete annihilation
of the insurgents by the Bolivian
Army, and the death of "Che" Gue-
vara, however, have severely dam-
aged the myth of Cuban guerrilla
invincibility and will probably
dim the enthusiasm for the time
being of some Latin American revo-
lutionaries who have been consid-
ering guerrilla activities.
In Venezuela, Cuban funds,
training, propaganda support, and
some advisers are going to two
separate dissident groups, The
Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR) and Douglas Bravo's
group. Last May, Venezuelan guer-
rillas, escorted by Cuban military
personnel, landed near the coastal
village of Machurucuto. Four Cu-
bans involved in the landing were
later captured by Venezuelan au-
thorities. There are indications
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that other landings took place dur-
ing 1967, and at least one impor-
tant landing occurred in July 1966.
Venezuelan guerrillas are
now being hard pressed by govern-
ment forces. In August, their
urban terrorist organization was
paralyzed by the arrest and cap-
ture of a number of its leaders.
There is also information indi-
cating that friction has de-
veloped between the Cuban and
Venezuelan members of the guer-
rilla groups. The Cubans are not
satisfied with the revolutionary
enthusiasm of their Venezuelan
compatriots, and the Venezuelans
resent the '?advice" the Cubans
are giving them--the same type of
friction that developed in Bo-
livia.
In Guatemala, where Cuba
has been giving assistance and
guidance to guerrilla and ter-
rorist groups for more than three
years, recent army operations
against the insurgents and the
formation of rightist vigilant
groups have played havoc with
guerrilla activities. The rebels,
however, are regrouping and are
still capable of harassing the
government. Terrorist attacks
on Guatemalan officials on 16 Jan-
uary clearly demonstrate the
rebels' tormenting capabilities.
Two US officials were also killed
during these attacks.
Havana radio quickly pub-
licized the shooting incident and
indicated that "Che" Guevara's
death was instrumental in uniting
the Guatemalan guerrillas. In
view of the often repeated Cuban
offer to help active guerrilla
groups, the Guatemalan rebels can
probably count on more training
and financial assistance from
Havana.
In Colombia, there was re-
newed and intensified guerrilla
activity during 1967. The Cubans
are giving assistance and train-
ing to several groups, some of
which are remnants of bandit gangs
that have operated in the country
for years.
The group which has received
by far the most Cuban aid is the
Army of National Liberation (ELN).
Some of its members were recently
arrested while trying to slip back
into the country carrying small
arms, ammunition, and radio trans-
mitters. They reportedly told
Colombian intelligence officers
that they and a number of other
Colombians had just completed a
guerrilla warfare course in Cuba
and that the weapons had been
given to them there. The ELN
stepped up its activity with at
least two raids in January, in-
cluding the ambush slaying of
three members of an army patrol.
Follow-up action by the military
resulted in the killing of five
ELN guerrillas.
The pro-Soviet Communist
Party (PCC) is reportedly trying
to convert its guerrilla arm, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARO),
into inactive "self-defense" groups.
This follows a request from the
Soviet Union to avoid any inci-
dents that might complicate its
newly established diplomatic
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relations with the Colombian Gov-
ernment. It is probable that
many FARC guerrillas, rather than
lay down their arms, will join
forces with the ELN or the newly
formed Popular Army of Liberation
(EPL) .
This new group has estab-
lished itself in northwestern Co-
lombia, has carried out several
isolated attacks and reportedly
is making preparations for full-
scale guerrilla warfare if the
government carries out its threats
to move into the area. This
group is the guerrilla arm of
the pro-Chinese Communist Party
of Colombia, but may seek as-
sistance from the Cubans if no
other source of aid develops.
(See maps following text for lo-
cation of insurgent groups in
Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala,
and Colombia.)
Prospects
Cuba has given ample notice
that it intends to continue. its
propaganda, training, and finan-
cial support to selected revolu-
tionary groups--especially those
in Colombia, Guatemala, and Vene-
zuela. Given Castro's goal of
developing and exploiting oppor-
tunities for further armed vio-
lence, plus the vulnerabilities
that exist in many Latin American
countries, new outbreaks of
Castro-sponsored rural-oriented
violence in Latin America can be
expected. Such ventures will have
little chance of success, however,
unless they exploit genuinely
popular antigovernment causes and
develop a broad peasant base and
a charismatic indigenous leader.
Guevara's defeat in Bolivia shows
that despite Cuba's mechanism for
sponsoring guerrilla groups and
Castro's willingness to infiltrate
key Cuban Army officers into se-
lected countries, these efforts
will at best produce only minor
harassments of the central gov-
ernments for the foreseeable fu-
ture. The danger increases, how-
ever, in those countries where
political and economic develop-
ment has been marginal, and where
a threat of a split in the usual
guarantors of stability--i.e.,
the military or oligarchy--is a
growing possibility. Should this
occur, what had been minor dis-
turbances in the countryside could
suddenly mushroom into a politi-
cal force out of proportion to
its numbers. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM)
SECRET
Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT
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 Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
~ SECRET
BOLIVIA: Area of Guerrilla Activity
CONFIDENTIAL
69178 i-66 CIA
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
SECRET
VENEZUELA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity
an Juan delo', sorros`
MIR, PCV area
of operation
Bravo group-40/s0
MIR-ass
PCV-ZO/so
CONFIDENTIAL
69177 1-68 CIA
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
~ SECRET ~""'
GUATEMALA: Area of Guerrilla Activity
~maf~ena go
13 /Vov. 30 (yon Sosa)
FAR 200 (Cesar MonEes)
,c,a~la~
Im
y#, ~
,r ~~ _" ~~a~pa
Gtiarertrala city - '~ ter"
SECRET
2~an ~risEotrak
CONFIDENTIAL
69176 1-68 CIA
Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
 Approved For Release 2006i1211~~1~1~-~L~P79-00927A006300020004-9
COLOMBIA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity
ELN-zoo/220
FARC-2so/soo
Elo~encia
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
69175 1-68 CIA
Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
 Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2006/12119 :CIA-RDP79-00927A006300020004-9