WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT FINLAND'S CONTROVERSIAL PRESIDENT KEKKONEN A CERTAINTY FOR RE-ELECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006200040004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
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• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Finland's Controversial President Kekkonen
A Certainty for Re-election
FF.I/CDF Pages 1, 3-
Secret
N9 44
5 January 1968
No. 0001/68A
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`4 *C 'F
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FINLAND'S CONTROVERSIAL PRESIDENT KEKKONEN--A CERTAINTY FOR RE-ELECTION
In mid-January, Finnish voters will begin an
electoral process that is certain to culminate in
the formal re-election a month later of President
Urho Kekkonen to another six-year term in office.
Kekkonen, who has been president since 1956, has
no serious challengers--largely because aspiring
Finnish politicians do not want to jeopardize their
future prospects in a race they cannot win. Kek-
konen does not dominate the Finnish political scene
because of his personal image, but rather because
of his success in maintaining a cordial relation-
ship with Moscow, a policy he has convinced the
Finnish people is a necessity for survival. The
Soviet leadership in turn has made it clear that
he is one of the few Finnish politicians who en-
joys their confidence and support.
The next six years are likely to see a con-
tinuation of Finland's foreign policy, the main
elements of which are standing aside from dis-
putes involving the major powers and avoiding any
action that would bring into question Finland's
commitment to a policy of friendship and coopera-
tion with Moscow. Recognizing that the Soviets
require something more than verbal assurances on
this score, Kekkonen can be expected periodically
to make initiatives in the foreign policy field
which his Scandinavian neighbors and others in
the West will not like but which may gain him
credit in Moscow.
The Finnish Presidency--
Past and Present
The Finnish constitution
gives supreme executive power
to the president, and he appoints
the premier and cabinet. Unlike
most other European presidents,
the Finnish president is a
"strong" chief executive and the
constitution specifies that he
has the responsibility to "deter-
mine the relations of Finland to
foreign powers."
In domestic affairs, the Fin-
nish president has traditionally
been regarded as a sort of pater
familias who is expected to rise
above partisan considerations and
deal evenhandedly with all po-
litical, social, and economic
groups. Because of his foreign
as well as his domestic policies,
Kekkonen has been a controversial
president; although he commands
strong support from many, he is
deeply distrusted by others.
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UNITED
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YUGOSLAVIA
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CYPRUS SYRIA
LEBANON
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UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC
SAUDI
ARABIA
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Finland has had eight presi-
dents during its 50 years of in-
dependence. Whether a result of
the development of the Finnish
constitution and form of govern-
ment or of the crises in domestic
or foreign relations that have
beset each president, almost
all of the eight have been force-
ful personalities who have left
a deep imprint on Finnish history.
Kekkonen has been no exception.
Kekkonen--The Man
And His Record
Kekkonen became president
in 1956, succeeding J. K. Paasi-
kivi, who is remembered in Fin-
land for his success in stabiliz-
ing Helsinki's relations with the
Soviet Union in the precarious
years immediately after World
War II. Even after 11 years in
office, Kekkonen is still a con-
troversial political figure be-
cause he has been unable or un-
willing to rise above partisan
interests and remains closely
identified with the Center
(Agrarian) Party which he headed
for a number of years before he
became president.
For years, he cooperated
with the Soviets in maintaining
the fiction that the rival So-
cial Democrats did not support
Finland's official policy of
friendly relations with Moscow,
with the result that this major
political party was barred from
participation in the government
for nearly eight years. By this
means, he perpetuated the hege-
mony of his Center Party over the
Finnish political scene, and
prevented the emergence of a So-
cial Democratic leader who might
effectively challenge his hold
on the presidency.
During his tenure, he has
narrowed the limits of debate
over foreign policy to a point
where free discussion has been
all but stifled, to be replaced
by the reiteration of sterile,
wooden formulations more charac-
teristic of Soviet sloganeering
than of the give and take as-
sociated with a democracy. Kek-
konen justifies this approach on
grounds that Finland's relations
with the Soviet Union are of
such overriding importance that
all domestic and foreign policy
issues must be subordinated to
the primary goal of keeping re-
lations with Moscow on an even
keel.
Nevertheless, even those who
are critical of him concede that
there have been positive aspects
to his tenure as president. Re-
lations with the Soviet Union are
stable, and a modus vivendi ap-
parently has been established--
admittedly at the cost of cer-
tain concessions to nationalist
pride.
Kekkonen has also opened to
debate a question that has long
divided Finnish society: the role
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of the Communists in contemporary
Finland. This is a controversial
subject in the light of the his-
tory of embittered relations be-
tween the descendants of the vic-
torious "Whites" and the defeated
"Reds" of the civil war in 1918.
Kekkonen has stressed reconcilia-
tion and the need to integrate
the Communists into society,
saying that a democracy can ill
afford to treat a fifth of the
electorate as second--class
citizens merely because they
hold a different political view-
point.
He has sought to persuade
and reassure the strongly anti-
Communist elements by noting
that many Communists loyally
served Finland in recent wars
with the Soviet Union. The Fin-
nish Communists themselves in-
creasingly appear to accept the
view that their goals can be
achieved only by parliamentary
means and are turning away frori
the idea of overthrowing the
existing form of government. A
large segment of Finnish society
remains unconvinced by Kekkonen's
arguments and regards the Commu-
nists as disloyal and subordinate
to Moscow, but suspicions
and hatreds of the past have
beer.. reduced somewhat.
is the candidate of the three ma-
jor parties in Prime Minister
Paasio's coalition government:
the Social Democrats, the Center
Party, and the Communist-front
SKDL. In addition, Kekkonen has
the independent backing of the
Liberal Party as well. as substan-
tial support within the Swedish
People's Party. The most recent
poll showed 72 percent of the
population supporting his candi-
dacy .
Kekkonen's View of
Foreign Relations-The East
Kekkonen's views on the im-
portant question of Finnish-So-
viet relations have gone through
a striking evolution. In March
].940 at the time of the Winter
War, he was one of only three
parliamentary deputies who favored
rejecting the Soviet armistice
terms and continuing the fight.
During World War II and the
years immediately thereafter,
however, Kekkonen reanalysized
his views on Finland's foreign
policy. He concluded that, to
survive, the nation would have
to put aside the enmity of cen-
turies and do everything possible
to establish and maintain an
amicable relationship with the
Soviet Union.
In the current presidential
race, the field is limited to
Kekkonen and two minor contend-
ers---Matti Virkkunen, the Con-
servative Party candidate, and
the maverick Veikko Vennamo,
who has been feuding with Kek-
konen and the Center Party for
years. The lopsidedness of the
race has been made even more pro-
nounced by the fact that Kekkonen
In common with his predeces-
sor, former president Paasikivi,
Kekkonen now contends that the
traditional Russian concern with
Finland has been of a strategic,
self-protective nature. Thus
Kekkonen now argues,, the Russians
in 1939 had alegitimate interest
in seeking to alter the border
so that they could better defend
Leningrad against a German
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assault. Although this objec-
tive was finally achieved when
the Soviets redrew the border af-
ter World War II, it neverthe-
less remains imperative, in Kek-
konen's view, for the Finns to
demonstrate clearly that their
independence does not constitute
a potential threat to Soviet
security--indeed, that it con-
tributes to it by stabilizing
the situation in northern Europe.
Kekkonen often lectures the
Finns on the need to come to
terms with the past and to accept
the reality of Finland's geo-
graphical position. In a speech
earlier this year to Lutheran
clergymen, he reviewed Finland's
past and present position in
Europe, and particularly its re-
lationships with the major
powers. He reminded this con-
servative-minded and tradi-
tionally anti-Soviet group that
Finland's so-called "eastern
problem" is not of recent vin-
tage. It is, he noted, the cen-
turies-old problem of establish-
ing a stable relationship with
the neighbor to the east--"irre-
spective of whether its name has
been Novgorod, Moscow, Russia,
or the Soviet Union."
Kekkonen believes that the
roots of potential conflict
between the USSR and Finland
have to a large extent been re-
moved as a result of two post-
war developments. First, the
1947 Peace Treaty under which
both countries pledge not to
join an alliance hostile to the
other; second, the 1948 Agree-
ment of Friendship, Cooperation,
and Mutual Assistance, which com-
mits Finland to resist an attack
against its own territory--or
against the Soviet Union through
Finland--by Germany or any power
allied with it.
Although Finnish officials
stress that the preamble of this
latter agreement clearly declares
Finland's desire to stay outside
conflicts of interest between the
major powers, the ambiguous word-
ing--especially of that portion
calling for "consultations" in
the event that one party believes
a threat of attack exists--raises
doubts about Finland's ability
to remain uninvolved if Moscow
were determined otherwise.
Foreign Relations--The West
Kekkonen's attitude toward
the West is colored by his view
of Finland's military vulnerabil-
ity and his belief that Helsinki
can expect no outside assistance
in the event of a crisis in re-
lations with the Soviet Union.
This position contrasts sharply
with that of the other Scandina-
vian countries, for Denmark and
Norway are members of NATO, and
neutral Sweden has developed
modern military defenses likely
to give pause to a potential ag-
gressor.
Although Finland is outside
Western defense arrangements,
Kekkonen probably appreciates
NATO's role as a counterweight
to what might otherwise be So-
viet military and political domi-
nation of most of Europe. At the
same time, he has indicated con-
cern about certain NATO military
activities in northern Europe
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which he believes the USSR might
regard as provocative. As far
as Norway's and Denmark's mem-
bership in NATO is concerned, he
insists that it is unrealistic
to expect them to leave the al-
liance after 1969. He may, in
fact, regard their continued mem-
bership as as essential element
in the "balance" existing in
northern Europe--offset by
Sweden's policy of nonalliance
and Finland's policy of neutral-
ity and friendship with the So-
viet Union.
His attitude toward the US
is compounded of acknowledgement
of the military shield it pro--
vides the European allies, along
with his belief that its power
cannot effectively be brought to
bear to ease Soviet pressures on
Finland. He probably regards
the US military presence in Eu-
rope as a positive factor, if
for no other reason than that it
serves to keep a resurgent West
Germany in check.
Kekkonen is especially con-
cerned about the German question,
because it could have a direct
bearing on Finland's future re-
lations with the Soviet Union.
The German-Soviet relationship
historically has been a fateful
one for Finland. In 1939 the
nonaggression pact between the
two powers assigned Finland to
the Soviet sphere of influence
and paved the way for the Winter
War. The postwar treaties Fin-
land was compelled to sign with
the Soviet Union are all directed
at preventing Germany or its al-
lies from threatening the secur-
ity of the USSR or Finland. The
continuing sensitivity of the
German issue for Finland accounts
for Helsinki's not having estab-
lished formal. diplomatic rela-
tions with either East or West
Germany.
Kekkonen: has periodically
floated proposals with the appar-
ent purpose of demonstrating to
the Soviets his concern about de-
velopments in, northern Europe.
In late 1965, he proposed the
creation of a. nuclear-free zone
in the Scandinavian area, claim-
ing that this would merely con-
firm the existing situation. He
has also advocated--without be-
ing specific-?-a Finnish-Norwegian
treaty for the "defense of the
neutrality" of the :northernmost
areas of the two countries--the
so-called North Calotte. Neither
proposal generated any enthusiasm,
however, for the Scandinavians
tend to be skeptical of Kekkonen's
forays into foreign policy, sus-
pecting a Soviet push behind
Finnish initiatives.
Kekkonen, at
67,
has
been in
good
health, but r
ecen
tly
there
have
been
reports that he
is show-
ing
signs
of fatigue and
strain.
This
may
account for his
asser-
tion
that
the forthcoming
presi-
dential election will definitely
be his last.
He does not appear to have
selected an heir but there are
reports that Foreign Minister
Ahti Karjalainen, a Center Party
member and Kekkonen protege, is
the leading contender. A rather
colorless professional economist
by training and a technician
rather than a politician,
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Karjalainen has no broad politi-
cal base and seems to lack the
drive and forcefulness that the
presidency requires. Although
Karjalainen sees eye to eye with
his mentor on foreign policy,
especially with regard to rela-
tions with the USSR, there are
some indications that the Soviets
may not regard him highly.
Neither the Finnish Com-
munists nor the Soviets, however,
are likely to harbor any illu-
sions about the prospects of a
Communist winning in a free elec-
tion. They may hope that before
the next elections relations be-
tween the Communists and the
dominant Social Democrats will
have improved to a point where
it will be possible for the two
parties to agree on a joint pres-
idential candidate.
Regardless of who succeeds
Kekkonen, the guidelines within
which he will have to operate
in conducting Finland's foreign
relations are likely to remain
fairly rigid. For Kekkonen and
his successors, the overriding
concern will remain the Soviet
Union and the ordering of rela-
tions with Moscow in such a man-
ner as to leave no doubt of Fin-
land's good will and commitment
to maintain good relations with
its neighbor.
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