PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER AYUB AND BHUTTO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004800100003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REPORT

see 2006/12127: 'CIA F~7d-0b92'iAO04 pq1 0:0003-8
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16 April 1965
PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER AYUB AND BHUTTO
Pakistan's fears of India continue to dominate
its foreign policy. In an effort to gain support
against New Delhi,Presiden-L Ayub and his neutralist
Foreign Minister Zulfiqar All Bhutto have set an in-
creasingly independent course in international
affairs over the past two years, even while keeping
Pakistan nominally tied to the Western alliance
system. Their attention has moved first to Commu-
nist China and now to Indonesia, and they are not
entirely discounting the Soviet Union as a poten-
tial source of help. Ayub probably views his of-
ficial visit to Washington on 26 and 27 April as an
opportunity to balance his recent cultivation of
Communist and neutralist countries.
Defense vs. Development
Suffering from roughly a
four-to-one disadvantage in
size, population, and military
and economic strength, Pakistan
remains as preoccupied today
with the threat posed by India
as it was during the bloody
religious massacres that fol-
lowed independence and the
partition of the subcontinent
in 1947.
These fears and the con-
comitant hostility have grown
since the Chinese attack on
India's borders in the fall of
1962, when New Delhi embarked
on an ambitious military expan-
sion and modernization program
with US and Soviet aid. With
the intention of building an
army large enough to face
Pakistan and China simultane-
ously, India has added about
300,000 men to its forces since
then, a little more than the
total in service in all of
Pakistan's forces.
Pakistan has not increased
its forces further, however.
Ayub apparently decided that the
required diversion of resources
would be too costly. This has
helped Pakistan to post an im-
pressive record of economic
development, and most of its
second five-year plan (1961-
1966) goals are likely to be
achieved. Pakistan's leaders
view this record, when contrasted
with India's economic difficul-
ties in recent years--most nota-
bly its continuing food crisis--
as an important source of
strength.
While helping his pro-
American economic adviser,
Finance Minister Shoaib, marshal
the resources to raise the na-
tional standard of living--if
only slightly--President Ayub
has relied heavily on the fertile
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imagination of
Foreign Minister Bhutto to de-
velop diplomatic strengths to
counter India's military growth.
Ayub's association with
Bhutto began when he chose him
at the age of 30 to represent
the Sind region of southern West
Pakistan in the national cabinet
in 1958. Since then, Ayub has
come to regard him as a-special
protege. When Bhutto, as min-
ister of commerce, took an in-
terest in foreign affairs, Ayub
gave him wide discretion. A
,D30-million oil exploration as-
sistance agreement from the USSR
was Bhutto's most dramatic suc-
cess in this post.
When foreign minister
Mohammad Ali died in March 1963,
Bhutto was named to succeed him.
This was at the height of the
reaction to the US decision to
provide military aid to India
following the Chinese attack
on India's Himalayan border-
lands. Since that time, Ayub
has come to depend heavily on
Bhutto for conceiving and
carrying out new foreign policy
initiatives.
During 1963 and early 1964
Pakistan concentrated its ef-
forts on a series of gestures
toward Peiping. Border, trade,
and civil air agreements were
concluded, and cultural ties
expanded. In a complementary
effort, Bhutto began re-estab-
lishing ties with the Afro-Asian
group which Pakistan had left a
decade earlier when it joined
the Western alliance system. At
the same time, cooperation and
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participation in SEATO and
CENTO was reduced.
The Pakistanis calculated
that New Delhi would be far
more nervous about China coming
to the aid of Pakistan in the
event of Indo-Pakistani hostili-
ties than it would be about pos-
sible US assistance to Pakistan,
especially in view of the closer
relations that were developing
between the US and India. By
cultivating Sino-Pakistani
friendship, they hoped to dis-
courage India from deploying
its growing army almost entirely
against Pakistan alone.
During this period Ayub
and Bhutto apparently hoped that
gestures toward Communist China
might also inhibit the new US
support for India. Pakistani
pressure on the United States
reached a peak in late May 1964
in the form of an official warn-
ing that Pakistan might lose in-
terest in free world concerns
and interests in Asia and "con-
centrate on the narrower field
of the preservation of its own
vital national interests."
When it was notified a few
days later that the US would
provide India with military
grants and credits totaling $100
million for fiscal 1965, Paki-
stan seemed to be searching for
some way to strike back. Con-
sideration was given to formal
withdrawal from SEATO.
Since late last summer,
Pakistan seems to have become
more resigned to continued US
military assistance to India
as a fact of life beyond its
power to change. It has con-
siderably reduced the frequency
and intensity of its pleas for
a cessation of LS military aid
to India.
Seeking New Friends
Somewhat later--last Octo-
ber and November--Pakistan also
became convinced that the new
Shastri government in India--
despite early signs of some
flexibility--would never be able
to enter into serious negotia-
tions on the all-important dis-
puted territory of Kashmir.
Pakistan therefore has concen-
trated its efforts on putting
India on the defensive diplomat-
ically. Appreciating full well
that Pakistan lacks the power
to force India out of the coveted
Vale of Kashmir, Ayub-and Bhutto
are trying to line up new friends
in the Afro-Asian world.
The most telling tactic in
this effort continues to be the
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development of relations with
China. Every new Pakistani
visit to Peiping or statement
on China. arouses fresh rage in
India, but Pakistan seems to
have gone about as far as it is
now willing to go in establish-
ing areas of cooperation with
China. The Ayub visit to Pei-
ping in early March did little
more than dramatize previous
positions and call for more of
the same, but the heated re-
sponse from India must have
been gratifying.
In a more recent develop-
ment, Bhutto seems to have con-
sulted with the Chinese Commu-
nists about their invitation
to Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdul-
lah to visit Peiping to plead
the cause of Kashmir self-deter-
mination against India. Since
Bhutto's announcement of this
invitation in late March, the
Shastri government has come
under heavy fire from govern-
ment and opposition benches
alike for allowing the Sheikh
to travel abroad despite his
refusal to describe himself as
an Indian citizen on his pass-
port application. Such suc-
cesses as this in keeping India
off balance continue to justify
Bhutto's brand of foreign policy
in Ayub's eyes.
Since last fall Pakistan
has moved to consolidate its
relations with Sukarno's In-
donesia, once a close friend of
India. A cooling of Indian-
Indonesian relations since 1,961
provided the opportunity. In-
donesia's support for Pakistan
on Kashmir has won it Pakistani
neutrality in the Malaysian con-
frontation, despite Pakistan's
Commonwealth ties to Malaysia.
Under Bhutto's direction,
economic cooperation between
the two countries is being ex-
panded. There are even unsub-
stantiated reports that serious
consideration is being given to
some forms of limited military
cooperation, including the sup-
ply of spare parts for Indone-
sia's US-built aircraft.
Bhutto may even have con-
vinced Ayub that Moscow might
eventually decide that support-
ing India on Kashmir is detri-
mental to the Soviet position
in Africa and Asia. If the
USSR could be persuaded to
adopt a more neutral position
on Kashmir, India would no
longer be able to hide behind
the Soviet veto in the UN Se-
curity Council, and new avenues
of attack would be opened on
India's occupation of the Vale
of Kashmir.
Such an eventuality still
seems remote, however, since
Russia has clearly placed a
good many of its eggs in the
Indian basket. Initial reports
on Ayub's recent visit to the
USSR, which ended on 11 April,
indicate that he received the
coolest reception of any visit-
ing chief of state in recent
memory. Ayub's recent busy
schedule of talks with Chinese
Communist leaders undoubtedly
did him no good in Moscow. None-
theless, Bhutto will probably
see to it that efforts are con-
tinued to soften Russia's atti-
tude toward Pakistan.
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 recent reorientation of Paki-
stan's foreign policy. In
his personal role, he clearly
aspires to acquire Nehru's un-
claimed title to leadership in
the Asian-African world. At
the present time he is mindful
of the opportunities that may
be presented at the Asian-
African conference scheduled
for late June in Algiers. He
has already firmly grasped
Nehru's mantle as chief spokes-
man for the new members of the
Commonwealth.
Having just visited Pei-
ping and Moscow, Ayub will
probably see his trip to Wash-
ington as an opportunity to
restore the rather delicate
balance he tries to maintain
in his international posture.
while he will probably press
his objections to US military
aid to India, especially to
nonofficial audiences, he
seems to have given up any
hope of persuading the US to
change this policy.
Ayub will probably keep
Bhutto well in the background.
However much Bhutto's voice
is muted during the Washington
meetings, however, he will
again emerge as Pakistan's
chief idea man and foreign
policy spokesman after Y~
Ayub return to D,'"- -____
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Ayub's Position
Although Ayub allows his
foreign minister considerable
latitude, the Sandhurst-trained
President evidently remains in-
sistent that Pakistan preserve
a substantial
with the West
Ayub was probably the first
guest in Peiping to urge an even-
handed foreign policy view on a
mass audience when on 5 March he
stated that Communist China and
the US "must arrive at an under-
standing on the basis of equal-
ity and mutual recognition of
interests." He also refused to
join in a statement calling for
the withdrawal of US forces from
Vietnam as a precondition for a
settlement there, and no state-
ment on Vietnam appeared in the
final communique.
Nevertheless, Ayub has
set the main outlines of the
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