ISSUES BEFORE THE 19TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

OCI No. 0359/64C
Copy No. 5.7
I -17
ISSUES BErORE THE 19tH UNITED NA. 'IQNS NEHA ASS MBL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF C..URrRENT
1 1 : CIA.,-RDP79-0Q92Z,A0047Q400QQ4-
T E,, L. L, G: E N,,C E
27 Npvembgr 1964
;SECRET
GROUP I 'txcluded from cbtomwtic
c ~vngradine 'and declo si Fic Lion
Approved For Release 20Q6/10/11 : CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For R~ease 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-0092704700030004-6
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC. SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS, If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.
Approved For
-00927A004700030004-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
SE CRE T
ISSUES BEFORE THE 19TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
For many months the UN membership has been
preoccupied with avoiding a crisis over the Ar-
ticle 19 payments issue. Unless a Last-minute
solution is found, a. serious confrontation is in
prospect when the General Assembly convenes on L
December for its 19th session. The outcome is
still in doubt, and even if a showdown can be
avoided--perhaps by adjourning the assembly for a
few months--the UN's role in future peacekeep-
ing operations appears bound to be modified.
Another critical question facing this session is
the perennial Chinese representation issue. For
the first time, a resolution to seat Communist
China in place of Taiwan could receive a majority.
Among other issues, Southeast Asia's prob-
lems may receive increased attention, Cuba may
launch a diplomatic offensive against the US from
the floor of the assembly, and disarmament and co-
lonialism will be spotlighted. Such perennial is-
sues as the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Korean
item will also appear. All told there are already
over 90 items scheduled, and this session's de-
bate is certain to be unusually important and dif-
ficult.
The Soviet Union's refusal
to pay its share of the cost of
the UN operations in the Congo
and Middle East has cast a heavy
shadow over the session. Moscow
and others in the bloc risk los-
ing their vote in the assembly
when it: convenes on 1 December.
Soviet officials have indicated
they do not want to see Soviet
relations with the UN or the US
seriously damaged, but thus far
they have adamantly refused
to pay their arrears. The pos-
sibility of a last-minute token
payment by Moscow cannot be to-
tally discounted, but the Soviets
would probably insist that their
stand "in principle" has not
changed while negotiations con-
tinued. The war of nerves seems
likely to come to a head on the
opening day of the assembly. The
outcome may affect the entire
future of the UN.
The last few weeks have
seen intensified efforts by
both great and small UN mem-
bers to avoid a showdown. In
addition to the original 21-mem-
ber group appointed to deal with
a wide range of problems bearing
on financing and peacekeeping
operations, a number of smaller
groups have also taken up the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For RLase 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927-- 4700030004-6
SE CRE T
A. Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall
have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears
equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for
the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, never-
theless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the fail-
ure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.
problem. Because of the strongly
prevailing fear of being caught
in a US-Soviet squeeze and pro-
voking a Soviet walkout, however,
only one proposal of any promise
has been put forward. This for-
mula, promulgated by four UN am-
bassadors, calls for creation of
a "voluntary rescue" fund to
which all members would be asked
to contribute in order to alle-
viate the UN's financial prob-
lems. This would give the USSR
and France--which also faces pos-
sible loss of its vote in Janu-
ary--a face-saving method to pay
their arrears before the assem-
bly convened. Serious divisions
have appeared among the four am-
bassadors, however, and their
plan may be modified along lines
not acceptable to the US.
If no solution is reached
in advance of the session, cur-
rent General Assembly President
Sosa-Rodriguez has the unenviable
task of ruling on whether the
USSR will be deprived of its
vote. He is reluctant to do so,
but may not be able to avoid
the issue.
There is considerable un-
certainty as to how events will
unfold on 1 December. The US
UN mission believes the US has
sufficient support to deprive
the USSR of its voting rights
in the assembly but expects
wholesale abstentions. The USSR
has told some UN delegations it
would consider a vote against
it an unfriendly act, and has
threatened to leave the assem-
bly and perhaps withdraw from
the UN if subjected to an ad-
verse ruling. Not only is the
voting situation unclear, but
the timing and wording of one
or many resolutions that may be
put to a vote will probably re-
main in doubt until the assem-
bly convenes.
Even if a last-minute com-
promise solution can be arranged,
the United Nations and particu-
larly its peacekeeping functions
will have been significantly af-
fected by the prolonged strug-
gle over the payments question.
Even if the USSR made a contri-
bution, it still in a sense will
have won its point that the Se-
curity Council must be given
more authority over peacekeep-
ing operations. Henceforth it
will be considerably more dif-
ficult for the General Assembly
to institute and levy funds for
such operations under powers de-
rived from the 1951 "Uniting for
Peace" resolution unless the
great powers concur. It will
probably he impossible to force
a permanent member of the Se-
curity Council to pay for an
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
.
SE CRE T
operation it finds politically
objectionable.
Conversely, a shift back
to the authority originally en-
visaged for the Security Coun-
cil promises to displease many
smaller UK members which col-
lectively make their weight felt
through action initiated by the
General Assembly. This may in
time result in a greater co-
hesiveness among the smaller UN
members and could force the great
powers into countermoves to
strengthen their own community
of interests.
Chinese Representation
The Chinese representation
question may be the most crucial
one before the assembly if the
Article 19 issue is surmounted.
It now appears that a strong res-
olution calling for the seating
of Peiping and the removal of Na-
tionalist China from the UN will
for the first time come precar-
iously close to, or even achieve,
a simple majority vote in the as-
sembly. (see Page 4).. While no
UN member has officially indi-
cated it would switch its sup-
port from Taiwan to the mainland
as a result of Peiping's nuclear
detonation, that event has en-
hanced Communist China's prestige
among many nonaligned countries
and could provide an additional
incentive for certain wavering
countries to vote for its admis-
sion.
Whether Peiping actually at-
tains a majority will hinge on
the decisions of only a few Af-
rican and Middle Eastern coun-
tries. France, Congo (Brazza-
ville), the Central African Re-
public, Kenya, and Zambia seem
certain to add new votes to
Peiping's total. Dahomey is
probably also in Communist
China's column now. Cyprus,
Malaysia, Sierre Leone, Malawi,
Malta, Chad, Senegal, and per-
haps a few other West African
and some Arab states are still
uncertain and presumably open
to persuasion. At any rate,
last year's 41 to 57 vote
against seating Peiping is cer-
tain to be considerably closer
this session.
Some countries have indi-
cated unwillingness to vote for
a strongly worded resolution
like the one introduced by Al-
bania last year which made no
provision for Taiwan's continued
membership. Kuwait, for ex-
ample, has indicated that if
separate votes are taken it
would vote to seat Peiping, and
against removing Taiwan; and if
the resolution called for both,
Kuwait would not support it.
Thus the wording of this year's
resolution, which will be in- 25x1
troduced by Cambodia and co-
sponsored by a few African coun-
tries, could be a key factor.
sug-
gest that e Gaulle ay be ac-
tively maneuvering on Peiping's
behalf and he may soon make pub-
lic his intentions. Paris may
introduce a moderately worded
amendment to the expected strong
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For R
VOTE ESTIMATE ON CHINESE REPRESENTATION
IN UPCOMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FOR SEATING OF COMMUNIST CHINA: 51
SECRET
OPPOSED: 49
ABSTAIN : 15
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Afghanistan
Yes
Kuwait
Abstain
Albania
Yes
Laos
Yes
Algeria
Yes
Lebanon
Abstain
Argentina
No
Liberia
No
Australia
No
Libya
No
Austria
Abstain
Luxembourg
No
*Belgium
No
Malagasy
No
Bolivia
No
*Malawi
Abstain( 2)
Brazi I
No
*Malaysia
Abstain( 1 )
Bulgaria
Yes
Mali
Yes
Burundi
Yes
*Malta
No(2)
Burma
Yes
*Mauritania
Abstain
Byelorussia
Yes
Mexico
No
Cambodia
Yes
Morocco
Yes
Cameroon
Abstain( I )
Nepal
Yes
* Canada
No
Netherlands
Abstain
Central African Republic
Yes (1)
New Zealand
No
Ceylon
Yes
Nicaragua
No
* Chad
Yes(1
Niger
No
Chile
No
Nigeria
Abstain
China
No
Norway
Yes
Colombia
No
Outer Mongolia
Yes
Congo (Brazzaville)
Yes(1)
Pakistan
Yes
Congo (Leopoldville)
No
Panama
No
Costa Rica
No
Paraguay
No
Cuba
Yes
Peru
No
* Cyprus
Yes
Philippines
No
Czechoslovakia
Yes
Poland
Yes
* Dahomey
Yes(I
Portugal
Abstain
Denmark
Yes
Rumania
Yes
Dominican Republic
No
Rwanda
No
Ecuador
No
Saudi Arabia
Abstain
El Salvador
No
* Senegal
Yes(1)
Ethiopia
Yes(2)
Sierrd Leone
Abstain
Finland
Yes
Somalia
Yes
France
Yes
South Africa
No
Gabon
No
Spain
No
Ghana
Yes
Sudan
Yes
Greece
No
Sweden
Yes
Guatemala
No
Syria
Yes
Guinea
Yes
Tanganyika-Zanzibar
Yes
Haiti
No
Thailand
No
Honduras
No
Togo
No
Hungary
Yes
Trinidad and Tobago
Abstain
Iceland
Abstain
Tunisia
Yes
India
Yes
Turkey
No
Indonesia
Yes
Uganda
Yes
Iran
No
Ukraine
Yes
Iraq
Yes
USSR
Yes
Ireland
No
UAR
Yes
Israel
Abstain
United Kingdom
Yes
*Italy
No
United States
No
Ivory Coast
No
Upper Volta
No
Jamaica
No
Uruguay
No
Japan
No
Venezuela
No
Jordan
No
Yemen
Yes
Kenya
Yes(2 )
Yugoslavia
Yes
*These states moving in direction of voting for
Communist China and bear closest watching.
Zambia
1963 TOTALS
Yes(2)
Countries changing their 1963 vote or voting for the first time.
For seatong of Communist China: 41
(1 ) Voted No last year
Opposed: 57
(2) Did not vote last year
Abstain: 12
SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
1
SECRET
resolution. French officials have
reportedly been abroad laying the
groundwork for seating Peiping.
Although the Chinese Com-
munists have shown an increased
flexibility in their drive for
international recognition, they
remain adamant in their opposi-
tion to a "two-Chinas" solution.
They appear content to bide their
time, convinced they will be
seated on their own terms, prob-
ably before too long.
In 1961 the General Assem-
bly voted 61 to 34 to consider
the Chinese representation issue
an "important question," thereby
requiring a two-thirds vote to
seat Peiping. In the US view,
this ruling stands unless for-
mally reversed by a subsequent
vote in the assembly. Should
the assembly decide to reconsider,
the ruling could presumably be
overturned by a simple majority.
It appears that some countries
which plan to vote for Communist
China are willing to uphold the
two-thirds requirement should
that be put to a vote. France,
however, will vote against the
important-question ruling. Even
if the 1961 rule is maintained,
but Peiping receives a majority,
Chiang Kai-shek might withdraw
from the UN.
Laos and Southeast Asia
Certain Laotian officials
have shown interest in appeal-
ing to the UN as a means of se-
curing an end to the military in-
tervention of Laos' Communist
neighbors. Laotians generally
are disillusioned with the In-
ternational Control Commission,
and there is a growing feeling
that a remedy for the prolonged
instability in the country must
soon be found. A prominent Lao-
tian has sounded out US officials
on the advisability of asking
the Security Council, or failing
there, the General Assembly, for
a detachment of UN forces to help
seal the frontiers.
Premier Souvanna Phouma has
sounded out Moscow on whether it
would lend support to such a re-
quest, but he has apparently re-
ceived no response.
The UN probably would find
it difficult to respond effec-
tively to a Laotian appeal un-
less a crisis situation--such as
a major offensive by the Pathet
Lao--existed at the time. Under
these circumstances the UN might
find sufficient support to dis-
patch an observer group. In
1959, the Security Council, re-
sponding to a Laotian request,
had authorized the sending of a
four-member observer team to in-
vestigate charges that North Viet-
namese troops were moving into
the country.
The introduction of a UN ob-
server presence into Laos--al-
though unlikely at the present
time--could open the way to an
even deeper UN involvement in
other crisis areas of Southeast
Asia. In recent years, the UN
has assisted in the transfer of
West Irian to Indonesia, sent a
team to "ascertain" the popular
will in Sabah and Sarawak prior
to the formation of Malaysia, and
sponsored the 1962 Gusing mission
designed to ease strained Thai-
Cambodian relations.
SE CRE T
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For Re+ase 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A'Iy64700030004-6
SECRET
The United Nations' re-
sponsibilities for keeping the
peace and mediating the dispute
in Cyprus promises to come up
several times during the 19th
session.
As long as the security
situation on Cyprus remains rela-
tively stable, the focus of the
dispute will be the assembly de-
bate which will probably start
after the first of the year.
President Makarios or his for-
eign minister is expected to at-
tend the debate, for which the
President has laid the ground=
work by his moderating tactics
toward the Turkish Cypriots.
Makarios will probably seek sup-
port for the unrestricted inde-
pendence of Cyprus, and judging
by the ardent pro-independence
sentiments of the great majority
of UN members, he is likely to
receive strong backing. Turkey
for its part will try to have
the treaties on Cyprus recognized
as valid but may find itself on
the defensive.
The Security Council faces
the question of extending the
mandate for the UN Force in Cy-
prus (UNFICYP) when the present
one expires on 26 December. The
operation requires voluntary fi-
nancing and the Scandinavians
have indicated willingness to
maintain their contingents on
the island. Although the opera-
tion is generally recognized to
have been instrumental in pre-
venting civil war on the island,
it has nevertheless not been
popular in various parliaments
and finance ministries, and it
may be necessary to reduce the
6,000-man force, perhaps even
to an observer group. Makarios
has indicated his willingness
to keep a UN force on Cyprus,
but he may believe that a re-
duced force and a more restricted
mandate would give him greater
maneuverability.
The most important develop-
ment in the Cyprus matter is ex-
pected about March, when UN me-
diator Galo Plaza submits a re-
port on his efforts to find a
permanent solution to the dis-
pute. Plaza has indicated that
unless the principal parties
can reach an agreed solution he
will recommend an independent
Cyprus with minority guarantees.
He may also suggest a subsequent
referendum on self-determination.
Plaza personally believes union
of Cyprus with Greece would best
serve Western interests, but in
the absence of agreement to it
he apparently feels unfettered
independence is the only alter-
native. Makarios will know how
to use a UN report along these
lines to support his own efforts
to achieve a fully sovereign Cy-
prus.
Heartened by support from
the nonaligned countries at the
recent Cairo conference, from
the Soviet Government, and from
Algeria, Cuba is expected to
take its promised diplomatic of-
fensive against the US to the
floor of the General Assembly.
Cuba apparently hopes thus to
use world opinion to force
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
SE CRE T
Washington to move toward ac-
ceptance of the Castro regime.
The Cairo conference denounced
US economic pressures on Cuba
and called on the US to evacuate
Guantanamo and settle its dif-
ferences with Havana. Cuba can
be expected to repeat these de-
mands and perhaps call on the
General Assembly, in addition, to
denounce US violations of Cuban
airspace.
Among other Latin American
issues, Bolivia may present its
case against Chile for alleged
interference with Bolivia's
right of passage to the sea.
Argentina may embarrass its
Western friends by pressing its
claims to sovereignty over the
British-held Falkland Islands.
The Afro-Asians are de-
termined to pursue in the com-
ing session their bitter at-
tacks on all forms of colonial-
ism. The communique of the
Cairo conference of nonaligned
nations gave greatest attention
to the condemnation of colonial-
ism, neocolonialism, and racial
discrimination--calling for eco-
nomic sanctions and even use of
force to defeat the colonizing
powers. Portugal, South Af-
rica, and Rhodesia will come
under particularly heavy attack.
The Arabs will probably state
their case against Britain for
its refusal to implement UN res-
olutions on Aden, Oman, and
the South Arabian peninsula.
The US, UK, and France may come
in for criticism for not grant-
ing independence to their Carib-
bean possessions, and to their
Pacific trust territories.
South Africa's apartheid
policies and its hold on South
West Africa will again be de-
nounced, and pressures for sanc-
tions against Pretoria are likely
to increase. The Security Coun-
cil has established a special
committee to study the effect
various economic measures would
have on the economy of South Af-
rica, and the committee is con-
sidering everything--up to a com-
plete embargo enforced by a
blockade.
Even if Rhodesia does not
unilaterally declare its inde-
pendence, the Salisbury govern-
ment and possibly the UK will
come in for heavy criticism. If
Ian Smith's government does de-
clare its independence, it will
find itself faced with the same
violent opposition now being ex-
perienced by South Africa.
Portugal rounds out the
list as one of the least popular
governments in the eyes of Afro-
Asians. Already in trouble for
its Angola policy, Portugal may
now face even greater problems
in the UN as a result of the re-
cent stirrings in Mozambique.
As before, majority sentiment
in the UN will urge the US to
support sanctions against a
NATO ally.
The UN membership is likely
to exert heavier pressure than
ever for progress on disarmament.
The General Assembly will
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
 Approved For Reuse 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A 700030004-6
SECRET
probably offer substantive rec-
ommendations and show a greater
reluctance to leave issues with
die 18-Nation Disarmament Con-
i'erence in Geneva, where so lit-
tle has been achieved.
to attack the presence of for-
eign bases on its soil.
As on such political ques-
tions as colonialism, the West
There are already six items may also find itself under fire
on the assembly's agenda relat- on economic matters.
tng to disarmament, including
proposals for general and com-
plete disarmament, further re-
striction of nuclear testing,
a ban-the-bomb conference, and
agreement on nondissemination
of nuclear weapons. In addi-
tion, U Thant has called for dis-
armament talks among the five
nuclear powers and there already
is growing feeling that Peiping
should be included in any dis-
armament talks under UN auspices
as a result of the Chinese nu-
clear detonation.
Nondissemination proposals
are likely to be of chief inter-
est. The Cairo conference urged
all states to conclude nondis-
semination agreements, and pro-
posals for the denuclearization
of Africa, the Indian Ocean area,
and Latin America may be dis-
cussed. The Soviet Union will
have ample opportunity to ex-
ploit this sentiment by launch-
ing a campaign against the multi-
lateral nuclear force (MLF). In-
dia and the UAR have already in-
dicated some opposition to the
MLF on grounds it may constitute
nuclear proliferation. France
for reasons of its own may be
able to increase UN opposition
to the MLF.
Cuba may take advantage
of the disarmament discussions
At the UN Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
in Geneva last summer, a group
of 75 (now 77) less developed
countries formed a surprisingly
cohesive bloc which at times
produced overwhelming majorities
for panaceas for their problems
which were largely unpalatable
to the more developed. In ef-
fect UNCTAD took on the appear-
ance of a confrontation of the
poor and the rich, with the lat-
ter on the defensive. The
"haves" were constrained to
argue that the "have-nots" must
focus more on their responsibili-
ties and cannot expect, for ex-
ample, to attain higher prices
for their goods merely by pro-
ducing large votes.
In UNCTAD the less developed
nations have erected within the
UN framework a piece of machinery
geared primarily to considering
the formulation of new trade and
development programs for their
benefit. During the current ses-
sion the prospects are that res-
olutions will be passed for-
malizing institutional arrange-
ments and endorsing the rec-
ommendations made by UNCTAD last
June. In brief, the poorer
countries desire higher prices
for their commodities and lower
prices for manufactured goods
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
rr..
SE CRE T
and they may try to commit the
wealthier countries to transfer
capital to them, to provide
greater access to their primary
products, and generally to elimi-
nate discriminatory measures
against the developing countries.
UNCTAD could also provide a
springboard for an assault on
trade principles such as most-
favored-nation treatment as em-
bodied in GATT--a forum allegedly
serving the rich nations at the
expense of the poor.
Hardy Perennials
The assembly will again be
faced with several "hardy peren-
nial" issues such as the Arab-
Israeli dispute, the Korean item,
Kashmir, and Tibet.
The Arabs may be confident
this year that they will win
greater support for their case
against Israel, and the recent
Israeli-Syrian clash may add heat
to the debate. Specifically,
the Arab states will again resist
efforts to rectify abuses of the
refugee relief program, claiming
such moves are in reality de-
signed to reduce the UN's role
in supporting the refugees. The
Arabs will try to obtain recogni-
tion for the new "Palestine Lib-
eration Organization," which as-
pires to represent all Palestin-
ians.
In opposition to Arab maneu-
vers, the Israelis can usually
expect either the support or the
neutrality of the Western powers
and of many African, Asian,and
Latin American countries. As a
countermove, Israel may sponsor
or encourage another resolution
advocating direct negotiations
between it and the Arab states
--a proposal the Arabs have
consistently rejected because
of the implicit recognition of
Israel such negotiations would
involve.
Each year since 1954 the
General Assembly has voted for
a resolution calling for the
"achievement by peaceful means
of a unified, independent, and
democratic Korea under a repre-
sentative form of government,
and full restoration of inter-
national peace and security in
the area." The resolution has
not brought unification any
closer, and the annual debate
may even prove disadvantageous
to South Korea. The Seoul gov-
ernment is still anxious to up-
hold the UN's competence in uni-
fication even though it is in-
creasingly doubtful that the UN
can accomplish anything. If the
resolution achieves fewer votes
this year than last, opposition
elements in South Korea may ac-
cuse the government of allowing
international support to dwindle
away.
Other governments will want
pet resolutions passed either
to bolster support at home or
give themselves a lift on the
international scene. The Dalai
Lama will have such sympathizers
as Nicaragua and El Salvador
sponsor a resolution regretting
the Tibetans' loss of human rights,
Tshomb6 may provoke an African
walkout if he appears before the
assembly to present his case on
the Congo, and the landlocked
nations may declare for their
right of passage to the sea. The
issues are endless, often tiring,
if not seemingly ludicrous, but
nevertheless ever present and
sometimes even vital to the gov-
ernments concerned. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004700030004-6
 Approved For Reuse ?&fty P79-00927A4700030004-6
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04700030004-6