THE POWER POSITION OF INDONESIA'S PRESIDENT SUKARNO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004300110002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

Release 2006/08/30: CIA-RDP79-00927AO04300110002-3
SPECIAL REPORT
THE POWER POSITION OF INDONESIA'S PRESIDENT SUKARNO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
25X1
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GROUP I Excluded from automatic
,iow-ngrading and declassification
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7 February 1964
Indonesia's Sukarno has greater power today
than ever before during his eighteen years as
President. By carefully balancing the strength
of the Communist Party against that of the army,
which is anti-Communist, he maintains his own
pre-eminent position and prevents these two major
power factors from challenging either him or each
other. Although Sukarno has permitted the Com-
munist Party to mass impressive strength and has
largely ignored national economic difficulties,
neither of these problems appears to constitute
an immediate threat to him.
Sources of Sukarno's Power
Sukarno's principal strength
lies in his rapport with the
Indonesian masses, particularly
on Java, the seat of government
and the home of 65 percent of
the nation's 100 million people.
Although the enormous support
he once enjoyed may have re-
ceded somewhat, he still seems
to be the national hero, the
nation's great man, the symbol
of the revolution which ended
Dutch rule in 1949. At 63
Sukarno appears vigorous
Sukarno has been and prob-
ably still is a mass leader of
extraordinary skill as well as
an intuitive politician who
readily grasps the strengths
and weaknesses of the individuals
and factions with whom he is
dealing. His political skills
have been a major factor in
unifying the geographically
sprawling archipelago, whose
ethnic diversities have con-
tributed to a series of challenges
to the Djakarta government--the
most recent one being the Sumatra-
and Celebes-based rebellion of 1958.
Even many Indonesians who disagree
with him continue to support him
because they are convinced that
he is a cohesive force essential
to preserving national unity.
This is particularly true of
army leaders.
Sukarno's "guided democracy"
--instituted between 1957 and
1960--has obviated the need for
complicated political maneuver
or concessions to placate and
retain the support of the polit-
ically articulate. He has dis-
solved what was once the best
organized and most vocal op-
position force, the Socialist
Party, as well as the largest
opposition mass organization,
the Masjumi. Leaders of these
two groups have been in prison
or under house arrest for several
years. Members of the surviving
Masjumi youth organization fre-
quently come under suspicion and
are arrested. Leaders of other
Masjumi- and Socialist-affiliated
organizations have been so coerced
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by fear of organizational dis-
solution or imprisonment that
they have readily fallen in line
with "guided democracy." The
press is rigorously controlled
and can be categorized only as
progovernment, pro-Communist,
or Communist.
The government consists of
an appointed, rubber-stamp leg-
islature, a series of advisory
councils, and a cabinet that
executes Sukarno's policies.
There is also the National Front,
an official multilevel organi-
zation ranging from an appointed
national executive council to
village committees. The front
is supposed to represent all
loyal facets of Indonesian
society and to indoctrinate the
people with the precepts of
"guided democracy." The Com-
munists and their front groups
now hold 80 percent of the ex-
ecutive council seats and pre-
dominate at all other levels of
the front organization. The
Communist Party's pressures on
Sukarno have nevertheless been
exerted primarily through the
party's own apparatus outside
the government.
The army continues to be
one of Sukarno's major props
and is unlikely to make any bid
for power on its own. Sukarno
in the past year has largely
reduced the army from an in-
dependent power factor to an
arm of the executive. His
first move was to lift martial
law, which had been in effect
since 1957 and which had con-
siderably expanded army powers.
He. subsequently replaced army
commander Nasution with the more
pliable General Jani, and then
reduced the army's role in the
cabinet.
Sukarno now has no political
rivals. He has consistently
blunted and diverted the careers
of real or potential challengers
for his position. The most recent
example is that of General
Nasution, who, in being promoted
from army chief of staff to armed
forces chief of staff, lost con-
trol of the troops and now finds
his status gradually diminished.
Rise of the Communists
If Sukarno is vulnerable
in any area of domestic politics,
it is in his relationship with
the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI).
Sukarno's own Marxist in-
clinations, largely emotionally
based, clearly predominate over
those derived from the West or
from Mohammedanism. He appears
to consider Indonesian Communists
as nationalists first and Com-
munists second. His tacks away
from them seem to be motivated
chiefly by his fear that they
are encroaching upon his power
position, and not by apprehension
that they are an ideological
threat.
The history of Sukarno and
the Communists is one of mutual
exploitation. The PKI's growth
from a discredited organization
in 1948, when it attempted a
rebellion against the government,
to a major power factor ten years
later can be traced largely to
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three causes: the party's
united front tactics since 1951,
which have included vigorous
support of Sukarno; Sukarno's
tolerance of the PKI's activity
and acceptance of its support;
and the party's good organization
and unremitting hard work. Its
campaign to identify itself with
Sukarno provided a major means
of ingratiating it with the
masses.
Sukarno in turn has had to
rely on the Communists because
he has no effective organized
political instrument of his own.
There have been repeated indica-
tions that he has given non-
Communist leftist organizations
and individuals both encourage-
ment and opportunity to develop
a mass following, but they have
failed to take full advantage
of their chances. For the most
part, leaders of such groups have
had little knack for organization
and no interest in sustained
effort at the rice-roots level.
The PKI today claims a
membership of 2.5 million. This
figure seems credible. In addi-
tion it numbers among its front
groups a peasant organization of
a claimed 7 million members,
a labor federation of 3.5 million,
and a youth group of 1.5 million.
Lccording to party Chairman
A?_clit, the PI(I is organized in
every Indonesian province except
West New Guinea, in 93 percent
of the subprovincial areas, and
62 percent of the villages.
PI{I Support Questioned
Dissension among the PMI's
leadership as to the wisdom of
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supporting Sukarno appears to
have diminished. For several
years, a militant group re-
portedly chafed at the contra-
diction of party strength and
party subservience to Sukarno.
A compromise may have been
reached about a year ago whereby
PKI support for Sukarno would
be further qualified, the party
would press with greater zeal its
own limited objectives,and it
would generally attempt a more
militant position. Although
the Communists apparently regard
Sukarno with contempt in their
inner circles, in public they
still refer to him with respect
and deference.
The PKI's attempts through
its labor union affiliates to
take over British interests in
mid-January are an example of
the more militant approach.
Although the army published an
earlier presidential proclama-
tion that there were to be no
seizures unless Sukarno so di-
rected, token interference by
the Communists continued in
many areas and serious harass-
ment in others. On 2 February
Djakarta announced the exten-
sion of "government supervision"
to those enterprises where the
unions had taken action. The
effect of this announcement is
still unclear. Although there
may have been collusion between
the PKI and Sukarno, appearances
are that the Communists acted
independently.
However, the Communists,
including the militants, appear
unready to attempt any major
challenge of Sukarno. They are
aware that he still enjoys mass
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support in Java; they fear that
a confrontation with the army
would follow a definite chal-
lenge to him and probably believe
that the party is unprepared for
armed conflict; and they note
that the direction of Sukarno's
policies, both domestically and
internationally, for the most
part, favors Communist interests.
The dangers in Indonesia's
economic trouble may lie less
in their purely economic aspects
than in the potential for Com-
munist exploitation. Sukarno
does not understand and prefers
to ignore economic matters; his
policies--pursued primarily for
political. reasons--have often
aggravated economic problems.
Indonesia's economy has the
classic weaknesses of the under-
developed nation: exports de-
pendent on world prices of a
few key products (rubber, oil,
tin, and copra); a lack of
trained economic, financial,
managerial, and technical
personnel; and a poorly educated
rank and file that cannot be
readily diverted to new pursuits.
The transportation and distri-
bution system among and within
the islands is either inadequate
or in disrepair, the pressure of
population on food supplies is
growing, and underproduction is
chronic. Indonesia has to import
over one million tons of rice
annually. Poor distribution and
military stockpiling often create
shortages where there need be
none. The results have been
severe inflation, dwindling
foreign reserves, and a chronic
budgetary deficit. Economic
development has depended entirely
on foreign aid.
Even with substantial aid
from both the West and the bloc,
development plans have been slow
in materializing, and implementa-
tion of projects has been meager.
The takeover of Dutch and Chinese
enterprises in 1957 and 1958
created dislocations from which
the economy has yet to recover.
Moreover, the few senior Indonesian
officials trained in economics
or related subjects received their
education in the West, and their
policies frequently have been
politically unacceptable to
Sukarno and his advisers. Still
another difficulty is that the
younger people who have been
trained more recently in economics
or administration are largely
drawn into the government bu-
reaucracy, where their talents
are not directly productive for
the economy.
Indonesia's present state
of inflation and depleted re-
serves--an intensification of
a situation chronic since in-
dependence--has been caused by
the program of massive arms
purchases from the bloc, the
internal. dislocations brought
about by the military build-up
in 1961 and 1962 against West
New Guinea, and now the strains
caused by the policy of con-
frontation of Malaysia.
Confrontation Consequences
The decision to cease trade
with Malaysia--which thereby
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excluded the use of Singapore
as a transshipping point--has
created a temporary vacuum in
segments of Indonesian commerce.
Of far greater significance,
however, was the withdrawal last
September of the International
Monetary Fund and certain Western
nations from a proposed stabili-
zation plan, which envisaged the
extension of some $300 million
in direct financial assistance,
other economic aid, and debt
rescheduling. Indonesian finan-
cial measures announced last May
as necessary components of the
plan have been partially aban-
doned.
belt-tightening is more readily
aroused and has been manifested
in demonstrations against con-
spicuous signs of affluence--
automobiles, large houses, etc.
Anti-Chinese riots last May in
cities of West Java apparently
were motivated partly by dis-
satisfaction with economic
hardships. These were not Com-
munist inspired, however, and
were easily controlled. Cur-
rently the seasonal rice shortage
is causing some concern to the
government, and the Communists
are circulating apparently ex-
aggerated reports of starvation
conditions in Java.
Djakarta has relieved some
pressures by rescheduling its
debt payments to the USSR and by
arranging partial payment in
commodities. Imports are severe-
ly limited. Additional relief
will come with substantial bonus
payments Indonesia is scheduled
to receive from the oil compan-
ies this year.
The impact of the economic
dislocation is reduced by the
fact that 80 percent of the
population is engaged in a sub-
sistence peasant economy. The
full force of inflation there-
fore does not hit the peasant as
it does the urban worker. For
the most part the Indonesians
appear to have passively ac-
cepted economic stringency and
tightened their belts.
In urban and wage-earning
areas, however, irritation over
Without Sukarno's per-
sistent diversionary campaigns
and the controls afforded by
"guided democracy," economic
problems probably would create
severe political difficulties
for him. For the time being,
however, the country still
seems able to absorb or to
forget its gamut of economic
problems, and Sukarno's posi-
tion is relatively unaffected.
Outlook
Sukarno's assets continue
to outweigh his liabilities.
Although his problems will
accumulate and intensify, he
will probably meet them in the
foreseeable future with con-
tinued careful domestic maneuver
and attempts to divert, attention
to international affairs.
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The PKI's immediate strat-
egy apparently is to move with
Sukarno, pressuring him when
possible, and avoiding any major
exploitation of the economic
situation. The party is con-
centrating on building a stronger
peasant base and on gaining
genuine representation in the
cabinet.
Should either his own in-
clinations or Communist pressures
lead Sukarno to appoint Commun-
ists to the cabinet--as he pro-
fesses he will do--the PKI could
go far toward consolidating its
position through its predominance
in the National Front and its
strength among labor and the
peasantry. Any decline inSukarno's
health or rise in the Communists'
capability to confront the army
will hasten the day when they
feel able to challgnge the
President himself.
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