TRANSLATION FROM DER ZURICHER OBERLANDER , 7 MARCH 1968 THEY SHOUT VIETNAM AND MEAN EUROPE MOSCOW IS ORGANIZING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE RENEWAL OF THE NATO TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 7, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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Translation from "DER ZURICHER OBERLANDER" 7 March 1968
THEY SHOUT "VIETNAM" AND MEAN EUROPE
Moscow is organizing a campaign against
the renewal of the NATO'.Treaty
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The camouflaged Agitprop .organizations are preparing for the coming
months a large-scale- propaganda offensive in the West. This campaign. has
already'started"and will reach its first'peaks in March with the noisy "Easter
the .destruction of NATO.
The NATO Treaty expires in April 1969. Moscow wants to- destroy this
basis of the Western defense system in order to thereby push America out of
Euro pe. This. is regarded as the
precondition', for the realization of Soviet
world domination. This is why Moscow's entire Fifth Column has been inflated
into a propaganda assault. The attack in E.arope.will be directed first of
all against the Federal Republic 'of Germay~ as ?%rell as against the southern-
ra,ost corner-stone of the Western defense system, Greece, and -- although it
does"not belong to NATO -- against Spain.
While on the one hand "liberalization of Communism" and the possibili.-
ties,for a "relazation of tensions" in Europe are-being propagated,, the Com-
munists-put forward, on the other hand, stiffer and stiffer demands as.pre
condition for this "relazation.". At the same time they kre lhterisi#ying their
subversion and psychological warfare.
The propaganda slogans can be summarized in the call: "Get out'of.
NATO!" By this slogan, first of all the trust of the masses'in the Govern-
ments of the U.S.A. and the Federal Republic of-Germany is to,be shaken. In
addition,, the real character of the unpopular war in Vietnam is.:being.distorted
and then, in that form, exploited for propaganda. The implementation.of,the
Vietnam:campaign was entrusted in the first place to the "World FedesaiOn of"
Democratic Youth" (WFDY). This organization, with its seat in Budapest, has
already drafted its program of activities in connection with this in January,
and will, at an extraordinary meeting of its Executive Committee in March in
Paris issue the necessary instructions to its member organizations. The mere
fact that this meeting will not take place, as usual, in an Eastern State but
in France already shows in which direction the campaign.will be developed.
They shout "Vietnam" and mean Europe.
Conferences on the conveyor belt
A much more complicated offensive on a "higher level" is being started
by the "World Council of Peace" (WCP). By this, mainly intellectuals are to
be baited and won over to support the Soviet policy concerning Europe. A
large number of seminars and meetings, camouflaged as pacifist, are envisaged
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2
about so-called "European Security" and the Vietnam War. Through these events,
the political atmosphere is to be made ripe for a "European Security Confer-
ence" for which Moscow is striving, on Government or parltt.amentarylevel.
The "International Institute for Peace", behind which the'Vienna Secretariat
of theWCP is hiding, has laid on fo this purpose a secret conference for
March, in order to find ways for the formation of an "above-party" Preparatory
Committee.. An important role in this campaign is allotted to the so-called
"All-Christian Peace Assembly" which is to begin at the end of March in Prague.
"this s embly is organized by the so-called "Christian Peace Conference"
which is closely connected with the "World Council of Peace (WC?) . The
"Asseczbly'Is aim is to infiltrate the Christian Churches and to draw them
more strongly into the Red "Action Front". Somewhat later,-in April, an
"International Conference of Scientists" will take place in Vienna, serving
similar aims, which will be orgs,nized by the camouflaged Communist "World
Federation of Scientific Workers" . (WF ). These are onlyf a few of the many
projects of this world-wide offensive, apart from the noisy Easter marches.
Greece - Just in time
Mid-February an extremely successful so-called "4th West-European. Con-
fsrence on Spain" 'was held in Paris, inspired by Communists behind the scenes
in the framework of this same: offensive. It,decided organizationally to ex-
pand the anti-Spain campaign by the formation of a permanent committee. This
has now-inducedMoscow's Agitprop agents to prepare a similar international
conference against Greece. Should the Governments of these Mediterranean
cow s be overthrown by old COMINTERN methods, the Communist seizure of
power there would be ;merely .a question of time. However, the NATO would lose.
thereby its most important bastions`inthe South and its disintegration could
no longer be prevented.
This shows how the links in the chain are Joined in this offensive.
And the following directive,'is+sued'fromMoscow, is being carried out: "The
support of the Communist policy by non=Co ists,.above all by intellectuals,
is today as a rule - more important than the winning over of new Party members."
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 28 June 1968
COMMUNISTS
Russia Wooing
Who was that gentleman talking so
much like a Super-European? Jean
Monnet? Paul Henri-Spaak? Not at all.
It was none other than the foreign edi-
tor of Pravda, the official organ of
Russia's Communist Party-a man
whose words and ideas could reason-
ably be expected to reflect the latest
thinking and policy ambitions of the
Kremlin. Last week, vacationing in The
Netherlands, Yuri Zhukov spoke to the
Dutch political weekly Haagse Post
:.rout what Russia has in mind when it
comes tq Europe, East or West. His ob-
vious nlpssage: After soft-pedaling for
the sake of detente their desire to re-
place U.S. influence in Europe with
their own, the Russians are once again
busily out to woo the Europeans.
Zhukov, 60, assured Europeans that
they need not be scared by the "dire pre-
dictions" of French Journalist Jean-
Jacques Servan-Schreiber that U.S.
business may one day dominate the
Continent's economy. "If all Europeans,
that is you and we, pull together," he
said, "we can soon be boss in our own
house." Then he cracked: "The Amer-
icans,. with their strange habit of liq-
uidating their leaders, should turn to
INTERPLAY
May 1968
lOI d
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their own neighbors, Canada and Mex- Urals they live on,,, Yet Russia ohvi-
ico, for cooperation." ously considers Dc Gaulle an ally in its
Dismissing NATO as "a completely European policy, so much so that even
useless affair," Zhukov admitted sport- his recent fulminations against Corn-
ingly that the same might be said of munism in France do not bother Zhu-
the Warsaw Pact. "We must dissolve kov in the slightest. "That's election
the two blocs and organize a system of talk;" hg says. Nor does he think much
European cooperation, economically, of the ltudent radicals who have lately
scientifically, culturally and even po- 'upset De Gaulle. Comparing Rebel
litically." For a start, Zhukov backs a Leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit with Left-
Belgian project calling for a "Pan-Eu- ist Guru Herbert Marcuse of the Uni-
ropean orientation conference," at versity of California, Zhukov said:
which parliamentarians from all Eu- "Cohn-Bendit is a flea and Marcuse an
ropean countries would voice their plans elephant, although I strongly criticize
for collaboration. his ideas too."
Fleas & Elephant. A united Europe Liffle Hopc- The Russians, who two
is bound to emerge as the world's lead- years ago prol.o:. ' i an all-European sc-
ing power; predicted Zhukov, making curity conference to disband the Con-
it clear that Russia ought to be includ- tinent's military pacts, are looking next
ed in the family. Even before the birth door again with renewed interest. While
of the U.S., he said, "Dutch merchants the Viet Nani war persists, they foresee
traveled to St. Petersburg and Peter little hope for enlarged trade or other
the Great came to Holland to learn a accords with the U.S. Instead, they seem
trade." This type of coo
eration
h
p
,
e
feels, continues today in such enter-
prises as the French Renault and Ital-
ian Fiat auto plants in the Soviet Union.
Charles de Gaulle's vision, in which
the Continent is also divorced from the
U.S., calls for a Europe from the At-
lantic to the Urals. Zhukov's view does
not stop at the Urals: "Russians are Eu-
ropeans, no matter what side of the
None of the key governments paid much attention to
NATO's recent self-examination during the year it was
carried on. Each was-and is-absorbed by larger, if not
wholly unrelated, considerations. Still, the organization is
a tougher instrument now than at any time since General
de Gaulle withdrew his forces from it in the spring of
1966. That is of some importance, because considerable
pressure, much of it arising from the diverse preoccupa-
tions of Washington, London, Bonn and Paris, has gath-
ered against the somewhat battered and weathered NATO
structure. The immediate question is whether the modest
gains of 1967 can be consolidated, or whether the alliance
will merely continue to drift further from the center of
events.
Out of the review known as the Harmel exercise a brief
but unanimous report was produced. It said nothing new
or daring, but it did restate some of the old orthodoxy,
and everyone, including the General, signed. Second, the
.
joint n-ilitary strategy was at last aligned with Washing-
ton's preference for a non-nuclear option and tighter cri- John Newhouse, the author of Collision in Brussels: the Com-
sis management at every stage ofC?ho~tility. f1f1 /nQf I7p- (~?]~ ~~~ $~ a new book, tenta-
Sel Belgian civil il tgVii ltp& ti1q15i~n~'1'L bY`C rib ' 'tai Z i d e nu a un a ng o-Saxons.
ready to make new overtures to West-
ern Europe, with its increasingly so-
phisticated technology. Moreover, with
the U.S. preoccupied elsewhere, and
with some Europeans wary of U.S. in-
fluence in their countries, Moscow may
now feel that it has an outside chance
to impose its own political formulas on
the Continent.
ing to reassure political circles about the possibly trouble-
some institution whose presence it had fallen to Belgium
to accept. The special beneficiaries of the exercise, besides
Belgium, would be such countries as Denmark, Norway
and Canada, whose NATO involvement must be justified
to public opinion, much of it hostile.
The governments of these countries were served by a
report which argued, if perhaps not very forcefully, "that
,,the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the al-
liance," and which noted "the importance of the. role the
alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in
the promotion of detente and the strengthening of peace."
Such language tends to fortify the orthodox argument
that detente is a product of the West's cohesive strength,
and serves to oppose the tempting French argument that
detente will be promoted through a loosening of the mili-
tary blocs.
A Concession and a Surprise
French acceptance of even such diluted language was an
undoubted concession and a mild surprise. For a time it
appeared that France would not approve the more explicit
passages; the others were prepared in the end to go ahead
without her, although the Germans and Canadians were
acutely anxious to avoid embarrassing Paris
De Gaulle's
 CPYRGH
Apprqy&q
acquiescence was larM. tfcPrbFeAW IM1 ez.e%1
quarrel with his Common Market partners on a lesser mat-
ter one week before he would have to quarrel with them
about something major-his rejection of Britain's second
try to join the European Economic Community.
The Harmel report favors certain activities, most of
which would have been carried on in any case. The French
will be part of whatever alliance projects interest de
Gaulle, and will leave to the Fourteen those he finds un-
acceptable or politically confining. For example, a study
on East-West balanced mutual force reductions is just
starting in the Council. France will almost certainly take
part in this vastly complicated exercise of clouded pros-
pect. On the other hand, she plans to ignore a study of
Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean, noted cryptically
in the Hitrmel report, on the stated grounds that the area
of great0st concern, the Middle East, is outside NATO's
competeipce.
The n1utual-force-reductions study, incidentally, points
up a graving but; belated recognition that alliance-force
goals and arms control are sides of a single coin, and
should therefore be related, not so much in spite of their
antagonism as because of it. The German problem lies
close to 'the center of both alliance politics and the poli-
tics of arms control. The consequences of stressing the one
at; the expense of. the other are predictably vexing. That
is certainly among the lessons of the troubled history of
the Non-'Proliferation Treaty, which for some time was
pushed with little regard to the interests of Bonn and
other non-nuclear capitals.
Something in It for Everyone
The Harmel saga coincided with much of the decisive
period of the Non-Proliferation Treaty negotiations, and,
at another level, was nearly as episodic. The point was to
reaffirm what every government already knows but often
ignores: that the Atlantic Alliance remains the best means
of coping with the security requirements of its, members.
From a European point of view, it allows the US to make
the weight in Western Europe against the Soviet Union
in Eastern Europe. From an American point of view,
NATO offers a stable instrument for guaranteeing the se-
curity of the exposed places on its perimeter-notably
West Germany and the southeastern flank, Turkey and
Greece. The alliance provides the essential cover for Ger-
man military strength; in return, it gives Germans the
larger setting that is dictated by their political require-
ments. These are considerations to be borne in mind by
those who suggest that the purposes of the alliance would
be as well served if Washington replaced it with a system
of bilateral security agreements. Germany aside, the diffi-
culties of maintaining such agreements with, say, Greece
and Turkey are easily imagined. In short, whatever the
stresses of the harem, this arrangement suits Washington
far better than a series of liaisons.
France is an equal beneficiary, in the sense that the sta-
bilizing influence of the alliance-of the American pres-
ence-gives de Gaulle diplomatic running-room in Central
and Eastern Europe (as, indeed, it gives East European
governments as well). Needless to say, he need not be a
7memoeR P 8 Q1306eAto exj~ls 000
p 0 Ot 00adv$ tage; but once
he quits it altogether, hia value to Moscow-his ability,
for instance, to influence joint activities like the Harmel
exercise-will be much diminished. His current position
is such that France is neither really in nor really out. Al-
though the seat on the Council is filled, France is divorced
from most of the programing and planning; these are
'functions of new instruments created since do Gaulle's
withdrawal from the military structure. The new strategy
MCI was adopted in the Defense Planning Committee,
whits ;its as fourteen without France. It is really an up-
dated version of the well-known MC 100/1, which was ac-
cepted in the spring oi: 1963 by the Military Committee
and than vetoed in the Standing Group (now defunct) by
the French representative.
Wilt de Gaulle Stay in the Game?
Nobody can predict whether do Gaulle will withdraw al-
together from the alliance; any objective assessment sug-
gests that he will remain and take part in whatever po-
litical activities affect French interests. Yet do Gaulle is
concerned with making the thrust of his policy irrevers-
ible, and must assume that with France altogether out
and pursuing a neutralist course domestic politics would
make it all but impossible for a successor government to
return. But the seat on the Council risks becoming a
bridge back into the forbidden, American-dominated
structure for some successor. Since there is at least an
even chance that eventually de Gaulle will leave the alli-
ance, some people were against diluting parts of the Iiar-
mel report just to obtain French acceptance. They were
wrong. Much of the value of the report lies in its unanim-
ity; in terms of alliance politics, much the best course is
to keep open whatever channels develop for French par-
ticipation. Logic and fashion conspire to focus thinking on
aprds-Gaullisme, however distant the day may be.
The switch to MC 14/1 is more a change in emphasis
than in basic strategy, since the US controls strategic de-
cisions anyway. It mostly means that NATO units which
were formerly available only for nuclear contingencies
can now be committed by SACEUR to less fanciful roles.
Obviously, all this serves to concentrate still greater au-
thority in Washington, hardly a cause for rejoicing in
Europe, especially Bonn. Still, the greater stress on non-
nuclear options tends-marginally, at least, to strengthen
the American commitment to maintain sizeable forces in
Europe; also, Europeans are starting to learn more about
nuclear strategy and control, thanks to the most useful
of the alliance's new instruments, the Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG).
Like the strategy change, the NPG has its roots in the
early 1960s. After a long period on the shelf, it was re-
vived by Mr. McNamara about two years ago; Britain,
Germany, Italy and the US are permanent members,
joined by three smaller countries holding rotating mem-
berships over an 18-month cycle. The utility of the group
depends quite literally on what the US is prepared to dis-
close in the way of data and the insights arising from
its long experience in the nuclear strategy business. It
amounts to separating the essential from the peripheral.
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 CPYRGH
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After years of lecturing his European colleagues on the power center in the West, a lesser power, no doubt, than
realities of nuclear strategy and control, Mr. McNamara the -tS, but in the Soviet view not very different and most
had a device that enabled him to explain the criteria and undesirable, however much a united Western Europe
procedures that underlie nuclear planning-a device which might appear to abet the Soviet interest in freezing the
has, of course, been inherited by his successor, Mr. Clif- division of Germany.
ford. It is not an easy function, and means breaking down Like Washington, the principal West European capitals
the inherent resistance to this sort of disclosure in vari- are currently preoccupied by national concerns and bi-
ous parts of Washington. For the first time, SACEUR,'s lateral relationships. This is likely to be the pattern for
planning is being revealed to European defense ministers. the immediate future-a sifting, perhaps cross-cutting
Useful s,tudies on the control and planning for tactical nu- pattern of bilateral arrangements coexisting uneasily with
clear weapons have been carried on. The French, who of NATO and the European Community, as both institutions
course do not participate, frankly admire the work of the co to security perform ,essentoia l weigh though restricted tr c t d functions.
group. both institutions will be considerably influenced by the
It has always been clear that if the alliance were to
continue some arrangement would be needed to permit shifting defense policies of London, Paris and Bonn.
The British government, for: all its declaratory Euro-
The
Do-
this kind of joint war-gaming. Nuclear planning requires
owed cert.:by in5ely ~~ri for ng the intr:a:n moalment. Conflict
political direction is assured before, during and after veThe B valuation is has a been spent 'f' force,
the outbreak of hostilities, in whatever form. But allied
governments must understand why and how. That is be- overarms sales to South Africa and the most recent de-
ginning to happen, although admittedly at a time when cisions on reducing defense expenditures. Although some
uncritically accept the argument that these decisions for-
sec the alliance lesser is concern. more c co oherent than it was two years tify Britaiil'a European bona fides, it can be arguod with
If f the much force that Wilson is abandoning positions and
? ago, it lacks the political dynamic which must at some
stage emerge. It is a comforting assumption that with the resources that are potentially European because they are
balance of power still centered in Europe the NATO gov- British. Britain's special role beyond the Mediterranean
ernments will be unwilling to run down their defense ca might one day have been subsumed in a Europ ?:; orma-
pabilities and to fold up the alliance. Still, the alliance, tion seeking to reestablish a world position. i It was
like any system, has built-in tolerances; the combination decided to accelerate the withdrawal both from Singapore
of time and pressure from diverse sources could overcome and the tumultuous Persian Gulf, instead o, s ,rc:i-thing
these and empty the organization of useful purpose. it out to 1975. The sums to be saved are iig;ible and
clearly out of proportion to the significaa;ce , the deci-
sion, which, among other things, can only deepen Wash-
America's and Europe's Diverging. Courses ington's disenchantment with Europe.
The cancellation of the order that ~ 50 0 1'-I~l t ..'
These pressures arise chiefly from the growing differ- The reconnaissance ioncof e means for i , liy; has
sates between Europe and America-or better, perhaps, foresaken the hardware, while paying e heavy ,.rice, aris-
from the apparently diminishing identity of interest be- ing in this case from the cancellation charges and the
tween them. The US is absorbed by Asian security, by the predictable loss of a good part of the access to the bur-
by dossier and by internal questions. Europe is chafed geoning American sera-space market guarantcuc} by the
by its organizational troubles and by the lamentably small F-111 o(iset arrangements. In fact, the F-1111 decision
figure it cuts in the direction of its own most important was taken on political rather than budgetary grounds.
affars. Admittedly London ordered the F-111 for use east of
attitude increasingly in vogue suggests
Suez. Yet its NATO/European vocation. was there. The
An American attitu
that Europe's relevance to the national interest is declin- current generation of long-range strike-and-reconuais-
ing steadily. This attitude gives reduced importance to Naliec aircraft assigned to SACEUR is nearly obsolete.
Europe's continued position as the point of confrontation ,vioreover, France's withdrawal from NATO alight even-
- the US find the USSR. It is an understandable Wally create a substantially enlarged belt of neutral air
re-
attitude-the action, after all, is elsewhere-but it ig- sir lee a problem that would point up the long run re-
nores, or rejects, the likelihood that as American concern cIuiremeut for a versatile, long-range modern airplane.
with Europe and the German problem declines, Soviet .fhe collapse of the Anglo-French swing-wing aircraft
concern with widening its identity of interest with the liroject could mean that Europe is unlikely to have such
US will also decline. In short, a reduction by the US of a weapcan system, at least not in the 1970s. France's I}a8-
its involvementwith Western Europe will not be matched Sault has tested a prototype, but it will not be produced,
by Moscow, and is likely to sharpen the tatter's temptation and the French government doesn't intend to consider the
to pursue a more adventurous European policy; it is not c1110ation of s swing-wing airplane until 1971 or 1972 at
a question of military conquest, if in the nuclear age it the earliest.
ever was, but rather an expansion of influence.
Viewed from Moscow, the alliance supports a distinct Britain Trims, France Girds f or War
and vastly successful Western system, with each European
member, France included, emulating much that is basic to The asymmetry in British and French defense policy is
the purely merican system. What's more, with the Euro- Al it co Ii Mete. The one is trimming, the other appar-
pean Inc eAPAMINO ePf Ret9me aomwd 7a:BUQty po i09 4w V99 $ to the outer reaches of
 CPYRGH
9trntegic weaponryAofppeid q-6*Abr4eth0bMMV : A [ (~ other' pulley ~Ior
still Western Europe's only thermonuclear power, intends that matter, so long as t ef enera is at the helm. But
to replace its Polaris submarines as they become obsolete. afterwards . . . It is here that the "European" argu-
In order to remain an even moderately serious member ment surfaces, if somewhat mistily. Some who have
of the nuclear club, Britain might eventually have to re- worked closely with the General and others who still do
thn Polaris missiles with the Poseidon (assuming its speak openly about establishing an entente niccleccire
,r:,l:ccnii; r ., Li; Americans are doing, and/or build a based on British membership in the European Commu-
i in order to have two boats in con-:''nity; the non-Community opposition is also picking up
::;le present signs are that Britain is this line. Many who are. involved in the nuclear program
,'v to dr, ci~r, feel they are creating European, as distinct from French,
Nor is any clearer that France can provide strategic' strategic options.
forces of the quality and quantity envisaged by de Gaulle Whether this outward-looking French attitude could
and the late General Ailleret-not, at least, in any normal actually promote strategic nuclear cooperation is hardly
time sequence. The latter's recent article calling for a de- clear. The notion offends orthodox thinking by putting the
tense capability directed toward toes azimuts (all points strategic cart before the political horse. Even after de
of the compass found favor with de Gaulle. But it does; Gaulle, the 'possibilities for Franco-British nuclear col-
not find favor with most deputies, or with numerous high laboration may well be restricted largely to arrangements
ranking civil servants concerned with defense, or, indeed, for joint targeting and limited data exchanges. British
with some prominent figures in the government. warhead and nuclear-submarine technology could be profit-
French defense policy is the issue, in fact, of a growing' ! ably linked to Frnc.- s growing ballistic-missile capabil-
debate, or the equivalent thereof in a constitutional mon- ity. But the political obstacles are self-evident. Britain
archy. A program that was designed primarily to impress ! presumably remains subject to the restraints imposed by
the Germans is to become the earnest of France's inviol- her contractual arrangements for nuclear cooperation
'ability and global vocation. The chairman of the Parlia- with the United States. Without some considerable re-
imontary Defense Committee, a Gaullist deputy named Le' orientation of French foreign policy, Washington would
Theule, has obliged the government to submit a report due be unlikely to approve much that was meaningful in this
in April explaining the distortion in the second five-year. area.
military program; or, more precisely, to justify the shift The pity is that the nuclear question so fascinates Con-
ing substantial funds to the nuclear program at the ex- tinental political and defense circles as to discourage sys-
pense of the forces classiques, all of which are lagging tematic examination of what in the way of joint non.
well behind the stated goals, nuclear defense arrangements might be created at the Eu-
Le Theule and numerous colleagues are known to be ropean level. This is perhaps understandable, since for
even more alarmed by the planning for the third five-year the moment nothing can be done at either level-nuclear
program; it starts in 1970, but the decisions on force or non-nuclear; the political interests of ,onn, London
goals and budget must be taken this year, probably in the and Paris tend to cancel out each other, and thus stabilize
summer. The understandable concern is that these deci 'the status quo.
sions will be virtual faits accomplis when sent for ap Meanwhile, the two great powers are extending the dis-
proval to the Palais Bourbon in December 1969. tance between their strategic capabilities and the possi-
:bilities of France and Britain to deploy fund maintain mod-
Options in the Air and under the Sea ern nuclear forces. Anti-ballistic missile systems, mul-
tipre individually-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), an
The government is considering a range of options; these expanding penetration technology, the prospect of ma-
amount to choosing between a dramatic expansion of the vine deep-submergence ICBMs-all this fords the anxiety
nascent nuclear submarine program-a jump from five to of those who favor a united and self-sufficient European
10 or 12 (the stated goal is now four)-or replacing the Community.
submarines as they become obsolete with a substantial Their cause would be better served if the framework of
force of ICBMs. The latter would demand still greater ! some agreement could be established that would put Eu-
qualitative strides from French technology. The third op- rope's own considerable assets at the service of a Euro-
tion would mean creating a mixed force of submarines and. pean defense organization when the political climate im-
ICBMs. Leaving aside technological hurdles, it is doubt proves. This would make both political and financial sense.
ful that France could build and deploy any of the forces The cost of weapons systems is rising at .-n alarming rate;
envisaged by the foregoing before the weapon systems the ability of European NATO governments to maintain
themselves were obsolete except by sacrificing quite a lot I adequate force levels in the 1970s is likely to decline, un-
of social infrastructure along the way. The reaction in 1 less there emerges some combination of more rational
both political and administrative circles mingles skepti- procurement procedures and a new political dynamic with-
cism with concern for the economy. The current strategic in the Western Alliance.
program is at the point where expensive support systems
must also be undertaken; for this and other reasons, the A Possible, if Imperfect, Solution
cost curve is expected to rise sharply.
Here again,'logic and fashion focus discussion on apres= Given an infusion of political will, the existing alliance
Gaullisme. Nobody, including the Prime Minister, will be machinery could be used to rationalize military spending;
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CPYRGH
T
the revised strategy is already linked with an agreement An EDC Could Work like the EEC
to put force planning and programming on a rolling five-
year schedule. But NATO in its present form is unlikely A European Defense Community, on the other hand,
to inspire this renewal of political will; on either side of might in time be ca,mble of imposing such decisions, as
the Atlantic, weariness and impatience with America's the EEC has in other areas, such as agriculture. TO
~an'omolous role in European affairs is growing. The soiu- h'ranco-British swing-wing project collapsed less because
tion, however imperfect, may be a new European Defense of conflicting requirements than because France's De -
Community linked to the US within NATO; in time, the sault managed to pre-empt the funds that would have sup-
latter could presumably be subsumed in a sort of two- ported French participation for his own F-1, which will
pillar arrangement. This Is hardly a new Idea, and has replace the Mirage II1.3t seems that in the end the tech.
been under study for some time in Whitehall; useful work nological and defense questions are closely linked with
by the Institute for Strategic Studies has endowed it with Europe's political development; defense arrangements
will require a strong central institution which would man-
some precision.
A age Europe's military spending within the framework of
European defense organization would presumably be
linked, with other Brussels-based communities; it, too, a general policy agreed to by governments.
would, be run by a commission whose supra-national all-: Now is not the time to push such a proposition for the
thority would` grow with time and would doubtless incor-' obvious reason that France-and hence Germany as well
poi?ate ministries of defense and supply. It would be a -is unwilling to contemplate British participation in any
non-nuclear enterprise, certainly in the early stages, with- Community activity as important as defense. But now is
out precluding a nuclear option if and as the unifying surely the time to focus thinking on such a prospect with-
process in the NATO capitals, especially Bonn.,
si'ic aC. Community would perhaps en- A persistent rumor suggests that General de Gaulle will
In the long g term, m, , suci~ a
In
courage each of its nuclear power centers, Britain and focus thinking on the subject this year by offering the
France, to avoid trying to duplicate the strategic panoply Five a defense community fashioned to his view of a
of the great powers, and rather to leapfrog various stages French-led Continental formation. Although it seems un-
in order one day, perhaps, to achieve comparable modes- likely, he has in the past toyed with the idea of securing
nity, if on a smaller scale. In the meantime, the Defense ;!a kind Hof subsidy from his partners, notably Bonn, for
'Community would exploit European excellence in the less France's non-nuclear forces, thus liberating resources for
costly tactical-weapon systems. France, for example, can his strategic program. However, he has never pushed the
'.develop combat aircraft of a quality equal to 'America's notion very far. To do so now would not suit the Five
and with a much smaller capital investment. Together, very well, but would further complicate the European-
Britain and France have either parity or superiority vis- and *Atlantic-political scene.
a-vis the US with regard to vertical take-off vehicles, In the absence of a real defense community, the Euro-
'hovercraft, various tactical missiles and other systems. pean governments will doubtless continue to prefer to co-
Opinion is growing within NATO and elsewhere that ordinate their defense arrangements with Washington
procurement can be rationalized only through specializa- and to buy their exotic hardware from the American shelf.
tion. Politically it is far from an ideal solution since it NATO in its present form will remain the most "cost.
tends to collide with the principle of juste retour, as well effective" device-in both political and military terms-
for meetin
minimal securit
re
ire
ent
t th
B
t i
g
y
qu
s.
u
a
s
m
as with national tradition. In any case, specialization is
unlikely to go very far in the existing NATO framework. ,unlikely to be enough in the long run to maintain its
Who, for example, would decide whether Country A or aplausibility. The recent gains are useful, but they do
Country B should satisfy the requirement for vertical nothing to rebalance the NATO structure.
takeoff vehicles? Would Belgium be willing to give up its
Navy, the Netherlands its Air Force,-on a NATO recom-
mendation ? Almost certainly not.
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T
 CPYRGHT
NATO'S FIF''ELf rgof1&$r Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030026-8
June-July 1968
97%=rLJ1 "'M
LrL, a-3 ujQU,
C^9
C'T
by a well-informed student of East European relations
The East European treaty of friend- tariat" is another Soviet officer, General
ship, co-operation and mutual assistance, I(azakov, who is subordinate to Marshal
known,. as the Warsaw Pact, was signed
'on May 14, 1955. It was the first formal
military alliance between the Soviet Union!
and the Communist States of Eastern
Europe - Albania, Bulgaria, Czecho-'t
slovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland
and Rumania. Though Albania has never;
officially ceased to be a member of the
Pact she has not played any practical part i
in its activities since 1960, when she
allied herself with China in, the Sino-
Soviet dispute:
The Signing of the Warsaw Pact fol-
lowed the ratification, nine days earlier, of
the Paris Agreements which admitted the'
Federal Republic of Germany to mem-
bership of the Western European Union.
(WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO).
The Pact, concluded by the Soviet
Union with governments which it had
itself imposed on Eastern Europe, was
initially intended as a soviet propaganda
answer to the Paris Agreements rather!
than a serious attempt at integrating the
military power of the Communist States.
. The Soviet Union already had bilateral
military arrangements with the Pact coun-
tries; it had signed 20-year treaties of
.friendship, co-operation and mutual as-
sistance with Czechoslovakia in 1943
(renewed in 1963), with Poland in 1945
(renewed in 1965), and with Hungary,:
Rumania and Bulgaria in 1948.
The Warsaw Pact provides primarily
for a military system designed to place
the armed forces of the East European
countries under, Soviet command. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Com-
mand of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces
is Marshal Grechko, Soviet Vice-Minister
of Defence. Under him, as deputies, are
the Defence Ministers of the other member
countries. The head of the "Unified Secre-
The Political Consultative Committee
comprises the Foreign Ministers of the
member countries; the chairmanship is
the prerogative of the Soviet Union. This
committee has held only about ten
!meetings since 1956 and seems, at least
juntil recently, to have been less a policy-
!making body than a forum for the presen-
tation of the Soviet policy line.
The Warsaw Pact justifies the sta-
;tioning of Soviet armed forces in Poland
(28,000 men) and East Germany (350,000
men), and allows the Soviet Union to
lelude the provisions of the Hungarian
peace treaty which called for the with-
drawal of Soviet troops from that country
,(where it now has some 50,000 men)
after the signing of the Austrian State
Treaty in 1955, and to maintain in power
the regime which it installed by its armed
intervention in November, 1956.
Changed Soviet attitude
Though the Warsaw Pact came into
being primarily as a propaganda counter-
move to the Paris Agreements, the Soviet' ;attitude to the Warsaw Pact changed in
the late 1950s and early 1960s; the result
1was increased importance for the Pact.
In October, 1961, the first Warsaw
Pact manoeuvres were held; Soviet, East
German, Polish and- Czechoslovak forces
;took part. Since then there have been at
'least nine other joint exercises, involving
also the other East European countries in
varying combinations, the two latest being
the manoeuvres in East Germany in Oc-
tober, 1965 and in Czechoslovakia in
September, 1966.
In the early 1960s, too, a programme
was started to re-equip and standardise
the arms of the East European armies
and to give them a greater role in overall
Soviet defence planning. By the time
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 CIA-RDP78- 3 614000400030026-8
Khrushchev fell in 1964 substantial assessment o the situation and of the
changes had taken place not only in threat presented by West Germany was
Soviet policy towards': the Warsaw Pact shared at the conference by the delega-
but in the capacity of 'the armed forces tions from the Soviet Union, Czecho-
of the East European members. slovakia, Poland "and others".
A number of factors contributed to the The Northern members - the Soviet:
change in the Soviet attitude. One was the' U ti, n. Czechoslovakia, Poland and East
change in the military policy of the Soviet Germany. appear to constitute an informal
;Union itself. Launched by Khrushchev in group within the Pact as being the mem-
1960, this policy aimed at reducing the hers most immediately affected by the
.role of the large Soviet conventional German question. Rumania, Bulgaria and
forces and relied more on nuclear weap-' Hungary have no direct quarrel with West
ons. This meant increasing the role of the Germany or a common frontier with her.
other Warsaw Pact members, re-equipping Without wishing to create two distinct
itheir forces and integrating them more- levels of interest in the Pact, the Soviet
closely with those of the Soviet Union. Union probably regards the Scuthern
There was also the need on the part of States as the weak point in the alliancf. +n
.of the Soviet Union for some organisa- the exceptional circumstances of ?"
tional means to try to maintain political when the true wishes of her
;
`unity in Eastern Europe, especially after,: mentarfiY found exPre-
Rumanian defiance had, doomed Soviet' shown her desire ' ,w from the
hopes for CMEA. The Soviet Union saw 'Pact; more rr. the Communist
in the Warsaw Pact a useful instrument :government of Rumania has made clear
for this purpose. its reservations. Its discontent with the
Soviet dominance opposed
Khrushchev's successors, while modifying
many of his schemes, have followed his
'Warsaw Pact policy and have continued
to stress the need for greater integration of
East European forces with those of the
Soviet Union. But there are signs that this
policy, which was intended to improve the'
unity of the Pact members, may be having
the opposite effect of encouraging op-
position to Soviet dominance.
In the last few years Warsaw Pact
States have shown reluctance to accept the
burdens which their membership entails.
Rumania, in particular, has worked to,
achieve greater independence within the
Pact - notably since November, 1964,
when she reduced the period, of military
service from two years to 16 months,
apparently without consulting her Pact
allies.
In January, 1965, there was an unusual
lack of unanimity at a meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee in War-,
saw, called to discuss the German ques-
tion. A vague communiqu6 at the end of
the session proposed no real measures
'and was, in fact, the, first Pact com-
munique which failed to affirm a unani
mous opinion. The East German leader,
Ulbricht, later said that the East German
Pact came to a head in April and May,
1966.
"Abolish military blocs"
A joint communique issued after Ruma-
nian-Yugoslav talks in April, 1966,
asserted that "the two sides consider that.
it is in the interest of the strengthening
of peace and the elimination of all forms
of interference in other nations' internal
affairs to abolish military bases and to
withdraw troops from other countries'
territorje~. The two sides also maintain
that the division of the world into military
blocs does not suit a positive development
of international relations in the world
today".
Shortly ' afterwards, on May 7, the
.Rumanian Party leader, Nicolae Ceauses-
cu, spoke in favour of the "abolition of
military blocs, the dismantling of foreign
bases and the withdrawal of troops from
the territory of other countries". The exis-
tence of such blocs, he said, was "an
anachronism incompatible with the na-
tional independence and sovereignty of
our Peoples".
Subsequent report from Eastern Europe
spoke of a memorandum sent by Ru-
mania to all East European members of
the Warsaw Pact calling for a greater say
in the use and deployment of nuclear
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weapons, challenging the Soviet monopoly
of the post of Supreme Commander,
questioning the need for greater-financial
contributions to the Pact and proposing
that the Soviet Union should. pay for its'
own troops in another country.
These reports were denied on May 18,
but, in making their denial, the Ru-
manians gave the impression that they
were opposed to any reorganisation of the
Warsaw Pact which would extend their
own commitments and which would effect
a more thorough military integration with
the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev replies
The Soviet Party leader, Brezhnev,
replied to the Rumanians when he spoke
at the opening of the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party Congress in Prague on May
31. Pleading, for' unity of action and for'
.closer political and military co-operation,
he said that the Soviet Union favoured
the replacement of military blocs by
peaceful co-operation .but would defend
Warsaw Pact interests as long as NATO
existed.
The Rumanian Communists echoed
Speaking at Pitesti on'
June W, Ceausescu stated that it was
"lime to abolish the NATO aggressive
pact and as a consequence also the
Warsaw treaty". In other words, the dis-
solution of NATO must come first; while
NATO remained in being Rumania would,
"like the other members of the Warsaw
Pact, increase its defence capacity
This theme was developed at the Pact
meeting in Bucharest in July. A 5,000-
word declaration on July 8, at the end of
the meeting, proposed ' the simultaneous
dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact and called for an all-European con-.
ference on security; questions of organi-
sation were shelved.
Simultaneous dissolution of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact has beep proposed 'on
a number of occasions by the Soviet
Union, though this was the first time that
the Warsaw Pact Powers as a whole had
made the proposal.
Consequences of dissolution
Simultaneous dissolution would have
great strategic advantages for the Soviet
Union. The Warsaw Pact is irrelevant to the
disposition of Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe; its dissolution would not affect
the' bilateral treaties the Soviet Union
already has with the Eat European
States.
Dissolution of NATO, on the other
hand, would mean the withdrawal of
United States forces from Europe; their
re-entry in the event of an emergency
would be incomparably more difficult
than similar re-entry of Soviet forces
(even if the latter withdrew from Eastern
Europe). NATO members would also lose
their extensive political organisation
(which does not exist within the Warsaw
Pact). for which bilateral agreements
would provide no effective substitute. So
long as NATO exists as an effective mili-
tary and political organisation its disrup-
tion and dissolution will remain a major
aim of Soviet foreign policy. But the
equation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
is unrealistic and unacceptable.
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10
 NATO LETTER Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030026-8
July-August 1968
Surely it can now be said that never before has the opinion of the younger generation had
more influence on world events than at the present time. Students in practically all NATO coun-
tries have made known their way of thinking in no uncertain terms. They have not hesitated to
critisiz or even condemn certain aspects of the existing political and social systems. In the
light df all this, it is interesting and necessary to know what the young think of NATO. That
is why we are publishing below two reports by the. NATO Letter staff on recent youth meet-
ings which dealt with the Atlantic ' Alliance. Elise. Nouel .analyses the discussions and resolutions of
the 5th General Assembly of the Atlantic Association of Young Political Leaders (2'3 Abbey
House, 8 Victoria Street, London SW 1, Great Britain) held in Luxembourg, while Peter Jen-
ner describes what happened at the travelling. seminar in Holland organized by the Dutch Stu-
dent Movement for International Relations (S.LB., Postbus 287, Groningen, Netherlands). Na-
turally, those who participated in these meetings are solely responsible for the views they expressed.
THE EDITOR..
P
oil,
ALTER ATIVE POUCY FOR TPHE VVES Via''
When the 5th Atlantic Conference of Young economy. The theme of the Conference lent itself
Political Leaders opened in Luxembourg on May ideally to such a programme and it was, quite ap-
26 last, events of unforeseeable scope and suddenn- parently. in the minds of all the delegates, the Conn-
ess were shaking the ancient structures of Europe's ecting link which ran throu. h their discussions and
universities, and reaching out to affect young mono- conclusions. The Young Political Leaders, it should
gerial personnel as well as workmen and farmers, be added, represent a wide range of political labels
In Paris, the Latin Quarter was in a state of siege, - Conservatives, Liberals, Democrats, Radicals,
the order to strike had been issued at Berlin Uni- Republicans, Socialists, Christian Democrats and
versity, the, red flag flew over Brussels Free Uni even Monarchists.
versity, tension was mounting at the Universities of At the outset, Mr. Peter.' Corterier (Germany),
Milan, Venice and Rome, and the barricades were' then President of the Atlantic Association of Young
going up at the Universities of Columbia and of Political Leaders (AAYPL), opened the debats with
the State of California. Throughout the Western a speech stressing the fact that NATO, while re-
World the old system was tottering. This explosion, maining indispensable until security is finally assur-
ed, needs "new ideas", purely military objectives
left its mark on the. three days during which the
Young Political Leaders discussed. the theme of the being out-dated. i-i' ' - -r. if >>;;~ `potable prin-
of the. Conference : "An Alternative Policy of ciples needed to +ne maintained and it was essential
the West". to prevent extz-cmist parties from instilling the con-
At the opening session the speakers who greeted' trary in the minds of youth. Mr. Lucien Emringer,
the 80-odd representatives from 12 NATO countries ' President of the Luxembourg Political Youth Cir-
(Greece, Turkey and Belgium did not attend) stress- cle (who has succeeded Mr. Otto Pick as Secretary
ed the positive role of the student iovement as a General of the AAYPL) stressed that the anxiety
genuine catalyst for the radical transformation of of the young and the present revolutionary situa-
society by reforming its political structures both tion resulted from "hundreds of millions of over-
at university level and in the major sectors of the nourished people faced by hundreds of millions
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11
 of goodwill and the pRri?ctpantsoinPttIsapgn?prgR/C%$/1 ticar I~acLers 8 must 030b6e rec p ive tto0ih6is8movement,
who are the statesmen of tomorrow, must work for since their duty is precisely to change and improve,
innovation", rather than attempt to defend a world that in some
aspects can no longer be defended. Since they enter-
Illlusion or Reality ? ed the world of politics precisely because they want
to change the world, they must call upon their ima-
Mr. Pierre Werner, Prime Minister of Luxem- gination ("Imagination has assumed power" read
Bourg, praised NATO and condemned those de- the slogan outside The Sorbonne) and attempt
tractors who equate it with servitude because the to find practical forms;; for democracy. But it should
free peoples of the Atlantic are in the vanguard of not be forgotten that tlj.is vast movement has the im-
democratic liberty. "But obviously political chan- act it does on the intelligentsia and on leadership
ges sometimes make it difficult for young people because it has the seal of freedom. Its very success
to understand the Alliance... Illusion or reality demands the maintenance of a free system by the
they ask themselves. The reality is that the Alliance:'; Western World.
has by balancing the power blocs, maintained peace ! ? The preliminary aims of the conference having
anal freedom for twenty years. Now it is up to the been thus defined, the Young Political Leaders
young to set new aims for the Pact and establish new separated into four committees which spent three
stabliising elements". days studying the different aspects of Western policy,
Mr. Fausto *Bachetti, head of the Private Office and in particular what might be the new mission of
of NATO's Secretary General, described the pre- the Atlantic Alliance. Comittee No. 1 (Chairman
sent' state of East-West relationships. He stressed Mr. Tom Van Sickle, Republican, United States;
the (improved relations in economic, cultural and rapporteur Mr. John Austin-Walker, Socialist, Great
technical fields, the political evolution of the Soviet' Britain) had as its theme "An Atlantic Foreign
blot, and NATO's desire to pursue the detente, Policy - Reality or Illusion ?". Committee No: 2
out however under-estimating the problems (Chairman Dr. Warnkc, CDU/CSU, Germany; rap
which., still separate the two sides and with res- porteur Mr. Patrick Dutertre, Centre Democrate,
pea, to which NATO most remain vigilant "since France) dealt with the question "Detente, a policy
milt ary security and the policy of detente are com-
r " for the West ?".Committee No. 3 (Chairman Mr.
ple entary not' contradictory. He went on to
stre s the need above all to preserve the liberty of Julian Critchley, Conservative, Great Britain, and
the individual, and added, "You are the political new President of the AAYPL; rapporteur Mr. Al-
leaders of the youth in various countries and you beet Hubert, Liberal, Netherlands) studied the pro-
are following different ideals and have only in com- blem "An Atlantic Free Trade Area -- A Valid
mon ? the respect and the cult of freedom and de Alternative ?". Finally, Committee No. 4 (Chair-
rnocracy. This variety of, ideals, this respect fora man Dr. Cuocolo, Christian Democrat, Italy; rap-
other opinions are the privilege of our Western ci- ' porteur Mr. Michel Theriault, Liberal, Canada)
vilisation and of our civilisation only... The preserv- examined another topical subject, "The Developing
ation of freedom. is not the obstinate resistance to Countries -- A Collective Responsibility for the
new ideas, but the possibility of keeping pace with West".
changes; which in our times are so rapid. Could
a generation have a more extensive and inspiring
Revolutionary Generosity.
Concluding the opening session, Mr. Pierre
Mahias, Secretary General of the Atlantic Treaty
Association (ATA) made an intensive survey of
"the great movement of ideas which. is sweeping
Europe". This movement, he 'said, contests first
and foremost Europe's universities, then its social
structures and finally much of its ethical teaching.
Young people, anguished by the future, demand
to be heard and to share in decisions regarding
their own destiny. Several positive aspects have al-
ready emerged. The most, important is that "for the
first time in fifty years, a .movement inspired by
revolutionary generosity has been born 'outside the
communist party, has developed without it and been
condemned by it. The split goes deep. The orthodox
communist parties run the risk of appearing out-
distanced, or worse. still out-moded". Young poli-
Resolutions Adopted.
The results of the work of each committee are
reflected in the resolutions adopted. Committee
No. 1 concentrated on the continuance of the Atlan-
tic Alliance in its specifically military aspect, given
the persisting Soviet threat and the infiltration of
Soviet naval forces into the Mediterranean and the
Middle East. While recognizing the primary mili-
tary vocation of 'NATO, this committee hoped a
place could be reserved for economic and social
problems. Furthermore, the member nations of
NATO should work together to resolve the pro-
blems of developing countries, not only as a matter
of conscience but because poverty, hunger and op-
pression favour the growth of communism. To this
end, closer co-operation should be established bet-
ween the United States and Europe in the. field of
industrialisation. Finally, in its conclusions, Com-
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 CPYRGH
T
mittee No. i c QurRxeftrJt tge eat?OPgM1af: 5pl?rggrnsOS6 0281JK. 3e?q _2ommittee noted
association for nations not wishing to participate that "the countries of the Alliance are not fulfilling
in the military side of the Alliance but interested in their responsability towards the developing countries
its political, economic and social aspects. to the extent of their capacity".
Participants in Committee No. 2 noted that a
certain detente has existed for several years between Key to EEC's Prosperity.
East and West, as a result of the bilateral develop-
ment of economic, commercial and technical rela- In plenary session, ! Mr. Marcel Mart, of the
tions. They would like to see the West build upon; EEC's Information Service, summarized the present
these beginnings a common attitude towards the, `situation in the Community. He started by recalling
countries of the East, and in particular their eco= the four crises which. hail nearly destroyed the Com-
nomic organisation COMECOM. This could be mon Market. The latter, he said, "emerged stren
done by means of long-term credits, which would'.: thened from these growing pains and we are now
of course have to be guaranteed by the governments ! witnessing the dissolution of the Free Trade Area
of the lending bodies or by the World Bank. En- whose members would like to join the EEC". Why ?
courigement for such a policy is furnished by de-' The EEC constitutes the world's primary importing
velopments in Czechoslovakia, a country already, and exporting bloc, with a trading figure of thirty
..very active in its commercial relations with West' thousand million dollars. Its area is one-fifth of
Germany and which has called on the United States that of the United States and one-eighth of that of
for the advanced technological assistance the Rus- the USSR, with 440,000,000 inhabitants. In reality
sians are not in a position to give it. If this ten- it is a bloc of poor countries which
apart from coal
,
,
dency were to become general it would undeniably have few raw materials. It imports its minerals, oil,
bring about the liberalisation of the countries of the uranium and, in general, all its energy needs. The
East. It would therefore seem that participation key to its future prosperity would therefore seem to
by international organizations in this policy is be- lie in its becoming, through its imports, the world's
coming imperative. In the longer term, the commit- primary processing unit.
tee called for military disengagement without once' One of the first measures if Europe is to keep
more endangering the security of the countries Of' 'up with the world technological revolution would
the Alliance, whose success is conditioned by pro- be greater co-operation between each member of
gress in the political field. the EEC and the United States. Mr. Mart illustrated
Committee No. 3 appeared, after three days of this need by the following example : "In Europe,
discussion, to have reached negative conclusions. twelve EEC firms struggle in order to produrc
Having started by advocating a new Atlantic Free total quantity of 1 , ,. .ci the
Trade Zone "to exclude members of the present United States fn- a ,,ens a production
Free Trade Zone and of the Common Market", the capacity of 4.. ;j megawatts. It is obvious that in
committee finally rejected this principle which- such circumstances the European countries have
"would increase the economic differences already every interest in giving up their internal competition
existing in Europe and in the Atlantic world, while: and following the example of America". Then
it
,
]wider European unity is desirable". was considered urgently necessary for the EEC
Starting from the principle that assistance to de-' seriously to consider the creation of a fiscal union
veloping countries is a moral duty for rich nations. and the suppression of national protective legisla-
Committee No. 4 considered that economic and tion. The speaker used another exemple to explain
social aid should be guided by technical advance- that French steel going to Luxembourg is subject
ment and that it is essential to follow the progress to a 3 % tax applied by that country to finished
achieved by peoples who receive such aid. But the products, while Luxembourg steel processed in
committee very judiciously called for an active France and re-exported is hit by the 25 % TVA
search for a new system to co-ordinate the efforts of tax. This creates an absolute imbalance of 22 %
the rich countries. This could be done through a to the prejudice of the EEC. The same difficulty
central organization including representatives of : arises for other products between other EEC coun-
governments and of private interests in the countries tries.
of the Alliance. Moreover, countries asking for. So far as the problem of research is concerned,
assistance should, with the help of qualified experts,, !Mr. Mart stressed that, while Europe is the greatest
submit their development plans in advance. The importer of raw materials, she is the greatest exporter
adoption of these two recommendations would put of "grey matter". This is because of the restricted
an end to the scattered efforts which at present give ? scale of Europe's enterprises, which prevents them
somewhat disappointing results in terms of Third from making the effort needed for key research.
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 CPS
There are, for exam pa-dii& Face s~a2D~5~t08/4 1 1A1 ~~t1#s 0f d~'@4 ~3(Itl to devote
Europe which combined add up to a single Ame- themselves to encouraging the evolution of demo-
rican company. It is therefore impossible for them cracy in conformity with the North Atlantic Treaty,
to undertake production of advanced items. As for in order to preserve world peace. The French DeIe-
the employment problem, this is particularly acute, gation carried the argument a step further in calling
since at this moment ten sectors of the European for the Atlantic Community to seek a true balance
economy are in a state of crisis with an employment among its members, in the form of a dual political
Icss of 50 %. These industries are, notably, ship- and economic partnership. On the one hand, Europe
hulloing, wood, clothing, textiles and coal. These should remain the military and political partner of
once rich sectors have lain off personnel as new the United States; on the other, European economic
procedures have made possible a reduction in man unity is the only way gradually to close the techno-
power: In agriculture, where 22 % of the active' logical gap separating Europe and America. Finally,
population of the EEC countries were once em- following the achievement of the Alliance in "prev-
ployed, today 15 % achieve increased output. In' enting the expansion of totalitarian communism,
addition there is the problem of surpluses. What and thus making possible a first stage of detente
should be done with them ? In the United States between East and West, it would appear that West-
only 5 % of the population works in agriculture' ern Europe could open the way towards a fresh
and she has enormous surpluses since 0.8 % of her detente which would gradually develop into increas-
agricultural manpower produces 60 % of her ed co-operation in specific fields".
Faced with this serious situation, it is high time
to consider revolutionizing structures - and with
the same determination that the. students are at-
tacking the question of university structures. The
EEC, therefore, must seek new formulae, its mem-
ber countries must abandon their nationalism and
dreams of indepen dance. There is another reason
for wanting to build a new Europe so that, in
creating new systems of financial co-operation, we
can achieve an end to poverty in Europe itself.
Mr. Mart concludes with the words of Voltaire. "If
you want me to venerate your gods, make them
bigger, otherwise it is not worth venerating them".
A Dual Partnership.
next year.,
Delegation invited the Conference to meet in Malta
After the closing session at Luxembourg, the
Young Political Leaders left for SHAPE, near Mons,
where they attended a briefing session and, a few
hours later, a reception at NATO Headquarters in
Brussels where they heard a description of the
present problems of the Alliance by Mr. Jaenicke,
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. In
conclusion, it may be mentioned that Malta, which
since her independence has become a member of
the Atlantic Treaty Association and which still plays
a role in the defence of the. Western world, has now
been admitted to membership in the Atlantic Asso-
cWion of Young Political Leaders. ? The Maltese
After the working sessions each delegation
published its own resolutions. In general they all
ELISE NOUEL.
IterrthtionaI Students' Traveflir Sinr h Holkiid"ATLANTIC PARTN : S P TODAY AN, D
Student opinion, expressed in particularly strident
and persistent tones, is much in the news just now
as it strives to make itself heard on a number of
issues effecting both Eastern and Western Europe.
When, therefore, sixty students from 13 European
countries set themselves the task of examining as-
pects of the Atlantic partnership, it is of interest to
find out what general attitudes emerge and, parti-
cularly, how 'NATO stands up to such a study.
At the start of a hot, sunny week in April, the
students converged on Amersfoort, a picturesque
little town in central Holland. But this was not the
end of their journey for it had been decided that
the seminar should combine travel with debate. Af-
ter three days at Amersfoort, the students piled into
a coach and went off to Tilburg, staying long enough
to hear a lecture by Professor F.A.M. Alting von
Geusau, of Tilburg University, on proposals for
disarmament and non-proliferation. Then off they
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went again
tcf?'1~1F1irSR t~'i8~ Sri ~h- cou be to en urt er. ne o le main tasks of
gen, a university town in the North/East of Hol- NATO in this field is to,-take its part in the prepara-
land. tion of a conference on European security." He
The general pattern of the seminar was for the went on, "of course, it is not easy to bring this
students to listen to a lecture on some aspect of about; it cannot be done rapidly; quite a lot of
the Alliance and then form small discussion groups things have to be prepared beforehand but NATO
to decide on questions to be put later to the speaker. has a vital role in the preparation of such a confer-
Such a system, of course, made it easier to discover! ence." He also thought it necessary that NATO
the views of the lecturers than of the students them- should co-ordinate policies towards Eastern Europe.
selves, though the questions provided an indication ; "And that doesn't only account for Germany but
o? the way they were thinking. It seems fair to say I think also that some of the smaller Western Euro-
that the great majority came to gather information pean countries could fulfil a useful function in this."
rather than attempt to impose an already formulated He said that the main tasks in the improvement
point of view. And, like most students, they also of East/West relations, as far as NATO was con-
game to see something of another part of Europe and cerned, were matters relating to security aspects.
to chat with people from other countries about less 'And that was why, in a, report prepared by his
weighty su ejects. party, strong emphasis had been put on the ques-
During the informal discussions in the evenings, tions of arms control and disarmament. "When
you consider the actual set-up of NATO," he went
it seemed that two aspects of the Alliance caused on, "far too little emphasis is given to the import-
the most anxiety : the role of the United States, and ance of disarmament and arms control, which is
the attitude NATO was taking to detente. And, also an aspect of the whole problem of security.
fortunately, the two lecturers who had been invited And, in our view, it would be necessary to increase
by the student organisers to speak specifically on the political staff of NATO, or do it in some other
NATO, touched on both of these. Mr. Pieter Dan- way, and bring about a kind of NATO disarmament
kert, International Secretary of the Dutc, Socialist ' and arms control agency." He thought that "this
Party, and a member of his party's NATO Commit- would balance on one side the military, strategic
tee, spoke on plans for the reform of NATO, and influence on the NATO Council by a disarmament
Mr. Harold Kaplan, Public Affairs Counsellor with and arms control influence."
the US Mission to NATO, spoke on American and "We are of the opinion," concluded Mr. Dankert,
European security. that if we want to go on in the way of detente,
to achieve a better understanding and, let's say,
A Dutch viewpoint. a real community in Europe, and in the whole
"I want to concentrate on the political side", East/West context, for the moment it is absolutely
said Mr. Dankert, "because that is the side in necessary to maintain NATO. But if we do not
which so much still has to be done." He went on change NATO, it has, perhaps, the tendency to be-
"It is very important to improve -consultation in come an entity in itself. I would say, in our view,
NATO and not only that but to lay down general NATO is not more than a means to an end of the .
aims for the policies of NATO as far as: relations real European security and a real European com-
with Eastern Europe are concerned." He pointed munity."
out that this proposal was not new. "In 1956 we An American viewpoint.
had the Committee of the Three Wise Men - three
foreign ministers of NATO countries - who came Mr. Kaplan, in ;iis lecture, said the basic problem
to the conclusion that an improvement ih consul- of NATO was to deploy forces in Europe which
tation was very much necessary but notwithstanding would, firstly, deter the Soviet Union from moving
the fact that they made quite a good report, not against the West and, secondly, prevent the Russians
much came out of it." and their allies from exerting, by virtue of an over-
He said it had become clear, for instance, that it whelming proximity and power, an undesirable in-
would have been wise of the United States to have fluence on the political evolution of the western
consulted with its European Allies before starting ; European countries.
its talks with the Soviet Union on the non-prolife- "This is what NATO has done for the past
ration treaty. "The same accounts for the decision twenty years; and this is what NATO continues to
by McNamara and the American Administration do," he said. "Its work must be seen in conjunction
to start an anti-ballistic missile programme. This with that of the other instruments of Western co-
has had a considerable influence on policies in : operation - and particularly the O.E.C.D. and the
Germany and in the Alliance as such, and consulta- ? E.E.C., which help to strengthen and develop the
tion on this point was really important from the Community which NATO so boldly assumed. One
point of view of the survival of the Alliance." measure of its success, a dangerous one, to be sure,
The period of detente which set in after Cuba, is that many Europeans... are surprised to learn
he said, made it necessary to concentrate on the that it still exists. An ironic effect of security, as
search for a common political line so that detente military people are prone to point out, is that it
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tends to subvert itself. If tension abates, the strain de it possible for Europeans to stand firmly on their
of maintaining ready forces begins to seem inioler- blocs and yet look beyond them; from a reliable
able, and the temptation to relax our efforts becomes defence system towards balanced East-West force
very great." reductions and other disarmament measures; from
He said that while NATO, in the words of the a resolute refusal of Soviet blackmail towards de-
American Permanent Representative Harlan Cleve- tente and "bridge-building", from the Atlantic
land, "has achieved a rough parity with the Soviet, Community towards the reconciliation of Europe
and other Communist forces in Europe", the Allian- and the reunification of Germany."
ce has been moving deliberately to make the North`
Atlantic Council (and he again quoted Ambassador !Europe's Evolution.
Cleveland) "a political clearing-house and centre' ' Turning to the American attitude to the new
of initiative for future European arrangements, in
situation in Europe, Mr. Kaplan said his task was
clucling settlement of the German question, and for"
the next steps (beyond the nuclear non-proliferation; made easier "because our government, despite our
treaty) in arms control and disarmament." preoccupation with difficult problems at home, and
despite the enormous responsibili(r,s which we have
Mr. Kaplan said the revival and renewal of the" been obliged to assume in other p: its of the world,
Alliance, the improved procedures for force plann-' has remained deeply sensitive and at.entive to Eu-
ing, the development of the Nuclear Planning Group, rope's evolution and to the changing moods of the
the official adoption of a new strategy, the establish Europeans. It is with hope - and impatience -
ment, of NATO and SHAPE in new headquarters that we watch this evolution and these moods, for
-in Belgium and the adoption at the Ministerial reasons which have been excellently stated early
Session of 1967 of the new, political work pro- this year, by our Under Secretary of State, Mr.
gramme - all this had occured precisely at a time' Katzenbach". Mr. Kaplan concluded with the
when the very relevance of NATO had been.placed following quotation from Mr. Katzenbach's Chicago
in question. speech : "If we are to come out of the next two de-
He went on, "What has placed NATO in ques- cades as successfully as we did the last two, both
tion in amanner which I consider interesting, dis- Europe and America must accommodate to the
quieting, yet potentially creative - provided al- changing times. Europe must be prepared to assume
ways, of course, that we prove equal to this challenge a greater share of the responsibilities and costs of
--:is simply the attitude of European youth on both world leadership. America must be willing to accept
sides of the Iron Curtain : of European youth and a less dominant role within the Alliance."
of those Europeans who are youthful enough in The travelling seminar was the second venture of
spirit to feel that Europe, after its long period of this kind to be organized by the Dutch Studenten-
impotence and convalescence, is ready to return vereniging voor Internationale Betrekkingen (SIB)
to its vocation of responsability and leadership in or, in English, the Student Movement for Interna-
the world : of European youth and of those Euro- tional Relations. The SIB has about 1,000 members
peans who are wise enough to realise... that it is in most' Dutch university cities and arranges con-
p;,ecisely the organization and stabilization: of West- `'ferences and lectures on a number of aspects of in-
ern Europe through NATO and the other instru- ternational affairs.
ni;ents.of international co-operation which have ma-' PETER JENNER.
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