THE MANPOWER SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000500120001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: AG

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Jan 1968 .
24 May 68
13 Jun 69
STATI NTL
30 Sep 69
4 Dec 70
The Manpower Situation in
North Vietnam
ER IM 68-4, The Manpower Situation in North Vietnam
TOP SECRET/Eyes Only Helms to the President memo re
latest information on deployment from the North
to William Sullivan (State) re Draft Memoranda
on Potential GVN Manpower Problems
Attachment: Preliminary draft, South Vietnam:
The Growing Manpower Squeeze,
1 Jun 69
Table: OER Estimates of North Vietnamese Manpower
Tied-Up Because of the Bombing
Excerpt from OLC Journal re meeting with Roland Paul,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff (gave him
OER/DDI figures on military casualties and male
population of North Vietnam, 1965-70
Attachments:
STATI NTL
to DDI memo, dated 3 Dec 70,
re Estimate of North Vietnamese
Military Deaths in the 17-35 Age Group
(Blind Memo re North Vietnam's Manpower
Losses attached)
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EXCERPT FROM JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Friday - 4 December 1970
3. (Secret - JGO) Met with Mr. Roland Paul, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee staff, and gave him the figures provided by OER/DDI
concerning the military casualities and male population of North Vietnam
age 17 to 35 for the period 1965 to 1970. Mr. Paul was most appreciative
and told me that in keeping with the classification he would hold the
information at his own desk for background. The information that had
prompted his query was received from Mr. Herman Kahn who had given
him a casuality figure of one-half the 15 to 23 year age group of the
male population. OER, has 1?een advised.
25X1A
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STATI NTL
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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REPLACES FORM 36-13
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(47)
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3 December 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT
Estimate of North Vietnamese Military
Deaths in the 17-35 Age Group
25X1A
1. The attached draft was prepared in response
to a request made to by Roland Paul, a
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. The only background I have on the request is
that the Committee had been furnished with an estimate
of the number of military deaths sustained by North
Vietnamese males in the 17-35 age group which the
Committee regarded as incredibly high. We do not
know who made the estimate or what kind of figures
were presented. You will note that our figures also
are not modest.
3. These figures are undoubtedly sensitive and
may come back to haunt us depending on the use to
which the Committee might put them. Therefore, I
thought you would wish to be aware of this request
before any decision is made to respond to Mr. Paul.
You should also know that the estimate of total in-
filtration, though nominally CODEWORD, was downgraded
to SECRET during the preparation of NSSM 99.
Attachment:
Memo re: North Vietnam's
Manpower Losses
Approved ForRelease2000/05/11 :
Deputy Director
Economic Research
A.R9p78 02995R000' 00120001-1
-?
25X1A
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STATI NTL
:RANSIVIITTAL SLIP
TO:
DD I
ROOM NO. \ BUILDING
REMARKS:
FROM:
ROOM NO,
4-7-18
FORM NO.0m
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INFUCH MAY BE USED.
(47)
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3 December 1970
MEMORANDUM
North Vietnam's Manpower Losses
Losses
1. Estimates of North Vietnamese manpower losses
in the war in Indochina since 1965 must be recognized
as having a large margin of error. The statistics
most frequently used to derive ?such estimates ?have
many weaknesses. KIA reporting is frequently inflated
and does not differentiate between VC and NVA personnel;
there is little hard information on how many Communists
died, or are permanently disabled, due to wounds and
sickness.
2. Despite the limitations in the data there is
no doubt, hOweVer, that the North Vietnamese have
suffered extremely large manpower losses. We estimate
that North Vietnamese male fatalities, in the age
bracket of 17-35, have totaled 550,090 men in South
Vietnam and upwards of 50,000 in Laos and North Vietnam.
The estimates are Consistent with the only acknowledge--
meht by a high-ranking Hanoi official that North Vietnam
had indeed suffered Very high -casualties. In an inter.-
view in April 1969 with. Miss Oriana Fallaci, an Italian
correspondent, Giap was told: "General, the Americans
say you've lost half a million men-" Giap answered:
"That's quite exact."
MethOdologies
3. Estimates of North Vietnamese casualties in
South Vietnam, the area for which the data is best can
be derived by either of two methodologies. One methodology
takes the total reported KIA and makes various assumptions
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'T
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about other deaths, and the North Vietnamese share of
the total casualties suffered by the Communists. A
second methodology starts by using the number of in-
filtrators the North Vietnamese have sent to South
Vietnam (the firmest statistical series on the war),
subtracts the number of North Vietnamese still in
South Vietnam (or recently moved into Cambodia) based
on order of battle estimates, and adjusts this figure
to take into account the relatively small volume of
exfiltration of North Vietnamese personnel from South
Vietnam to North Vietnam. The application of the second
methodology, which rests upon the most reliable set of
statistics and requires fewer tenuous assumptions, is
discussed in detail below. Interestingly, however,
the first, or "KIA methodology" using what would appear
to be the most reasonable assumptions,, gives an estimate
of enemy losses that is remarkably close to the estimate
given by the "infiltration methodology." The data
supporting the estimates of casualties in Laos and
North Vietnam are much less firm than for South Vietnam.
However, they are still probably of the right order of
magnitude.
4. Since 1965 North Vietnam has sent some 800,000
military personnel to South Vietnam. There has been
some reverse flow back to North Vietnam of sick and
wounded which we would judge to have been on the order
of 50,000 men. In addition, a few thousand key personnel
have rotated back to North Vietnam for training and
specialized tasks. However, these numbers have never
been large enough to alter materially our estimates of
losses. At present, there are between 100,000-150,000 North
Vietnamese personnel in the Communist military forces in
South Vietnam and Cambodia. Thus the military manpower
losses in these areas could have been as much as 600,000
personnel.* From a statistical analysis of demographic
data obtained from PW interrogation reports we know
that about 90% of the NVA personnel in South Vietnam
are between the ages of 17-35. Thus, the North Vietnamese
* Not all these losses have occurred in South Vietnam.
Probably as many as 80,000 losses were due to disease
and the rigors of the long trek by infiltrators to South
Vietnam.
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have suffered about 550,000 deaths within this
age bracket. No more than a few hundred North Vietnamese
casualties were younger than 17. As stated previously,
the estimated losses in Laos ?and North Vietnam (military
losses resulting from the bombing) are based on more
tenuous data and less stringent methodologies.
Si5nificance of the Losses
5. The estimates of North Vietnamese losses
(Killed) can be put in perspective by comparing them
to North Vietnam's manpower pool of young males between
the ages of 17-35. In 1965 this pool, both the physically
fit and unfit, numbered 2.8 million. At that time the
number of young males between the ages of 17 and 35 was
growing, and the size of the pool allowing for only
normal death rates would have reached slightly over 3.0
million by the end of 1970. Thus, allowing for battle
deaths, the pool of manpower is now estimated at only
2.4 million, down 600,000 from what it would have been
today given a normal growth of the population.
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25X1A
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141
3 December 1970
qo
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Estimate of North Vietnamese Military
Deaths in the 17-35 Age Croup
25X1A
1. The attached draft was prepared in response
to a request made to by Roland Paul, a
staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. The only background I have on the request is
that the Committee had been furnished with an estimate
of the number of military deaths sustained by North
Vietnamese males in the 17-35 age group which the
Committee regarded as incredibly high. We do not
know who made the estimate or what kind of figures
were presented. You will note that our figures also
are not modest.
3. These figures are undoubtedly sensitive and
may come back to haunt us depending on the use to
which the Committee might put them. Therefore, I
thought you would wish to be aware of this request
before any decision is made to respond to Mr. Paul.
You should also know that the estimate of total in-
filtration, though nominally CODEWORD, was downgraded
to SECRET during the preparation of NSSM 99.
25X1A
Deputy Director
Economic Research
Attachment;
Memo re: North Vietnam's
Manpower Losses
Distribution:
Orig. & 1 - Addressee
2 - OD/OER
1 - DD/OER
DD/OER: :ajs/5001(3 Dec 70)
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3 December 197C,.
PeLMOWINDUM
North Vietnam's Manpower Losses
_
LOS 1S
1. Estimates of North Vietnamese manpower losnes
in the war in Indochina since 3.965 must be recognized
as having a large margin of error. The statistics
most frequently used to derive such estimates have
many weaknesses. KIA. reporting is frequently inflated
and does not differentiate between VC and RVA personne17
there is little hard information on how many Communists
died, or are permanently disabled, due to wouhda and
sickness.
2. Despite the limitations in the data there is
no doubt, however, that the North Vietnamese have
suffered extremely large manpower losses., We estimate
that North Vietnamese male fatalities, in the age
bracket of 17-35, have totaled 550,000 men in South
Vietnam and upwarde of 50,000 in Laos and North Vietnam-
The estimates are consistent with the only acknowledge-
ment by a high-ranking Hanoi official that North Vietnam
had indeed suffered vary high casualties. In an inter-
view in April 1969 wita hiss Oriana Fallaci, an Italian
correspondent. Giap wae told, "General, the ieeericans
say you've lost half a million men. Giap answered
'I'hat's quite exact."
Methodolo
3. T3etimates of North Vietnamese casualties in
South Vietnam, the area for ahich the data ie best can
be derived by either of two methodologies. ene methodology
takes the total refeorted KIA and makes varioue assumptiona
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about other deaths, and the North Vietnamese :there of
the total casualties suffered by the Communists. A
second methodology starts by using the number of in-
filteatore the North Vietnamese have sent to 3outh
Vietnam (the firmest statistical series on the war),
subtracts the number of North Vietnamese still in
South Vietnam (or recently moved into Cambodia) based
on order of battle estimates, and adjusts thie figure
to take into account the relatively small volume of
exfiltration of North Vietnamese personnel from South
Vietnam to North Vietnam. The application of the second
methodology, wnich rests upon the most reliaele set of
statistics and requires fewer tenuous assumptions, is
discussed in detail below. Interestingly, hosever,
the first, or ltIA methodology" using what would appear
to be the most reasonable assumptions, gives an estimate
of enemy losses that is remarkably close to tae estimate
given by the "infiltration methodology. The data
supporting the estimates of casualties in Laos and
North Vietnam are much less firm than for South Vietnam.
However, they are still probably of the right order of
magnitude.
4. Since 1963 Worth Vietnam has sent eome 800,000
military personnel to South Vietnam. There has. been
some reverse flow eack to North Vietnam of sick and
wounded which we would judge to have been on the order
of 50,000 men. In addition, a few thousand 'Fey personnel
have rotated back to North Vietnam for training and
specialised tasks. gowever, these numbers heve never
been large enough to alter materially our estimates of
losses. At present. there are between 100,00-150,000 North
Vietnamese personnel in the Communist military forces in
South Vietnam and Cambodia. Thus the military manpower
losses in these areas could have been as much as 600,000
personnel.* prom a statistical analysis of eemograpbic
data obtained from eel interrogation reports we knoe
that about 901 of the NVA personnel in South Vietnam
are between the eget: of 17-35. Thus, the North Vietnamese
*Wot?irl-these los es have occurrel in Soute Vietnam.
Probably as many as 80,000 losses were due to disease
and the rigors of the long trek by infiltrators to South
Vietnam
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have suffered about 550,000 deaths within this
age bracket. No more than a few hundred North Vietnamese
casualties were younger than 17. As etated previously,
the eetimated losses in Laos and North Vietnam (military
lossee resulting from the bombing) are based on more
tenuous data and less stringent methodologies.
Significance of the Looses
S. The estimates of North Vietnamese losses
(Killed) can he put in perspective by comearing them
to North Vietnam 'e eanpower pool of young males between
the ages of 17-35. In 1965 this pool, both the phesicallv
fit and unfit. numbered 2.8 million. At that time the
number of young males between the ages of 17 and 35 was
growing, and the size of the pool allowing for only
normal death rates would have reached slightly over 3.0
million by the and of 1970. Thus, allowing for battle
deathe, the pool of manpower is now eutimated at only
2,4 million, down 6r)0,000 from what it would have been
today given a nornal growth of the population.
3 -
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? ,
3 77,eoftstber 1971
th Vietnam*a lan?ower Lov,sr,s
LOS'SOS
E,4;timatess of 4ortJ1 Vietnamese ran2ocr loalzes
In the war in Indochina since 19E5 must 1-3e rocognized
as having 4 large margin of error. The stat.14tics
most fre,quentl:t used to derive suc:. aatimatea !lave
many tinaknosses. itrN reporting is frequentl; inflated
and does not differentiate between VC and N'W personnel
tnere i4 1itt141 hard information on how many Communintl
died or ar41 fmr,.auently disabled, due to ',/nunds and
2 r70?st.,ite the linitationa in Cm data there is
no lout hovtiver, that the Nortt vietaamocno ave
5uff4r,led iritremely large manpower low-ies, estimat-,1
tat North Vi.iAnamee male fatalities, in t ago
orack.4.t. of 17,35, !lave Lotaled 550,CM men in South
Vietam and up--iardf, of 5,-,)?030 in Laol, And Nortfl Vietnan,
Mc a'ativata:i are conaiet(int with tite only ac.nowledg.
:oent by a high ,ranking Hanoi official that :4'orth Viataaa
had ladeed sufferad very hig% casualties, an inter-
viaw in April 195') it.ik:iss Oriana Fallaci, 4n Italian
corresondent: r.,:iap was told '?-aneral, the -f-rioans
say you've loRt half a million Lap ar,wered-
att .;uite exact,'
'!*!- t10. I Gq s
3. Estiriatcz of worth Vititnamqsa casualtia3 in
South Vietnam, the area for which the data i beat can
1>e aerived by either of two raethodologiaz, methodology
takea to total rorted KTA and mael variou asnumitiens
_
L_
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about other deaths, and the North Vi tnamese share of
tae total cauaXtiei suffered by the Couita. A
second methodology starts by using tna nutli,cr of IIA-
filtratore the Uort; Vietnamese have aant to Zoatn
Vietnam (the firmest statistical serlea on Ll.a war),
subtracts the number of North Viethamtttse still in
South Vietuam (or rocently moved into Camtodia)
on order of battle estimatea, and st ti figurt
to take into accouat the relatively small volame of
exfiltration of North Vietnamese personnel from South
Vietnam to Nort Viot4am, The 42plication of the aeconta
methodology, waich resta upon the most relie-le sat of
statistics and reci'aires fewer tenuous asaail,ytions, ia
discussed in detail 'aelow. Interestingly, aGwever,
tho first, or -ZIA metaodology- using what would appear
to be tail most ria rale assumptiona, gives 411 eatimatc
of enemy lossue tnat is remarkably close to t:;e eatimate
given ay tna 'infiltratich metnodolow." 17%:ta
-
aapporting thiestirates of casualtit in La...3san
44ort Lt Vietnam are rwoh lees firm than for Sov.th Vietnam.
However, they are ntill probably of ta ri,v1t order of
magnitu6.
4. 4>iacta 1445 Nort4 Vietnam ba 4 :tent nflmi4L- ittn,,1)0
military persoenel to South Vietnam. Tharc! t,eaa
some roversa flow 1,1ack to ilorth Vietnam of r4..and
cunded ',41',Ich we wc,u1,1 judge to have been on the order
of 50,004 ran. In addition, a few thousan4 ypersonae'
have rotated lack to worth Vietnam for trainig and
sq:acialised taska. lowever, these num-aers Lave never
baea largo enough to alter materially our astLzataa of
lossea. At present, there are oetween IrE),0 150,00n NOrt-z
VietuaNese personnel in the Communist eilitar-,' for in
South Vietaam and Cami)edia. Thus tne minter: nanao4t,r
losses intht,,,si,t areaa Oeuld ilave -aeen 43 much aa 60C!1Ca;)
personnel.* From a statistical aselyais of :i.;.,,mographie
data obtainati from PW interrogation roporta 'know
that but )04 of tae 3VA personnol in out
ara .4EttkAraala tha agea of 17-35. Thu, th orti Vietnemo3
A ot ati te10LiC4 have occurred in South viatnam.
Prol;ably 43 many as H4,010 loses were due to dleaaae
arEa the rigora of t-mt long trek by infiltrator a to South
Vietnam,
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haw suffered about ?-Dtr.09 deaths within thin,
ag- bracket. NO rore than a feld nundred '!lorth Vietnamese
caualtiss were younver than 17. As stated ":;xevioualy,
eatimateC losca in- r.aos and 4ort h Viotnlm (military.
losies resulting fror., the bom4ling) are. balee. on more
tenuous data anl strin5ent methodo1o4771e,
Significance of the. Loses
?..1. The estimates of North Vitaesi+ 1.4,ses
(Aillad) can !Da put in peractective by com2ari.nq thw.t
to North Vietnam's manpower pool of younq ;-male.a l'pet-441en
tAe agea of 17-35. In 1965 thia pool, both the ?4,:"gica111'
fit ani unfit, numbr2red 2.8 million. At tnt tine the
numn,er of you the agen of 17 and
growinl, and th iiit of the pool alla4ing for only
normal death rates qould have reacned slightly over 3.1
million by t*,te an of 1970. Thus, all in for hattlo
deethl, the iool of manpower le AOW eutimat157 at only
2.4 million, down 6q0,000 fror .4nat it wouLA 11,01W- 1.rtf,m
todai 7iven a norwal growth of tno
3 --
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Note on OER Estimates of North Vietnamese Manpower
Tied4Jp Because of the BoMbing
Thousand Persons
Civilians Full Time Part Time
Repair and Reconstruction of
Lines of Communication 72 100 to 200
Transport Workers 100 to 120 25
Civilian Defense 150
Sub-Total 172 to 192 275 to 375
Military
Air Defense 83 25 to 30
Coastal Defense 20 to 25
Sub-Total. 103 to 108 25 to 30
GRAND TOTAL 275 to 300 300 to_405
The standard textual formulation OS this drain was as follows:
Extra manpower demands induced by the bombing brought about
some tightening of over-all manpower avallabilities? but never
reached proportions, significant enough to limit Hanoi's support
of the war. Additional demands for laborers to repair bomb
damage, to move goods, and to help in civil defense were estimated
to total between 475,000 and 600,000. Of these, less than 200,000
were occupied full time in war-related activities; the remainder
were used as conditions warranted. The bombing required an
additional 100,000 military personnel within North Vietnam to man
the air defenses.
OD/OES
30 September 1969
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Note- on OER Estimates of North Vietnamese Manpower
Tied-Op Because of the Booting
Repair and Reconstruction of
Lines of Ccuannication
Transport Workers
Civilian Defense
SubTotal
liter,
Air Defense
Coastal Defense
3Ub-Total
GRAND TOTAL
Thousand Persons
72
0
8
20 to 25
103 to 108
2=Itk==
100 to 200
25
150
275 to 375
25 to 30
25 to )0,
300 to 405.
"
The standard textual formulation of this drain was as follows:
Extra manpower demands induced by the boMbing brought about
tome tightening of over?all manpower availabilities? but never
reached proportions? significant enough to limit Hanoi's support
of the war. Additional demands for laborers to repair bed)
damage, to move goods, and to help in civil defense were estimated
to total between 4750000 and 600,000. Of these, less than 200,000
were occupied fUJ1 time in war-related activities; the remainder
were used as conditions warranted. The bombing required an
additional 100,000 military personnel within North Vietnam to man
the air defenses.
OD OER
30 Septesiber 1969
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Note on OEN Est
Tied4Up
Ci
Repair aM Reconstruction of
Lines of Communication
Transport Workers
Civilian Defense
Bub-Total
Natterr
Air Defense
Coastal Defense
OubAtots1
GRATED TOTAlt
et North Vietnamese tinuposer
cause of the Bombing
1 2 to
20 to 25
103 to 108
274p to_300
100 to 200
25
150
25 to 30
of this drain was as follovs:
the bonbing brought about
availdbilities, but never
to limit Bknoitn support
era to repair bomb
in civil defense vere estimated
? Of these, lees than 200,000
ted activities; the remainder
The bombing required an
North Vietnam to man
1969
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Note on OER Estimat of Borth Ytetnece
Tied?Up Because of the Bombing
Sub-Total
83
20 to 2,
3.0.3 to ice
100 to 203
2,
130
to 5
of thin drain vas as to
d lay the bombing brought about
manpower avmilabilities, but never
enough to limit Ranoiis support
for laborers to repair both
help in civil defense vere estimated
*000. Of theses less than 200,000
?related activities; the remainder
The big required an
within North Vietnam to man
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13 June 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable William H. Sullivan
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
SUBJECT : Draft Memoranda on Potential GVN
Manpower Problems
1. As I indicated in our conversation at the NSC ad hoc
subcommittee on Vietnam which you chair, my associates have
recently completed preliminary drafts of two memoranda relating
to potential manpower problems the GVN is likely to face in the
not too distant future. In essence, these memoranda reflect fall-
out from work done on the overall problem of "Vietnarnization, "
specifically work initiated in connection with the related triad of
National Security Study Memoranda: 19, 36 and 37.
2. One of these memoranda deals in general terms with
"the growing manpower squeeze" in South Vietnam. The other
approaches a subsidiary aspect of this overall problem by looking
at certain patterns that have developed in the course of ARVN
expansion from 1965 to the present.
3. I wish to emphasize that these are both preliminary
studies subject to considerable further refinement. Comments
and critiques on them would be most welcome. In light of the
political sensitivity of some of the matters raised therein and to
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obviate the risk of certain paragraphs of these two memoranda
being lifted or quoted out of context, I am limiting circulation of
these drafts to our colleagues on the NSC ad hoc subcommittee
enumerated below.
25X1A
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs
Attachments
cc: Mr. Richard Sneider w/atts
Mr. John Burke wiatts
Mr. Dennis Doolin wiatts
Rear Admiral H. H. Epee, Jr. ',Arians
Major General John F. Freund wiatts
Mr. Joseph A. Mendenhall wiatts
:rnee
1 - DD/ER wiatts
1 - C/OCT/IC w/atts
1 - C/ONE/FE wiatts
1 - C/FE w/atts
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SOUTH VIETNAM: THE GROWING MANPOWER SQUEEZE
1 June 1969
PRELIMINARY DRAFT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
. Directorate of Intelligence
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1969
South Vietnam: The Growing Manpower Squeeze
Introduction
As the tempo of combat in South Vietnam has
increased and Saigon's participation in the con-
flict has grown, the Government of South Vietnam
(GVN) has been compelled to dig deeply into its
available manpower resources to meet military
manpower requirements. The Communist 1968 Tet
offensive spurred the Saigon regime into greater
efforts to mobilize the population and to increase
the country's commitment to its own defense. The
General Mobilization Act of 15 June 1968 called for
the mobilization of most males between the ages of
16 and 50, with those in the 18-38 age group liable
for service in the regular and territorial forces.
Males in the 16-17 and 39-50 age groups are
eligible only for part-time service in the newly-
created People's Self-Defense Forces, although
those_ 39-43 years of age may be. given noncombat
asignment8 in rear service units.
Since 1967, the number of men serving in South
Vietnam's regular and territorial forces has in-
creased nearly one-third, and the total number of
men mall GVN military forces has risen to more
than one million. As a result, the share of the
population under arms has climbed to an estimated
4.8 percent (5.9 percent if the paramilitary forces
are included),* the highest in the world. In .
Taiwan, for example, this ratio is 4.1 percent;
in North Vietnam, 2.8 percent; and in the Soviet
Union, 1.4 percent.
* If only the GVN-controlied population is in-
cluded, the estimated shares. are 5.8 percent and
6.8 percent, respectively.
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In meeting its military manpower requirements,
the GVN has had to shortchange the burgeoning
civilian manpower demands (particularly the demand
for skilled labor) generated by an accelerated
wartime urbanization. An estimated 30-40 percent
of the country's population is now located in or
near the main population centers. The migration
from rural to urban areas, which has been particu-
larly rapid since 1964, stems largely from the
intensification of military operations and Viet
Cong (VC) terrorism in the countryside and the
job opportunities created by the US military
buildup. In addition, the expansion of the GVN's
military forces has been accompanied by an in-
creased flow of military dependents to the cities.
This population influx has also increased the
manpower demands for industry, commerce, civil
service, construction, and public services, at a
rate faster than the supply of available human
resources.
As a result of all of these pressures, the
country's manpower pool has been strained and
Saigon will be hard pressed to fulfill any antici-
pated expansion of its military forces without
seriously impeding its economic growth. Moreover,
the. manpower shortage has been and will continue
to be an important contribution to inlationary
pressure.
Growth: of' solath: Forces
South Vietnam's military and paramilitary
forces have more than, doubled since 1963. At the
end Of March 1969, the GVN had more than one mil-
lion men under arms (see Table 1).
The manpower for the Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces (RVNAF) -- the Regular Forces and the
Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) -- consists of
volunteers and draftees, with the former having
accounted for 70-80 percent of the total during
the past three years. The manpower input for 1966
totaled about 205,000 men, but fell to 164,000 in
1967 (see Table 2). The number soared to nearly
315,000 in 1968 as a result of Saigon's post-Tet
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Table 1
Growth of South Vietnam's Military Forces
1963 - March 1969 a/
Regular forces
Regional forces
Popular forces
Total RVNAF forces
National Police
Revolutionary
Development Cadre
Civilian Irregular
Defense Groups
Truong Son Cadre
Armed Propaganda
Teams
Kit Carson Scouts
Total paramilitary
forces b/
Total RVN forces
In Thousands
Mar
1963
1966
1967
1968
1969
216.0
322.9
442.9
426.9
434.5
85.9
149.9
151.4
219.8
232.0
95.5
150.1
148.8
172.5
176.0
397.4
622.9
643.1
819.2
842.5
19.7
58.3
73.4
78.4
77.1
0
0
37.0
45.9
47.3
18.0
34.7
38.3
42.3
44.0
0
0
6.7
7.0
7.3
0
0
0
3.8
4.0
0
0
0.3
1.5
1.9
128.4.
113.0
155.7
178..9
181.6
525.8
735.9
798.8
998.1
1,024.1
a. Data are for end of period shown.
b. Armed Combat Youth data are included in the total
from .7.960 through 1966; the organization was disbanded in
1967.
1968 mobilization program. The number of con-
scripts more than doubled and voluntary enlistments
jumped about 85 percent. The latter increase
probably reflects in large part the effort of many
to avoid the draft in order to join the territorial
forces and remain close to their home areas. The
strength of RF/PF forces increased by more than
90,000 during 1968. The paramilitary forces,
staffed almost entirely with Volunteers, increased
by an average of about 30,000 men annually during
the last three years.
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Table 2
South Vietnamese Military Volunteers and Conscripts
1966 - March 1969
In Thousands
Manpower Input
Paramilitary
Volunteers
Volunteers
Conscripts
Total
1966
159.1
46.1
205.2
28.2
Monthly average
13.2
3.8
17.1
2.4
1967
115.8
48.5
164.3
33.1
Monthly average
9.6
4.0
13.6
2.8
1968
215.3
99.1
314.4
28.8
Monthly average
17.9
8.2
26.2
2.4
1969
January
8.3
6.8
15.1
2.7
February
11.1
. 7.0
18.1
1.4
March
20.6
5.4
26.0
1.8
.Attrition of South Vietnam's Military Forces
While the South Vietnamese forces have received
sizable inputs in recent years, their attrition
also has been high. This attrition has consisted
almost entirely of desertions and combat casualties
(see Table 3).* Losses of 152,000 in 1966 and
122,000 in 1967 equaled about 75 percent of total
accretions for each of these years. In 1968,
losses jumped to 203,000, but were only two-thirds
of total accretions because of the sharp rise in
personnel inputs.
4 There 1-9 no information available on other types
of attrition, such as retirement. However, the
magnitude of other attritive factors is not con-
sidered significant.
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Table 3
South Vietnamese Military Losses
? 1966
- 1968
In Thousands
1966
1967
1968
Total 'losses a/
?152.5
122.1
203.4
Net desertions
116.4 b/
77.7
116.1
Casualties
36.1
44.4
87.3
Killed in action
11.9
12.7
24.3
Wounded, non-fatal c/
20.9
29.4
61.1
Missing/captured
3.3
2.3
1.9
a. Paramilitary not included.
b. Gross desertions.
c. There is no information concerning the number
of wounded who return to action. However, the GVN
only includes those whose wounds are serious enough
to require hospital care. Therefore, the number
returning is not believed to be large enough to
affect significantly the aggregate analysis.
Desertions
The major share of KVNAF losses has been
through desertions; during the 1966-68 period,
desertions accounted for nearly two-thirds of
total attrition. Desertions totaled 116,000 in
1966, dropped to 78,000 the next year, and jumped
to 116,000 during 1968.* In addition, an average
of 8,600 men deserted annually from the paramili-
tary forces during these years.
The average monthly desertion rate of 10.5 per
-thousand troops in 1967 was substantially less than
4 Figures for 1966 are gross desertions; for 1967
and 1968 they are net desertions (gross desertions
less returnees).
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that recorded in 1966. However, the rate for 1968
increased to 12.7 per thousand troops. Although
the rate during the first quarter of 1968 continued
to reflect the downward trend of 1967 (averaging
7.7 per thousand troops), it jumped sharply after
March, reaching a high of 17.3 in October. Averages
of about 15 per thousand recorded during the third
and fourth quarters of 1968 were the highest since
a GVN crackdown on desertions in mid-1966. The
rate subsequently began to decline, falling to 8.3
in February 1969. In March, the rate rose to 10.7
and the quarterly rate remained well above the
average for the first quarter of 1968.
A particularly significant trend is the com-
paratively high rate of desertions among the major
combat units which are expected to eventually re-
place US combat forces. Desertions from regular
combat units during 1968 were at a rate estimated
to equal about one-third of the strengths of these
units. Thus, the overall desertion rate for RVNAF
is substantially reduced by the lower rate of
desertions among RF and PF units. The rate among
the regular units in 1969 has continued at a high
level. The March rate for ARVN's 10 infantry
divisions ranged from 13.5 per thousand to 50.4 per
thousand with an overall divisional average of 28.4
per thousand.
? Ca.sualties
The other element in available attrition data
is combat casualties. The country's battle casual-
tiesJaave riseni sharply as RVNAF participation in
the war has increased. These totaled pearly' 87,500
in 1968, about double the casualties sustained in
1967 and more than 140 percent greater than those
in 1966. Combat deaths in these years averaged
about 30 percent of total casualties. _There are
no. casualty figures available for the paramilitary
forces prior to 1968. In 1968, paramilitary units
suffered nearly. 14,000. casualties, of which about
3;600 werel combat. deaths.
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South Vietnam's Manpower Pool
Any assessment of Saigon's ability to maintain
(and expand) its military forces depends for the
most part on estimates of the country's available
manpower. Estimating the size of the pool, how-
ever, is complicated by a lack of accurate demo-
graphic information on South Vietnam. South
Vietnam is one of the few countries that has never
had a national census, and the most recent area
census was a pilot study. of Phuoc Tuy Province
undertaken in 1959. Currently, the most widely
used population figure is an estimated 17.2 mil-
lion in 1968. An additional obstacle to estimating
the GVN manpower pool is the impossibility of
determining with any great degree of accuracy the
share of the South Vietnamese population under
the effective control of Saigon.
The most recent estimate of South Vietnam's
population distribution was undertaken by the US
Agency for International Development in 1967.
According to this study, there were about 3.5 mil-
lion males in the country between the ages of 15
and 49. Using these figures as a base, we esti-
mate the manpower pool available to the GVN to be
about 2.1 million men and those in the 18-38 group
at more than 1.3 million (see Table 4). However,
more than one million men already were under arms
at the end of March 1969, leaving a residual of
some 350,000 men available for induction into the
military forces.
Since most of the eligible draftable popula-
tion already have been conscripted, any sizable
number of future conscripts must come from those
reaching 18 years of age. It has been estimated
that 320,000 South Vietnamese reach the age of 18
each year, more than half of them males Eliminating
those ostensibly under VC control and those unfit
for service, the estimated annual accretion would
be around 100;000. Thus, the estimated total
draftable manpower in the 18-38 age group available
at the beginning of 1969 was about 450,000.
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Table 4
Estimated South Vietnamese Manpower
in 15-49 Year Age Group
Pool
In Thousands
Age
Group
Number
of Males
15-17 540
18-33 1,784
34-38 460
39-44 429
45-49 .329
Total 3,542
? Number Less
Those Under
VC Control LY
459
1,516
391
365
280
Number Less
Those Unfit ,
for Service 12/
321
1,061
274
256
196
3,011 2,108
a. The Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES). of January
1969 estimated that 10.9 percent of the population
was under VC control. Another 9.2 percent were in
so-called contested areas. Assuming half of the
latter to be under VC control, we thus eliminate
about 15 percent.
b. The GVN has reported that about 30 percent of
draft age men are found to be unfit for military
service.
Impact on the Labor Force
Although the mobilization program has as yet
not created any serious general labor shortage,
it has cut deeply into the country's limited supply
of skilled manpower. The impact has been particu-
larly severe in urban areas where the bulk of the
skilled labor is located. About one-third of the
6 million South Vietnamese estimated to be in the
civilian labor force are engaged in nonagricultural
pursuits, primarily in the cities and towns. Since
the GVN has. greater control over the urban areas,
it seems likely that a disproportionate share of
the draftees are coming from these areas.
According to studies undertaken by the US
Embassy in Saigon, approximately 90 percent of
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Vietnamese civil servants are considered to be
skilled. Perhaps 60 percent of the Vietnamese
employees of the US sector of the economy can be
classified as skilled and semi-skilled. Civilian
government employment was frozen at the 30 April
1968 level, and drafted personnel have not been
replaced. The impact of mobilization has been
? felt most in such highly technical government
operations as the Saigon Metropolitan Water Office
and Directorate of Civil Aviation and in such
? private companies as Esso Standard Eastern, which
employs a large number of technically trained,
draft-eligible young men.
The mid-June mobilization bill provided for
limited deferments for police, Revolutionary
Development cadre, technical specialists, and
teachers, as well as for public health and educa-
tional personnel serving in the countryside. In
September 1968 the government decided to exempt
from the draft all primary school teachers serving
at the hamlet level and to allow all secondary
and primary school teachers on the government pay-
roll in larger towns to continue teaching after
attendance at a nine-week military training
course. In the private sector, where as many as
one-fifth of all employees are believed to be
eligible for the draft, agreement was.reached with
the Ministry of National Defense .(MOND) in October
? 1968 on deferment criteria affecting eMployees in
more than 1,000 manufacturing and Commercial firms.
Approximately 40,000 men in the civil service and
private sectors have received deferments.
Mobilization at the present rate in combina-
tion with the lack of a well-defined deferment
? policy for skilled Civilian personnel will further
deplete the number of needed administrators,
managers, technicians., and skilled craftsmen who
are as necessary for effective civilian operations
as they are for the armed forces. There are some
20,000 third-country nationals employed in South
Vietnam (primarily skilled workers and technicians
from South Korea and the Philippines), but their
number is not likely to increase significantly in
view of the political sensitivity which surrounds
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their employment. Moreover, with few exceptions,
these nationals are employable only in the US
sector.
Outlook
Unless the GVN alters its draft regulations,
it is likely to be hard pressed to meet its future
military manpower requirements. Not only will the
military begin to encounter shortages of skilled
-personnel, but difficulty in)tapping the existing
manpower pool also is likely to emerge. Even if
attrition of Saigon's military forces during 1969
does not reach last year's level, it is likely to
remain high as RVNAF combat participation continues
to increase. Military replacement requirements
alone are likely to be more than 150,000 men.
Combat casualties during the first quarter of 1969
were at an annual rate of about 75,000 men. Deser-
tions also are running at a similar rate, but are
likely to rise as the number of 18 yea.r old draftees
increases.*
Even assuming the unlikely event that the entire
crop of new 18-year olds is drafted in 1969,
Saigon would still have to find upwards of 50,000
men to fill the remaining estimated gap. This, of
cdurse, assumes no expansion of-forceS.. Should the
US begin to pull out any troops, replacements for
them would have to be found.** Saigon has in fact
-announced that it plans to increase its regular
forces by at least 71,000 men during 1969 in the
expectation that some US troops will start to
withdraw this year.
* A recent OASD/SA study indicated that the high
desertion rate in 1968 was due in large part to
the siBable numbers of new men being drafted. It
indicated that perhaps 80 percent of the deserters
were men with less than 6 months of military
service. These men presumably succumb qUickly to
the pressures of severed family ties, unfamiliar
surroundings, and poor morale,
** This assumes an unrealistic 2:1 ratio. OASD/SA
has estimated that an ARVN division functions about
half as well as a US division, or a 2:1 ratio.
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Thus, in order to fill its military manpower
gap, Saigon either would have to draft men over
38 and/or lower the fitness requirements. Drafting
men in the 39-44 group would increase the avail-
ability pool by more than 250,000 men. Lowering
standards so that only 25 percent are rejected
would add an additional 100.,000 men. In both
cases, however, it is likely that the quality of
manpower would be lowered.
?-?".
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THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) MANPOWER SQUEEZE
Many aspects of the progress noted in the pacification program during
.he last year have been encouraging. However, it is unlikely that this
trend would continue unchecked if a substantial reduction in U.S. combat
strength were made without a comparable rise in Vietnamese armed strength.
The analysis of the data available on pacification in South Vietnam indicates
that the battalion is still a key element in providing security to hamlets
and this situation is unlikely to change as long as the Communist forces
retain their battalion-oriented force structure. Any withdrawn U. S. ?
battalions would, therefore, have to be replaced by ARVN battalions if a
continuation of the trend in rural security is to be maintained.
While the question of the relative effectiveness of ARVN and U.S.
battalions in South Vietnam is still under considerable study and debate,
there is no reason to believe that the ARVN battalions are significantly
superior to those of the U..S.; most studies, in fact, suggest that the
reverse is true. At the very least, therefore, each U.S. battalion
removed would have to be replaced by one ARVN battalion; in the case
of the larger U. S: Marine Corps battalions perhaps two ARVN battalions would
be required as replacements.
The need for an increased number of ARVN battalions is fairly
clear, but the ability of South Vietnam to generate these new battalions
is open to question. The attached graph depicts the relationship between
total ARVN strength and the number of battalions actually put into the
field. The increase in ARVN strength from 1965 to 1969 has not resulted
in a proportional increase in the number of maneuver battalions. Since 1965,
total ARVN strength has increased by 115,000 men, or 42.9 percent.
During the same period, however, only 35 additional battalions have
been fielded, an increase of 26.3 percent.
The quantity of men required to back up those field elements
organized into battalions can readily be described as "overhead" and
it is clear that ARVNis overhead is increasing. The reasons for the
increase in overhead, however, are not known with any degree of
certainty. There is a wide range of possible causes, including defective
organization, manpower quality or training difficulties, scarcity of
leadership cadre, or an inability to cope with high levels of attrition due
to combat and desertion losses. Significantly, there is also the possibility
that the increased overhead may not be an operational drawback. It may
represent a rearrangement of combat and support forces that contributes
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1:6 the overall effectiveness of the battalions that currently are in the
The possibility that the trend in overhead growth may not be
totally disadvantageous does not, unfortunately, eliminate the manpower
squeeze currently facing ARVN. If the war is to be Vietnamized and there
is no radical change in the military organization of the Communist forces
or offsetting improvements on ARVN's part, there appears to be no option
but to increase the number of ARVN battalions. To the extent that the trend in
overhead will be representative of future ARVN development, each new
battalion placed into the field will cost an increasing number of men which
must be added to total ARVN strength. This type of organizational trend
would ultimately place a severe strain on any manpower pool, but if, as
has been suggested by other reports, the total manpower pool of South
Vietnam is already tight, the prospects for obtaining increased ARVN
battalions without jeopardizing other governmental or industrial programs
do not seem overwhelmingly bright. Furthermore, if in the long term
Vietnamization of the war must include the takeover by ARVN of combat
support functions currently supplied by U.S. forces, then realistic expecta?
tions should count on as a minimum the ratio between total strength and fielded
battalions that currently exists. (With probability being on the side of even
.
more ripid growth in ARVN overhead.)
The implications of the potential squeeze on the ARVN organization
are serious, but it should be stressed that these implications are based on
a number of analytical assumptions which are subject to change. First, it
is possible that the combat support elements left behind in any U.S.
withdrawal could free ARVN manpower currently in overhead for full combat
duty: Second, it is possible that the Communist forces can be held down
by an expansion of Regional and Popular Forces and that the need for
additional ARVN battalions will not be felt as strongly as is currently
believed. Lastly, it is possible that the growing overhead problem being
encountered by ARVN is a function of its rapid growth after the 1968 Tet
offensive and with some semblance of stabilization the overhead can be
reduced.
None of these possibilities, however, can be counted on to eventualize,
and should be used to dissuade U.S. and Vietnamese analysts from
examining the overhead problem itself. There is little quantitative infor-
mation available on the nature and purpose of ARVN's past growth in overhead,
and thus the foregoing analysis is limited to the aggregate statistical
situation as it currently exists without any attempt to measure the impact
of many significant variables. Nonetheless, it appears probable that a
withdrawal of U.S. battalions may place a considerable stress on the
present organization of ARVN. Alleviation of this stress will require
either a major restructuring of this force or a level of manpower input
that might quickly become incompatible with the existing manpower pool.
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RELATIVE GROWTH RATES OF TOTAL STRENGTH AND BATTALIONS
FOR THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN): 1965-69
SECRET
Total
Strength
(Thousands)
400
Total
Battalions
400
350 350
300
250
200
150
100
50
fl""1
941055-69 CIA 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Manpower Situation in North Vietnam
Secret
Copy No.
ER 114 68-4
January 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and. 794, of the US. Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLARSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate Of Intelligence
5 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Manpower Situation in North Vietnam
Summary
A fresh appraisal of the manpower situation
in North Vietnam leads to the general conclusion
that reserves are adequate to meet current
demands and that Hanoi could support a military
mobilization effort higher than present levels.
During the past three years the North Viet-
namese population has been subjected to heavy
manpower demands to build up and maintain military
forces and to implement countermeasures against
the bombing of North Vietnam. These drains
admittedly have been sufficient to bring about
some tightening of overall manpower availabilities.
Local stringencies are reflected in occasional
reports from some regions on the drafting of youths
as young as 14. An analysis of all available
evidence indicates, however, that these reports are
discussing atypical situations and are often con-
tradictory. In the more generalized case the
Hanoi regime has acknowledged manpower problems
and responded by an increasing use of women in
the labor force. However, Hanoi's manpower
reports continue to describe conditions and
problems that were also characteristic of the
North Vietnamese labor force before the war-
induced manpower requirements were felt.
A comparison of the manpower situation in
both North and South Vietnam is revealing.
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Special Assistant for Viet-
namese Affairs.
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These countries present nearly parallel cases.
South Vietnam, however, effectively controls
a much smaller population -- 11 million to
12 million -- than North Vietnam, whose population
exceeds 18 million. Yet South Vietnam has been
able to maintain a full-time military force
nearly 1.5 times the size that North Vietnam main-
tains. The disruption of agricultural produc-
tion and distribution in South Vietnam is largely
due to the huge refugee problem and the interdiction
of normal transport route, both reflecting VC/NVA
action rather than the call-up of military manpower
by Saigon. If North Vietnam were to call into full-time
military service the same share of its population as
has South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese full-time
military force would be more than double its present
size.
Despite the possibility of significant errors
in the estimates of manpower resources, North
Vietnam's situation does not appear critical.
The agricultural labor force of 7 million by itself
is such a large component of the total labor force
and is so under-utilized that large numbers of
workers could be drained off without significant
decreases in production. In addition, other sectors
of the economy are believed to contain additional
slack wrich could be used to meet mobilization
demands.
An examination of the manpower situation in
World War II Germany also reinforces the judgment
that North Vietnam has adequate manpower reserves.
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Introduction
1. North Vietnam is a predominantly agricul-
tural country with more than 70 percent of the
labor force engaged in farming and related
activities. As in virtually all underdeveloped
countries, this labor force is grossly under-
utilized in peacetime. Most of the population
has always subsisted on a very low standard of
living, calculated to be less than $100 per
capita in terms of total output of goods and
services. The population has been inured to
hardship, having undergone famine and war over
long periods in the life of most adults living
today. The country is ruled by a doctrinaire
Communist elite, with a revolutionary tradition
and a familiarity with suffering. Manpower is
relatively mobile, both geographically and with
respect to work tasks, since the great bulk of
labor is essentially an unskilled force.
2. North Vietnam may now be experiencing
some difficulties in filling all its requirements
for manpower from the prime age groups. For
coastal and antiaircraft defense as well as its
home reserves, North Vietnam may have to make
increased use of older men and the less physically
fit. However, the weight of the evidence does not
support a presumption of a numerical manpower
shortage. Although the air war ties up large
numbers of North Vietnamese in bomb damage repair
activities, most of this labor force is so engaged
only part time. There are ample reservoirs of
labor in agriculture, services, and handicraft
industries to supply this low-skill labor force
with only a negligible effect on the output of
the economy as a whole.
Demographic Data
3. Estimates of the current population of
North Vietnam range from 17 million to 20 million.
A population of 17 million has been cited in some
North Vietnamese statements, and a current
population of 20 million can be derived from
official North Vietnamese estimates of the annual
growth rate of the population applied to 1960
North Vietnamese census data. In a country as
undeveloped as North Vietnam, an accurate enumera-
tion of the total population is impossible even
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for a highly centralized regime. According to
the calculations of the United States Bureau of
the Census, North Vietnam's population at the
beginning of 1968 was about 18.7 million.
Of these, approximately 2.8 million are males
between the ages of 17 and 35, more than half of
whom are believed to be physically fit for military
service. During 1968, an estimated 200,000 males
will reach the age of 17, the minimum for drafting
into the militia, and slightly less than 200,000
will reach the military service age of 18. Of
the latter, approximately 120,000 men probably would
be physically fit for military service. The US Census
Bureau estimates are developed through the use
of Western demographic techniques and historic
demographic data on North Vietnam and provide the
data used in this memorandum, although they are not
assumed to be without error.
Labor Force
4. In the 15 to 64 age group, there is a
potential working force of 10.4 million, of whom
about 4.9 million are male. Excluding the
military forces and students, the work force
totals about 9.8 million, of whom about 55 percent
are female. The following tabulation shows an
estimate of the labor force according to major
sectors of employment as of 1 January 1968:
Sector of Employment Thousand Persons
Agriculture 7,000
Services 800
Industry (including
handicrafts) 800
Transport and communi-
cations 400
Trade 300
Construction 250
Other 250
Total 9,800
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The estimates of the labor force, by occupation,
are based on statements by North Vietnamese
officials. Although the number of workers in
each of the above categories may be subject to a
substantial margin of error, the large number
in agriculture and the handicraft industries has
been reported with some consistency. Similarly,
there is little doubt of the continued employment
of a relatively large labor force in the services
sector of the economy. These three sectors, in
which individual productivity is low, provide a
reservoir of manpower that can be tapped with
little adverse effect on the total domestic
production.
5. Before the bombing began in 1965 the North
Vietnamese labor force was largely unskilled,
underemployed, and, at least in agriculture,
seasonally unemployed. Agriculture employed 70
percent of the civilian labor force and was
particularly labor-intensive. Through natural
increase, more than 120,000 males and almost the
same number of females are added to the agricul-
tural labor force each year. By keeping the
agricultural labor force steady at about 7
million since the beginning of 1965, the regime
apparently has freed a total of more than 700,000
potential agricultural workers for non-agricultural
activities. Henceforth by simply drawing on the
natural increase of men in the agricultural labor
force and permitting the natural increase of women
to replace an equal number of men, the regime
would be able to obtain a large additional number
of males for military or war-related tasks. In
addition, the present size of the agricultural
labor force could be reduced substantially without
producing a proportionate decline in agricultural
output because of the low marginal productivity
of each farmer. For many years the regime has
had a goal of reducing the number of farm workers
per hectare from the present level of three workers
per hectare to only one person per hectare.
6. It is possible over the longer term for
North Vietnam to compensate for a considerable
reduction in agricultural labor by the increased
use of agricultural machinery and materials. The
amount of fertilizer and equipment used per hectare
is well below that of Western countries. The
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increased use of equipment, such as tractors,
trucks, irrigation pumps, and harvesting machinery,
would undoubtedly decrease the labor requirement
per unit of rice produced. So far, however, we
have seen no great emphasis by the regime on the
importation of such labor-saving machinery.
Alternatively, shortfalls in food production could
be made up by imports from the USSR and China.
Such imports Are now taking place.
7. Handicraft industries account for about
one-third of the total oUtput of North Vietnamese
industry and employ about 600,000 workers. This
work force distributed throughout the populated
areas of the country has been and continues to be
a source of manpower that can be diverted with
only slight adverse effects on the economy.
8. In addition to the manpower reservoir in
agriculture and handicrafts, there are various
smaller pools of manpower in other occupations
from which men could be drawn. We have, however,
little evidence of diversion of manpower from
these sectors. There are estimated to be
approximately 120,000 males in trades outside of
the state sector, about 180,000 in consumer
services and about 40,000 males in teaching.
Therefore, about 340,000 males of working age and
demonstrably capable of some economic activity are
available for military-related work. In addition,
at least 40,000 male students above the age of
15 are studying in North Vietnam and about 5,000
are studying abroad. These have not been included
in the labor force. The number of students is
growing, especially those studying abroad.
Excessive diversions from these groups for war-
supporting tasks would undoubtedly result in a
decline in living standards and, in the case
of students, would be counter-productive in the
long run, but might be considered justifiable
under the circumstances.
9. The bombing of North Vietnam's industrial
facilities has freed a small number of factory
workers for other activities. Industries that have
been paralyzed by direct bomb damage and/or outage
of electric power were primarily modern facilities
using complex machinery and modern production
techniques yielding higher labor productivity.
It is estimated that by mid-1967 about 30,000
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workers had been put out of work by the damage
to modern industry. Although the workers freed
represent only about 4 percent of the industrial
labor force, they have a higher degree of technical
competence, skills, and industrial discipline than
the average member of the labor force. They
undoubtedly play a significant role in the main-
tenance of production by dispersed industries, in
the repair of damaged facilities, and as cadre
for supervising general bomb damage repair work.
10. Since early 1965, North Vietnam has had
the use of some 34,000 Chinese engineering troops
to repair bomb damage and to build new lines of
communication in the northern areas and some 16,000
Chinese antiaircraft artillery troops to defend the
two rail lines to China. These forces were introduced
soon after the US bombing began. There has been rela-
tively little change in the total numbers, although
regular rotation has been carried out. Their use
stems primarily from shortages of construction skills
and organizational knowhow among the North Vietnamese
rather than gross manpower shortages. If North Vietnam
were suffering a general manpower shortage, we would
expect that the number of Chinese laborers could be
greatly increased.
War-Induced Manpower Requirements
11. Major war-induced manpower requirements
in North Vietnam are twofold: (a) those to
support the buildup of Communist military forces
and to replace combat losses in North and South
Vietnam; and (b) those required to repair the
damage from airstrikes against North Vietnam.
12. North Vietnam's armed forces were built
up rapidly from about 230,000 in February 1965
to the present force level of 480,000, or to
about 3 percent of the population. This buildup
has required the mobilization of less than 20
percent of North Vietnam's draft-age men, and
Hanoi has not found it necessary to alter the
current military service ages of 18 to 35. The
rate of increase during 1967 was well below that
of the two previous years. The military buildup
alone has required about 120,000 persons annually
during 1965 and 1966. During 1966, estimated North
Vietnamese combat and infiltration losses ranged
from 35,000 to 45,000 men, and during 1967 these
losses were much higher. The manpower requirements
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have been met for the most part by the drafting of
almost all the 120,000 physically fit males
estimated to reach the draft age each year. The
regime has also had to mobilize some reservists.
During 1967, there has been no evidence of
changes in North Vietnam's mobilization program.
Unless North Vietnam sees a need for maintaining
a much larger military force in the North in 1968,
the number of physically fit males reaching the
draft age should meet or exceed the number required
for military service in South Vietnam at present
loss levels.
13. The principal diversions of civilian
manpower have been those required to repair and
build lines of communication, to disperse
industry, and to man the transport system.
The services of 475,000 to 600,000, or about 3
percent of the population, have been required to
offset the effects of airstrikes on North Vietnam.
Of the total in war-related activities, less than
200,000 are occupied full time. The part-time
civilian force is used primarily as conditions
warrant. At any one time, more than one-half of
the part-time workers may be engaged in the repair
of lines of communication and about one-third in
civil defense. In substantial portions of the
country, weather conditions prevent air attacks
for several days at a time. During respites from
bombing, the part-time force is more actively
engaged in repairing bridges, filling in craters,
and stockpiling materials. For example, an
article published in Hanoi in September 1967
discussed the mass use of nearly 300,000 people
in the area south of Vinh for several days and
nights on two separate occasions for completing
road repair and road construction tasks. It is
probable that the concerted activity described in
this article was undertaken to capitalize on the
absence of air attack during the 1967 Tet or
previous bombing pauses.
Evaluation of Reports on Availability of Manpower
14. Reports that North Vietnamese youths below
the age of 18 are being drafted are infrequent
and of highlydubious character.
stated that 14
year olds have been taken into the army,
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25X1X
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state. that 0 was t e upper age imit or t e
draft in Lao Cai, while
stated that
males between the ages of 20 and 45 are drafted 25X1X
in Lao Cai and that no one under the age of 20
was conscripted. These inconsistencies cast
serious doubts on the reliabilit of the 25X1X
information
15. The discrepancy in the minimum conscrip-
tion age might be explained by the fact that
youths participate in bomb damage repair work or
in air defense activities under military leader-
ship. In addition, it is also possible that
youths below the draft age have volunteered and
have been accepted for military service. The
occasional North Vietnamese soldier captured in
South Vietnam who claims to have been drafted at an
early age possibly is either understating his age
to obtain leniency or had originally been a
volunteer. Finally, the recent reports of the
very young being drafted are not new. Similar
claims had been made in 1965, a period when it
is generally agreed there were no serious man-
power problems in North Vietnam.
16. Statements by the North Vietnamese regime
during the last year which mention a manpower
problem in North Vietnam are similar to complaints
the regime has been making for many years and
do not necessarily indicate a worsening manpower
situation. An article in Hoc Tap of July 1965
used almost the same terms to describe the man-
power situation in North Vietnam, as did an article
in Hoc Tap of July 1967. Despite the diversion
of manpower that had occurred since the bombing,
Deputy Premier Le Thanh Nghi in the July 1967
Hoc Tap article still referred to the large labor
potential of the country, the serious waste of
labor, and the present great volume of idle labor.
The regime has been complaining for many years
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that the North Vietnamese work force is poorly
organized, that manual workers make up too large
a percentage of the labor force, and that this
condition must be corrected.
17. Similarly, the recent statements from
Hanoi that women are participating to a greater
extent in the labor force are a continuation of
statements that the regime has been making for
years. The current degree of participation of
females in the labor force results from trends
established well before the bombing started.
As far back as 1962 the regime boasted that
women accounted for 60 percent of the work force
in agriculture and for most of the working staff
in light industries.
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APPENDIX
The War Supporting Role of Manpower
in South Vietnam and World War II Germany
This appendix analyzes the manpower situations
in South Vietnam and in World War II Germany to
assess the extent to which these countries were
able to commit their population to war supporting
activities. The case of South Vietnam is very
similar to that of North Vietnam, yet the govern-
ment of South Vietnam, with fewer population
resources, has sustained a much greater manpower
commitment than has North Vietnam. Although
World War II Germany cannot be directly compared
with North Vietnam, it was chosen to provide
some insight into the extent to which a highly
industrialized state can commit its population
to war supporting activities. The situations in
South and North Vietnam are not completely
parallel and of course the comparison of the
German experience with that of North Vietnam must
be a cautious exercise. Nevertheless, the
experiences of other countries are of value in
helping to assess the manpower drains that an
economy can stand during wartime.
Manpower in South Vietnam
1. The estimated population of South Vietnam
was about 16 million at the end of 1964 and more
than 17 million at the end of 1967. At the end
of 1964, only about 7 million people were under
the control of the Government of Vietnam (GVN);
by the end of 1967, the controlled population
totaled 11 million to 12 million. In recent years
the population available to South Vietnam to meet
its manpower requirements has been equal to from
40 to 70 percent of North Vietnam's manpower
resources.
2. Despite this much smaller population base,
the government of South Vietnam has been able to
maintain a full-time military force nearly 1.5
times that of North Vietnam. GVN military forces,
including paramilitary and national police, have
grown from about 610,000 at the end of 1964 to
about 740,000 at the end of 1967. This force is
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nearly 6 percent of the population controlled by
the GVN. North Vietnam's armed forces, on the
other hand, are only about 3 percent of its
population. There are, of course, differences
between North and South Vietnam which make absolute
comparisons questionable. However, in major ways
there are parallels. For example, the industrial
base which supports the war effort in both countries
lies outside Vietnamese national borders -- in
the United States for South Vietnam and in the
USSR and Communist China for North Vietnam.
Second, both Vietnams are essentially labor
intensive, subsistence agricultural countries
that supply most (but not all) of their food
needs. Third, both North and South Vietnam
have made considerable use of women in their
civilian labor forces. Fourth, the war has
contributed to a decline in agricultural pro-
duction in both countries. Finally, foreign
military engineering forces are an important
bolster to the logistic supply lines within each
nation.
3. South Vietnam has more men in uniform
than the North, as shown in the following tab-
ulation, but it is difficult to equate full-time
military forces in South Vietnam to those in the
Million Persons as of
1 January 1967
South Vietnam
North Vietnam
Population
10
to 11
a/
18.3
Civilian labor force
5.6
9.6
Agriculture
4.0
7.0
Non-agriculture
1.6
2.6
Military forces
0.7
0.5
a. GVN controlled population only, which compares
with an estimated total population of 17 million as
of 1 January 1967.
North. For example, North Vietnam has about a
400,000 part-time armed militia in addition to
its nearly 500,000 full-time military forces.
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South Vietnam's Popular and Regional Forces
resemble militia in organization, training, and
mission, but they serve full time.
4. South Vietnam's success in maintaining
such relatively large military forces is particu-
larly significant in view of its greater desertion
problem, the large number of casualties, and the
difficulties of maintaining control over the
population. The GVN armed forces have had nearly
60,000 men killed in action in the last seven
years and another 140,000 to 250,000 wounded
during the same period. In addition, they have
experienced a desertion/defection rate of about
100,000 a year. Although some of the latter
losses are not permanent, South Vietnam has had
to maintain a large flow of new recruits into its
armed forces. The military mobilization program
has been accomplished by a government that has
been much weaker than the Hanoi regime. South
Vietnam has not yet drafted men below the age
of 20, although it intends to. North Vietnam has
fully mobilized its 18 and 19 year olds.
5. Despite the large numbers of manpower
mobilized, the refugee problem, and the general
insecurity in the country, economic production
has not suffered drastically. Rice production
in 1967 was down less than 20 percent from the
relatively high level achieved in 1964. Employment
in agriculture fell from 5.7 million in 1960 to
4 million in 1966. Although the loss of manpower
clearly has affected rice production, numerous
other problems related to the war also have
contributed to the decline in output. For example,
rice production would probably recover substantially
if security in the countryside improved. If, in
addition, the approximately 2 million refugees
could be resettled and assigned to productive
tasks, the agricultural manpower problem would
disappear. Therefore, the existence of a 740,000-
man armed force and a rapidly increasing non-
agricultural labor force -- which roughly doubled
from 772,000 to 1,575,000 during 1960-66 -- do
not appear to have had a significant effect on
agricultural production.
6. The big growth in South Vietnam's non-
agricultural labor force began with the commit-
ment of US combat forces in mid-1965 and the
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continuing need to support the increasing number
of troops. Until 1967, demand for unskilled as
well as skilled labor outpaced the supply. For
example, there was a shortage of Vietnamese
construction workers to help build airfields,
bases, and storage facilities for US forces, as
well as a lack of transport workers. As a
result, wage rates in construction and transport
rose markedly. The rapid growth of non-farm
economic opportunities, along with persistent
insecurity in rural areas, stimulated a large
migration to urban areas. In addition, non-
agricultural labor was diverted to these
priority industries. South Vietnamese coastal
shippers diverted their boats from hauling
rice to moving supplies for US troops. Although
the demand for Vietnamese labor, particularly
unskilled labor, has leveled off since the end of
1966, US military and civilian agencies and their
contractors still directly employ about 130,000
Vietnamese. The demand of US personnel for
services and handicrafts has also created
numerous new jobs for Vietnamese.
7. Although the GVN has been able to meet
a considerable proportion of the demands on its
manpower resources, it does have some problems
and has received vital support from its allies.
The United States provides manpower directly for
military logistical support and for medical and
other highly skilled services. The United States
is also largely responsible for the construction
and maintenance of roads, bridges, and other
transport facilities. In addition, the US-financed
import program is to some extent a substitute for
domestic labor.
Manpower in World War II Germany
8. World War II Germany and present-day North
Vietnam are two highly disparate economies. Germany
was a highly industrialized state with its own
munitions and war supporting industries. North
Vietnam has an essentially subsistence agriculture
economy that is almost completely dependent on
external sources for the materials and munitions
needed to sustain the war.
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9. The fact that the Germans sustained their
massive war effort for the most part from their
own resources meant that in almost every respect
the German commitment of manpower to war supporting
activities far exceeded that observed in North
Vietnam today.
10. The German armed forces, for example,
reached a peak of 10.2 million during World
War II, or about 13 percent of the population.
North Vietnam's full-time military forces total
480,000, or less than 3 percent of the population.
Germany committed about 6 percent of its popula-
tion -- 4.5 million persons -- to air defense
and repair activities, compared with approximately
500,000 persons, or less than 3 percent of
North Vietnam's population. The manpower drain
in deaths as a result of enemy action was also
proportionately far greater in Germany. An
estimated total of at least 3.8 million Germans
about 5 percent of the population -- were killed
by enemy action. The manpower drain in North
Vietnam as a result of enemy action through the
end of 1967 is estimated to be 0.5 percent of
the population, or only one-tenth of that
sustained in Germany.
11. Although the German manpower commitment
constituted an obviously heavier burden than that
noted in North Vietnam, there is little evidence
that the availability of manpower was a meaningful
restraint on Germany's ability to carry on large-
scale military operations -- at least up to the
last year of the war. The breakdown of distribution
systems, the destruction of power sources and key
industrial facilities, and the loss of territories
were the key factors underlining the collapse of
the German war machine.
12. During World War II, more than 12 million
men were taken into the German military service.
Despite this mass transfer from the civilian labor
force and other war-related manpower drains, Germany
never fully mobilized its total manpower resources.
Manpower pressures were not critical until the
last months of the war, when Allied forces had
already assured a total military victory.
13. Manpower pressures in World War II Germany
were alleviated by a number of factors, one of
the most important being the abundant use of
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foreign labor and prisoners of war. At the end of
the war the use of upwards of 8 million foreigners
and prisoners of war accounted for about one-fourth
of the civilian labor force. They accounted, for
example, for 22 percent of the agricultural labor
force of about 11 million persons, which was
substantially unchanged from its pre-war levels.
The rest of this captive labor was used in the
non-agricultural labor force, which had declined
by only about 10 percent during the course of
the war.
14. The failure of Germany to mobilize addi-
tional labor to offset military mobilization
programs is thus explained in large part by the
use of foreign labor. It is also explained by an
increase of 23 percent in labor productivity from
1939 to 1944.
15. Significantly, the Germans apparently
found it unnecessary to increase the use of women
in industry during World War II. At the end of
1939, German women accounted for about 37 percent
of the German civilian labor. The number of
women employed in the German labor force remained
practically unchanged throughout the war, in
contrast to the increased reliance placed on them
in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The German experience is in even sharper contrast
to North Vietnamese practice. Hanoi encourages
the employment of women in all sorts of economic
and war-related activities, and women may account
for more than one-half of North Vietnam's labor
force. If the German government had found it
necessary to increase the use of female labor
even to the extent that the United Kingdom did,
then it could have added more than 2.5 million
persons to the labor force.
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Secret
No Foreign Dissem
Secret
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IX I
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OlJ])<
.0dAX
24 May 1968
MENORIlliDIMI FOR: The President
1. The study on North Vietnamese manpower which you re-
questedVednesday is going forward and will be rinishedwithin the
two weeks you gave us.
- 2. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you on the
latest findings with respect to deployment from the north since con-
cern is being expressed in several quarters that the Intelligence
Community may have under-estimated this rate of deployment. What
we rind as of now is that men on the move through the pipeline from
North. to South continues in May at the same high level it has attained
during the firat four moths or this year. lab have added 17,000
wl
North Vietnamese between I May and 23 May to the 83,000 we observed
moving in the period between 1 January and the end of April. Put in
other words, the number of individuals en route to South Vietnam fra
within North Vietnam is at the very least adequate to continue the
relatively intense military activity- in South Vietnam which we hats
noted in recent weeks. It is noteworthy that if our analysis is
accurate, two out of every five soldiers headed into South Vietnam
are being directed to the Saigon area.
Approved For Release 2000/05/1l-..1,ciAADF,78T02095R00050lip?p
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3. The methodology which we use to calculate this North
Vietnamese deployment rate is complex and subject to err,r. Never-
theless, we owe you our experts, view on what the allied forces and
AVN will be up against in the weeks to come. That brings me to this
statement: We can specifically account for the 100,000 troops men-
tioned in the preceding paragraph. We think this is too small. The
experts believe it to be closer to 1500000. We can already estab-
lish that 3,000 have arrived in South Vietnam and believe the
number may be even higher. In sum, at a minimum this rate of de-
ployment will enable the enemy to replace his losses and maintain
the high rate of activity which we have recently witnessed in South
Vietnam, particularly inthe Saigon area. If General Westmoreland
operations do not succeed in imposing the same level of attrition
we also have witnessed in these previous weeks, then this rate of
flow will enable the enmy to mount even larger operations, including
a major offensive this summer.
Richard Helms
Director
A (
cc: Secretary of State ,7'2
Secretary of Defense ,o'?,
D,D 47e 4,/
"77-77
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This is presumably related
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KARL
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