CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200220012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: July 8, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM
Office of Research and Reports
8 July 1966
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CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM
Summary
The immediate impact of mining the s forth Vietnam would
be a severe disruption o normal transport activity as the country
reallocatea i1ta ~ eerrial resources to develop alternative means
of supply from a road Over the longer term the impact could be charac-
terized as one of deli but not of denial of i.m orts. We estimate that
by the use of alternate transport connections to Communist China or other
transport expedients the regime could probably move almost all normal
foreign trade and could certainly maintain the import of essential mili-
tary and economic goods. The movement of goods would be more costly and
the means of transport would become highly vulnerable to a~tacT~.
_, Nevertheless a mining program alone could not stop Nor-c~Ti_Iietnam from
continuing its support Q the ~r r in Sout V nam.
If the mining program were carried on in conjunction with an inten-
sified program of air attack against significant military/economic
targets -- the remaining petroleum storage facilities, the Haiphong cement
plant, and the logistics target system -- the impact would be more severe.
North Vietnam would probably be unable to maintain the normal flow of
import and export traffic. Some economic requirements would have to go
unsatisfied and many of the Bloc aid projects and domestic construction
programs would have to be postponed. In spite of increased losses to
air attack there would still be adequate transport capacity to support
the military establishment and the ability to continue the present level
of aggression in South Vietnam and Laos would not be appreciably diminished.
Political reaction to a mining program, with or without an intensified
air campaign, would probably follow established patterns. Some Free World
countries would see this as a step toward a wider war. Those Free World
countries still trading with North Vietnam, particularly the maritime
powers, would object vigorously. But the alignment of Free world nations
toward the Vietnam war would not change significantly. The Communist
countries would mount an intensive propaganda campaign. Both the USSR and
Communist China would probably increase their logistic support to North
Vietnam but each would refrain from steps leading to a direct involvement
with the US. Hanoi's reaction would be keyed to its success in countering
the interdiction programs. The North Vietnamese would probably not con-
sider any basic change in their policy toward the war unless they were
singularly unsuccessful in maintaining the import of essential supplies.
This is unlikely.
North Vietnam's foreign trade in 1965 amounted to at least.3.2 million
tons. About 2.7 million tons was seaborne trade and about 520,000 tons
moved overland on the Hanoi - Dong Dang railroad. The port of Haiphong
handles almost all of North Vietnam's imports and all of its exports except
coal. The other two major ports -- Cam Pha and Hon Gai. -- are used almost
exclusively for coal traffic.
The North Vietnamese could use several options to counter a mining
program. These would include the use of shallow draft vessels for the.
coastal transport of imports from Communist China, the lightering of cargo
from ships anchored outside the minefields, or the use of land transport
connections to Communist China. The most pressing problem would be sus-
taining petroleum deliveries. The use of lighters or a combination of
lighters and, as they become available, overland or underwater pipelines
should enable deliveries to be maintained at the current rate of 860 tons
per day. Some or all of this petroleum could also be moved on overland
routes from Communist China.
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Coastal transport of most dry cargo imports from Fort Bayard could
be sustained by using a maximum of 2,000 powered shallow draft vessels.
A total of 5,700 craft suitable for this movement are available in the
waters off southern China and the northern coasts of North Vietnam.
If transport by coastal or lighterage operations proved inadequate
or was not immediately feasible, trade could be routed along the rail
and. road connections to Communist China. The Hanoi - Dong Dang line is
currently used at only one-third its daily capacity of 3,300 tons each
way;per day. It is also now possible to route North Vietnamese imports
via lthe Hanoi - Lao'Cai line which has a similar capacity. The road
connections to China have a daily capacity of 4,750 tons a day in the
dry season and 1,050 tons a day in the wet season. Total imports by
North Vietnam were at a level of about 3,200 tons a day in 1965. It
is unlikely that the ca a ova~ and _sou_te-s __can be r~cLucm
by ;nterdiction to a level that most normal imports cannot be satisfied.'
and petroleum imports under conditions of intensified air attacks; the
traffic load would exceed the interdicted capacity of the routes. In
this case some impor an expor pro rams would have o be forme with
the grew es lxnpac es.ng e in ._theconstruction andmodern industry
sectors of--thy ec-aloTh._
Fed
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CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS OF NORTH VIETNAM
I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam's Foreign Trade
A. Volume of Foreign Trade
In spite of the bombing of North Vietnam and the interdiction of
tines of communication, the volume of foreign trade, both by sea and
railroad in 1965 exceeded the level of 1964. Foreign trade in 1966 is
continuing at the 1965 level although there have been significant changes
in the composition and direction of the trade. The total foreign trade
of North Vietnam in 1965 amounted to at least 3.2 million tons.* About
2.7 million tons, or 85 percent of the total, was seaborne trade moving
through the seaports of Haiphong, Cam Pha, and-Hon Gai. The remainder,
about 520,000 tons, moved overland by rail across the North Vietnamese-
Chinese border at Dong ] ng. In addition a small amount of trade moved
by highway.
The volume and commodity composition of the seaborne trade in
196,4, 1965, and the first six months of 1966 are shown in Table 1. About
70 percent of the trade consists of exports, of which coal is by far the
major commodity. Coal accounts for about 25 percent of foreign exchange
earnings. Apatite and cement have been the other major export items al-
though exports of apatite by sea have not been observed since August 1965.
The major seaborne imports have been petroleum and fertilizers. Imports
of machinery, vehicles, and manufactured and processed goods, are all
vital to the small modern sector of economy and to the country's program
for industrial expansion.
SN~ 350E 0 tons of imports and 170,200 tons of exports. Coal made up about
half of the rail imports, while military supplies made up a significant
portion of the remaLn er. Machinery, metals, specialized petroleum pro-
due s,. and a variety of consumer goods were also imported by rail.
Exports by rail consisted of apatite (until the Lao Cai line from the
mines was interdicted in July 1965), coal, and products of North Vietnam's
food processing and handicraft industries. Rail traffic thus far in 1966
probably has continued at the 1965 level, except for the export of apatite
which probably has not resumed.
B. Level of Traffic Compared with Route Capacity
1. Ports
Deep-draft international merchant ships normally call at only
three North Vietnamese ports -- Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai. Only
Haiphong is served by North Vietnam's rail network. Haiphong is the
principal maritime port for virtually all seaborne imports, and all of
the seaborne exports except coal. Haiphong's petroleum storage facilities
normally handle about 90 percent of all petroleum imports. Cam Pha and
Hon Gai handle only one significant cargo, anthracite coal for export.
About 90 percent of the seaborne coal exports originate at Cam Pha which
is-the only coal port able to accommodate large-size ships at its dock.
Both ports have limited wharf and storage facilities for general cargo,
which consists almost exclusively of supplies for the mines and their
small worker communities.
* Tonnages in this report are expressed in short tons.
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.Table 1
North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade a/
1964, 1965, and Jan-Jun 1~
Thousand Short Tons
1964 165 b/ Jan-Jun 1966
Total Seaborne Trade 2,430 2,660 1,227
Imports 703 768 532
Petroleum 157 188 145
Fertilizers 154 179 136
Grain and bulk food 179 131 32
Timber 35 16 11
Miscellaneous 179 255
Exports 1,725 1,888
Coal 1,047 1,268
Apatite
Cement
Miscellaneous
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154
350
86
208
694
610
0
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Haiphong has the capacity to handle about 5,000 tons of
general cargo and 900 tons of bulk petroleum per day. During 1965
the port handled daily about 3,300 tons of general cargo of which 1,600
tons were imports and 1,700 were exports. Petroleum imports, which
amounted to 515 tons per day in 1965, have increased to about 860 tons
per day so far in 1966. Thus the volume of general cargo handled in
1965 was well below the estimated capacity of the port, and remains
so in 1966, while the volume of bulk petroleum imports has approached
the estimated capacity of the port facilities to handle it. Irregular
arrivals of ships, however, have led to Wort ennr_rest'u nn q n(9 r1P1 a,rg
3. Roads
Only small amounts of cross-border, short-haul foreign trade
moves by truck
_tLe-tweonNorth Vietnam nd China.
The estimated total capacity of the roads that cross the
border and lead to the Hanoi - Haiphong area is 4,750/1,050* tons a day.
Of this amount, 3,000/700 tons could come over the eastern border of
North Vietnam (from the Nanning, Canton, and Fort Bayard areas) and
1,750/350 tons over the western border (the K'un-wing area).** The road
capacity from Hanoi to Haiphong is estimated to be about 1,150/400 tons
per day.
4. Inland Waterways
Very little, if any, foreign trade currently moves on inland
waterway connections between Communist China and North. Vietnam. With the
completion of the new railroad connecting Yunnan Province with the rest of
China, the Red River connecting Yunnan Province with Hanoi takes on new
importance. The capacity of the Red River from Lao Cai to Hanoi is esti-
mated to be 1,000 to 3,000 tons per day. Some imports for North Vietnam
could now move over this circuitous and costly rail-water route via
Yunnan Province.
* The figures separated by the slanting line show estimated minimum
capacities between terminal points under the best and worst climatic
conditions.
*X- Supplies from the Nan-ning, Canton, and Fort Bayard areas can now be
shipped by rail through China to K'un-ming, China, and then to North
Vietnam by rail and road over the western border, if necessary.
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II. Impact of Mining Under the Present o I_in.g' 'Hander Program
Immediate Effects
If mining of the ports was carried out without warning, a number
of foreign flag ships might be caught in the ports.* The daily average
number of ships at Haiphong during January to June 1966 included 10
freighters (5 Soviet and European Satellite, 3 Free World, and 2 Chinese
Communist) and 1 tanker (usually Soviet). The actual number on any one
day; during this period ranged from 3 to 12 ships. Since the end of April,
however, the average number of Free World vessels at Haiphong has declined
to bne. In addition one or two ships (of the flags listed above) are
loading at both Cam Pha or Hon Gai on any given day.
An immediate short-term effect of mining the ports would be an
int nsive disruption of normal transport activity. This would arise from
the need to adopt alternative distribution procedures, to reroute import
.traffic, to reallocate small craft, rolling stock, and trucks, and to
reassign personnel. The maximum impact from mining the ports under the
present Rolling Thunder program would be one of delay but not of denial
in the delivery of imports. Sustained delivery of petroleum imports would
be the major problem. Almost all exports could be continued, except that
the added costs of handling coal exports might be so great that they would
be foregone.
The amount of delay in rearranging the routes and methods of
import and export would depend on the extent of North Vietnam's contingency
planning. The organization of transport to cope with the effects of bomb-
ing has improved substantially in the past year. There are several indi-
cations that the regime has prepared itself to cope with a denial of the
port of Haiphong. About 50 dispersed petroleum storage sites have been
built and others are under construction, alternate petroleum distribution
procedures have been adopted, and by-pass bridges, roads and rail routes
have been constructed. The extensive publicity given to possible US
courses of action against the port of Haiphong make it highly probable that
Communist plans to deal specifically with a mining of the port are well
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ade, the Nor Vietnamese have seriously considered using an island off
the coast near Haiphong as a base for loading and unloading ships and
would assign some 300 lighters to the operation. An alternative plan was
also reported whereby an area on Luichow Peninsula in China would be used
and the material shipped to Hanoi via land or coastal shipping. The North
Vietnamese capability for various courses of action of this type are dis-
cussed below. Their alternatives include the shifting of seaborne trade to
South China ports and using land transport routes through China for the
movement of cargoes to and from North Vietnam; the use of small watercraft
to load and unload ocean-going ships while they are anchored outside North
Vietnamese ports; the use of other minor ports in North Vietnam; and the
use of pipelines for petroleum.
B. Means of'Maintaining Foreign Trade
1. Small Watercraft Through Haiphong and Other Ports
Only in recent years have the areas near the docks at Haiphong
been dredged to permit dockside loading and unloading of ships with full
loads. Prior to dredging, goods were lightered between ships anchored down
* It would be possible for mines to be equipped with delayed action fuses to
give foreign flag ships time to clear port or to divert shipping enroute to
the port.
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stream and the docks to lighten or top off the load. Thus, the North
Vietnamese have had considerable experience with these operations.
If the mining operation affects only the movement of ocean-
going ships, shallow-draft watercraft could be used to transport supplies
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~o and from the mined ports. There are probably over 900 motor-powered
end about 4,800 sailing junks operating in the waters off southern China
(Hong Kong-Canton-Hainan area) and the northern coasts of North Vietnam that
might be used for improvised lighterage in addition to those craft normally
used for this purpose. Because of their shallow drafts the junks might
move unharmed over the minefields. They could travel close to the shore
thereby minimizing opportunities for detection by US aircraft. The number
of small craft available in the area could, if properly organized, handle
the total cargo estimated to have moved through, the port of Haiphong in
1965. .
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Excluding petroleum, North Vietnam imports through. Haiphong
amount to about 1,600 tons a day. A combination of about 2,000 motor powered
and sailing junks would be required to handle this volume of imports if they
were to be delivered via Fort Bayard in China.
Cargoes to be handled by small craft would., however, be limited
to items that could be loaded and unloaded by ships' gear and floating
cranes, and carried in small native craft, lighters, and barges. Among
such items would be bagged fertilizer, grain and other foods, petroleum
in drums, and vehicles. Loose bulk products such as fertilizer, grain,
apatite, and coal probably would be difficult to handle. The use of clam-
shell buckets, ordinary buckets, wicker baskets, slings, and other such
devices could also be used to offload bulk cargoes into lighters, but any
of these alternatives would be time consuming.
The river port of Nam Dinh is a significant loophole in current
mining programs. Nam Dinh is the third largest city in North Vietnam and
is served by the main railroad and highway network as well as the extensive
inland water network in the delta area. The port area of Nam Dinh, includ-
ing piers and river bank suitable for handling cargo, has a cargo handling
capacity 6f about 4,000 tons a day, almost equal to the general cargo
handling capacity of Haiphong. Small ships with a draft of up to 9 feet
could use this port as an alternate to the mined ports, although some of
the cargo would have to be discharged along the banks of the Red River.
The ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gai are especially equipped to
export coal and have very 3-imited ties for handling other types of
cargo. coal occasionally is loaded from
lighter e sips are anchored outside the port area.
Presumably this is only done for topping off or when the berths at the
docks are filled. The time and expense of lightering coal make it unlikely
that more than 10 percent of normal exports would be loaded in this manner.
The small amount of imports normally needed in the coal mining areas could,
however, be imported by lightering. Truck transport from the port area to
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the main transport network probably would not be used for either coal
exports or for the movement of imports away from the port. Both ports are
connected by route 18 with the main road network and -thereby to Hanoi and
Haiphong, but have no connections to the main rail network. The capacity
of route 18 is limited to 100 tons a day during the rainy season, because
it traverses low-lying terrain that is subject to inundation, and even during
the dry season it can handle only 600 tons a day. Furthermore, if route 18
were used for truck traffic carrying supplies from China to Hanoi or Haiphong,
traffic from Cam Pha and Hon Gai would have to share route 18 with this
traffic.
2.. Maintaining the Flow of Petroleum
The recent strikes against the major petroleum storage facili-
ties in North Vietnam have created new problems in maintaining the flow
of petroleum imports. We do not know at this time the extent of destruction
of the facilities at Haiphong. -
If the facilities were not destroyed but are denied by mining,
there are still several alternatives available-to maintain petroleum imports.
While all of these methods would require the Soviet tankers delivering
petroleum to spend longer times in Vietnamese waters than during the normal
discharging process, their use would not prevent continued petroleum deliver-
ies to North Vietnam at the current rate of 860 tons per day.
The alternative means for transporting petroleum from tankers
to storage facilities would require the following three categories of
equipment, either alone or in combination:
(1) Shallow-draft petroleum lighters: These would have to be
tank vessels capable of receiving petroleum while tied alongside a tanker
at anchor. They would have to be of sufficiently shallow draft to permit
navigation either through mined portions of the Haiphong channel for sea-
going vessels or through any of the various shallow river channels that
link Hanoi, Haiphong and other storage centers with the Gulf of Tonkin.
North Vietnam is not known to possess any vessels in this category. How-
ever, six tank vessels with capacities estimated at 300 tons have been
observed in North Vietnamese waters. They are suspected to be of Chinese
Communist origin. Additional petroleum lighters could conceivably be brought
in., both from Communist China and the Soviet Far East.
(2) Underwater pipelines: Flexible underwater pipelines with
diameters of up to six inches were used by the US Armed Forces during World
War II for the movement of petroleum over distances up to fourteen miles.
Similar lines are currently in commercial use at ports in the Free World
and the USSR.
(3) Temporary overland Pipelines: The Soviet Army in East
Germany has for a number of years employed temporary overland pipelines in
its field maneuvers. These have been six inch lines with capacities in
excess of 800 tons per day. They have been observed operating at distances
up to 176 miles and apparently require booster pumps at nine mile intervals.
We are not certain of the extent to which underwater and
.overland pipelines are now present in North Vietnam but estimate that they
could be easily supplied in the required amounts. Assuming the availability
of the above equipment, it could be used in the following alternative means:
(1) Lighters alone: This method would require the discharge of
petroleum into lighters td be delivered directly to the pier at the storage
facility in Haiphong. If their shallow draft renders them immune to the
mines, they could travel by way of the channel for sea-going ships. Other-
wise they would have to follow one of the various shallow river channels
available.
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(2) Lighters and aver an i-pe ine: it were not feasible
to use lighters in a movement directly to the storage facility, they could
be used to transport petroleum to the terminus of a temporary overland
pipeline linking the storage facility in Haiphong with a shore point along
the Gulf of Tonkin outside of the mined area.
(3) Underwater pipeline: If the mined area did not extend too
far?into the Gulf of Tonkin, it might be possible to lay an underwater pipe-
line between a suitable anchorage in the Gulf of Tonkin following along one
of the shallow river channels leading to the storage facility.
(1) Underwater and overland pipeline: Assuming an overland
pipeline had been laid between the storage facility and a shore point on
the Gulf of Tonkin as in Alternative #2, it might be possible to link the
shore point with a suitable anchorage for tankers using an underwater
pipeline.
3. The Use of Chinese Transport Connections
Land transport from the Chinese port of Fort .Bayard via the
Chinese rail network provides the North Vietnamese with a significant
alternative route for their foreign trade if the ports are mined. This
route probably could provide sufficient capacity for all of the normal
imports of North Vietnam. Not all of the exports would necessarily be
moved by rail, however. The problem and added costs of moving export
coal from North Vietnamese mines to the rail system might mean that this
movement would be foregone. If our air strikes against the rail network,
nevertheless, continue at the level achieved thus far in 1966, North
Vietnam should have no difficulty in maintaining both the current volume
of imports and exports by land as well as the imports normally received
by sea. Although the volume of foreign trade traffic on the Dong Dang
line increased by about 30 percent in 1965, we estimate that this line
even when carrying transit traffic was used at less than 50 percent of
its normal capacity of 3,300 tons EWPD. In spite of the air strikes the
North Vietnamese with Chinese help have been able to maintain the line at
its normal capacity.
The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line was effectively disrupted for
through service during the second half of 1965 and for most of 1966. Inter-
diction of this line disrupted the export of apatite by rail to China and
through the port of Haiphong to other countries, and ended the movement of
Chinese transit traffic to and from Yunnan Province. There are recent
indications, however, that the North Vietnamese may plan to ship apatite
from Lao Cai through Yunnan to the rest of China over the new K'un-ming-
Kuei-yang railroad, which was opened to traffic during the first part of
1966. Thus North Vietnam now has a second rail line to China which can
be used for imports and exports. Chinese goods to and from Yunnan now move
over the Chinese rail line rather than through North Vietnam, so that some
.railroad cars formerly used for this traffic.are now available for other
purposes.
At the beginning of 1966, North Vietnam had about 1,500 to
1,600 freight cars, including an estimated 300 tank cars. Some meter-gauge
freight cars, including about 150 tank cars can also be obtained from
Communist China. Although the estimates of capacities and of the actual
traffic carried on the North Vietnamese rail lines may be subject to large
margins of error, ample excess capacity is estimated to?be available on
the railroad lines to carry any tonnage that might be diverted to them by
mining of the approaches to the port of Haiphong.
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Although road transport has not been used for a significant
quantity of North Vietnamese foreign trade, it is available as an alternate
to sea transport. The North Vietnamese have shown considerable ability to
.maintain motor transport operations in spite of the air strikes delivered
thus far. The approximately 12,000 trucks in the North Vietnamese civilian
and military truck parks would probably be sufficient to move over the roads
that import and export tonnage which for various reasons might not be
handled by.rail movement.
A final alternative would be the use of the new railroad within
China to Yunnan Province and thence the Red River to Hanoi. The capacity
of the river for movements from Lao Cai to Hanoi is estimated at 1,000 to
3,000 tons depending on the season of the year.
C. Measures to Reduce the Volume of Traffic
The DRV could reduce the volume of traffic that would be required
to move through the mined ports by eliminating all non-essential seaborne
foreign trade.* Export of coal from Hon Gai and Cam Pha represents about
70 percent of the volume of North Vietnam's total seaborne exports and
accounts for about 25 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. The coal
export trade might, therefore, be considered essential by the North Viet-
namese, but the time and expense involved in its transportation by means
other than water would probably make it unprofitable to continue its export
if the ports were mined. A similar situation would apply to the export
of cement and apatite. A decision to forego the export of these bulk com-
modities would reduce seaborne exports from more than 5,000 tons per day,
including coal, to less than 500 tons a day.
North Vietnam would be more reluctant to cut back on its imports.
Fertilizers, grains and bulk foodstuffs are important to the economy. They
do, however, represent only a small percentage of the total food supply
and if necessary could be eliminated by strict rationing programs. Coal
for the coking plant at Thai Nguyen, which represents a significant portion
of rail imports, could be cut out with only the production of pig iron being
affected. Reduction in use of petroleum would be more difficult to achieve,
and we estimate that North Vietnam would try to maintain petroleum imports
at about current consumption levels. The reduction of imports of miscel-
laneous cargoes, some of which are essential to the continued operation of
modern industry and transportation, would be more difficult. Imports of
military supplies would certainly be maintained as would imports of rails
and that portion of timber imports which is used in transport repairs. We
estimate that less than half of the 1965 level of imports could be eliminated
without materially affecting the economy or military capability in the short
run. In the long run, the modern sector of the economy would be greatly
slowed down by such a reduction.
See Table 1, page 4, for foreign trade data.
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III. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified Rolling Thunder Program
The effectiveness of the mining of the three major ports would be
greatly enhanced by an expanded bombing program including intensive
interdiction of road and rail connections with China, attacks on the
remaining petroleum storage target system and the Haiphong cement plant,
and 24-hour armed reconnaissance against all forms of transport, partic-
ularly in the northern part of North Vietnam. The attacks on the
remaining petroleum storage target system would leave the North
Vietnamese with stocks in dispersed sites, drummed storage or the dis-
tribution system amounting to 60 clays normal consumption. By eliminating
non-essential requirements these stocks could last 90 days. Within this
period the alternative measures to restore petroleum'imports could be
put into effect. An attack on the Haiphong cement plant would deprive
North Vietnam of domestic production of 720,000 tons of cement, almost
90 percent of'which is consumed within the country. About 100,000 tons
of this consumption is for military construction. If North Vietnam
attempted to maintain all normal construction activity, particularly the
Bloc aid projects, an additional 500,000 tons of cement would have to
be imported overland.
If only one-half of the normal traffic through Haiphong could be
handled by lighters and other craft, once they are subject to 24-hour
armed reconnaissance, the other half would probably be transferred to
rail transport. In this case 800 tons per day of general cargo imports
and up to 400 or 500 tons per day of petroleum imports would be trans-
ferred to rail transport. Rail connections to Communist China which are
currently operating at only about one-third of capacity, would then be
forced to attempt to operate at approximately full capacity under inter-
dicted conditions. If production in the cement plant were also halted
at the same time, an additional import requirement for cement, probably
as high as 1,700 tons a day would be generated. This additional tonnage
would raise traffic even beyond the uninterdicted capacity of the rail
connections to China. As a result, some economic requirements at least
would go unsatisfied and many of the Bloc aid projects and other domestic
construction programs would have to be postponed. Sustained interdiction
of the lines would force the Communists to allocate considerable amounts
of manpower and materials to maintain the railroad lines and alternate
highway routes. The repair of major bridge structures would be measurably
more complex and expensive than the relatively simple expedients which
keep traffic moving in the southern provinces and in Laos. Sustained
24-hour interdiction and destruction of locomotives and rolling stock
by armed reconnaissance would stop all daylight traffic and disrupt night
traffic, thus slowing down movement and making the logistic resupply of
Communist forces considerably. less reliable than at present.
The North Vietnamese would probably be forced to make greater use of
highway and inland water traffic. Although it is extremely'difficult to
interdict these systems, their greater use would increase the opportunities
for harassment of actual traffic movement. The roads from China are
estimated to have a limited capacity in rainy season of about 1,000 tons
EWPD. In the area. north of Hanoi the height of the rainy season occurs
during July through September. A sustained high level of interdiction
during this period would be more effective in reducing the gap between
transport capabilities and the volume of traffic to be moved.
On balance we estimate that the North Vietnamese, with Chinese engi-
neering help and the possible loan of transport equipment, could continue
to move at least the essential import and export traffic, by using all
modes of transport. The essential traffic, however, would not include
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supplies for all sectors of modern industry, some of which would then
cease to operate as supplies of raw materials and imported machinery
were depleted. The resulting economic impact would be significant
because modern industry accounts for about one-half of gross industrial
output. Industrial construction would come to an almost complete halt
under the assumed attack. There would be a sharp setback to North
Vietnam's economic development program. The repercussions of the slow-
down of modern industry would, however, be limited by the primarily
se11f-sufficient nature of the subsistence agricultural sector, which
supports about 80 percent of North Vietnam's 18 million people. The
impact of even a complete loss of its modern industrial base would be
a ratter of direct concern to only a small element of the North Vietnam
sogiety. Most of the population leads a fairly primitive life, with
simple wants and needs. Only a small segment of the society would
find its daily routine or standard of living measurably impaired if
the; industrial base ceased to operate. More than one-half million
non-agricultural workers would be released from their jobs, but most
of these workers would undoubtedly be reemployed in reconstruction
and transportation. The morale and productivity of the nonagricultural
labor force probably would decline because of the transfer from normal
work, the regime's probable demand for further amounts of uncompensated
labor, and the separation from families as a result of new job assign-
ments or the probable further evacuation of dependents from urban areas.
But these effects would be felt directly by such a small segment of
the population that they would neither control the reactions of the
rest of the country nor be compelling enough to shape the attitude of
the policy-makers.
A further decrease in the normally tight supplies of food and other
essential consumer goods as a result of the disruption of the trans-
portation system and denial of imports might also have, a harmful impact.
Although North Vietnam imports some foodstuffs it is basically self-
sufficient in food. However, the distribution problems resulting from
the disruption of transport could lead to food shortages in some
smaller urban areas and intensify food shortages in the already food-
deficit regions in the :southern, north-western, and northeastern parts
of the country. Evacuation of urban residents, which is currently
underway, would undoubtedly be stepped up to relieve food shortages.
The proximity of North Vietnam's major urban areas -- Hanoi, Haiphong,
and Nam Dinh -- to surplus rice-growing regions would ease the problem
of distribution of food to these areas.
As certain sectors of the economy, such as the cement plant, coal
mines, and the iron and steel plant, ceased to operate, transport
capacity presently used to serve them would be available for use in
other ways. Ample transport capacity would remain to support the mili-
tary establishment. Thus ability to continue the present level of
aggression in South Vietnam and Laos would not be appreciably diminished
by any or all of these proposed air attacks.
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IV. Political Reactions:
A. Free World
9R000200220012-2
Free World reaction to the mining of North Vietnam's ports would
probably be the same whether or not it was accompanied by intensified
Rolling Thunder strikes. Some countries would fear that one more step
had been taken toward a wider war. Grumbling could be expected from
countries which trade with North Vietnam and from those which tradi-
tionally resent any interference with maritime trade. There is little
likelihood, however, that the mining of the ports would significantly
alter the current attitude of any Free World nation toward the Vietnam
B. The Communist World
1. North Vietnam
The mining of its major seaports would cause serious concern
to North Vietnam's leaders, particularly if that action were accompanied
by a step-up in the Rolling Thunder program. The key to Hanoi's reaction
would be the effectiveness of the interdiction and the adequacy of
alternate means of bringing in supplies. The North Vietnamese probably
would wait until they had been able to evaluate the effectiveness of
their contingency plans for insuring the import of supplies before
considering any basic change in their policy toward the war.
Hanoi's propaganda machine could be expected to mount an
outcry alleging a serious new escalation of the war. This outcry would
probably include a Foreign Ministry statement, a protest to the Inter-
national Control Commission (ICC), and possibly a note to the 195+
Geneva Conference Co-chairmen urging all "peace-loving people" to take
action to stay the hand of the "US imperialists." The propaganda would
also probably include vague references to retaliation against US forces
and a reiteration of Hanoi's determination to continue the fight at any
cost.
2. Communist China
Peking would react noisily to the new US attacks but even
if mining of the ports were accompanied by increased bombing of North
Vietnam it is unlikely that the Chinese response would go beyond
propaganda blasts and stepped-up logistic support for Hanoi. The
Chinese are very reluctant to risk a war with the US and could be ex-
pected to move with great caution, avoiding any action which they
believed might increase the chance of US military moves against China.
The initial reaction would probably be a violent propaganda
barrage labeling the new developments as a step toward general war in
Asia and implying that Chinese involvement was more likely as a result
of the US escalation. The objective of all this would be to generate
deterrent pressure from US allies and neutrals against; any further
enlargement of the war. The Chinese campaign would also be targeted
against the general public in the US in the hope of developing effective
domestic opposition to administration policies.
Peking might, if the Vietnamese press for it, publicly
acknowledge some part of the Chinese logistic support presence in North
Vietnam and might make some thinly veiled military moves inside China
designed to demonstrate growing Chinese concern. Peking would, however,
be very reluctant to do this. Since the fall of 1965 the Chinese have
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sharply reduced public statements suggesting that they might take a
direct role in the hostilities and have implied that 'war with the
US would come only if the US attacked China. There has been no ref-
erence to Chinese "volunteer" involvement since last November.
The Chinese would, however, almost certainly attempt to
increase the level of logistic support in an effort to make up for
restrictions imposed on sea supply by mining of the ports. The
Chinese have already started to improve overland supply routes to
North Vietnam, probably in the expectation that the ports might
sometime be damaged or put out of action. These efforts would be
increased. Communist China might also furnish additional anti-air-
craft weapons and possibly more Chinese AAA units to 'bolster North
Vietnamese air defenses. It seems unlikely, however, that the Chinese
would commit their outmatched air force to defend North Vietnam.
3. The USSR
The USSR would also be quick to mount an intense propaganda
campaign condemning US actions and reiterating its pledge to provide
North Vietnam with the necessary defensive assistance.
The Russians would, however, recognize their inability --
within the limits they have long since drawn for their involvement to deter or counter US air attacks on North Vietnam. Evidence available
over recent months reaffirms our estimate that the Soviet leaders are
determined to avoid steps which might lead to any direct Soviet-US
military confrontation in Southeast Asia. Recent evidence suggests a
diminution of the activity, and perhaps of the presence of Soviet
military advisors already in North Vietnam.
In the unlikely event that the US mining program resulted
in serious damage to Soviet ships in North Vietnamese waters, Moscow
would almost certainly feel constrained to level a sharp protest. The
Soviet leaders would probably avoid making such an incident a cause
celebre, however, but rather would be likely to control their response
in order to prevent relations with Washington from falling into a state
of complete disrepair.
--a
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 SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000200220012-2
CAPACITY OF ROADS
CROSSING WESTERN BORDER
1750 tons per day- dry season
350 tons per day- wet season
~~Or
RED RIVER CAPACITY
1000.3000 tons per day
HANOI-LAO CAI
AND HANOI- DONG DANG
RAILROAD CAPACITY
3300 tons per day- each way
~CAPACITY OF ROADS
CROSSING EASTERN BORDER
LIUCHou
PENINSUL
3000 tons per day- dry season 1 L i-rung
700 tons per day- wet season
r r t.i a
HAIPHONG
CAPACITY OF
PORT OF HAIPHONG
5000 tons per day - general cargo
900 tons per day -
bulk petroleum
Vinhj
rove or Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-R
Rou-rE 18 Il /5
" 'm Pha
Liu-thou
~/7:i RuTv.4J
!={ ban-Chiang)
D
HONG
KONG
, (U.K.)
o MACAO
(PORT.)
25X'
North Vietnam and South China
TRANSPORTATION