PROGRAM TO INFLUENCE WORLD OPINION WITH RESPECT TO A COMMUNIST CHINESE NUCLEAR DETONATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000100110018-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 25, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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ER 62-6990
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
01/
EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 5 3
DATE 28 September 1962
DCI
DDCI
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS) - additional distribution listed below
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE) _
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
FE Division
AD SI__
This memorandum contains information for the addressees. Ad-
dressees may give this memorandum additional circulation within
their components as required. All copies should be destroyed not
filed, upon completion of circulation. A master file will be kept in
the Executive Director's Office and will be available upon request.
STAT
State Dept. review completed
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UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
SECRET
September 25, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN A. McCONE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SUBJECT: Program to Influence World Opinion with
Respect to a Communist Chinese Nuclear
Detonation.
Attached is a copy of a paper entitled "Program to
Influence World Opinion with Respect to a Chicom Nuclear
Detonation".
Also attached is a copy of a memorandum from Secretary
Rusk approving the program as U.S. policy and assigning
responsibility to me for affecting the coordination envisaged
therein. The Interdepartmental Political-Psychological
Working Group will assume primary responsibility for carrying
out this function. The group is prepared to assist your
agency in fulfilling those elements of this program which
are your primary responsibility.
Mr. William Jorden, who heads the Psychological Group
in my office, is available to answer any questions you may
have or to otherwise assist you and your agency in this
program.
George C. McGhee
Attachments:
As stated.
SECRET
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iF(T Program to Influence World Opinion with Respect to 0
C i.coi. Nuictear Detonation
VRORLEM: To develop a U.S. program aimed at enlightening
and influencing world opinion, particularly Asian,
in anticipation of a Chicom Nuclear detonation.
CURRENT ESTIMATE:
T-nteiligence estimates (July 1962) place a
probable initial Chicom nuclear detonation in the
period 1963-64. A delivery capability is not ex-
pected for at least two years thereafter, with only
a modest stockpile of weapons available in the latter
half of the 1960's.
ASSUMPTIONS: The Chinese Communists will continue to pursue
an internal policy designed to give tnem, in the
shortest possible period of ti:ae, the domestic
resources required for great power status on the
world scene, including nuclear capability.
Despite continuing efforts to prevent an open
break in the Bloc, the Sino-Soviet dispute will not
he resolved in the foreseeable tutuie.
CRE T
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 s e_ Ysa:+
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The Soviet Union will not contribute to Chicom
nuclear capability.
The Soviet Union will not assume a public
position in opposition to the Chicom nuclear program.
DISCUSSION: While reaction to a Chicom nuclear detonation
will be world-wide, the primary impact will be felt in
countries in the Asian community.
The impact of the initial detonation will vary
depending upon the state of political and economic
developments in Communist China, in the other Asian
countries, and in the East-West conflict.
Continuance or worsening of Chl.com difficulties
in agriculture and industrial production will continue
to make highly desirable a breakthrough in the nuclear
field for the regime's prestige abroad and for inter-
nal effect.
On the whole, Asian views on nuclear affairs
are characterized by vast ignorance and strong
emotionalism. As to knowledge, Australia, New Zealand,
India and Japan are exceptions to this generality
because of their educational systems and programs
for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Strong
SECRET
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t
Strong and vocal popular movements, particular-
ly in Japan and India, oppose the deployment of nuclear
weapons and support "S= the Bomb" movements.
For the most part, public as well as govern-
mental attitudes in Asia toward nuclear weapons are
surcharged with strong negative overtones.
From the point of view of an Asian already
apprehensive about a powerful and aggressive Com-
munist China, the acnievement by an Asian country
of a nuclear weapons capability will have dramatic
repercussions. Perhaps even more than the effect
of Soviet space successes, evidence of a Chicom
atomic capability, however small, is bound to have
an impact upon Asian estimates of Communist Cnina's
scientific and technological prowess.
The further a country is removed from the borders
of Communist China, the less chance t,iere seems to
be of panic or precipitate policy shifts.
The imponderables of estimating Asian reactions
to a Chicom nuclear test are extreme. Broadly
speaking there may be three categories of reaction:
(1)
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(1) an acute concern accompanied by a drive
to seek an accommodation with Peiping.
(2) an opposite reaction of stiffening resistance
to Communist China including a willingness to seek
additional U.S. security assistance.
(3) a short-lived period of acute concern
followed by a return to the status duo ante.
After the initial nuclear detonation, or per-
haps even before, the Chicoms will launch an inten-
sive, large scale propaganda campaign to exploit
the event. They probably will seek to convey the
impression that they are on the verge of becoming
members of the nuclear club; that they are the
first Afro-Asian country to achieve nuclear status;
and that consequently they will soon be in a posi-
tion to dominate Asia militarily.
On a relative basis, there can be little doubt
but that over the long run a Chicom nuclear program
could have a degrading effect on the U.S. political
and military positions in Asia. The U.S. will accord-
ingly be faced with policy problems concerning the
security
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: = a ;; r_, y or , s ,. c~?u sr a e* the deep l ovmen t of
,wc-4s . and concinvencv nuns for mi. i_ tary operations.
".nce 1957. stories have circulated in various
media, principally Jaapaneso, Indian, and American,
to the effect that a Chicom nuclear detonation was
imminent. Such stories are likely, to continue,
especially in Asian Journalistic media.
A Chicom detonation will have an affect on ques-
tions concerning:
l) Chicom representation in the U. N.
(2) recognition policies of various countries
toward Communist China
(3) test ban and disarmament negotiations.
The extent of this effect will depend on pertinent
conditions at the time of detonation.
UU,S, OBJECTIVES: Primary U.S. objectives involved in this subject
fall into two separate categories:
(1) those intended to create through a positive
approach the image of U,S0 and Free World strength
in all fields - militarily. politically, ideologically,
economically, etc.
(2) those intended to counter an image of
Chinese Communist power which might induce awe
or unreasoned rear: to alert Asia without causing
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Specific objectives wtaich might be included
under tae first general category:
(1) to emphasize the diversity, flexibility and
strength of the U.S? deterrent-weapons and delivery
systems.
(2) to enlighten target audiences with tue basic
principles, complexities and problems of a nuclear
program
(3) to reassure all free peoples that we remain
dedicated to their defense if they so desire while
actively seeking ways which will safeguard peace
in their areas.
(4) to appear firm in countering a nuclear
threat to the Free World and flexible in exploring
ways to reduce tae likelihood of nuclear war.
(5) to ensure our subsequent flexibility in
nuclear weapons policy with respect to the structure
and composition both of U.S. forces in the area
and of allied and neutral nations.
(6) to make clear U.S. opposition to the proli-
feration of independent nuclear weapons capabilities.
((7)
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(7) to demonstrate now the threat of Chicom
nuclear power can be met by appropriate local efforts
backed up by U. S. power.
(8) to state and restate U.S. sincere desire
for effective world-wide disarmament and nuclear
test bans which would include and be binding on
Communist China.
Specific objectives which might be included
under the second general category:
(1) to avoid exaggerated fears among Asians
by placing developments in a proper perspective with
regard to the status of Chicom nuclear developments
in relationship to U.S. nuclear capabilities.
(2) to prevent a loss of confidence among U.S.
Asian allies in the value of their relationship to
the U,S0 and to prevent among Asian neutrals a
movement to positions more favorable to Communist
China than taose now existing.
(3) to underline the pointlessness of a primi-
tive independent, national, nuclear capability -
the cost involved. the sacrifices which must be made.
(4)
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to make clear the gap between a nuclear
explosion and an affective nuclear capability.
(5) to exploit disruptive elements of Sino-
Soviet rift which will cast doubt on Chicom ability
to sustain a complex technological program to ICBM
capability.
(6) to contrast the nuclear achievement with
China's grave internal weaknesses.
PCC MENDED PROCEDURES :
X. Pre-Detonation Period:
A.
Immediate Action:
1. Preparation of a UoS. Government statement
for issuance following a Chicom nuclear test.
2. Preparation of a circular instruction to
all U.S. diplomatic missions, selected con-
ulcer establishments and major overseas
military commands which would include the
following components:
a - '-he current intelligence estimate
concerning initial Chicom nuclear detonation
b.- the public posture and rationale which
ULS~ officials abroad should adopt if
Auestionedi
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-xo-scerning this subject at
C . > a ? _ -V, 1%t the interdepartmental
~ c :ct3 euip aced to further the
o wra,