NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS, TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, VICE WILLIAM EGAN COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01089R000100010001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 96
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Report of Proceedings
Hearing held before
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Washington, D. C.
WARD & PAUL
? 410 FIRST ST:RUT, S. E.
WASAINGT014, D. C. 20003
[phone]
Duplication or copying of this transcript
by photographic, electrostatic or other
facsimile means is NOT AUTHORIZED.
Copies available, when authorized by Corn-
miftee, only through Official Reporters.
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CONTENT
STATEMENT OF: PAGE
The Honorable John Tower, A United States Senator
from the State of Texas
George Bush, of Texas 11
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NOMINATION OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS,
TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
VICE WILLIAM EGAN COLBY
411= ONO ???
Monday, December 15, 1975
???
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 o'clock a.m
in Room 1114, ?Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John C.
Stennis (the Chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, McIntyre
Byrd, Hart, Leahy, Thurmond, Tower, Goldwater and Bartlett.
Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Chief Counsel and
Staff Director; W. Clark McFadden, II, Counsel; John T. Ticer,
Chief Clerk; Phyllis A. Bacon, Assistant Chief Clerk; Edward
B. Kenney, Professional Staff Member; John A. Goldsmith, Pro-
fessional Staff Member; Don A. Lynch, Professional Staff Member;
Francis J. Sullivan, Professional Staff Member; Roberta Ujakovic).,
Research Assistant; and Doris E. Connor, Clerical Assistant.
Also present: David Raymond, Assistant to Senator
Symington; Charles Stevenson, Assistant to Senator Culver; Ed
Miller, Assistant to Senator Hart; and Doug Racine, Assistant
to Senator Leahy.
?
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The Chairman. Members of the Committee, the Chairman
proposes that we have a statement from Senator Tower of Texas,
the nominee, Mr. Bush, being from Texas, and then I have a
short statement here as Chairman and I will ask if the gentle-
man from South Carolina has a brief statement, too, a short
statement, and I understand Mr. Bush has a statement that I
have not read, but I will call on him then and then we will
proceed with questions.
We are glad to have our visitors. We are glad to have
the press and radio and television. We will all have to keep
quiet, otherwise it will nullify the cause you have for being
here. That is a mutual undertaking of all of us. I am sure
that all will observe it. It is just the price of staying in
here and that is a very cheap price to pay, especially
when it serves your own purpose.
All right.. Senator Tower, we will be glad to recognize
you, sir, and you have a statement. You may proceed.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN TOWER, A UNITED
STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Senator Tower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a great pleasure for me to be able to present to
this Committee, on which I am proud to serve, my fellow Texan,
George Bush, who has been nominated for the Office of Director
of Central Intelligence. I believe that George Bush is
eminently qualified. He is a native of New England, has a
distinguished war record, got his education at Yale, then
had the eminent good judgment to move to Texas, where he has
spent all of his adult life.
He has been very successful in the areas of petroleum
resources development and drilling, always public spirited
and always involved in public affairs. Re resigned his
corporate responsibilities in 1966 to run for the House of
Representatives. He was re-elected without opposition in 1968.
He has served as the Permanent Representative to the United
Nations. He has served as Chairman of the Republican National
Committee. He has served as United States Liaison to the
Government in Peking.
He has served always in every capacity with great distinc-
tion and he was recognized early in his public career for his
enormous accomplishment of being the first freshman Congressman
to be appointed to the Ways and Means Committee in some 50 years
prior to that time.
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I believe that the fact that he has a good intellect and
good mind, and ability to marshal facts and reduce them to
manageable proportions and draw the appropriate conclusions,
in view of his proven good administrative ability I think that
he has all the equipment necessary to make for this country one
of the most outstanding Directors of Central Intelligence that
we have ever had.
I am therefore pleased and proud to have the opportunity
to present him before the Committee and to urge that the
Committee recommend favorably his confirmation to the Senate.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. Senator Tower, as I
said in the beginning, is a valuable member of our Committee
here. We are glad for him to appear here in his special
capacity.
Senator Jackson is unable to be here this morning but
will be here according to his plans this afternoon.
I do not think that there is any chance to be voting on
this matter today anyway, but I -- due to some who had to be
away, I will just say we will not have voting today. I am
sure that is agreeable to all the group.
Members of the Committee, I have a short statement here
that -- an introductory statement in a way, that I wrote out
on the back of an envelope, so-to-speak. I have another
statement that is partly historical about reviewing the enactmen
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of the original Act. I want to say just a few words here.
My desires and wishes would be that there not be any secret
intelligence agency at all, the CIA, but my judgment and exper-
iences here tell me that we must have such an agency. This is
a new and different concept of government as I see it from
anything we have had heretofore, but soon after the end of
World War II we realized that we must have an intelligence
gathering agency. Much of its work would have to be carried
out in secret. Thus, we enacted as a part of the National
Security Act of 1947, provisions for the creation of this
Agency.
As I said, this statement here is more or less for the
record and for the information of the public at large if .
the media should see fit to use it. Later, with the joining
of NATO and other commitments, and I was here when these things
happened, we were further convinced that such an agency,
properly managed, was not only necessary but was very apt and
useful in carrying out those commitments which were considered
a part of our own national security, and in spite of some bad
things that have happened along from time to time in different
administrations, I know as a fact that the CIA has rendered
some very valuable services to our Government, to our national
security.
Now, our Government, and this includes the Chief Executive
and at least a major segment of the Legislative Branch, must
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have the benefit of what is going on in other countries, be they
friendly or unfriendly. It is actually frightening to me to
think of any President trying to proceed without intelligence
of the nature that I have mentioned. Of necessity that power
is given to this Agency under law and is placed largely in the
hands of the Chief Executive, whoever he may be.
First, through these hearings, we can emphasize the absolut
necessity of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief
Executive of the Nation of this special power and of the care
and personal attention the President must give to this special
and exceptional power and also give to the individuals that he
selects to act for him under this law. And I hope these hearing
will emphasize that point. That is a fact of life that we know
now that we did not know when the Act was originally passed.
It is a fact that the funds that. Congress appropriates for
this special Agency are placed directly in the hands of the
President of the United States. In the final analysis he is
the one that directs the Agency in the use of these funds.
Further, there must be a surveillance by the Congress of
the exercise of the power given and the funds provided to a
President, any President. This system of surveillance must be
mocked out and carried out more intensively in the future than
in the past.
Again I mention these points now just to make clear that
even though changes in the law and the system are needed, as I
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see it, proposed changes are not now the main focal point of
these hearings. They are relevant and, of course, the question
will be in order, but changes in the law or the system would
require hearings quite extensive indeed. That is my belief,
that extensive hearings planned for that purpose would be held
on any major change of the law. The chief focal point of our
hearings beginning today relate to the nominee, the Honorable
George Bush of Texas. Mr. Bush is a gentleman that so far as
I know has an honorable public career, a man of capacity and
integrity. These matters and others are all placed in issue
by his nomination. I believe this Committee wants to make a
full examination of his character, his integrity, his capabil-
ities and other qualifications that pertain to the duties
of the Director and related matters.
I have a further statement, members of the Committee, that
is just more or less historical as to the law that I would like
to place in the record at this point, together with a biographi-
cal sketch of Mr. Bush.
(The prepared statement of Senator Stennis, together with
biographical information on Mr. Bush follows:)
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All right, Mr. Bush. We are glad to have you here. You
have been before Committees of the Senate before. I remember
one in particular, and we are glad to have you, sir, and you
do have a prepared statement you told me a few minutes ago,
and the members have it here.
Senator Thurmond, our valuable ranking member of our
Committee, I want to recognize him now. Senator?
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bush, I am very interested in the work of the CIA.
I have been very concerned over what has been happening in
this country, the attitude of some people towards the CIA and
the other intelligence gathering agencies of our Government.
In fighting a war one of the most important things is
known as the G-2. The G-2 is a man who collects intelligence
on the enemy. In peacetime, if our President is going to make
wise decisions, he must have intelligence, he must have knowledg
he must have information as to what is going on in different
parts of the world and especially with regard to potential
enemies.
If you are confirmed to this position, it is my sincere
hope that you will not have your ardor lessened in the least
because of this investigation of the CIA and other intelligence
agencies. We have three members, I believe, of this Committee
who are on that Committee -- Senator Tower, Senator Goldwater,
'and Senator Hart. In my judgment, it is extremely important,
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regardless of what some of the big newspapers say and news media
of every kind say, that you dedicate yourself to gathering the
information that the President of the United States needs
because he cannot act wisely unless he has it. It is vital
to our survival in my judgment. And I just hope that in the
performance of your duties you will not be discouraged in the
least by the actions of some people, especially some news media
in this Nation.
In looking over your biography, I notice you are well
educated. You graduated from Yale, Phi Beta Kappa. You were
an athlete, in varsity baseball, I believe, three years, captain
of the team. You went into the service at age 18, became an
ensign, served three or four years in the Navy, was shot down
in combat, awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, and three
Air Medals, all of which to me is impressive. It is impressive
to me because you have served your country in uniform and you
have been acknowledged by your country as being worthy of
decorations.
Then you have held important positions -- Congressman from
Texas I believe three terms, Permanent Representative of the
United States to the United Nations, Chairman of the Republican
National Committee, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Peking, People's
Republic of China.
I was impressed, too -- it may sound like a little thing
but it shows a part of a man, an important part, I think -- the
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fact that you served as the Chairman of the Texas Heart Fund
and that you serve as Lifetime Trustee at Phillips Academy,
and Community Associate, Lovett College, Rice University.
I think all of this shows an, interest on your part in
humanity, in civic development, love of your country, willingnes
to serve your fellowman. From your experience and your intellec
tual integrity, the reputation you bear for honesty, it seems
to me that from all of this experience and your personal qualiti
that you are well qualified to fill this important position,
and speaking for myself I shall be very pleased to support you.
The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. If it is agreeable
with the Committee -- thanks, Senator -- we will proceed now
with Mr. Bush.
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STATEMENT OF GEORGE BUSH, OF TEXAS
Mr. Bush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Committee. Particular thanks to my fellow Texan, Senator Tower.
I am pleased to be back in the United States. I am still'on
Peking Standard Time so I am a little tired and I hope you will
forgive me, Mr. Chairman.
My nomination was sent to this Committee some time ago
but I was unable to leave China prior to the President's trip
to the People's Republic. The President left Peking on December
5 and Mrs. Bush and I left on December 7.
I recognize that I am being nominated as Director of the
CIA at a very complicated time in the history of this Agency,
and indeed in the history of our country. In fact, having been
in China for a year, I did not fully realize the depth of the
emotions surrounding the CIA controversy until I came back here.
But be that as it may, I have a few fundamental views that I
would like to set out in the brief statement and then, sir,
I will be happy to respond as frankly, as honestly as I can to
any of your questions.
First, my views on intelligence. I believe in a strong
intelligence capability for the United States. My more than
three years in two vital foreign affairs posts, plus my attendin
Cabinet meetings for four years, plus my four years in Congress,
make me totally convinced that we must see our intelligence
capability certainly maintained and I would say strengthened.
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We must not see the CIA dismantled.
Reporting and investigative reporting in the papers and
investigative work proper by the Senate and the House have
brought to light some abuses that have taken place over a long
period of time. Clearly things were done that were outrageous.
Some of them were morally offensive. And these must not be
repeated and I will take every step to see that they are not
repeated.
I understand that Director Colby has already issued direc-
tives that implement some of the decisions of the Rockefeller
Commission, decisions designed to safeguard against abuses.
If confirmed, I will do all in my power to keep informed persona
ly, to demand to the highest ethical standards from those with
whom I work, and particularly to see that this Agency stays in
foreign, I repeat, foreign, intelligence business.
I am told that morale at the CIA and indeed in other
parts of the .intelligence community is low. This must change
and I an going to do my best to help change it. Some people
today are driven to wantonly disclose sensitive information --
not talking here about the Congress -- not to the proper over-
sight authorities of the Congress but to friend and foe alike
around the world. In many instances this type of disclosure
can wipe out effective operations, can endanger the lives of
patriot Americans and can cause enormous damage to our security.
I view the job of Director of Central Intelligence not
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as a maker of foreign policy but as one who should forcefully
and objectively present to the President and to the National
Security Council the findings and views of the intelligence
community.
It is essential that these recommendations be without
political tilt.
It is essential that strongly held differences within this
very large community be presented. It is essential that without
regard to existing policy or future policy; the intelligence
estimates be presented -- cold, hard, truthful.
I am convinced that I have the proper access to the
President that was strongly emphasized in the recent Murphy
Commission Report. I hope you find gentlemen, that I have the
proper integrity and character to do this job.
Further, I see running of the CIA as very important, but
I see the responsibility for coordinating all of our foreign
intelligence activities as even more important. The CIA has
a fundamental input into intelligence estimates, but so must
the other agencies.
I will be fair to all, but I will do my level best to
eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and minimize inter-
agency bureaucratic disputes. It will not be easy, I am told,
but I will try hard on this.
Now, Mr. Chairman, a word about my personal qualifications.
I am familiar with the charges, very familiar with them, that I
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am too political for this job. Here is my side of the story.
Yes, I have been in politics. I served four years in
Congress. I served two years as Chairman of my party and I
have no apology for either service. Indeed, I am proud to have
served in partisan politics.
Some of the difficulties the CIA has encountered might have
been avoided if more political judgment had been brought to bear
And I am not talking about narrow political partisanship. I am
talking about the respect for the people and their sensitivities
that most politicians have a real feel for and understand. I
do not view political experience as a detriment, Mr. Chairman.
I view it as an asset, but I also recognize the need to leave
politics behind the minute I take on the new job if this Senate
confirms me.
And I would like to add, if confirmed I will take no part,
directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity of
any kind. I will not attend any political meetings. I will
give no political speeches nor make any political contributions.
My ability to shut politics off when serving in non-partisa
jobs has been demonstrated in two highly sensitive foreign
affairs posts, as I hope this Committee can verify.
For two years I was AmbasSador at the United Nations, and
for a little over a year I served as Chief of the U.S. Liaision
Office in Peking.v Both jobs taught me a lot about the product
of our intelligence community. Both taught me the fundamental
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importance of retaining an intelligence community second to none
Frankly, many of our friends around the world and some
who are not friendly are wondering what we are doing to ourselve
as a nation as they see attacks on the CIA. Some must wonder
if they can depend on us to protect them if they cooperate with
us on important intelligence projects.
I think many admire our ability, and justifiably so, to
cleanse ourselves and admit mistakes. But in something as
sensitive as intelligence they frankly hope that we do not go
so far that we will kill off an important asset that they them-
selves and the free world vitally need for their own security.
In addition to my foreign affairs assignments, I attended
Cabinet meetings from 1971 to 1974. Those four years gave me
I think a good insight into some of the foreign policy considera
tions facing our country.
I think this foreign affairs background will be useful
in my new job.
I also feel the administrative experience' that I had in
starting and running a business enterprise, which prospered,
will be helpful.
Now, lastly I will address myself to a question that is
on the minds of some members of this Committee. It is on the
minds of many people in the United States who are not on this
Committee, and I believe from reading the newspapers it is on
the minds of many people who are responsible for the editorial
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contact with many of the readers of newspapers, and that is
mainly the question of my having been considered in the past
for the post of -- the position of Vice President of the United
States.
When Secretary Rumsfeld was before this Committee not so
long ago, his name having been speculated on for Vice President,
he said "It is presumptuous of me to stand up and take myself
out of consideration for something I am not in consideration for
The Committee accepted this answer than and I offer it now.
But let me just add a little bit more here.
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If some individual or group comes forward promoting me for
Vice President when I am Director of CIA, I will instruct them,
ask them, to cease such activity.
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But then there is one other question and I decided to get
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it out openly and frankly and I decided the Committee was
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entitled to my frank feelings on this. The question is this.
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"Even if you have not lifted a finger to seek the nomination
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and even if you have actively discouraged others from advocatin
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you for office, and the nomination is then offered to you, will
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you then accept?"
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I cannot in all honesty tell you that I would not accept,
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and I do not think, gentlemen, that any American should be
asked to say he would not accept, and to my knowledge, no one
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in the history of this Republic has been asked to renounce his
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political birthright as the price of .confirmation for any
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office. And I can tell you that I will not seek any office
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while I hold, the job as CIA Director. I will politics totally
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out of my sphere of activities.
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In this new job I serve at the pleasure of the President
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and I plan to stay as long as he wants me to.
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Some of my friends have asked me, "Why do you accept this
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job with all the controversy swirling around the CIA, with its
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obvious barriers to political future?"
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My answer is simple. First, the work is desparately
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important to the survival of this country and to the survival
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of freedom around the world. And second, old fashioned as it
may seem to some, it is my duty to serve my country. And I did
not seek this job but I want to do it and I will do my very
best.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right, Mr. Bush. You have made a very
impressive statement here.
On this Vice Presidential matter, I am glad you covered
that. I did not know that you were but I 'am glad you covered
it. And I say with all deference to all former Directors of
this agency, it is a difficult job. If I thought that you were
seeking the Vice Presidential nomination or Presidential nomi-
nation. by way of the route of being Director of the CIA, I
would question your judgment most severely.
(Laughter)
That I would not vote to approve you on the basic judgment
and basic qualifications, because as I see it, this would be
the very opposite of preparation for aspirations or planning,
either one of those offices. Others may see that differently
but that is the way I see it and politically it is almost as
impossible a job as being Mayor of New York City, for instance,
and I say that with deference to Mayor Beame and others.
I think, too, personally as I see citizenship, you have
gone as far as a man should go in declarations. People jump
us, view anything as not being considered. Of course, as far
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as you know, our political system is contrary to a man
renouncing every other office or any other office unless he has
a personal desire to.
Now, you have answered most of the questions that I have
and I questioned in the beginning -- by the way I want to say
to the Committee that these two nominations came over either
together or one followed the other, Mr. Rumsfeld and Mr. Bush,
and discussing the question of the hearings, I just told them,
well, we would take up Secretary of Defense first. I understoo
Mr. Schlesinger was leaving before that week was out, and
Mr. Colby was going to stay on. And they said then that you
were in China and would have to remain there some time at least
and that when you got back and you got acclamated a little,
let the Committee know, and this is the way this thing happened
about it being delayed.
I was first concerned that we might not be here this
week but found out we were and most likely all of the week. So
we set it at this time.
Now, to go to your background, Mr. Bush, in preparation
for this very difficult assignment, I wish you would state a
little more about the experiences you had that relate to these
duties. For instance, NATO and how long you were there and
something about your contacts there, the feel of things, and
*then your experiences in China without making disclosures of
intimate things, of course, but you have a background that few
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men have that come to this office. Enlarge on that some, pleas
Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman, at the United Nations where I was
the Permanent Representative for two years, I came into
contact -- in those days I think there were 134 member nations,
and now it is 148 or 145, and I felt then, and I will elaborate
on that when I come to China, that in spite of the rhetoric in
that place, much of it hostile to the United States, particu-
larly because the United Nations is getting to be more and more
group oriented -- the African group, the Latin American
group -- there is an Arab group -- and I think for those
members who have served there from the Foreign Affairs Committe
Foreign Relations Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, they
find that member countries they can talk to individually will
tell them one thing, but in groups, their group positions, no
nation seems to want to stand up and.depart from them.
My observation, based on bilateral contacts, is that many
countries whom we might assume were hostile to us from group
statements are really friendly to us. I took a trip in 1972,
I believe it was, to nine or ten African countries for the
President and when you got into a bilateral basis, I found that
most of these countries individually were extremely interested
in seeing the United States stay strong and in seeing -- we did
not get into the intelligence question but in linking the
'United States to their freedom or to their right to exist
independent of others.
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In China, that was a very different experience and that
experience put me in touch with the largest country in the
world. It put me in touch with very, very powerful and strong-
willed principled leaders. I saw more clearly then through
their eyes and through the eyes of my diplomatic colleagues,
the importance of being strong as a nation, with particular
regard to the possible problems that can emerge from the Soviet
Union.
And the diplomatic community there again reflected the
same thing I experienced in the United Nations, sometimes in
group enforcing positions of their goverments that I was not
particularly happy about, but then on a bilateral basis
encouraging us to stay strong as a nation.
So without going further, I will be glad to be responsive
in more detail on it, and I think these three years in foreign
affairs convinced me that we are the only hope of the free
world. There is no other one. None at all in this world. And
we have got to be strong militarily, but to do it we have got
to understand the threat. We have got to utilize intelligence
and it has happened since history began and we must keep and
strengthen our intelligence capability, and having said that,
I repeat I am not condoning any of the excesses of the past.
Indeed, I pledge myself to do what I can to see that they are
eliminated.
That is a very general answer, sir.
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The Chairman. Well, it has been my observation in the
case of other nominees who undertook this job that as a minimum
it takes 12 months of intensive application, intensive applica-
tion, to get on top of the job, so to speak, to get the feel
of it, the many angles, the ramifications. These are worldwide
as you know. Certainly domestic too.
Are you willing to put in that -- whatever intensive
application is necessary just to get on top of it, so to speak?
Have you thought --
Mr. Bush. Mr. Chairman --
The Chairman. Have you thought that out?
Mr. Bush. I have thought it out. I am committed to it.
I hope that my record reveals I am not opposed to hard work.
Indeed I have done it since I can remember and I certainly will
make that commitment and I plan -- I have no other plans. My
plan is to get In there. There is an awful lot of learning to
be done. I have been back here a week and have not had access
to much of the classified information even now, and probably
that is better until this Senate disposes of this matter one wa
or another, but I promise you, sir, that I will set an example
out there in terms of hours, in terms of hard work, that I
think this Committee will be proud of. And I have done it
before and I am prepared to do it again.
The Chairman. Well, I ask every nominee this question
just in simple terms. Now, boiled down, why do you agree for
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your name to be submitted and you undertake this job?
Mr. Bush. I have a -- I hope you understand this one. I
have a sense of obligation to this country. I am one who is
old fashioned in the sense that I think duty and obligation to
serve still should be inculcated into every son and every
daughter of every father, and I feel. strongly about it. My
foreign affairs experience has taught me the absolute essen-
tiality of this work and it is for -- the reason that it is no
more complicated than that.
Mr. Chairman, I did not seek this job. I was riding my
bicycle in Peking, coming home from church. A messenger came
up and said, say, there is news for you back there. I went
back there, held up this telegram, and it was out of a cold
clear blue China sky that this thing descended on me. And I
thought about it, not long, thought about it and decided as I
think maybe your opening comments, there is nothing in this
politically for me. It is my obligation to my country and I
just hope I can convince those who cannot accept that because
maybe they do not know that to me that is what motivated me and
I think my reply to the President of the United States when I
sent it back reflected that.
The Chairman. All right.
You did not volunteer. They just volunteered you.
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
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Senator Thurmond?
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions
here that can be answered for the record and save time. I am
very pleased with the statement Mr. Bush has made here and I
suggest that he answer these questions for the record.
Mr. Bush. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Senator.
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, this is a very impressive statement in my
opinion that you have made. Based on the remarks that have
been made already, it looks to me as if you are already con-
firmed. But I would like to ask you a couple of questions and
make some comments.
The first one is that I think a.strong economy and a sound
dollar is just.as important to the national security as any-
thing else., Without an economy that is viable, this country
could not preserve its system. You would agree to that, would
you not?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Well, I thought you would based on
your record and your experience which has been extensive. I
do not think I know of any man your age who has had more
experience in government. Much of the criticism of the CIA,
it is as clear as light to me, is the fault of Congress, not
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just the people working for the CIA. This Committee -- and I
have been on the Committee, the Subcommittee on the CIA for
perhaps 15 years, it has never really looked into the CIA which
it should do if it wants to have the obligation.
As perhaps the greatest industrialist I ever knew said,
if a man thinks he is being watched, it is just about as good
as watching him. And the Central Intelligence Agency has known
for many years that in effect it was not being watched. And I
hope that you will do in this job what was done in the Atomic
Energy Act. It was very difficult for me to get any real
interest in this Committee for a long time in the development
?of nuclear weapons and it was very difficult in the Foreign
Relations Committee to get any knowledge of nuclear weapons.
It was like trying to pull teeth.
So I went on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee where under
the law it is the obligation of the Atomic Energy Committee to
keep the Joint Committee informed and I found out more about
atomic weapons in a few weeks than I had in the previous 20
years, even though I had served 20 years already on this Com-
mittee even though I think the Backfire and the Cruise missile
are the two most important considerations, especially the
latter, from the standpoint of the future of your children and
my grandchildren.
So I would hope that you would agree that even if you
were not questioned, that you would come before this Committee
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and volunteer anything that you thought was wrong in the way of
actions that were being asked of you, or that you were con-
sidering from the standpoint of what is best for the country.
Would you do that?
Mr. Bush. Senator Symington, I hope that I -- I know that
my experience in Congress has taught me great respect for it,
and I am confident that I could cooperate fully with the proper
oversight committees in that regard. And I would.
Senator Symington. That is not a direct answer, but I
would hope --
Mr. Bush. The answer is yes.
Senator Symington. I would hope you would. That is a
direct answer. And I appreciate it very much.
The reason I say that is that with one exception, one
conspicuous exception, the estimate of what the enemy had by
the CIA was invariably lower when it came to ground power than
that given to the Committee by the Army, and the estimate by
the -- the original estimate always before the massaging took
place was the same with respect to the Navy and the Air Force,
and there are some of us who believe that most of what we buy
is necessary for the security of the United States, and much of
what we buy is not necessary and that directly affects the
economy.
So I would hope you would come to us -- as I understand,
you report directly to the President of the United States, do
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you not?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, and the National Security Council,
but I have --
Senator Symington. The National Security Council is
merely an advisory body to the --
Mr. Bush. President.
Senator Symington. -- to the President, and I would hope
that -- I have had two positions myself on the National
Security Council in the past and with all due respect to the
National Sdcurity Council, what I want to know is if President
Ford will give you direct access to him.
Mr. Bush. One of the -- Senator Symington, that has -- I
did ask that in the acceptance and it was agreed to.
Senator Symington. I am very glad of that.
The Chairman. Pardon me, Senator.
You did ask --
Mr. Bush. I made clear before -- as a matter of fact, as
a provisal of acceptance of the job -- that I would have direct
access to the President and the President agreeed to that,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That was not clear.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Some years ago, about four or five, two of the ablest
investigators that I know went around the world, as a matter
of fact. They were primarily interested in uncovering the
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covert operations in Laos. But on going back they looked over
various things and they said that the duplication and waste of
intelligence in the Mediterranean was the most they had ever
seen anywhere, anyplace, any time. You had the CIA, you had th
DIA, you had the NSA, you had the ONI, you had Air Force
intelligence and Army intelligence. You also had a setup in
the State Department under a former Deputy Director of CIA.
So you had -- and everybody was collecting everything.
Much of it, if not most of it, was not being read and the
taxpayers were paying for all of it.
With your background, would you be interested in looking
into that? I would hope you would. After all, you are the
number one agency in intelligence in the government, even thoug
you only get a small fraction of the total intelligence dollar.
Mr. Bush. Senator Symington, I certainly would. I cannot
tell you at this time that I know exactly where the major
points of duplication are. I know enough about the job now to
know that as the Director of Central Intelligence that you do
have some responsibilities, major responsibilities, though in
some places not total authority for coordination, but as I
implied in my statement or stated in my statement, I viewed
that responsibility as terribly important and I will do my best
to eliminate duplication, though I noticed that previous
Directors testifying here indicated that in some cases duplica-
tion of getting a new look at analyses, say, from DIA, CIA,
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could be helpful. But that is not what you are talking about.
You are talking about waste and I will do my best to eliminate
that.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Somebody mentioned the Mayor of New York. A prominent
banker said if the truth was actually known the condition of
the federal government from the standpoint of assets versus
liabilities, and so forth, was far worse off than the city of
New York. The only difference is that the people in Washington
have printing presses. That was said by a prominent banker
who I happen to know you know well, and I think there is merit
in that observation.
Now, just one more line of questioning. An article came
in written by General Graham, and I will read you what -- just
one paragraph from this article, and, Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that it be made a part of the record at this
point.
The Chairman. All right. Without objection the article
will be included in the record.
(The material referred to follows:)
COMMITTEE INSERT
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Senator Symington. This article said:
"If the military profession loses its role in describing
these threats to national security it surrenders much of its
influence in decisions about military strategy, military force
structure and the nature of its own armaments. We have in the
past 10 years come perilously close to losing this vital role.
The impact of the intelligence views of the Department of
Defense was progressively weakened between 1960 and 1970 and
the voice of civilian agencies in all facets of military intel-
ligence became progressively more dominant. The military
budgets carried the onus of heavy outlays for intelligence
collection but the key intelligence judgments derived from this
costly effort were for the most part made in other agencies."
I was involved in the creation of the National Security
Council. I doubt if there is more than one person in a 100
in this room that remembers the name of the first Director of
the CIA. But the Agency was, in my opinion, created as much in
the thinking of Secretary Forrestal as that of anybody because
although he was very pro-military, he realized that there must
be some brake on the various demands of the various services
for the various new weapons systems that were being proposed
by various people, and so forth and so on.
?And when I read that the gentleman who made this statement
Was being taken over by the Central Intelligence Agency that
worried me, so I called up the Director of the Central
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Intelligence Agency and asked him if he knew about this speech.
because it worried me. He said, have you read the speech? I
said, no, just the record. And so he said, well, if you read
the speech, I do not think you would feel that way about it.
So I read the speech and then wrote the Director of the
CIA, the Honorable James R. Schlesing:
"Dear Jim, as you can see by the attached, I have read
the article in detail and have extracted certain statements
made hopefully not out of context. At the end of the article
as presented he states, and I quote, 'there is no longer a need
in my judgment to duplicate DIA's efforts in other agencies.'"
As you know, the Defense Intelligence Agency is part of
the military setup.
"Especially in this article, and the fact that he is
going to work for you in the Central Intelligence Agency have
created much comment down here. I would hope we would get
together soon re same. Sincerely."
And then I put in a long-hand note, "specifically where
does this leave the CIA?" The second paragraph which I just
read tO you.
To my surprise, and I think it is fair to say to my
regret, this letter was dated April 13, 1973, and a few days
or weeks later Mr. Schlesinger went over as Director of the --
Secretary of Defense. One of the first things he did was to
take this gentleman back into the Pentagon and make him the
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Director, make him the head of the DIA. And to me that was
rather questionable from the standpoint of what the man had
written in a talk if he was sincere in his opinions.
Now, what I am getting at is this. You will feel entirely
independent of anybody, but your own mind, based on your own
experience when you analyze what this country needs for its
national security. Am I correct in that?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. I am very -- I am very pleased that
you have taken that position. I accept, knowing you and your
family for a great many years, I accept every statement that
you have made today as accurate. I think you are extremely
well qualified for the position and if you will stick to your
guns as you have said you would this morning, I see no reason
why you cannot make an outstanding success in this position.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Tower, did you have any questions?
Senator Tower. No, I defer --
The Chairman. Senator Goldwater?
Senator Goldwater. George, I think in -- I do not have
any questions but because there is a strong possibility that
you might be asked about Vice Presidential intentions by one
member who is a Candidate and another one who might be, I
thought it might help if one who has been through that track,
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around that track, I might make a few comments on it. I agree
completely with your statement. You say, "I don't think any
American should be asked to say he would not accept."
And I do not think any American would. I do not mind
telling you that I recommended that you be Vice President to
Mr. Nixon and again to Mr. Ford. To your advantage they saw
differently than I did.
Now, Vice Presidents are not selected in the committee
room of the Armed Services. Maybe the way we do it is not the
way it should be done. I do not think it is. It may not be
the best, but usually some hotel room is the meeting place and
I remember in 1956 when Mr. Nixon was picked in a hotel room
in Chicago. Then in 1960 another hotel when Mr. Lodge was
picked.
In my case I forget whether it was my room in a hotel or
somebody else's room, but I called on the members of the
Congress and asked who they would like me to name as Vice
President and they gave me the name of Bill Miller.
In 1968 in a hotel room in Florida, the Fontainebleu, I
believe it was --
Senator Tower. Hilton.
Senator Goldwater. What?
Senator Tower. Hilton.
Senator Goldwater. I forget where it was. It was so
damned many years ago.
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From about 1:00 o'clock in the morning to about 5:00
o'clock in the morning we met with Mr. Nixon and he finally
said, could you live with Mr. Agnew? So that is the way this
job is going to be chosen and it is not going to be done here
and I hope none of our members bedevil you about whether you
will or will not because you might ask them the question who
asked you to run for President. And that would be a good
point. Do not ask me.
I just want to tell you, George, it is a real pleasure to
have you here. I know Senator Symington, your father and I
all started service in the Senate at the same time, and you
follow all the fine traditions of your father and the only
mistake you have ever made is moving to Texas.
(Laughter)
The Chairman. All right.
Thank you,. Senator.
All right. Senator MacIntyre?
Senator MacIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I started to think of what to do with this nomination,
I am reminded how it was that we seemed to get all the real
difficult ones here. The key issue is, of course, the
political background that you have already achieved. In your
courtesy call to me, Mr. Bush, you stressed that your political
background should be considered as an asset, especially when
contrasted or measured against the performance of some CIA
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career men. I have to admit this position does have some appeal
But there is another strong and reasonable position that says
that no one with your political background and past should be
considered. That goes on to say that the FBI and the CIA are
two posts in Washington that have to be considered differently
than Cabinet posts.
Those positions, like the Supreme Court, should be
insulated completely from politics and if -- if you agree with
this opinion, then no matter how good you are, you are
disqualified.
There is another position, too, as you tried to figure out
what to do with a George Bush's distinguished career, ability,
everything that one could hope for, and that is that a poli-
tician should not be automatically disqualified if he possesses
the other necessary qualities. And certainly, Mr. Ambassador,
it would be beneficial to have someone who is sensitive to the
public and who understands the concepts of accountability to
the people.
However, is it appropriate to have someone with a clear
political background at this time in the history of the CIA?
Public confidence in the CIA must be at a low point now after
Watergate and the revelations of political abuses in past
administrations.
Now, as a firm believer in the importance of the CIA and
the necessity of its legitimate functions, I do not want to
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see the agency further weakened by the appointment of a person
who is perceived, whether rightly or wrongly, by the public as
a political person.
Thus, at this particular or peculiar time in the history
of the CIA, the question that hits me is this. Is it
appropriate to app6int someone like you, Ambassador George
Bush, with a distinguished career? Is it? And I would
appreciate your reaction to this middle position, this third
position, that you could not, should not be disqualified if you
have the other characteristics, but at this time in history,
what are the perceptions going to be out there in the great,
wide, mid-United States?
Mr. Bush. Senator MacIntyre, it is my view that there
should be one criterion. I am not trying to tell you how to
run your business, but I think there should be one criterion.
If you accept that my foreign affairs background has been
conducted without political favor, and if you accept the
premise that it does not hurt to have been involved in politics
not wholly partisan but so you have a feeling for the people,
then it seems to me that I think if I tried to put myself in
your shoes that I would not be concerned about appearance.
That is what editorials-say.
But does this man have the character? Does he have the
, integrity to do this job? And if you have a reservation in
your mind about that, I understand you are voting it down right
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now, but if you do not, I would find it difficult for you to
say, George, you are qualified, you have the background, you
have the ability, you have the political feel, but you are
disqualified because other people will not think it is all
right.
So that would be my answer to that question, sir, and I
hope you find I do have it and I hope you find that in two
rather sensitive jobs -- the minute I walked into them,
politics was put behind me. You put that United Nations
mission -- 104 people -- I do not think you will find any one
of them saying I did anything to politicize. What I think,
sitting here blowing my own horn, what I did was lift the
morale in the place and although there were understandable
reservations about my qualifications when I went there, I
think some of your colleagues that served with me and the
others would say that this guy did a good job.
So I would hope you would put emphasis on my ability to
do it because I understand there is this appearance. I just
do not think this Committee should knuckle under to appearance
if indeed I have the qualifications.
So I would ask to be judged on integrity and character as
opposed to how somebody else might view a job.
Senator MacIntyre. Let me ask you one very sizeable,
mean question that I would not think of asking of a similar
appointee five years ago, but in view of history, let me ask
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you this question.
You said you were riding a bicycle in Peking when you
suddenly got word, when a messenger in the Embassy called you.
You did not seek this appointment. I know you told me, and I
do not think I am giving off anything that is secret, but as
you looked at it, you felt that if the President wanted you to
take this vital position, that your sense of duty to the countr
and to the President was paramount and you accepted it.
Now, let us assume you are appointed. Let us assume we
are moving three or four months down the campaign trail, that
you are not going to be impervious to. You are going to read
the papers about it, I know.
What if somehow you get a call from the President next
July or August, George, I would like to see you. You go in the
White House. He takes you over in the corner and he says, look
things are not going too good in my campaign. This Reagan is
gaining on me all the time. Now, he is a movie star of some
renown. He traveled with the fast set, I guess, I do not know,
maybe it was a slow set. He was a Hollywood star. I want you
to get any dirt you can on this guy because I need a jolt.
Now, what are you going to do and what can you do and
where would you go? Now, I may have asked the question poorly,
but I am trying to say what if something miserable like this
came right on your chin?
Mr. Bush. I do not think that is difficult, sir. I would
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simply say but that gets back to character and it gets back to
integrity, and furthermore, I cannot conceive of the incumbent
doing that sort of thing, but if I were put into that kind of
position where you had a clear moral issue, I would simply say
no because you see I think, and maybe -- and I have the
advantages as everyone on this committee of 20-20 hindsight,
that this agency must stay in the foreign intelligence business
and must not harrass American citizens, and Operation CHAOS,
and that these kinds of things have no business in the foreign
intelligence business, and under my leadership they will not
have, and so that causes me no problem whatsoever because, as
I have said, and I really believe I am putting politics behind
me on this, and again we get back, Senator MacIntyre, to my
being able or not able to convince you of that.
That is the main thing. And then if I can, then you shoul
no longer be troubled by that kind of -- I understand you are
raising it but I think if I have got it, you should not be
troubled by it.
Senator MacIntyre. But your answer is you would say no,
Mr. President.
Mr. Bush. That I would --
Senator MacIntyre. That is it.
Mr. Bush. I would say no, Mr. President. Yes, sir.
Senator Macintyre. I think somehow, Mr. Chairman, in this
law when the CIA Director is asked to do something like that he
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should report it to the U.S. Senate because as you may or may
not know, in almost the same fashion this was done and the
CIA Deputy Director agreed with the telephone call because he
said he knew it was the President of the United States talking.
That is why I asked the miserable question.
I cannot conceive that you would do it.
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator MacIntyre. But I do think because I talked to
one of the former Directors just recently, and he said, Tom, I
had no place to go.
I do not know how that true that is, but he said so.
Thank you very much. I will give you every consideration.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Bartlett, you are next.
Senator Bartlett. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
There has been a lot of talk about different approaches
and vehicles to be established -- oversight capabilities over
the CIA. How would you welcome much closer oversight as a
means that you meet your goals and do a better job?
Mr. Bush. Senator Bartlett --
The Chairman. Pardon me just a minute.
Mr. Bush. I heard the question, Mr. Chairman.
My view on that matter, Senator Bartlett, is that is a
matter for the Senate to determine, whatever the oversight
, responsibilities should be. One of the recommendations of the
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Rockefeller Commission was some kind of a joint -- a joint
committee and all I can tell you is that I will closely cooper-
ate with whatever authority is set up for the Senate, the House
of joint, whatever is determined by the Congress, but I have no
hesitancy in saying that I will cooperate. I am sure there wil
be times, very frankly, when there could be differences as to
what may be disclosed, but I will cooperate to the best of my
ability with whatever oversight authorities are in existence no
and with whatever oversight authorities the Congress decides on
for the future.
Senator Bartlett. What I was getting at, with your back-
ground in Congress, do you feel it would be helpful in
achieving the goals of CIA to have committees better informed
than they have been in the past on a continuing basis?
Mr. Bush. I do, sir. And I would approach my job in that
manner.
Senator Bartlett. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned on page
of your statement, "Many of our friends around the world and
some who are not so friendly are wondering what we are doing
to ourselves as a nation as they see attacks on the CIA."
Where do you think the line should be drawn in the
investigations presently going on?
Mr. Bush. Well, it is a very hard question because I have
been gone and have not watched all the details. Certainly I
have no: problems with the Congressional investigations per se.
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This is the prerogative of the Senate. It is the prerogative
of the House. They ought to do it.
I was somewhat alarmed when I turned on a television
program the other night and saw some individual on a British
program wantonly disclosing names of corporations that had
cooperated with the CIA. I do not find that useful to our
security and intelligence or anything else. I have no detailed
knowledge of what these organizations do. I just do not have
that. I have not been briefed on that. ?But I just have the
feeling that there is some -- pick up Playboy magazine and read
a -- which I do not do very often, Senator Bartlett --
(Laughter)
And read a detailed expose naming names of CIA agents
which could endanger their families, possibly. I would have to
look into it more to make that charge. But I do not like that.
I think those kinds of things confuse our friends and delight
those who would like to know a great deal more about our intel-
ligence.
So in this statement I just wanted to get it out there.
There are some people that feel differently about it. I think
you need a balance between disclosure to the public and what I
would consider wanton disclosure that does not work in the
interests of the United States.
Senator Bartlett. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to say I
' applaud what you have said about the comments that have been
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made in your direction concerning your Chairmanship of the
Republican party and your being a politician. I think there
can be real hypocrisy involved in such attacks.
I think that politicians are like other professions or
other people, that they can be good or bad or in the middle, an
I think a person should be judged on his own character and his
own abilities and he could have been or could not have been a
politician and meet the test.
So I really applaud you on that because I think that we
could not have people who wanted to serve in whatever capacity
they might be asked, or they wanted to be available to do their
best and be unable to do it because of some experiences in the
past that were perfectly fine and honorable but were so-called
political. So I commend you very much.
Mr. Bush. Thank you.
Senator Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.
Gentlemen, it looks to me that you are not using the tele-
vision cameras. I wish you would turn those lights out. It
would save me and perhaps others a headache.
Senator Byrd?
Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We will go to you and then we will turn
them back on.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Bush, we know each other and have had
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an opportunity to talk and know each other's views. I think it
is very important that our country have a strong intelligence
agency. We are spending $90 million on defense. Most of the
members of the Congress feel that is necessary. And indeed it
is in my judgment. So a strong intelligence, it seems to me,
a very important part of the defense mechanism and I know from
talking with you that that is your view as you enunciated here
today.
I think it.is vitally important also that the CIA be
completely divorced from partisan politics, and in reading and
hearing your statement this morning, it seems to me you have
gone about as far as a person can go in that regard. On page
you say, "I recognize the need to leave politics the minute I
take on the new job if confirmed."
And on page 5 you say, "If confirmed, I will take no part,
directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity of
any kind."
And then on page 7 you say, "I will put politics totally
out of my sphere of activities."
So you have gone very far in your
The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. Have seats, please.
Senator Byrd. -- in your statement in that regard.
I have one question which is along the line of Senator
MacIntyre's but is a broader one, I suppose. I assume that if
confirmed, you would not permit the CIA to be used by any
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individual or any groups for partisan political purposes.
Mr. Bush. That is correct, sir.
Senator Byrd. Mr. Chairman, I think the nominee has the
judgment, that he has the ability and that he has the character
to assume this very important position. I was concerned when
it was first announced about the political aspects but in
thinking about it I am convinced that being the type of man
that I know George Bush to be that I do not have that concern
and I think the Chairman brought out a very good point, that if
a person did have political ambitions, this is about the worst
place possible to use as a stepping stone.
Be that as it may, I have no longer any concern about the
nominee's position on these matters, and I shall be glad to
support the nomination.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hart?
Senator. Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, along with Senators Tower and Goldwater,
I have worked for the last 10 and a half months on the Select
Committee having to do with the intelligence community, so I
think those of us who have been involved in that experience fee
very strongly about not just this confirmation but the future
of the intelligence community in this country.
You have said, and I think it is admirable, that "things
were done that were outrageous and morally offensive. These
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must not be repeated and I will take every step possible to see
that they are not."
I would like to probe a little about what steps you would
take to see that they are not.
You have talked, and I think rightly so, about political
insulation but along the lines more of insulating the agency
from your own political background. I am most concerned
frankly about insulating you from the rest of the political
process, particularly in the White House. What those of us on
the Committee have found out is that sometimes the agency was
off on its own, but just as often it was operating under the
direction of political figures of various administrations in
both political parties.
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What steps would you take to insulate yourself from the
wishes of the President to promote his own singular political
purposes or conduct some operation abroad that in your judgment
was not what this country should be doing?
Mr. Bush. Senator, I do not know how one insulates oneself
6
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7
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10
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per se as an answer to the question. I would insist that to
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the degree it was possible, given the timeliness of whatever
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Committee, National Security Council, have the right to act on
19.
these matters.
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familiar with, many of which I am not, and I think there are
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all kinds of ways to be sure that what you do in the final
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analysis is properly recommended. But once it was recommended
25
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you in the final analysis after urging reconsideration or
saying I want 24 hours to present the views of the intelligence
community or the CIA or whatever it is, in the final analysis
you have only one remedy. I think we both know what that is.
Senator Hart. Well, it seems to me --
Mr. Bush. That is to get out.
Senator Hart. -- there is another one. That is to let
the President know where you stand on some of these things
before you go into office because -- so there is no doubt in
his mind how far you are willing to let the CIA go.
Mr. Bush. I accept that, sir, yes, sir.
Senator Hart. Let us probe what you feel to be morally
offensive and outrageous. How do you feel about assassinations?
Mr. Bush. I find them morally offensive and I am pleased
the President has made that position very, very clear to the
Intelligence Committee and I think also Director Colby who I
think knows about this, I know he feels --
The Chairman. Excuse me. What was your question?
Senator Hart. The question was whether, one, a Director
of the CIA can insulate himself from wrong political pressures
by letting the President know the bounds beyond which he will
not go as Director --
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Hart. -- before he takes office.
The Chairman. Yes.
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Mr. Bush. I accept that and I think it is an excellent
suggestion and I would be prepared to do it and I think in
matters that did come up that this be in violation of domestic -
of the rights of citizens in this country, I think if I continue
to emphasize we are talking about foreign intelligence, even
though there are some legitimate, not operations, but things
that must be done domestically by the CIA, in its own security,
?for example, that could help with the problem that understandabl
troubles the citizens in this country.
Senator Hart. Well, I want to get to that but let me
pursue some of the foreign techniques. What about supporting
and promoting military coups d'etat in various countries around
the world?
Mr. Bush. You mean in the covert field?
Senator Hart. Yes.
Mr. Bush. I would want to have full benefit of all the
intelligence. I would want to have full benefit of how these
matters were taking place but I cannot tell you, and I do not
think I should, that there would never be any support for a
coup d'etat, depending on what the facts were from -- in other
words, I cannot tell you I cannot conceive of a situation where
I would not support such action.
Senator Hart. What about a government that was constitu-
tionally elected?
Mr. Bush. I think we should tread very carefully on
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governments that are constitutionally elected. That is what
we are trying to encourage around the world and I feel strongly
about that.
Senator Hart. What about paramilitary operations, providin
funds and arms to establish a government that we wanted?
Mr. Bush. I can see certain circumstances where that
would be in the best interests of the United States, the best
interests of our allies, the best interests of the free world.
Senator Hart. How about providing money for political
parties and candidates in various countries?
Mr. Bush. I have a little more difficulty with that one
but, again, without having the benefit of the facts and what
the situation is surrounding it, I would not make a clear and
definitive statement whether that ever or never should be done.
Senator Hart. Well, you raised the question of getting
the CIA out of domestic areas totally. Let us hypothesize
a situation where a President has perhaps stepped over the
bounds. Let us say the FBI is on the track of some people who
are involved in that and they go right to the White House.
There is some possible CIA interest. The President calls you
and says, I want you as Director of the CIA to call the
Director of the FBI to tell him to call off this operation
because it may jeopardize some CIA activities.
Mr. Bush. Well, generally speaking, and I think you are
hypothecating a case without spelling it out in enough detail
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to know if there is any real legitimate foreign intelligence
aspect, but generally speaking the CIA should butt out of the
domestic business and it certainly ought not to be a domestic
police force and it certainly ought not to be involved in?
investigations domestically of this kind of thing.
Senator Hart. That is the easy side.
Mr. Bush. Well, it is not --
Senator Hart. I am hypothesizing a case that actually
happened in June 1972. There might have been some tangential
CIA interest in something in Mexico. Funds were laundered
and so forth.
Mr. Bush. Using a 50-50 hindsight on that case, I hope I
would have said the CIA is not going to get involved in that
if we are talking about the same one.
Senator Hart. We are.
Senator Leahy. Are there others?
Senator.Hart. There has been a doctrine operating between
the political structure and the intelligence community for many
years called plausible deniability. It is letting the President
know just enough about what is going on, but not enough so that
when the question is asked, did you know this was going on,
he has some grounds for denying that he knew.
How do you feel about that, particularly where major covert
operations were involved?
Mr. Bush. I think the President should be fully involved
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and though I understand the need for plausible deniability, I
think it is extremely difficult. I just do not think a Presiden
should be shielded when you are dealing with something this
important from the totality of the information. That is my
own view on it.
Senator Hart. Now, Senator Symington pointed out the
fact that, of course, I think too many -- too few people in
this country are aware of and that is even though we have an
individual who is the Director of Central Intelligence, that
individual as the Director of Central Intelligence only controls
about 15 or at most 20 percent of the intelligence budget.
80 percent of that is under the control of the Department of
Defense, Secretary of Defense.
Do you have any recommendations or thoughts on how one
operates as the Director of the entire intelligence community
and yet does not control the vast bulk of their budget?
Mr. Bush. No. I will welcome the recommendations from
your Committee or welcome the recommendations of the Pike
Committee. I will welcome the recommendations that are being
prepared as I understand it in the White House now. I have
been here a week and I have no firm judgment on how that should
be done. I would make a general statement, though, that I
think if a man -- if the Director of Central Intelligence, if
it is determined by these recommendations that the Director
!should have the authority, it seems to me that the best way to
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have the responsibility is to have something to say about the
funds, and so I think in that area you might find the answer,
but again I would accept and look at and study before I took
a personal position on the various committees that are studying
these matters to come up. They have been on it for several
months and I have been back here one week, and I would be
presumptuous I think to say these are my views.
I have got some general feelings on it and one is I think
the Director of Central Intelligence needs some kind of a base.
He has some kind now in CIA and I am not enthralled with the
concept that everybody has his empire and you are just floating
around EOB someplace and that is a generalized concept, but
if you are going to have the authority, the responsibility,
he ought to have some muscle to do something about it with.
So I would hope whatever your Committee recommends and
whatever others recommend is that they do not set up some
Director of Central Intelligence and then not give him the tools
to enforce these coordinated activities or budgetary expenditure
you know, increases or decreases.
That is very general, Senator Hart, but I do not --
Senator Hart. But I think what you are saying --
Mr. Bush. I have not any recommendations yet.
Senator Hart. You would be willing to go to the mat with
the Secretary of Defense to get a little more authority over
how that 80 percent of the intelligence budget is spent.
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Mr. Bush. Well, particularly if -- yes, sir. The answer
is yes, sir, but particularly if you are supposed to have the
responsibility for it, I think you must do that, and I think
I would be in a position to -- I would not say have equal
standing because those are Cabinet positions, both State and
Defense, with policy making functions. This is not as I
conceive it and I think it is properly conceived as defined in
the statute, is not a policy job, but I think I have -- I think
I can see situations where I would want to forcefully present
the views of the intelligence community even though they might
be on a different direction from existing policy, and let
somebody else make the policy, but get those views in there.
Senator Hart. How is my time coming, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. You have run over.
Senator Hart. I had some other questions, but let me
just make one observation that I made to you when we visited
in my office briefly, and that is I think leaving aside your
own qualifications and background and integrity, etc., and
your ability to convince us in spite of your political backgroun
that you will not politicize nor permit the CIA to be politicize
under your direction, there is still a separate question I think
all of us have to acknowledge, and this is the precedence
established by this kind of appointment and however qualified
and all the rest of it you may be, I think it is a step in the
direction that troubles an awful lot of us that does not reflect
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on you personally one iota.
Mr. Bush. May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes, yes. Make it as brief as you reasonabl
can. Mr. Leahy has been waiting.
Mr. Bush. Senator Hart, I would simply appeal that you
not be -- not make judgments on your vote based on outside
appearances, editorials, fear of whether somebody is going to
say a politician, which I do not think is a bad word there.
I think it should be made on the basis of qualifications and
integrity and how it is going to be viewed a year from now,
two years from now, three years from now, and that is what I
appeal to you to do in determining whether I am fit to take
this job.
Senator Hart. Mr. Bush, I do not make my judgments based
on editorials..
Mr. Bush. .Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, earlier in a statement made by Senator
Stennis as Chairman of this Committee, he said that he would
question your judgment if you were using the CIA as a stepping
stone to the Vice Presidency. I might add I would question
your sanity if you were going to use the CIA as a stepping stone
to the Vice Presidency. I cannot imagine any worse way today
to get into that. But I would like to go into a couple of
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areas.
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator Leahy, Senator Hart has asked you about political
assassinations and absent, I would assume -- we will not get
the question too muddy -- absent a declaration of war in a
particular area, do I understand your answer that you are totally
opposed?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator Leahy. To political assassinations?
Mr. Bush. I understand a directive has gone out on that.
We would not need it as far as I am concerned. I do indeed.
It is appalling to me.
The Chairman. Mr. Bush, excuse me a minute. Use your
loudspeaker.
Mr. Bush. I am opposed to political assassinations and --
Senator Leahy. I understand there is a directive from
President Ford on that. Supposing you were serving under another
President and such a request was made of you as CIA Director.
What would you do?
Mr. Bush. I would -- I feel strongly enough about that
one -- you have precluded wartime -- to say that would be the
place where I got off or he changed his mind, one.
Senator Leahy. Let me follow up, and this follows up a
question asked by Senator McIntyre. Besides resigning would
you feel strongly enough about that to report it to the proper
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oversight committees? For example, in the Senate the Armed
Services Committee?
Mr. Bush. On that matter, yes, sir.
Senator Leahy. Then let me ask you --
Mr. Bush. Can I elaborate once more? I can see situations
where I might resign.
Senator Leahy. Certainly.
Mr. Bush. Over something that I conceived to be a real
moral problem but where the Chief -- where the President had the
legal right to go through with it where I would not do that
or I might quietly fade away without calling a press conference
or without -- but I would always faithfully try to testify
before the appropriate oversight committees of the United
States Congress.
Senator Leahy. I am not concerned on what is the best
way for Congress to carry on this oversight function. For
example, can the Congress carry on its oversight function if
it has full control and debate over the CIA budget or should
they --
Mr. Bush. I think the proper investigative bodies of
Congress, I mean the proper oversight committees, should be
informed on the budget but I would oppose making the CIA budget
public.
Senator Leahy. I am concerned -- I recall once in a debate
in this Committee, and without giving out any secrets, having
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a whole series of little items, $5 million and $10 million, etc.
until we got down to the bottom item of several hundred million
dollars put in there for miscellaneous use. Coming from a
small state, that seems like a lot of money, and I wondered
exactly what it was. I am wondering how we do carry out this
oversight.
Mr. Ambassador, do you feel the Congress has done an
adequate job of carrying out its oversight function of the CIA
during, say, the past four or five years?
Mr. Bush. I think many individuals in the Senate that I
have talked to feel that it has not and I would be inclined
to go along with that. But I again do not have all the evidence
on that that has come to your Committee, but I have not --
Senator Leahy. Has this Committee itself, has this
Armed Services Committee done an adequate job?
Mr. Bush. .I am not about to sit here criticizing the
Senate Armed ,Services Committee, given the limited amount of
information I have. Your Committee has had access to a tremen-
dous amount of information. I have had access to none of it.
and I do not know how many meetings they have had and I just
simply am not going to criticize this Committee because I do
not know how many times you have met on this. I have not been
briefed.
Senator Tower. Would you Senator from Vermont yield for
a comment from the Select Committee on that point? Senators
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Hart and Goldwater and I have served on the --
Senator Leahy. Your time, Senator.
Senator Tower. I will not use my time. I mean, you
may have all of my time you like.
The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. I did not catch the
point exactly. Did you yield to him?
Senator Leahy. Yes, I yielded to the Senator.
Senator Tower. I think it would be useful for the
Committee to know at this point that the Select Committee is
at the moment considering various oversight options to recommend
to the Senate. That is currently ongoing in the Select
Committee and that on the 20th the Chairman of the Committee and
the Vice Chairman, myself, will testify before the Government
Operations Committee on this very matter. So it is a matter
currently under consideration.
The Chairman. All right, Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Does the investigation made by the two
Committees, House and Senate Committees, those investigations,
in your opinion have they hurt the CIA? Let me rephrase it to
make sure we are exact on that. The Congress has this year
carried out two fairly substantial investigations of the CIA,
both in the House and in the Senate. Has that hurt the CIA
in your estimation?
Mr. Bush. I have not been out there. I do not know what
effect it has had on the morale of the CIA. I simply cannot
59
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answer that question.
Senator Leahy. Has it hurt --
Mr. Bush. Around the world I think some do not seem to
understand our Constitutional process, and so perhaps it has
raised some eyebrows. I know it has in some other countries,
but whether it has hurt it here, I simply cannot say. To the
degree it has encouraged the outside and wanton disclosure,
and my understanding since I have been back here for six days
is that these Committees have both been very responsible with
classified information and stuff, I do not see how the charge
can be made that in doing its Constitutional duty that it has
hurt.
Senator Leahy. If the Congress had done a thorough,
continuing, ongoing oversight of the CIA during the past five
years, would these Committee meetings have been necessary?
Mr. Bush. Probably would not have been necessary.
Senator Leahy. Thank you.
Mr. Bush. On the other hand, perhaps it is timely to have
a review that will make some substantive suggestions. It is
my understanding that both Committees are empaneled in order to
suggest legislative change and it is those suggestions that I
Would like to see and I would Certainly believe to the degree
they are left for administrative decision, I would consider them
very, very thoroughly because I know people have put in an
awful lot of hard work on those Committees.
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Senator Leahy. How would you feel about taking the
oversight away from the present Committees that have it and
putting it into a special joint committee?
Mr. Bush. My four years in the Congress taught be one
thing and that is to let the Congress determine its own procedur
and I would simply bow to the will of the Congress and cooperate
fully with whatever your Committee, you know, whatever is
decided by the Congress. I would cooperate.
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Senator Leahy. I am not on the Select Committee. Senator
Hart and Senator Tower and Senator Goldwater are but could that
be -- maybe I should ask it this way. Could that be an effec-
tive way of carrying out the oversight of the CIA?
I am not lobbying for any particular method of doing it,
Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Bush. I think it could and it is a recommendation of
the Rockefeller Commission. I support that recommendation, but
having said so I would, if there is some new situation that
comes forward, I would be glad to -- I will offer my full
cooperation if I am confirmed.
Senator Leahy. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the Rocke-
feller Committee and that has spoken of having a Presidential
advisory committee, oversight, and you support that?
Mr. Bush. There already is a Presidential advisory
committee -- the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board -- and it
would have my full cooperation, sir.
Senator Leahy. Well, that was going to be my next
question.
The Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was first
established back in the mid-50s by President Eisenhower. It
was the President's board of consultants on foreign intelligenc
activities. I understand the name was changed in 1961 by
President Kennedy to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
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There have been three different charters -- 1956, 1961
and 1969. The contents were about the same.
This summer I had my staff look at the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. I cannot really see where it can
carry out much in the way of oversight findings. They have had
a relatively small budget. They get almost all their informa-
tion from the CIA. And according to their staff director, I
mean from the -- yes, they do, almost all their information,
from CIA, when the -- on foreign intelligence matters.
According to their staff people down there, they point out
that their job did not include oversight and review of the CIA
but rather is confined to coming up with ideas which would
improve our intelligence efforts and they brought out one of
them, the U-2. The Commission report on the Board said it does
not exert control over the CIA. In fact, the CIA is the Board
only source of .information about CIA activities.
Do you :think that is really going to do an awful lot for
us?
Mr. Bush. I think that depends on whether the recommenda-
tions -- what these committees come up with. I do not -- if
your implication is, and maybe I missed it in the question,
Senator Leahy, you said they rely on the Director of Central
Intelligence or the CIA for intelligence. I would oppose yet
another intelligence gathering organization. So maybe I mis-
read that. But I feel that the Board has a useful function.
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I noticed one of the recommendations in the Rockefeller
Commission is that the Inspector General should report any
irregularities that he finds to the President's Board and I
think in those areas and perhaps others that your Committee can
suggest it would be good, but I would oppose -- the fact that
they get their information from the existing intelligence
community does not trouble me because I do not think we need
another intelligence agency.
Senator Leahy. I agree with you on the Inspector General,
but the Commission also found that because of the CIA's
compartment -- the way they have set up their compartments in
there, their compartments' secrecy and all, that the Inspector
General never even knew of the illegal and improper activities
which recently have come to light.
Would you, if you were the Director of the CIA, would you
upgrade the staff and responsibility of the Inspector General?
Would you give him access to all CIA files?
Mr. Bush. I think I read enough on that, sir, to answer
affirmatively, yes, I would.
Senator Leahy. Would he be allowed to report directly to
the appropriate Congressional oversight committee if one is
set up?
Mr. Bush. I sure would want to be sitting next to him
because I do not believe if you are going to give a person the,
you know, under the statutes, the Director has certain
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responsibilities and I view one of them -- rather, I would view
it reporting to these committees. I do not think that you need
to be able to have absolutely everybody go off free wheeling
but certainly he should be made available to these committees,
but I would like to know what was going on, and it is my inten-
tion if confirmed for this job to know what is going on as much
as possible.
If you suggest, and I may be misreading it, that I would
not know what the testimony was or I would not know what he was
doing, just testifying --
Senator Leahy. I am not suggesting that at all.
Mr. Bush. -- that is against the very compartmentaliza-
tion, that it might have caused some of the problems, so I
would simply think, yes, he should be available. I would like
to know about it.
Senator Leahy. I am not suggesting you not know what he
was talking about at all, Mr. Ambassador. I would not suggest
that of any agency head of their own Inspector General.
What I was concerned about, the Inspector General in many
ways has far more time to look for these things than the
Director does, and I want to be sure you have such access
because in the past apparently he has not had such access and
that is probably one of the reasons we are facing this problem
today.
Mr. Bush. Let me tell you why I respond that way.
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In the Rockefeller report there was a suggestion that he
go directly to the CIA base. I have no problems with that.
I want to be informed: I want to know about it. And if he was
saying what his suggestions were, I would like as the Director,
I would like to know about it and then also have the right to
say whether I agreed or disagreed.
You have got to have a disciplined organization.
The Chairman. I am sorry. Outside of Senator Tower's
time, you have gone over. Ask one more question. Or do you
want to complete --
Senator Leahy. I will wait until the next go-around.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Bush, some minutes ago on the proposition there of
having a request from the Executive Department, be it the
President or someone under the President, you gave a response
as to what your, action would be. Would you direct your first
assistant, we will say, to report anything of that nature, any
request of that nature that he might receive, report it to you?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, I would.
I think that it is essential that the Director be informed
of White House requests.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Bush. And I do not know how many they get over there.
Some of them I am sure are strictly routine, but certainly as
a matter of principle I think whether they come into the
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Counsel's office, the Inspector General's office, the Deputy's
office, I would insist on being informed.
The Chairman. I was directing the question mainly at
matters of serious importance and consequence, and you would
say -- would you apply that same rule, then, to your chiefs of
divisions? I do not know just what term you may use in the CIA
but I am thinking in terms of those that have charge of various
major operations. Would you instruct them, too?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It seems to me that is like getting at
the thing in such a way as to make the total responsibility and
authority on you.
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I would.
There are four deputies in addition to the -- and I would
do that, the same for the Inspector General, the same for the
General Counsel's office.
The Chairman. And to insure that you are directing the
policy on those kinds of question, and I am not hitting at any
President, but to insure that you did have that responsibility
and power you would also direct any others that are in a key
place to give the same reports to you.
Mr. Bush. I would, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Now, a matter that I have been concerned
with for years is the fact that you are not only Director of
the CIA but you are Director of all the Central Intelligence
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which includes operations of the DIA and others, but still you
do not have the authority over them. You just have the authori y
over what I call the CIA proper or hard core. That money and
all is put in another budget. It is a separate matter.
Now, if you are confirmed, I want to strongly suggest that
you take the lead in trying to get a workable, practical plan,
that if you are going to have the responsibilities, that you
have the authority. Did I make that clear to you?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir, and I hope --
The Chairman. What is your response on that?
Mr. Bush. My response, Mr. Chairman, is I hope I can find
ways to implement that suggestion.
The Chairman. Yes.
May I divide time with you, please. I will yield to you
in a minute. In the meantime we will try --
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Those of you not on the machine have a seat
Sorry we were invaded there. Some very able men have
tried and have undertaken just such a mission here and due to
the pressure of other things and various matters, they did not
come up with anything very practical, but you already see that
problem facing you, do you not?
Mr. Bush. I see the problem, Mr. Chairman, but I cannot
in conscience tell you I see the clear answer.
The Chairman. No.
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Mr. Bush. Because I see between the Defense Intelligence
Agency and CIA and others in the community, I see an enormous
problem of coordination, but I can pledge to this Committee I
will address myself to it as best I can.
The Chairman. Yes.
Well, it is a very delicate and sensitive matter by nature
and then it is a very practical problem, too, of getting at it,
but I think it can be handled. It just takes some cooperation
between the Executive branch and the Legislative branch.
I have been impressed there with your answer, too, to
Senator Leahy's questions, all of which were good, regarding
the Inspector General. You said you would want to be with him,
or be informed. I judge that it is by no means -- by no means
you were trying to control what he said, anything of that kind,
but since the responsibility rests on you, you would want to
know and would be entitled to know, I think, what his testimony
was or what he was saying. Is that correct?
Mr. Bush. That was my point, Senator.
The Chairman. Well, I have always advocated keep the
power where the responsibility is, keep the responsibility
where the power is. I said here in a brief opening statement
that through these hearings we can emphasize the absolute
necessity of a clear consciousness on the part of the Chief
Executive of the nation of this special power that is invested
in him under the Act and of the care and personal attention the
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President must give through this exceptional power and also to
the individual that he selects to act for him.
Quoting further I said I hope these hearings will
emphasize that point. I think the hearings have emphasized
that point to you and to the public and to the President, the
questions that came from members other than me, and my time ran
out. And I think, as I see it, it is an obligation that you
owe to the President especially, to keep him directly advised
of the enormous duties.
I know it is beyond human comprehension almost, ability to
reach the obligations the President has. But this is a special
law and operates in a special way and it is not within the
pattern of other agencies as I see it, and he is going to need
your help as well as you need him. So you are conscious of
your obligation in that way.
Mr. Bush. . Yes, sir, I am, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Not trying to alone protect him from things
but to protect the country and protect your position, your
obligation that you assume. Is that the way you see it?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I see it -- I see that relationship
clearly.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Bush. Some have changed that because -- I know the
President -- that would be bad for some reasons. I think it is
good. If I have the proper integrity for this job I think the
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intelligence community is entitled to have its views forcefully,
firmly presented to the President and then have the policy
makers take over, and that is my concept of this relationship,
and certainly if there was wrongdoing or I detected improper
pressures from the White House, I think because of access I
would be in a reasonable position to do something about it.
I am not saying I am omniscient and would see right away
that it was good or bad. I think there are some gray areas.
But I would have the access and I think I would use it not to
do bad things suggested by the White House but the other way
around.
The Chairman. Yes.
And you would either correct it yourself or take it up
with him, those matters of any greatness at all.
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
I thank, you very much.
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Mr. Ambassador, just several points
you made this morning that worried me a bit. I really do not
think you meant it that way when you said that maybe you were
old fashioned because you still believe in effective patriotism.
I have watched my four grandsons and I think.it is the
Children today -- the youth of today are just as patriotic as
anybody has ever been. I am not looking for votes because I
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am not going to run again. But I think the leadership in the
White House, and I am not talking about any one administration,
and the leadership in the Congress is more responsible for the
lack of desire to join the armed services than anything -- any
other single situation. These "no-win" wars, for example.
I have got a son who is a disabled veteran and his son
is -- I would not want to have to argue with him physically
anyway -- said to me I will go to Vietnam. I know that he woul
not have felt that way if it had not been for actions in the
government itself.
And so I would hope that you would not think that a lot
of the youth are not patriotic.
Mr. Bush. I have four sons, one daughter. I have just
as much confidence. I do get concerned about what sometimes
seems to be -- well, take the word "Politician". The connota-
tion of the politician has changed, some of it with reason,
some of it in my view without. I stand here and say I think i
is honorable. I know a lot of people do not. So it is this
kind of general feeling I have rather than any lack of confi-
dence in my four sons and I am sure yours, sir.
Senator Symington. Well, I wanted you to expand on that
because you made that statement and I knew in my heart how you
felt about it. I wanted you to explain it. The basic problem
in my opinion in the United States today is greed and I remembe
reading an article that there was much more greed, desire for
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power, than there was for money and as I watch the operations
around here sometimes I get pretty disgusted with the whole
situation. The efforts the authority, the efforts for votes.
And that has not got anything to do with money, although there
are an awful lot of people who are interested in getting as muc
money out of the government as they can. The record so proves.
Most of them are not in government. Some of them are.
So I think our great problem today is greed and the only
way we are going to solve it is sacrifice, and I do not know
anybody who is asking me to sacrifice anything. I watch
people go by me 20, 30 miles above the speed limit, one person
per car, etc. We could go into a lot of detail about that but
I think you know what I am getting at.
Mr. Bush. I do, sir.
Senator Symington. This country has got to have a leader-
ship that shows the way and I will take my full responsibility
and inability to do it in the legislative branch and I honestly
do not think in recent years it has been characteristic of the
executive branch either.
Now, another matter that worried me a bit is we are gettin
very open, you might say, and I hope that that does not impinge
too heavily on your job. It is my understanding that the man
who really runs the system of the country that is considered
generally to be our leading opponent, that his title, actual
title at least among his colleagues, and I get this pretty
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straight, is Director of Misinformation. So I hope you do not
feel obligated by what in the past has happened and I happen to
have been Acting Chairman of this Committee when this business
broke about the CIA and the laundered money, and so forth, and
I hope you do not feel obligated to run out and report every-
thing that is going on. Otherwise you in effect defeat the
basic concept of your job which has got a covert operation
involved.
It is done with the premise that it is important to the
security of the United States, and may I say having spent many
years in the Pentagon and years in other parts of government
as well as in the Senate that I think it is vitally important
to the United States and I hope you agree that there is infor-
mation that you only have to give the President and you do not
necessarily have to give the Congress.
Mr. Bush. I agree. I do feel that one of the things that
troubles me is the tendency -- as I understand it, the
employees of the CIA, and I think properly, take a pledge of
secrecy, not to disclose classified information when they are
there and not to disclose it after they leave, and I am appalle
at indications that some do not take that pledge seriously
because it is not fair to those who are working faithfully for
their country in ?this important place.
I think it is wanton and I do not think it is right and I
will certainly do what I can -- this is a side area but I will
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certainly do what I can to see that the families and the indi-
viduals who do abide by the rules of that game there are not
endangered by the wanton disclosure on the part of others and
that clearly moves over into some of the more sensitive,areas,
I think, but I have a general feeling that Congress must be
kept closely informed, and yet I am confident when I get in
there I will find things that are between the Director and the
President just as there are between the President and other
appointees.
Senator Symington. Well, I completely agree with you.
Mr. Bush. That should be kept confidential.
Senator Symington. I only mention it so you would further
expand it.
There was one forceful remark made a few years ago by the
person who had the most responsible field in this Congress and
he was asked did he know what the CIA was doing with its money
and he said, no, he did not want to. We just cannot operate
that way.
But that is what we are talking about. We are talking
about covert operations.
One other point that worried me a bit in your testimony
is that you said something about the fact that you were not a
Cabinet member and you were not in policy and therefore you
might not have a' -- did not have Cabinet rank, that you were
an operating man primarily. I will agree with that but, on the
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other hand, it is very difficult -- it has been in the past -- i
my executive experience in government and business experience,
it is very difficult to separate policy and operations. It is
hard to do. And I would hope the fact that you were nota
member of the Cabinet but especially in the theory of the
original law and the law as it is today you report to the
President, to the National Security Council, you would have no
hesitation in giving him the situation as you saw it regardless
of whether you were formally a Cabinet member or not.
Mr. Bush. That would be my intention, sir, and I was
simply referring to the essentialities of presenting to the
policy makers the most objective possible analysis, whether it
agreed with existing policy or not, but I do recognize the
Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA function as well
does not make foreign policy. That is the point I was trying
to make.
Senator Symington. I think you cleared it up adequately
and again I thank you for your courtesy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chairman. Excuse me, just one minute, please.
Gentlemen of the Committee, on this matter of alleged
conflict of interest that we always go to, go into, in these
matters Mr. Bush has conferred with Mr. Braswell, our valuable
Chief of Staff, Staff Director, and has written a letter to the
Committee dated December 14 addressed to me as Chairman, I
considered that to the Committee about these matters and I
have it here for the inspection of any member of the Committee
that might want.
Let me ask Mr. Braswell one question. Mr. Braswell,
you heard my statement made here. You have handed me this
letter dated December 14, 1975, and in your conferences now
with Mr. Bush and those representing them, does he meet all
the requirements of the Committee that we customarily apply
with reference to reported nominees?
Mr. Braswell. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bush does meet these
requirements. The letter indicates that he will sell any
holdings which pose any conflict of interest with the Central
Intelligence Agency. There are a limited number of securities
which have certain relationships and it is indicated that he
will dispose of those within 30 days after confirmation.
The Chairman. All right. All right, members of the
Committee. We will put this letter with its exhibit in the
file. It is available to any Committee member that might want
to examine it. But it is -- we do not customarily put these
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matters in the record, the regular record, but keep a special
file on it.
(The document referred to will be found in the files of
the Committee.)
The Chairman. Senator Hart, that brings us to you.
Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, back in 1952 at the request of President
Eisenhower, the Committee or Commission looked into the state
of the intelligence community at that time 'and under the
chairmanship of General Doolittle they reported back some
recommendations for changes, but most importantly in the
Preamble of their report there is a statement that I think many
of us have found rather shocking. It is to the effect that
at that period of the Cold War that this country was faced
with a ruthless enemy and that to survive in the world, a
world populated by enemies of this sort, we had to become at
least as ruthless as that enemy or those enemies and in effect
discard or shelve what the report called the traditional America
values.
In the judgment of some of us who have been looking into
this area for many months, it is that kind of an attitude or
mentality which has led to some of the conduct which you describ
as outrageous. What is your feeling generally about the activi-
ties of this country with relation to those of others? Do we
in your judgment have to adopt the same techniques to survive in
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this world?
Mr. Bush, Senator, I made my public position on assassina-
tion. Having said that, I am somewhat aware, not p2rhaps as
aware as the Committee, having not had access to t z? information
that we are up against some pretty ruthless people and they
are today ruthless and they are tough and today they will resort
to schemes that are not overly pleasant.
I am not going to sit here and say we need to match ruthles
ness with ruthlessness. I do feel we need a covert capability
and I hope that it can minimize these problems that offend our
Americans. We are living in a very complicated, difficult world
Senator Hart. But you would not go so far as to say we
have to abandon our traditional values or sense of fair play.
Mr. Bush. I would not abandon my own traditional values
or sense of fair play, certainly, and'I do not think we should
as a nation.
Senator .Hart. The principal intelligence judgments are
products of
estimates.
the intelligence community, national intelligence
They are not presently or have not been traditionall
given to the Congress or Congressional committees. Rather,
the judgment of the intelligence community is summarized when
it is given.
What would be your view on having the CIA's national
intelligence estimates made available to the appropriate committ
of Congress, particularly Foreign Relations and Armed Services?
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Mr. Bush. I would want to take a close look at that.
I would -- I am not too familiar with the totality of the
national intelligence estimates, what that involves, so I am
not going to commit ahead of time to what would be delivered,
but certainly in terms of keeping these committees involved,
keeping them involved on important matters, I would be inclined
to say at this point yes, but I would reserve the right, if
I could, to at least understand the totality of what we are
talking about.
I think, getting back to Senator Symington, I think there
are some things that must be between the intelligence and
the President and must be determined by the President, and that
I would have to stand with.
Senator Hart. Under present procedures, when the Congress
is informed about covert operations, it is informed after the
Executive Branch has already approved those operations. It
seems to me that an alternative would be for the Director of
Central Intelligence to present the proposed action to the
Congress, or the appropriate Committees, at the same time,
simultaneously with proposing that action to the Executive
Branch. What would your feeling be about that?
Mr. Bush. I would oppose that.
Senator Hart. On what grounds?
Mr. Bush. On the grounds I think it is the obligation
'of the President to determine the covert activities and I would
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say after plenty of adequate consultation with the NSC and
representatives of the intelligence community, but I think he
81
must make that decision and I do not think it ought to be a
joint decision and I think it might be a joint decision if
it were done in the manner you suggest.
Senator Hart. So the only way to prevent the Congress
from vetoing a decision is to just not let them know.
Mr. Bush. There are things in intelligence, Senator Hart,
that I think have to be kept confidential, but that is not to
say they should not be disclosed and that is not to say they
should not be fully informed at the appropriate time. The law
specifically, as I understand it -- the amendment specifies
they shall be informed and I will do my best to inform them
but before a foreign policy decision is made, I do not think
that there has to be a group decision on that. I think that
is what the Presidents are elected to do.
Senator Hart. Well, one, information does not presume
decision. Nor does it presume disclosure. And I think --
Mr. Bush. I did not suggest, sir, that it meant disclosure
Senator Hart. You certainly did. Your response was you
do not think there should be disclosure.
Mr. Bush. I mean public disclosure. I was not suggesting
a leak if that is what you meant.
Senator Hart. Well, that takes us to a current case and
that is Angola. It has been suggested in situations such as
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Angola that rather than have assistance provided, if you will,
under the table, why do we not just openly acknowledge the fact
that we are assisting certain governments and certain political
groups around the world, that we feel that they stand for
democracy and the kinds of things we represent. We are assistin
them openly, rather than have it sort of come out piecemeal
as it always is done.
Mr. Bush. I think in some instances we should do that.
Angola I have not been briefed on. I do not know the facts.
I do not know the problems. Neighboring countries -- I do not
know what the extent of the Soviet aid is to the MPLA. I
just simply do not know, so I would have to defer but I think
in this instance that is correct, and in some instances we do
this with arms programs.
Senator Hart. So you would not preclude the possibility
that there might be situations in the world where we would
want -- and I am not talking about arms programs, I am talking
about whether it is political conflict, the nature of the
government which will emerge in dispute, and we take sides with
one party or another and openly provide them financial assistanc
or arms in the struggle. You would think that would be a
possibility.
Mr. Bush. This gets close to the responsibilities of the
Congress during war and things of that nature, you see.
Senator Hart. That is right.
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Mr. Bush. And I think each case has to be looked at on
its own merits.
Senator Hart. But you do not preclude that possibility.
Mr. Bush. Would you repeat what I am not precluding once
more?
Senator Hart. That we would openly assist financially
and with arms where a dispute is going on as to what kind of
government should emerge in a country, not after a government
has emerged and been recognized, and then we provide arms.
When there is conflict, when there is hostility, when the
nature of that government is not determined.
Mr. Bush. I would not preclude that in some cases this
might be done but I am not arguing the merits of how Angola
is being handled at this time because very candidly I am not
briefed on that.
Senator Hart. You have been very critical of previous
CIA and other intelligence officials and officers for disclosing
the nature of their experiences. Would you favor anything like
a British Official Secrets Act to prevent that kind of thing?
Mr. Bush. Where, sir, did you point to my being critical
what was the first part of the question?
Senator Hart. I said in your opening statement and at
other times you had been critical of former CIA officials and
officers who were I think you cited public broadcasts.
Mr. Bush. Oh, those were -- oh, excuse me. Ex-CIA employe -s
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yes. Go ahead.
Senator Hart. To prevent such -- would you favor something
like the British Official Secrets Act?
Mr. Bush. Well, I understand that was one of the recommend
tions of the Rockefeller Commission. Certainly I would give it
some serious attention. Again I am not fully up to date on it
but just from reading their recommendations, provided the indivi
dual rights are safeguarded, I can see some reason. What I
was talking about is existing oaths of secrecy that are taken
by these employees, some of whom then go out and at their own
discretion leak classified information and I oppose that.
Now, what needs to be done to guarantee against it I do
not know, but perhaps that suggestion in this Rockefeller
Commission report might be the answer. I am not prepared to
do it. I have not really fully gone into the details of it.
Senator Hart. Do you believe --
Mr. Bush. In six days.
Senator Hart. Do you believe, Ambassador, that our
ambassadors and heads of missions should be fully apprised of
CIA activities in their countries?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir.
Senator Hart. Absolutely?
Mr. Bush. Yes, sir. I feel strongly about it for chiefs
of missions.
Senator Hart.. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
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The Chairman. Senator Tower, will you excuse me? I
overlooked the fact that you might have additional questions.
Senator Tower. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Then, gentlemen, when we recess we propose
to recess until tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock in this
room, at which time I had agreed that we would hear Senator
Church for a statement. I invited him to come and sit with
us today or make a statement today but if he would like, he
will be with us tomorrow at 10:00 o'clock to make a statement.
Tomorrow at 10:00 I would propose that we first then recognize
the Senators who could not be here today and then we would
proceed with those that have been.
All right, Senator Leahy.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to follow
up on Senator Hart's questioning on Angola, Mr. Ambassador,
I understand you do not feel that you have enough information
about that to state whether prior to any CIA intervention in
Angola there should have been consultation with the Legislative
Branch, either in closed session or other confidential fashion.
Mr. Bush. I do not know the facts on Angola, but I
thought I responded to the Senator that I do not think there
had to be consultation with Congress before doing what --
providing arms to Angola.
Senator Leahy. I understand that and it somewhat concerns
me if you will allow just a little editorializing which I
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understand sometimes goes on. You have had more experience in
Congress than I have. But, you know, if the CIA had the oppor-
tunity to support forces we are now opposing it looks -- many
people feel that the CIA is trying to correct its own mistakes,
pouring arms and money into what could be potentially a terribly
dangerous conflict, and I recall at the time of the winding down
of the Vietnam War when we had the President of the United
States telling us we had to give them $200 million or $400 milli
more or there would be a calamity. We were told by the Adminis
tration there would be hundreds of thousands of lives lost in
Vietnam, in a blood bath, if we do not pour in more money. At
the same time our own reports, intelligence reports, show no
matter what kind of money we put in, unless we put in American
manpower and airpower it would not make any difference at all.
And I think that whole debate -- we went through another whole
wrenching -- this thing might have been avoided if we had just
been honest instead of having the White House and others say
they will give us this so we can turn the corner one more time.
If they had just been honest and said what we had, had full
consultation with complete reports, we would have realized it
would have been useless at that time and Angola just points up
again the same question.
As I say, that is editorializing and I am concerned and
I realize there is a dichotomy of views on this, but I am
concerned about about the fact that somehow we seem to have that
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feeling that we can get into these things and people somewhere
along the line can make these decisions in total secrecy and
the best purposes of the United States would be served, and
really we should not ask questions because nobody in the United
States, high in the United States Government, would make a
decision that was not for the best interests of our country.
That may be so, but I think there are a lot of people in
the Congress that may question just whether it is, whether it
really is in the best interests of the country in those regards.
So I hope that if you concerned that you will have a
fairly open idea of in which areas there should be consultations
with the Congress and so advise the President. I think that a
number of things that we find ourselves getting involved in,
we would not if we made it with more thorough consultation.
Incidentally, do you favor a fixed statutory term for
CIA Director, say a term of years?
Mr. Bush. Again, understand I have not studied anything
but I am inclined to say yes to that. I do not have any views.
I think they recommend in here ten years. I think it makes
sense to have a certain fixed term.
Senator Leahy. If a Democrat were elected President next
year and you were CIA Director, would you feel duty bound to
turn in your resignation?
Mr. Bush. NO, but I feel he would be duty bound to take
my resignation. Yes, I feel duty bound to hand in the resignati
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and he could act on it if he wanted to.
Senator Leahy. Would you feel that because it was a
Democrat or just a new President?
Mr. Bush. Because I serve at the pleasure of the President
and the new President should not have to throw me out and go
through the embarrassment of calling friends and saying, go
get this guy out. I want to put somebody else in. And I would
do it just as one Republican Administration changes hands and
I had done it and was out -- the United Nations. No, I feel
strongly as long as we have it the way it is that you serve
at the pleasure of the President, that you should not be --
should not embarrass the President in trying to derrick you
out of the office.
Senator Leahy. You do not think it is a partisan thing.
Mr. Bush. It is objective, the way the rules are.
Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a very
brief statement.
The Chairman. All right, Senator.
Senator Leahy. This is a crucial period as we all know
for the intelligence community. Public trust, confidence
have been badly eroded and I think in many instances justifiably
so, but the intelligence community can serve a valuable function
in our government. Any one of us would be naive in thinking
that a country with the military power of the United States
could survive without an intelligence community. But it has to
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operate within the law and it has to respect the rights of the
American people and in the past there are many instances where
it has not.
Intelligence capability is needed, deserves the support
of our people. So far it has to be concerned. In its final
report to the President the Rockefeller Commission concluded
that the proper functions of the Agency must depend in large par
of the character of the Director of the Central Intelligence.
The best assurance against the misuse of the agency lies in
the appointment to that post of persons with the judgment, the
courage, the independence to resist improper pressure and
importuning, whether from the White House, within the agency,
or elsewhere.
We are to decide whether the President has ignored that
advice in this case. I do not mean that in any way to detract
from your own obvious qualifications. I think you served
extremely well at the United Nations. I think you served
extremely well in China. The CIA needs aDirector who would be
free of political biases. While a man with a political back-
ground should not be rejected automatically, I think a man
whose background has been primarily political is not a good
choice, not a good choice for this position at this time. For
the CIA to function properly it must have an independent voice
in policy determinations. The agency must be free from partisan
political pressure, from all groups, both inside and outside
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the Government, and that includes the White House. Most impor-
tantly, the public must have the perception that the CIA
Director will have an independent. If the Director is perceived
to be governed by political considerations, the public confidenc
which we so desparately need at this time might not be attained.
The position of the Director requires a person of proven strengt
and independence, someone who will be willing to tell the
President that he is wrong, if that becomes necessary, and a
person who in that same way will help us in the Congress to
carry out our own oversight functions, our own responsibilities
because quite frankly the Senator from Vermont feels in many
instances we just have not.
So I thank you for taking the time to listen, Mr. Bush.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you, Senator.
Does any other member of the Committee have any questions
of Mr. Bush?,
Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask two quick
questions, if I may.
The Chairman. All right, Senator Hart.
Senator Hart. Mr. Ambassador, if the President of the
United States ordered the CIA to attempt to overthrow a foreign
government and you were requested to appear before the appro-
priate Congressional Committees in executive session and under
oath were asked if in fact this Government or any of its agencie
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were involved in attempting to overthrow that government, the
President also instructed you that you were not to disclose the
fact that we were involved in that kind of activity to anyone,
including the Congress, what would be your reaction?
Mr. Bush. My reaction would be to get a -- to understand
thoroughly what the law said on that.
Senator Hart. The law says do not lie to Congress.
Mr. Bush. The law --
Senator Hart. The law says do not lie to Congress.
Mr. Bush. I would not lie to the Congress, Senator Hart.
Senator Hart. Do you have any feelings whatsoever about
separating clandestine services from intelligence evaluation,
particularly covert operations, putting them under some other
direction?
Mr. Bush. I have a feeling that they ought not to be under
policy and in peacetime under policymaking bodies and thus I --
unless somebody comes up with a more clear answer, I think that
they should be in the Central Intelligence Agency. I would be
somewhat appalled if somebody suggested they be put into the
State Department or Defense Department because I think they
should be separate. I perhaps properly, perhaps improperly,
separate policy from -- to the degree you can, CIA from those
two other agencies.
The implementation of policy is covert but I have seen
no housing that would be more appropriate than the CIA at this
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juncture. I am open-minded on it.
Senator Hart. The National Security Council? If we really
came to the view that a lot of people have suggested, that
covert operations should be ad hoc and not continuing, then
could not the National Security Council set those in motion
other than having an in-house capability all the time?
Mr. Bush. Frankly, Senator, I had not thought about that
in particular, and I have studied the recommendations of your
Committee very carefully if that is one of them.
Senator Hart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. All right, gentlemen. Any other questions?
Gentlemen, just for the information generally, we were
talking about disclosures. I would think the only reason anyone
would hold back a disclosure would be some kind of a fear that
it might be injurious to the welfare of the country if it got
out, so to speak, in the public domain where the adversary, a
potential adversary, would know it.
We find there is an old espionage act passed in 1917
or 1918, anyway, during World War I, whose language is very
inadequate. That is the only law except one I mentioned that
makes it a criminal offense -- I want Mr. Leahy's attention --
makes it a criminal penalty --
Senator Leahy. I am sorry.
The Chairman. -- for anyone to go on and disclose these
sensitive matters. And that exception is the Atomic Energy Act
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criminal anyone who discloses sensitive and classified informa-
tion. And it was under that Act as I understand that partly
was used after World War II, was passed after World War II,
but that was involved in the Rosenberg case. So we looked this
up closely last year in connection with a matter that we had
in our Committee and found that this old espionage was insuffi-
cient, the old espionage section of the law, and of course
the Atomic Energy Act did not apply to the facts we had.
My point is as long as the law is in that shape, these
people are going to be slow to divulge these super sensitive
matters to members of Congress, to members of the Executive
Branch at the level, say, lower than the President and Cabinet,
or to anyone. It is going to be slow to do it because there is
no criminal penalty protection that applies to those facts.- And
we have been concerned about that.
This question of ordinary amendment to the criminal code,
you know, would be one way to get at it. Another would be to
amend this Atomic Energy Act. It is a very difficult matter
to get at and I have got some good lawyers on this Committee,
better lawyers than I am. I refer the matter to -- it is one
of the problems and I think it Would be worth looking into,
Senator Leahy. I know you are a man of competence in the
law and I wish you would look into it some, please.
My point is that when we disclose it, it is barefoot and
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free. There is no penalty on them. This leads to further
disclosure.
All right, Mr. Bush. Is there anything else you wish to
say?
Mr. Bush. No, sir.
The Chairman . Well, we thank you very much for being
here.
Mr. Bush. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You made an excellent witness. You have
already heard me say that when we recess we will recess until
10:00 o'cicok in the morning. Now, please keep your seat. Pleas
keep your seats. 10:00 o'clock in the morning, and I will
recognize Senator Church and then the absent Senators who
could not be here today, I mean, and Mr. Braswell, notify them,
please, if they are here that they will be recognized first
and then we will get to the others.
All right. Thank you very much. We will take a recess
until tomorrow at 10:00.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed,
to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on Tuesday, December 16,
1975.)
01111 IMO 01?0
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