MBFR: MISSION THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01500R000100030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

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FM USMISSION NATO
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INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 4976
RUFHAU/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1419
BT
S E.C R E T SECTION 1 OF2 USNATO 2440
EoO. 116525 GDS
TAGSI PARMD NATO
SUBJ. MBFR' MISSION THOUGHTS ON. NEXT STEPS IN VERIFICATION
VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR
REF''BONN 7169
SUMMARY; MISSION BELIEVES THAT GIVEN STRONG FRG RESERVATIONS ON
A RESLATIVELY ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM NOW RECONFIRMED BY
REFTELP U.S: SHOULD NOW UNDERTAKE CAREFUL REVIEW OF OUR OVERALL
APPROACH TO VERIFICATION, AND CONSIDER POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO
SOME ELEMENTS THEREOF. AS MISSION SEES IT9 U.S. HAS BASIC CHOICE
OF EITHER BASING LONG TERM VERIFICATION
SYSTEM LARGELY ON NTM0 OR OF FINDING WAYS IN WHICH THE OVERT
SYSTEM COULD BE TAILORED TO MEET AT LEAST A MAJORITY OF GERMAN
CONCERNS. WHILE RETAINING ITS ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND
PURPOSES THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO STIMULATE THINKING ON SUBJECT
AND SUGGESTS SOME ILLUSTRATIVE WAYS IN WHICH WE MIGHT PROCEED
TO ADOPT OUR CURRENT POSITION, END SUMMARY
1, IN VIEW OF FRGIS STRONGLY HELD RESERVATIONS ON A RELATIVELY
ELABORATE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEMO MISSION BELIEVES U,S. WILL HAVE
TO DECIDE VERY SHORTLY WHETHER:
Ao WE ARE IN ESSENCE PREPARED TO ABANDON LARGE ELEMTS OF AN
INSPECTION SYSTEM FOR MBFR (ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO MONITORING
POST?WITHDRAWL FORCE LEVELS) THUS RELYING LARGELY ON NTM BUT WITH THE
POSSIBILITY OF SOME STATIC POINTS AT EXIT POINTS TO VERIFY WITH-
DRAWLS (PER RUTHS7S LATEST COMMENTS IN REFTEL' OR
B, WHETHER WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE OVERT
SYSTEM ALONG LINES OF THE ONE DEVELOPED IN THE U';S; OCTOBER 5 PAPER;
2, IF WE ARE TO PURSUE OPTION (A) THE CURRENT STATE OF FRG THINKING
OFFERS US THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHIFT OUR POSITION GRADUALLY IN THE
DIRECTION OF A MORE NARROWLY FOCUSSED APPROACH TO VERIFICATION,
SUCH A CHOICE WOULD PROBABLY HELP US ON OTHER ISSUES WITH THE FRG AND
SERVE TO INCREASE THE NEGOTIABILITY OF AN OVERALL MBFR AGREEMENT WITH
S E C R E T
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THE EASTY IT WOULD ALSO, OF COURSE, INTRODUCE IMPORTANT DIFFICULTIES
FOR A NUMBER OF OTHER INTEREST ALLIES (E;G;r UK9 BELGIUM/NETHERLANDS)
3; IF ON THE OTHER HAND WASHINGTON WISHES TO MOVE FORWARD ON
OPTION ;BP, MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE WILL SHORTLY HAVE TO COME TO
GRIPS WITH AND ACCOMMODATE OUR PREFERENCES ON AN OVERT SYSTEM TO
THE FRGS STRONG RESERVATIONS AND CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT
TO MOBILE TEAMS, WHICH PER REFTEL~ NOW APPEAR TO US AS
HARDENING OF BONN'S POSITION. OTHERWISE, A LONG-DRAWN
OUT DEADLOCK MAY ENSUE IN WHICH A SIGNIFICANTLY MORE RESERVED
POSITION TOWARD MBFR MAY AFFECT U.S, ABILITY TO REACH UNDERSTANDINGS
WITH BONN ON OTHER ISSUES IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS.
4: AS THE MISSION UNDERSTOOD INITIAL U:S. THINKING ABOUT VERIFICATION.
THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE U.S, WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NON-
INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. AS THE
GERMANS PERCEIVE IT (AND HAVE OCCASIONALLY REMINDED US)9 THE U3S.
IS NOW A STRONG ADVOCATE OF OV'ERT VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS WHICH
MIGHT BE NON-NEGOTIABLE WITH THE WARSAW PACT BUT WHICH9 IF
ACCEPTED BY THE PACTS WOULD POSE SEVERE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FOR
THE FRG; IT NOW SEEMS CERTAIN THAT THE GERMANS WILL PERSIST IN THIS
UNDERLYING ATTITUDE WHICH WILL COLOR THEIR THINKING ABOUT VERIFICA-
TION: THIS, IN TURN, WILL MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE U3S9 TO STRIKE
A REASONABLE COMPROMISE WITH BONN, AND ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DO SO
IF WE CONTINUE TO ASK FOR THE FULL GAUMUT OF VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS WHICH WE HAVE LAID BEFORE THE ALLIES'`
5. IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION THAT THE MOST DEFICIENT PART OF THE
GERMAN POSITIONS IN TERMS OF OBTAINING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION9 IS
THE GERMAN SUGGESTION THAT OVER VERIFICATION COULD BE DISPENSED
WITH ONCE WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED; AS WASHINGTON HAS
OFTEN POINTED OUT. AND AS THE MISSION HAS'UNDERSCORED IN ITS DISCUS-
SIONS HERE WITH THE ALLIES. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE ADEQUATE
ASSURANCES THAT RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS ARE BEING MAINTAINED AT THE
AGREED CEILINGS: THEREFORE;, THE MISSION SUGGESTS THAT WE SEEK
TO OBTAIN SOME GERMAN MOVEMENT ON THIS ISSUE WHICH WOULD COMMIT
BONN TO SOME FORM OF OVERT VERIFICATION IN THE POST-WITHDRAWAL
PHASE;
6. THERE ARE SEVERAL POSSIBLE WAYS TO MEET GERMAN CONCERNS, FOR
EXAMPLE, THE GERMAN IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE; DESPITE THE
DIFFICULTIES CITED BY WASHINGTON IN RECENT GUIDANCE. COULD BE
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ILLUSTRATE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, THE WEST MIGHT ASK FOR A CERTAIN
QUOTA OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS; THIS WOULD CORRESPOND ROUGHLY TO
THE GERMAN IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENEGE BUT IT WOULD REQUIRE
THE WARSAW PACT TO ADMIT INSPECTORS FOR A LIMITED NUMBER OF INS-
PECTIONS WITHOUT A REQUIREMENT THAT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE BE
.PRODUCED BY THE NATO COUNTRIES. WE COULD INDICATE PRIVATELY THAT THIS
APPROACH IS IN FACT A SIGNIFICATN DEPARTURE FROM THE TYPE OF FORMAL
..MOBILE TEAM ACTIVITY WE HAVE HERETOFORE PROPOSED AND WHICH9
PER REFTEL, THE GERMANS CONSIDER 'UNACCEPTABLE."
7, TO STRENGTHEN OUR NEGOTIATING HAND FURTHER, BOTH VIS-A-VIS
THE GERMANS AND ULTIMATELY AGAINST THE WARSAW PACT, THE U.S, COULD,
IN ADDITION TO THIS ON-SITE INSPECTION SYSTEMP PROPOSE A SYSTEM OF
A LIMITED NUMBER OF DESIGNATED CONTROL POINTS CI E., SPECIFIC,
CIRCUMSCRIBED GEOGRAPHIC AREAS SURROUNDING TRANSPORTATION CHOKE
POINTS) TO WHICH INSPECTORS COULD MOVE AT ANY TIME AND WITH NO
RESTRICTION ON FREQUENCY,
8. IF THE U.S~ WERE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS MUCH AGREEMENT WITH THE
FRG ON OVERT VERIFICATION, WE WOULD HAVE COME VERY CLOSE TO
ACHIEVING THE ESSENTIALS OF WHAT WE ARE PRESENTLY SEEKING, INDEED,
WE WOULD HAVE ACHIEVED MORE, IN ALL PROBABILITY, THAN WE ARE LIKELY
TO ACHIEVE IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT. HOWEVER, THERE
IS A THIRD ELEMENT OF THE GERMAN POSITION WHICH REMAINS TO BE
ADDRESSED THIS IS THE ISSUE OF HOW LONG OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTE`1S
WOULD REMAIN IN GERMAN TERRITORY-TO MONITOR POSSIBLE REDUCTION
FORCE LEVELS,
9. THE GERMAN VIEW, OF COURSE, IS THAT ALL OVERT SYSTEMS SHOULD
BE REPLACED BY RELIANCE ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ONCE WITHDRAWALS
ARE COMPLETED; EVEN IF WE WERE TO SECURE FRG AGREEMENT TO THE
DEGREE OF OVERT INSPECTION DESCRIBED ABOVE, THEY WILL PROBABLY CONTIN
UE
TO INSIST THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD NOT APPLY IN PERPETUITY
..IN SHORT, ONE OF THE MAIN SELLING POINTS IN PERSUADING THE GERMANS
TO ACCEPT OVERT VERIFICATION FOR POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS
WILL BE A U.S. ASSURANCE THAT THERE MAY IN TIME BE A PHASING OUT OF
INSPECTION SYSTEMS ON GERMAN SOIL.
S E C R E T
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2440
iO, THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD PROVIDE
SUCH ASSURANCES: FOR EXAMPLE? WE COULD GIVEN THE GERMANS PRIVATE
.ASSURANCES THAT IN PERIODIC REVIEWS OF THE OPTIONS OF THE MBFR
AGREEMENT? THE U,S, WILL? WITH ITS ALLIES REVIEW WHETHER THERE IS
NECESSITY FOR A CONTINUATION OF OVERT VERIFICATION, THE U;S, COULD
PERHAPS GO FURTHER THAN THIS AND PROVIDE THAT OVERT VERIFICATION
WOULD BE PHASED OUT AT THE END OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME UNLESS TWE
PARTIES AGREED TO CONTINUE THE SYSTEM: ALTERNATIVELYD THERE COULD
BE PROVISIONS FOR A GRADUAL PHASING OUT OF THE MORE OBTRUSIVE ELEMENT
S
OF THE SYSTEM? WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
WILL AT THE'END OF A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME REPLACE OVERT SYSTEMS
-OF VERIFICATION,
1i, WHATEVER ASSURANCE WE CAN GIVE TO THE FRG IN THIS REGARD WILL
OF COURSE HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED AGAINST THE LONG-RUN
VIABILITY OF THE MBFR TREATY, IT APPEARS TO THE MISSION) HOWEVER, THA
T
SOME ASSURANCES OF THIS KIND WILL BE NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO SECURE
FRG AGREEMENT TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF POST-WITHDRAWAL FORCE LEVELS;
-12, WITH REGARD TO OVERT VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS THE GERMANS
ALREADY ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE A REQUIREMENT FOR OVERT VERIFICATION,
THE PROBLEM HERE IS TO DESIGN A SYSTEM WHICH PROVIDES SOME MEASURE
.OF MOBILITY WHILE REASSURING THE GERMANS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF
OBTRUSIVENESS AND THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH MIGHT MAKE THE FRG A
"SPECIAL ZONE."
13, BENELUX AGREEMENT TO FIXED CONTROL POSTS IN THEIR TERRITORY
SHOULD BE OF SOME HELP WITH THE GERMANS ON THE "SPECIAL ZONE" PROBLEM
Sp
AND ON BASIS OF WHAT GERMANS HAVE SAID? MISSION BELIEVES THAT WE
CAN NEGOTIATE WITH THE GERMANS
AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF FIXED CONTROL POSTS, THE REMAINING PROBLEM
IS WHETHER WE CAN INTRODUCE MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS INTO THE SYSTEM
S E C R E T
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ANDS IF SOp IN WHAT WAYo WE THINK IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DO THIS IF
ONLY TO AVOID A POSSIBLE DEADLOCK WITH THE U;K, AND BELGIUM/
NETHERLANDS,
14, ONE WAY WOULD BE THROUGH THE TACTICAL DEVICE OF AGREEING TO THE
BRITISH POINT OF VIEWo I,E,n THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE BOTH
FIXED AND MOBILE VERIFICATION TEAMS TO THE SOVIETS AND BE PREPARED
TO SETTLE FOR ONLY FIXED POSTS IF THE WARSAW PACT REJECTS, AS IS
.LIKELY, MOBILE TEAMSoTHE U:S~ COULD TRY THIS APPROACH ON THE
GERMANS AS A FIRST STEP; THIS APPROACH IS LIKELY THAT WE BE PREPARED
TO FALL BACK TO AN APPROACH WHICH WOULD PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE
FREQUEN Or THE ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AS DESCRIBED ABOVE,
SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD THEN FORCE THE U,K, AND BENELUX TO
ACCOMMODATE THEIR POSITION TO STRONG FRG VIEWS, THUS REMOVING THE
U,S, FROM THE CENTER OF CONFRONTATION WITH BONN515, WASHINGTON SHOULD CONTINUE TO BEAR IN MIND THAT NTM ISSUE
REMAINS HIGH ON FRG LIST OF VERIFICATION ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUII-
TION, IN INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS FRG DEL HAS TOLD US CATEGORICALLY
THAT BONN MUST HAVE AN INDICATION OF NTM CAPABILITY (AS NOTED IN
REFTEL) BEFORE IT REACHES ANY DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS ON AN OVERT
INSPECTION SYSTEM; IN VIEW OF CONTINUING DIFFERENCES WITH FRG
GOVERNMENT ON VERIFICATION; WE CANNOT DETERMINE FROM HERE HOW FIRM
THIS POSITION IS, WE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THE FRG MILITARY (AND
THE DEFENSE MINISTRY IN GENERAL) CONTINUES TO FAVOR AN OVERT SYSTEM
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE ALLIES HAVE MUCH TO GAIN IN ESTABLISHING AN
OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM IN PACT AREAS OF THE NGAj WHEREAS A RECIPROCA
L
DEPLOYMENT OF A PAC', INSPECTORATE ON THE NATO SIDE WOULD MERELY
LEGALIZE A PROCESS WHICH THE PACT ALREADY ENGAGES IN THROUGH A VARIES
Y
OF WAYS; INCLUDING CLANDESTINE, MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE FRG DEL
POINT OUT THAT PRINCPAL SOURCE Or RESISTANCE TO THE NVISIONED
OVERT SYSTEM APPEARS TO BE EMANATING FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, OR
CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF,
16, IN ANY CASE, NTM QUESTION WILL STILL BE VERY MUCH ALIVE
UNTIL U,S4 REACTS, WE DO SEE ANY U,S, ACTION ON NTM AS VERY MUCH OF
A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORDS HOWEVER SINCE MEANINGFUL DISCUSSIONS OF NTM
CAPABILITY WOULD PROBABLY GIVE FURTHER ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE IN FRG
GOVERNMENT FAVORING A MINIMAL OVERT SYSTEM, WHILE THIS PROBLEM
DOES NOT NEED TO BE RESOLVED IN IMMEDIATE FUTUREa WE HOPE
WASHINGTON IS GIVING CONSIDERATION OF NTM SHARING QUESTION.
S.E C R E T
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17, THE MISSION IS ADVANCING THE ABOVE SUGGESTIONS IN THE HOPE
THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES WILL CONSIDER MEANS OF ACCOMMODATING
GERMAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS; WHICH, AS WE NOTES COULD EXACERBATE
OUR NEG07ATING PROBLEMS WITH THEM ON OTHER ASPECTS OF MBFR,
THE MISSION IS SUGGESTING ABOVE APPROACHES ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE
BASIS AND SIMPLY TO STIMULATE THINKING ON WAYS IN WHICH TO REACH
COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS WITH THE FRG: WE BELIEVE2 HOWEVER. THAT
WASHINGTON REACTIONS WILL BE REQUIRED EXPEDITIOUSLY ONCE FRG HAS
PUT FORWARD ITS SPECIFIC AMENDMENTS TO SPC`'S VERIFICATION
PAPERS WHICH WE NOW EXPECT DURING WEEK OF MAY 6. MISSION WOULD
APPRECIATE USDEL MBFRYS AND EMBASSY BONN'S COMMENTS- RUMSFELD
S E C R E T
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