POST MORTEM ON CZECH CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01495R001300130019-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 22, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Post Mortem on Czech Crisis
REFERENCE: USIB-D-28.1/5, 11 October 1968
1. In accordance with instructions contained in reference,
the strategic Warning Working Group (SWWG) received the post
111ortem reports on the Czech crisis prepared by CIA, DIA, NSA and
INR, and reviewed them thoroughly. The CIA and DIA reports are
studies in considerable detail of the intelligence coverage of the Czech
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20 August by Soviet and other Eastern European forces. The INR
summary addresses some aspects of the crisis of particular concern
to the State Department and the NSA report gives details of SIGINT
coverage during this period. These four reports, taken together,
present a thorough, comprehensive and very detailed review of all
intelligence activities--collection, analysis and reporting--during the
nine month period of developing crisis and final military intervention.
The reports are so complete in themselves that no attempt was made
to summarize them as a single document. A very brief summary of
events and intelligence coverage thereof is attached as Annex A.
The INR, CIA, DIA and NSA reports are attached in subsequent annexes.
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2. In the final analysis intelligence coverage of this crisis
was adequate up to the point of the decision to invade Czechoslovakia.
The capabilities of the forces to carry out the invasion was clearly
stated. The intention to invade was not known until after the fact.
The lack of ability to assess more accurately the likelihood of this
intention .vas the point of intelligence failure in the Czech crisis.
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3. There are certain areas of possible improvement in
intelligence performance which have been taken under consideration by
the SWWG for possible referral to action agencies. These areas
include:
4. The SWWG believes that the Soviet actions during the
period of May-August 1968 offer an unique opportunity to study the pro-
cedures utilized by the USSR to conduct military operations. Seldom
has a major military power made such a large-scale deployment of
forces under non-wartime conditions which permit a study of the
many facets revealed by these operations in something of an academic
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atmosphere. Much more can be done with the evidence accumulated
over the past few months than has been possible in these post mortem
studies which have been prepared by busy people also occupied by
on-going responsibilities. Consequently, we recommend an intensive
further study of the evidence be made by an objective group. This
study possibly could be achieved by the establishment of an ad hoc
group established solely for the purpose and staffed by representatives
from CIA, DIA, State, NSA and the military services. Alternatively,
such a study might be undertaken under contract by a suitable existing
research organization. Specific guidance for such a study would have
to be developed and preparations of this guidance would be a major
undertaking. The SWWG, if directed, could monitor the development
of this guidance which would require major contributions from
member agencies.
]:;hairman 25X1
Strategic Warning Working Group
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The development of the Czech crisis was protracted, extend-
ing from January 5, 1968 when Dubcek replaced Novotny. The
possibility of the impending crisis was recognized from its inception,
with an initial report on January 11 of the beginning of far reaching
changes in Czech life.
The intelligence community became increasingly concerned
with and reported the growing ferment in Czech life and the impact
tbiS raighi: have on other countries in 1astern F;nr.ope. (n March ?0
a recommendation was made to the Senior Interdepartmental Group
that they take the implications of the situation under consideration.
A State Department Task Force on Czechoslovakia was formed in
April and NATO set up an intelligence watch with a special daily report-
ing procedure in May.
The confrontation at Dresden on March 23 between Dubcek and
the leaders from the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary
and Rumania was inconclusive and satisfied no one. A month later,
on April 23, an intelligence memorandum reported that Dubcek's
program had led to a. bloodless but nevertheless very real revolution
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in Czechoslovakia and that Soviet and other leaders obviously feared
the spread of these concepts to their own countries. It was recognized
and reported by the intelligence analysts that this constituted a threat
to vital Soviet interests and that if political pressures failed, the
Soviets would face a choice between acceptance and military action.
Intelligence publications first began to suggest that a Soviet
military intervention in Czechoslovakia was a real possibility in late
March. This warning was repeated and on May 10 definite evidence
of Soviet troop concentrations and maneuvers on the Czech border
was reported for the first time.
Reporting on Soviet military preparations and maneuvers from
May 10 on was thorough. Our reporting was able to make the
important distinctions among the relatively small deployments for
extensive
political purposes in May, the/deployments involved in the Warsaw
Pact exercises in Czechoslovakia in June/July, and the very large
deployments, complete with mobilization and reinforcement from
the rear areas, which were undertaken from the second half of July
and culminated in the actual invasion. Their capability to intervene
in Czechoslovakia at any time should they elect to do so was clearly
stated. However, it was not possible to report when the decision to
invade was being taken, when the Soviet troops had received their
orders and were preparing to move, or when the Soviet troops actually
began to move.
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Political reporting, based in large part on open sources,
was extensive and it was possible to keep well informed of the various
political moves made by the Soviets and their allies on the one hand
and Dubcek and the Czech government and party on the other. The
import of the various meetings between the Czechs and the Warsaw
Five was reported promptly and accurately. In spite of this, however,
although intelligence publications had said that the possibility of
intervention with military forces was not to be excluded, at no time
was the intelligence community able to make a judgment that a Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia was more likely than not. Only ten hours
before the invasion was the DCI able to inform the President and his
senior advisors that an important development regarding Czechoslovakia
was taking place in Moscow. He did not predict intervention but did
note the hardening trend of Soviet policy.
Certain items of information, collected by highly sensitive
technical rnc:ans beforo the invafd.on but not available in Washixngton
until afterward, would have made a difference in political and military
reporting and could have permitted a better assessment of a Soviet
intent to intervene as opposed to the continuation of a war of nerves.
Also, many individual items of information fell into place after the
fact, and later came to seem obvious indicators.
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Insofar as the possibility of an attack on NATO and/or the
United States was concerned, the intelligence community examined
all available information and reached the conclusion that such an
attack was unlikely. There were no indications at the time of unusual
strategic forces activities. Also, the identified movements of Soviet
and other Warsaw Pact forces involved showed no pattern which posed
any threat to NATO. The detected deployment of more Pact forces
than were needed for the Czech situation reflected a cautious policy
and a use of extra forces to guard against a miscaluclation of Czech
strength and to brace against possible NATO counteraction.
In summary, the strategic warning of a confrontation between
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was adequate. An assessment
that this confrontation did not represent a direct military threat to
NATO was made by the intelligence community and constantly reviewed
~~~ira a.f(ii'r-i :d ras the. c ri.sis deepened. And fi.na.ll.y, tactical warning
that a Soviet deciion to intervene in Czechoslovakia with military forces
had been made, or even that such intervention was more likely than
not, was not given and could not have been given under the circumstances
and with the information available at the time.
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