PAUL WALSH ON HANDLING GREG RUSHFORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000100100013-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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H S L C,
.Review Staff: 75/3436
13 November 1975
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Paul Walsh on Handling Greg Rushford
Walsh said a 12 November DDO meeting with Rushford
had gotten off to a rather acrimonious start. Rushford
stated that he had "White House authority" to transmit
his 4 November letter and access to a list of all
analysts working on SALT.
After some phone calls by Ed Proctor to Rushford
it was agreed that CIA will search its records to
withdraw and make available to Rushford any memoranda
on SALT related subjects other than those on the normal
monitoring reports.
Rushford said he wants data on the Soviet "backfire"
and will submit a written request in the meantime the
data will be pulled together.
With regard to people and interviews, Rushford
will be given access to a list of analysts who report
on all functional aspects of the SALT monitoring reports..
A list of these analysts will be sent to the Review Staff
by 9:30 on 13 November.
The subject of a third presence at the interviews
was brought up. It was suggestion
that the Review Staff alert the analysts to Greg
Rushford's interest in interviewing them. Each person
will be given the option of having a third party with
them. If they ask for it a member of the Review Staff
will sit in. If they do not want such a third party,
the interview will be conducted by Rushford alone.
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Donald P. Vreyr~Z
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
REVIEW STAFF
7j"- 33 7
SUBJECT: Meeting with the Senate Select Committee
on 31 October 1975 in Order to Review
Paramilitary Operations in Laos and. Indonesia
1. On 31 October 1975 Mr. Colby, DCI and Mr. Nelson, DDO,
combined to give a presentation on paramilitary operations to the Senate
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to intelli-
gence Activities. In this presentation the paramilitary operation in Indonesia
during the period 1957 to 1958, and the Lao paramilitary operation during
the period 1961 to 1973 were discussed. Attached, is a resume concerning
these paramilitary operations which was placed into the Committee Record
of this hearing. The 31 October meeting was presided over by Senator
Church. Also present during various portions of the presentation were
Senators Tower, Schweiker, Hart, Morgan, Mondale and Huddleston.
2. In the course of the discussion on the Indonesian paramilitary
operation the Committee asked for a paper from the Agency which would
outline what role, if any, was played in the coup of 1965 by those Indonesian
officers that were supported by the CIA paramilitary operation which took
place from 1957 to 1958. Mr. Colby agreed that the Agency would provide
such a paper to the Committee. (ACTION REQUIRED: CJ EA is tasked
to prepare the required paper.) 25X1
SENSITIVE
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4. The CIA participants.in the 31 October session, in addition to
Messrs Colby and Nelson, were as follows: Special-
Counsel to the DCI; Review Staff;
Chief, Africa Division, and Mr. Ted Shackley, Chief, h;ast Asia i ,ion.
SENSITIVE
SECRET
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Theodore U. ac ' y
Chief, East Asia Division
Attachment:
Resume of PM Ops
Distribution:
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PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS
WHAT ARE.PARAMIL?ITARY OPERATIONS?
Paramilitary operations involve the provision of
covert paramilitary assistance and guidance to conventional
or unconventional foreign military forces or organizations.
Thus, a paramilitary operation is one which approximates a
conventional military operation in its techniques and its
requirements for military-type personnel, equipment, and
training. As a foreign policy instrument, it implies
either. the use of force or the prevention of the.use of
force, and it is employed only in circumstances: where
other means are inadequate, infeasible, or where the time
factor precludes the utilization of other means. A para-
military operation may involve something as simple and of
such short duration as,a one-time delivery of arms and
ammunition to help a'friendly government defend itself; or,
it may involve a program of several years' duration designed
to provide intensive training in basic guerrilla or counter-
guerrilla tactics_for-an instructor cadre, which can, in
turn, pass these skills on to units engaged in combatting
an externally supported insurgency or incursion.
Although the terms "covert" and "non-attributable"
were frequently used in connection with large paramilitary
operations of the past, such operations given their nature
and scope are never truly covert. Our paramilitary involve-
ment in Laos became typical of this type of operation as the
concept of deniability or nonattributability was no longer
applicable once duration and escalation eroded the original
cover mechanisms.
PARAMILITARY RESOURCES
A recent review by a CIA/DOD group of paramilitary
capabilities concluded that CIA's paramilitary resources
are at a minimum or.near-minimum level for current and con-
tingency use. There is concern that a continued reduction
of our paramilitary-program, concurrent with a reduction in
DOD's capability to provide support to CIA in this area,
could seriously impair the ability of the United States
Government to respond with covert paramilitary action in
those instances where national needs and policy so dictated.
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Our most critical resource, however, is personnel.
To one degree or another, materiel and equipment can be
obtained from outside sources (military or.commercial)
if lead time permits, but the capability to plan, support
and conduct covert paramilitary operations can rest only
in personnel whose skills have been developed and refined
through experience in previous operations. The total
number. of currently qualified air, ground and maritime
paramilitary officers and technicians in CIA is less than
However, these officers are extensively cross25X1
trained and capable of performing in a wide variety of roles
ranging from covert aviation operations to instruction in
heavy weapons. .
It.should be made clear that the capability to con-
duct paramilitary operations is dependent on the same CIA
infrastructure that makes possible the entire range of our
other operations overseas. Our paramilitary infrastructure
which is much more limited in size than it was two years ago
is currently devoted~to a large extent to the support of CIA's
intelligence collection responsibilities. This support
ranges from facilitating the collection efforts of our
Chiefs of Station abroad in a number of different areas to
the support of developniental techniques and devices which
eventually will be utilized against high priority targets.
Thus, in summary CIA has the essential infrastructure and
the experience to operate in an environment which requires
increasing assurance that risk of exposure can be held to
an acceptable level and CIA requires-.a'limited paramilitary
capability in order to successfully meet its intelligence-
gathering responsibilities. .
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