US-USSR TALKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01439R000500090003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 26, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved
Background
In the early months after the June 67 war
there was no movement toward peace in the Middle
East. The Arabs were stunned and feebly reas-
sembling their military establishments. The
triumphant Israelis were waiting for the Arabs
to make peace gestures. As time passed it be-
came apparent that peace settlements were not
coming and that instead a new :drift toward hos-
tilities was developing.
Five months after the war on 22 November
1967,.the.UN passed resolution 242 which,. among
other things, called for Israeli withdrawal from
territories occupied during the war and asserted
the. right of every state in the area. to live in
peace within secure and recognized boundaries..
Ambassador Jarring came to the Middle East to.
promote. this settlement. As months passed it
became evident that Jarring's efforts would not
bring even indirect negotiations. Arab terror-
ists, meanwhile, were increasing their operations
against I.srael,.and Israeli retaliation, harsh
and extensive, inflamed the situation.
The Soviet Union, which immediately after.
the end of the June war began to re-equip the.
Egyptians, Syrians, Iraqis, and Algerians, also
began talking in the spring of '962 ahou-F find-
ing a formula
L
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In September Moscow indicated to. ng o- i s.
interest in finding a solution for the Middle
East..
In late 1968 the French began to promote a
Big Four conference. When the. Soviets trans-
mitted a Middle East settlement proposal to.the.
US on 30 December 1968,.it.was clear that dis-
cussions would be. held.
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Soviet Motivations
1. The. Soviet initiative springs out of
several factors. Moscow wishes to open the. Suez
Canal to provide better access to the. Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean. But even more im-
portantly Moscow.fears that the Middle East
situation might get out of hand with unfore-
seeable consequences for the Arabs and the
Soviet Union itself. Moscow wishes to reduce
the dangers of a Big Power clash and at the.
same time hopes to gain prestige by posing as
the Arab.champion. Moscow is aware .that another
Arab-Israeli war at this time would certainly
bring another debacle to. the Arabs. and would
risk a US-Soviet confrontation. On the other
hand, Moscow recognizes that the chances of a
settlement are poor.
2. Accordingly Soviet policy has been, and
is, dual in nature. Moscow negotiates to achieve
a settlement which would be acceptable to the Arabs.
At .the. same time it maintains and hopefully improves
its relations with Arab governments. and with. the.
guerrilla movements. The. Soviets know .that any
settlements. achieved would neither. end suspicion
and tension nor the Arab need for Soviet arms
and political support. If settlement talks break
down completely, . the. Soviet Union remains the
strong friend of the. Arabs. The Soviet Union
has been cautiously maneuvering itself into a
position of contact with. and support for the
guerrilla movements. The Soviets can move for-
ward on this new relationship anytime they wish,
taking their cue from the rise or fall of the.
fedayeen's political fortunes.
Developments in the Talks
3. The Soviet proposal of December 1968,.
drafted in patterns which the Arabs. favor, was
studied for weeks. by US experts. The US. decided
that it would engage in talks to. determine if
the~USSR were seriously interested in searching
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for Middle East settlements and damping down the
expanding hostilities even though the. Soviet pro-
posals were not acceptable. Bilateral talks began
on 18 March 1969 in Washington between Assistant
Secretary Sisco and Ambassador Dobrynin. On 3
April Four Power talks by the. respective ambas-
sadors to. the. UN opened in New York.
4.
After a short time,
the talks bogged down in trivia; for example,.
from the.end of May until the. talks were ad-
journed on 1 July, the. meetings were devoted
largely to developing wording for a possible
draft communique, which would give the. public
the. impression that something was being accom-
plished. Aside from developing working relations
between the ambassadors concerned, the accom-
plishment of the Four Powers was agreement on
six rather bland points: 1) support of the..22
November 1967 UN. Resolution (aimed at promoting
a Middle East peace); 2) Big Four suggestions
will be submitted to the parties involved, not
imposed; 3) all terms of a settlement must be
agreed on as a package; 4) the. settlement must
reflect the inadmissibility of the. acquisition
of territory by war; 5) the aim is not an armi-
stice but .a just and lasting peace; 6) in
accepting the. charter of the UN,.all member
states have undertaken a commitment to. act in
accordance wi.th.Article 2 (Member states re-
nounce the use of force). The Four Power. talks
are still in recess, awaiting the outcome of the
bilateral discussions.
5. Early in the bilateral talks Dobrynin
emphasized that the Soviet Union wanted pease,
not simply an armistice. He repeatedly insisted.
that by. UN resolution Israel had to get out of
occupied territory, but he recognized that be-
fore this would occur a package settlement had
to be accepted.
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6. In April 1969 the. US prepared a draft
proposal which was presented as its "14 points"
to Dobrynin in early May. On 17 June Dobrynin
presented a counter-draft which represented lit-
tle Soviet "give." On 15 July Sisco delivered
another draft,.a "13 points" proposal. The USSR
did not produce a counter proposal, but commented
at length on each point.
9. To date Moscow has yet to respond of-
ficially to. the paper, but the remarks of a
lower level Soviet official that Moscow found
the paper "unbalanced and unacceptable" suggests
an eventual unfavorable reply.
The Soviet Position
10.. There has been movement in the Soviet
position,.but no major concessions. No real
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progress has been noted on basic issues. such as
refugees and the. return of occupied territory.
The Soviets seemed to be interested in arriv-
ing at an agreement, but one acceptable to the
Arabs.. Soviet gains in the Middle East have
been too dramatic to be thrown away on a peace
gamble which their friends, the. Arabs, do not
want.
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The Arab Position
12.. The Arabs. view the Two- and Four-Power
talks as their last hope of dislodging Israel
from their lands short of war. They are afraid
that the talks. have collapsed altogether; this
accounts for the militant tone in Nasir's re-
cent speech, which seems to have been designed
not to close the door on a possible settlement
but to serve notice to the US. that should the
talks. be allowed to fail, there would be an-
other war.
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The Israeli Position
14.. Israel has been and remains adamantly
opposed to the. Two- and Four-Power negotiations.
in Te.l Aviv's view the cards are stacked against
them. The Israelis believe that three. of the.
participants (the Soviet Union, France,,and the.
UK) are basically pro-Arab. Further the Israelis
view the. new US. administration as less dependable
than th.e. previous one. They thus believe that
in the process of the talks vital Israeli inter-
ests would be. compromised in the. interest of
illusory approaches to peace. Israel,therfore,
has consistently sought to. characterize the US-
Soviet bilateral talks as detrimental to US.
interests as well as to its own.
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Prospects
18. The Soviet union's response to. the.
latest US. packau
ne ative
he Soviet re-
se,. owe.ver, wi again depend on the.
outcome of their continuing discussions with.
the Arabs.
19. Moscow is in any event ready to. resume
the Big Four talks in New York.
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20.. Accordingly, it would seem that talks
on a Middle East settlement will be continuing.
The Four Power talks can only become meaning-
ful,,however, if some breakthrough is achieved
in US-USSR discussions. There is no indication
that this will happen. Gromyko recently re-
ferred to the Syrian Golan Heights as an area
which must be evacuated by Israel. Tel Aviv
insists that the. Golan Heights are not nego-
tiable. The Soviet reference to the. Golan
Heights: could have been a Soviet tactic or
it could prove to. be an eventual stumbling
block. The Syrian question has not been dealt
with. in the Big Power talks. Nevertheless,.
before any meaningful settlement can be achieved
accord on Syrian problems must also be reached.
Likewise,.the incredibly complicated Jordanian
problems, which have not been under US-USSR dis-
cussion, must also be resolved.
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