STAFF NOTES: EAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300110001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 13, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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East Asia
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January 13, 1975
No. 0056/75
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January 1 3 ; 1975
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Indonesia-USSR: Warming Trend . . . 1
The Thai Student Movement--A
Current Assessment . . 3
. . . . . . . . . .
Burma: Government Under Fire . . . . . . . . 6
Malacca Strait Oil Spill
Reopens Controversies . . . . . . . 11
Malaysia: Insurgent Squabbling . . . . . . . 13
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War:ni.nc 't' rend
F0re.1.gn P1 i n:i s ter Adam P1a 1.1k success Cu 1 vi.:;.i. L
to Moscow in I ato Uccatnbcr J.'VociucOd no :;urpri :; e:;
but did provide furt?hor evi.clonco that Moscow-
Jakar La relation:; are imi>r.oy.inci.
r_ trip Capped
year o i Lcac i .y increasing contact:; bctwoen the
two governments. A lone-delayed trade agreement,
which the Sov i.e t:, had sought for several. year,,;,
was signed in March. Jakarta has now agreed to
let the Soviets begin construction of their large
now embassy building, first agreed to by Sukarno
but in limbo since 1965. Exchanges of official
visitors also increased markedly in 1974, even
though Jakarta remains cool to Soviet desires for
cultural exchanges and other nonofficial visits.
During Malik's trip, he signed a general
economic and technical cooperation agreement with
Moscow. 't'he agreement does not specify the amount
of credits the Soviets wi1.1 provide nor the proj-
ects to be assisted; details will be negotiated
later. Indonesia is interested in projects that
will not require large numbers of Soviet technicians,
whom Jakarta views as potential. subversives. Mos-
cow, however, favors sonic sort of large showy proj-
ect that would provide maximum publicity for its
new friendliness with Jakarta. Agreement was also
reached for a visit to Indonesia during 1975 by
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Seeking better ties with the Soviet Union is
part of a general Indonesian effort to improve re-
lations with European Communist states--a con-
scious policy decision made in 1973 to end almost
eight years of frosty relations caused by the ag-
gressively anti-Communist outlook of Suharto and
January 13, 1975
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Lary co I le"(11le :. Du.rinq hi:; recent travels,
for exelmJ)le, Mr.l].i.N: al. ,o v.it;i.t:.e%l J.:-,t e;ernlnny and
11Un,Ja1.'y, where he n.LCJncCi 1:rack a(J1-comC`.nL:;. till:licY.
the year, Jakar(:a ,;idneci ac;reenlent:, wiL?h Yu(jo-
:~li"V.i.a, 170111ani;l, and l'olan(d. In addition to the
Lr lde pact., I ndono::;Ia has disco;;coed the prospects
economic and Lechnlccl 1. assis Lance from these
:i i 'at Cs, .
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The warming trend is thus partly a re-.turn
fi:C) Jakarta's traditional nonaligned foreign policy
t.nat prevailed until 1965. Uut the decision also stems
rom Indonesia's perception of a changing world situ-
.3,tion. Jakarta', leaders have noted the more moderate
foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its relations
with Western states. They also see a need to balance
growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. In prac-
tical terms, moreover, they want to explore new
sources of credit in the expectation that Indonesia's
existing aid donors will begin reducing their com-
mitments. More solvent financially as a result of
the recent dramatic price increases in oil and
other export products, Indonesia can now accept
Soviet credit terms, which are stiffer than those
January 13, 1975
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The Tllat student rlicvem}.'nF_ on tl.~t ..I.:,ccndancy
throughout 1972 and into late 0 *13, gja ned a.nr.stant
wor Ldwide notoriety wa.t.h the 1:.111 Jt the
military regime in October. 1973 AL That time, stu-
dent power and i.nfluence Wa::?, at. Lto zenith and many
Thai observers belicvac: r.naat the, once apo! i tical
students represented a now ant important addition
to the Thai pol i tlcal. equation . This assc5:;rnent
proved generally accuratr_ during much of 1.974. Pr. j. me
Minister. Sanya Thamma:;ak, appointed to head an interim
government and unsure of his public mandate, turned
often to the student leadership in the early months of
his adrnini.` trat: ion before making important policy de-
cisions Today, student leaders are largely ignored
by the government, reflecting the precipitous decline
in public support for the student movement in genera..
There can be little doubt that the uni.versity-
based Nat.ion:al Student Center of Thailand, which pro-
vided the crucial organizational backbone to the stu-
dent movement in its formative years, has fallen on
hard times. The group's executive committee, which
once provided the leadership that brought thousands
into the streets, is so rent with ideological and
factional rivalries that it has been unable to choose
a secretary general since last August. Moreover,
although on-again off-again elections to choose a
secretary general are now set for January 12, no
candidates are as yet registered for the contest-
Equally humiliating to the once proud organization
was the discovery last month that the chief of its
financial department had embezzled scree $28,000 The
revelation received headline Treatment in the Bangkok
press, which has become ir~_-Leastngly critical of the
student movement.
January 13, 1975
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'IThe rea:ion for the doe I itie in 1:11df!nt. .1 of 111-
o11cC qon'"- 11I11.:11 decpur than tina11eial r;cand:.l) n ilnd
inter.ll:!cine st:rugaler; wi.t.1ii.n the Nat.i.onal S'Ludent
Cent:er. Simply put., the studontr; lo""t- Widespread
public Sympathy for the.i r cause once it. became ap-
parent. that they could ot:fer no mcaningfu1 alter.na-
Live to the old political order. they helped bring
down. The 'Phoi people had Looked to the un.i.veri~i.t j
students ?ind their academic mentors to provide some
direction in a country shorn of political leadership;
instead, they got more student domonstrati.ons, some
of them turning violent and others serving to keep
Bangkok in a state of tension during much of 1974.
Student activists, such as Thirayut I3unmi and Seksan
Prasertkun, found it easier and more fulfilling emo-
tionally to organize new street demonstrations than
to work with the new S anya government to ensure an
orderly transition to civilian rule.
The public, moreover, .`.ailed to perceive any
distinction between the activism of university stu-
dents and the lawlessness of various youth gangs,
including vocational. students. Thus, the public and
press looked upon university-sponsored demonstrations
--such as those protesting the visit of Prime Minister
Tanaka, the US military presence, and the Sanya gov-
ernment's new constitution--as n1.:nifestations of a
broade- breakdown in hubl'.c order.
The leftward drift of the student leadership
also contributed significantly to the decline of the
movement. As the public became increasingly irritated
with the ,tudents' protests, their leaders became in-
creasingly radical in their political viewpoint. In
public rallies, student leaders attacked Thailand's
close relationship with the US, the military's role in
politics, and the conservative elite's stranglehold
over the power structure. In private, activists such
as Thirayut criticized the monarchy and called for the
January 13, 1975
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While the student movement is clearly in a
state of disarray, it is still capable of being a ma-
jor disruptive force Former prime minister Thanom's
sudden return to Bangkok in late December, which al-
most immediately sparked a large st'ident demonstra-
tion, served as a reminder that certain highly emo-
tional issues can unite the various student factiox:
into a cohesive political force. Large numbers of
students are unlikely to take to the streets again
in the near future unless provoked by an army coup
d'etat or the return of the ousted military rulers,
but growing public intolerance of student dissidence
could lead to an early and perhaps bloody confrontation
between students and the government. The police and
army have been particularly resentful of the pruminer.t
political role student leaders have played over the
past year and they may seize on any convenient pretext
to arrest the "radical" leadership.
January 13, 1975
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