STAFF NOTES: CHINESE AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300080029-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: December 9, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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70p secret
Chinese Affair
Top Secret
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December 9 1975
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-ON TENTS
December 9, 1975
China-Vietnam: The Islands Dispute.
The Tachai Campaign:
Provincial Returns Come In. . . . . . . . . . . 6
Leadership Notes. 8
France: No Plums for Sauvagnargues . . . . . . . 9
The Modernization of
Bureaucracy in the PLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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The Kwangsi Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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Peking's sensitivity over the security of its
southeast flank, as well as its increasing impatience
with Hanoi, was vividly illustrated late last month
in a sharp People's Daily attack on "foreign aggres-
sors" in the South China Sea.
The question of sovereignty over two major is-
land groupings in the area--the Spratlys and the
Paracels--has been a major annoyance in Sino-Viet-
namese relations since the Chinese took the Paracels
from the former Saigon government in January 1974.
Both Peking and Hanoi have periodically reiterated
their claims to both island groups, but neither side
had openly pushed the issue in public. The Chinese
even declined to respond to Hanoi's announcement
last May that North Vietnamese forces had captured
several of the Spratlys--500 miles south of the
Paracels--from the former South Vietnam government.
In September, the Chinese turned up the heat
on the islands issue just prior to North Vietnam
party chief Le Duan's visit to Peking; they publicly
reiterated their claims to the disputed islands and
recalled for the first time in months the 1974 take-
over in the Paracels.
Last month's broadside was by far the toughest
Chinese statement on the dispute since early 1974.
It amounts to the first direct challenge of Hanoi's
claims to the islands and emphasizes the serious-
ness of Peking's determination to regain all con-
tested islands. The article asserted that China's
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claims date back 2,000 years and cited archeological
and other evidence to support the claims. Chinese
sovereignty over all the islands was described as
both "sacred" and "inalienable." Peking's demand
that all the disputed islands must be returned to
Chinese control was juxtaposed with its long-held
pledge to "liberate" Taiwan, a clear indication not
only of the importance the Chinese attach to their
claims, but also a sign that Peking may be prepared
to wait some time for a final solution of the issue
--as it is in the case of Taiwan.
In an apparent attempt to avoid any confusion
about the primary target of Peking's blast, the ar-
ticle employed language that played down the signifi-
cance of claims other parties have to the Spratly
Islands. The Nationalist Chinese claim all of the
islands and maintain a military garrison on one, but
the People's Daily reference to the fact that many
of the islands are still not "in Chinese hands"
rules out the possibility that Peking was referring
to the Nationalist presence there. Peking is doubt-
lessly confident that Nationalist claims will be re-
solved when the much larger Taiwan question is
settled.
The Philippines also claim some of the islands
in the Spratly group. Peking has never made an is-
sue of Manila's claims, however, and, when diplomatic
relations between the two countries were established
earlier this year, both sides agreed to settle all
bilateral disputes without resort to force. Peking
seems prepared to put aside the disagreement with
Manila.
Although People's Daily left no doubt that Hanoi
was the major object of its wrath, its attack on Hanoi
was implicit: references to Moscow in the blast were
explicit and vituperative, leaving no question that
Peking believes the Vietnamese are abetting the So-
viets in an attempt to expand Russian influence into
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the region. Significantly the article was published
only two days after Le Duan returned to Hanoi from
Moscow--where he received a much warr.:~r welcome than
he had in Peking, gained a Soviet agreement to pro-
vide substantial economic aid to North Vietnam, and
seconded Moscow's views on detente end on interna-
tional peace and security. Peking insLsts that both
detente and the recent Helsinki security pact are
Soviet "tricks" designed to facilitate what the Chi-
nese see as Soviet "expansionism,." Le Duan's en-
dorsement of detente', puts Hanoi squarely in Moscow's
camp on an issue of major importance to the Chinese
and was almost certainly read in Peking as a deliberate
provocation.
In fact, the trea?_nent Le Duan received in Peking
last September contzasts sharply with the rousing
welcome he got in Moscow. There was no joint commu-
nique to mark his China visit, and the Hanoi leader
failed to tender the normal farewell banquet prior
to his departure for home. Moreover, Le Dun went
to,Peking with the hope of signing several economic
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he Chinese gave less an
Tne ast working-level Vietnamese
negotiator left China in mid-November after three
months of talks--without any indication of further
progress. His departure virtually rules out the pos-
sibility of any additional economic agreements between
the two parties, at least for the time being.
The Chinese clearly see a correlation between
Hanoi's increasing tilt toward Moscow and the long-
range possibilities for Soviet "meddling" through
Vietnam in the South China Sea, as well as Southeast
Asia generally. It also is apparent that the Chinese
consider control of islands in the area vitally im-
portant to their security. The People's DaiZy ar-
ticle, in fact, refers to the region as "an important
gate of China" and to the islands as located on major
shipping lanes.
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For their part, the Soviets have been sharply
critical of the Chinese seizure of the Paracels.
Since early 1974, Moscow has routinely attacked
China's claims to all of the islands and its use of
force in the Paracels. The Soviets, however, have
stopped short of providing outright support to Hanoi's
counterclaims. Soviet maps still show the islands,
as belonging to China, although recent press comments
have implied that they were Vietnamese. A Soviet
official recently said Moscow considers the status
of both island groups as "undetermined." Peking
ignored these attacks until last week. Then, the
People's Daily article asserted that the Soviet
Union, throwing aside earlier support for China's
claims, mounted a "venomous" assault on Peking
after the Paracels incident.
Peking's long-term concerns almost certainly
hinge on its view of Soviet intentions and activities.
Chinese leaders also seem persuaded, however, that
in the shorter run Hanoi could unilaterally disrupt
their hopes of developing a bloc of friendly countries
along China's southern border. The Chinese and Viet-
namese share very few common perceptions of Southeast
Asia. They are clearly on opposite sides in the cur-
rent dispute between Thailand and Laos. Hanoi has
vigorously defended tha Lao side and has launched
frequent attacks on Thai "aggression." Peking, on
the other hand, has remained relatively quiet on the
subject, privately lobbying for a peaceful solution
to the disagreement and encouraging improved relations
between the two countries. The Chinese have been by
far the largest contributors to Cambodian reconstruc-
tion since the communists took over there last spring.
Peking has also made it clear that it was on Cambodia's
side in the border dispute with North Vietnam and ap-
parently encouraged the Cambodian Communists to open
diplomatic relations with Thailand.
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On the Sino-Vietnamese border itself, 25X1
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cadre are being advised to stand firm in the face
of alleged Vietnamese attempts to "occupy" Chinese
territory. Althouth these putative border incidents
have not been confirmed and there is very little
likelihood that a serious border dispute will develop,
the fact that the Chinese continue to talk about
such incidents suggests that Peking is determined to
maintain a degree of anti-Vietnamese feeling along
the border.
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The Tachai Campaign: Provincial
Returns Come In
Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-'ping reportedly described
the September-October "learn-from-Tachai" conference
as the most important meeting held in China since
the communist take-over. While Teng was obviously en-
gaging in hyperbole, his remark underlines the im-
portance that has been accorded to the Tachai campaign
in the last few months. Tachai now overshadows this
year's two other major campaigns--strengthening pro-
letarian dictatorship and criticizing the classical
novel "Water Margin." Reporting on virtually every
organization China is now in terms of learning
is mass campa.Lgh
will be further broadened witn convening of a
series of national. meetings on other economic sectors
and on culture. A national coal conference has al-
ready been held.
Most provinces have held a series of mass ral-
lies and other meetings to publicize the major ad-
dresses at the conference by vice premiers Teng
Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng, and to send off youths
and cadres to rural areas. The New China News Agency
reported on November 25 that over one million cadres
from 1.2 provinces had already gone to communes to
engage in manual labor and to direct production.
Most of these cadres appear to be from the hsien
(county) level, although a number of provincial and
prefectural leaders have also gone to the country-
side. The function of the latter cadres seems to be
to ensure that local cadres perform their duties with
the necessary zeal. Morale among local cadres has
been badly shaken by a series of purges and campaigns
dating from the Cultural Revolution and their reputa-
tion has been tarnished by publicity accorded to ex-
amples of corruption, sexual indiscretions, and a
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lack of initiative. Domestic propaganda has made it
clear that the hsien, and especially the hsien-level
party committee, is the key level in administering
the campaign. Indeed, cadre rectification at the
hsien level and below is one of the major themes of
the camnaian.
The Tachai campaign already seems to be the
most clearly defined and well-orchestrated campaign
since the Cultural Revolution. Given its scope, am-
bitious goals, and rising volume of rhetoric, there
is at least some danger that things could get out of
hand. But if current moderate leaders remain healthy
and in agreement and can successfully manage the cam-
paign with other efforts to correct trouble spots in
the economy fairly impressive gains may well be in
the offing.
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moderate
.Le uers iip vexing anc in the provinces will have
to monitor the campaign carefully lest criticism of
cadres leads to a rekindling of factional animosities
and the frustration of campaign goals.
On the whole, however, significant progress
has been made in curbing factionalism and increas-
ing production this year. 25X1
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cultural work was reliance on old cadres. Recent
provincial rotations and new appointments seem to
confirm that Peking holds this view. Veteran cadres
such as Fukien First Secretary Liao Chih-kao are re-
portedly cracking down hard on factionalism and have
transferred a number of noncompliant cadres
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Leadership Notes
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Two top leaders have recently reappeared after
significant absences. Chiang Ching was present on
December 1 at the meeting and picture taking session
between President Ford and Chinese head of state Chu
Te. Her last appearance was on October 15 at the
closing session of the national Tachai conference in
Peking. Chiang's political power has been sharply
diminished this year, and her appearances now seem to
be under the control of regime moderates and designed
to promote an, image of unity. In the past, Madame
Mao tended to punctuate periods of nonappear.ances
with public activities that were designed to raise
rather than lower political tensions. Her association
with the Tachai meeting was obviously meant to present
major undertakin
.q iinif-prl fronf- for this 25X1 a central
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document on the ac al mo is the ex
ample of Chiang and Teng Hsiao-ping who took time off
from the meetings to engage in manual labor. Her
presence at the meeting with President Ford is de-
signed to convey the same message--the support of the
'n economic specialist Li HSien-nien.
political left for Sino-US relations.
The other reappearance was Defense Minister Yeh
Chien-ying, who headed the Chinese representation at
the Peking celebrations of Albanian national day on
November 29. Yeh had not appeared since October 25
and is widely rumored to be i 1i. Surprisingly, Yeh
did not see President Ford even though he played an
important role in past meetings with ranking US of-
ficials. Yeh's place seems to have been taken by
another Chou En-lai stalwart, Vice Premier and lead-
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France: No Plums for Sauva nar ues
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French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues' five-
day visit to China last month was apparently less
than a total success from the French point of view.
IThe French foreign minister told
repor ers that he had been unsuccessful in his ef-
forts at reopening talks on the Concorde. Chinese
claims that French prices were "not competitive"
indicate that discussions on other sales were equally
unproductive. Officials in Sauvagnargues' party ad-
mitted that the only concrete result of the visit
was an agreement to expand cultural exchanges.
Despite their apparent disinclination to break
any new economic ground with Sauvagnargues, the Chi-
nese did express general satisfaction with Sino-French
relations--indicating that if President Giscard
d'Estaing's visit does not produce any pleasant eco-
nomic surprises neither will it be marred by any un-
pleasant political disagreements.
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Both sides placed far more emphasis on congruent
views on such matters as the need for European mili-
tary and economic cooperation. Peking used the occa-
sion of Sauvagnargues' visit--coming as it did soon
after the Rambouili.et summit and before the Paris
Conference on International Economic Cooperation--to
voice support for European efforts at easing economic
confrontation with the Third. World. Peking has long
believed that further hardening of the confrontation
would work to Moscow's advantage and sees Paris--
with its strong residual ties to former colonial
clients--as having a special role to play in promoting
compromise between developed and developing nations.
A People's Daily editorial published a week before
Sauvagnargues' arrival in Peking stands as the most
explicit Chinese endorsenyen.t yet of the establis -
ment of a "Second World - Third World" dialogue.
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The Kwangsi Connection
w Lung First Secretary Wei Kuo-cheng have had _a
long and intimate relationship
lin 1930 the
t e pe to organize the 7th Chinese Peasants'
Red Army in Kwangsi. They were survivors of the
force that eventually joined Mao in the Kiangsi
soviet in 1931. Both took part in the Long March
(1934-35) but joined different units; Teng went
with Liu Po-cheng while Wei joined Chen I's forces.
Following the Communist victory in 1949, Wei
became mayor of Fuchou, while Teng assumed more sub-
stantial national and regional posts. The two may
have had an opportunity to work together briefly
in 1950.
g, who as a reputation fcr bringing
s up on his own coattails, may have been a
major sponsor of Wei for his first important provin-
cial assignment.
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in 1957, following two years of crop failures,
Wei survived the dismissal. of three top Kwangni of-
ficials accused of mishandling relief grain. The
defense that Wei was out of the province during the
period cannot be refuted but seems flimsy; his sur-
vival suggests high-level support in the party, per-
haps from Teng. As his survival of the Cultural Rev-
olution attests, Wei undoubtedly has had well-placed
backers other than Teng, but Teng's influence seems
paramount. Teng moreover, has championed minority
causes, and Wei is from the Chuang minority. In
his report on the 1953 Electoral Law and the 1957
Report on the Rectification Campaign, Teng made major
allowances for minorities. In the 1957 speech he
advocated a moderate approach to settling minority
problems--a stance criticized during the Cultural
Revolution.
Teng's support of Wei may have been returned in
kind. Wei, who joined the Politburo in August 1973,
four months before Teng was reinstated, has been in
a position to support an old ally's resurgence to
power while simultaneously advancing his own career.
F
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 Scientific delegation begins
Austria and Italy.
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November 9 F rtr,r; atomic energy delegation ar-
3"V: pis in Peking at invitation of the
Academy of Sciences; feted by Vice
Premier Hua Kuo-feng on November 23;
departs for home November 24.
November 20 Chinese journalism delegation arrives
in Paris: meets with Prime Minister
Chirac on November 21.
November 21 26th anniversary of the establishment
of Sino-Albanian relations celebrated
with considerable fanfare in both Pe-
king and Tirana.
November 22 Chinese advance team arrives in Japan
to open consulate eneral in Osaka.
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November 22-23 Chu Te sends official condolences on
death of Franco; congratulates Juan
Carlos on his proclamation as King of
Spain.
November 23 French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues
departs Peking following last-minute
meeting with Teng Hsiao-ping.
November 24 Peruvian trade delegation arrives in
Peking; feted by Foreign Trade Minister
Li Chiang; new trade agreement nego-
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tiated which includes provisions for
export of 75,000 tons of .:ice to Peru.
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November 24 Rwandan education delegation begins
tour of China. F_ I
November 25 Surinam congratulated on independence;
official message sent in name of Chou
En- lai .
Chinese representative Lai Ya-li ad-
dresses UN General Assembly plenary
session on Soviet interference in
Angola.
Trade delegations depart for Cuba,
Iraq. F7 I
Panamanian Women's group arrives in
Peking; Bolivian youth group departs.
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Sri i'.nkan trade delegation arrives
in Peking, greeted by Minister of
Trade Li Chiang. Trade protocol signed
on November 30.
Korean Workers Party delegation, led
by central committee member Kim Huan,
arrives in Peking; welcomed by Inter-
national Liaison Department Chief
Keng Piao.
December 1 Chinese industry and trade delegation
arrives in Singapore for "friendly"
visit.
December 1-5 President Ford visits China.
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