PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070046-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: May 25, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

 Approved For Release 2005/07/12: CIA-RDP 0608R0003.00070046-3
'J., ... (;ULL'E;ili Si.Lua ion
1?1~3113PECII.IS POP,
AlIC&OIFIJIMED
~' i gh'ti ng r)r 'f~?C~ n h( riL l:L' C):' th
r1 Cjil t-.,11' i'l g
Ptl a ] r-lnc~r~s Party and radical fc:~da c,er1 has di mini shed
significantly since the announcement of a cease-fire and
the appcintment of the military cabinet on May 23. For
the moment b
th
i
o
s
des are restid thhli
,rane;e Paangsts
and Lebanese leftists because -they were caughtvoffyguard
by its appointment and are considering their next move.
The new government has drawn initial stren
th fr
g
om
..the surprise that surrounded its installation, from its
law and order image, and from widespread
popular uncertainty
about what it will be like to be governed by a military
cabinet. At the same time, however, it faces extremely
difficult problems: religious and- political tensions are
at the highest. level in the country's history; and
opposition forces are united as seldom before.
The policies and tactics adopted by the new govern-
ment could and probably will be the deciding factor in
whether Lebanon's traditional governing system survives
the present crisis. The best hope is that it will take
a non-partisan, conciliatory approach that through
negotiations could restore a modicum of public order and
leave Lebanon much as before. *At worst, it will move with
force, against the fedayeen and the leftists, precipitating
civil war, destroying the 'system of political and religious
compromises on which, the government rests, and inviting.
intervention by Syria or Israel or both. Such developments,
at a minimum, would seriously complicate general Middle
East peace negotiations. In the extreme, they could
prompt general hostilities that would involve Syria,
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt.
Strategy of the New Government
For the moment, at least; the new government has
opted fora conciliatory approach. Deputy Prime !Minister
Noussa Kanaan has stressed that the government is
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is Lo resto7:e
:L fl 1_~ 13.v, .J.nCt 1:L'1a.t 1't wi 1 S'c`JoCL to as, L. i:.l'I
be t,aceI1 the go'!e iln ent: and the fedayeeu. The Ca:i1SoL'sl:Lp, cu1:1e%?7s, or
any of the. other trappings of military rule.
r..+. +? . +-+.+. ++.+...a vG 1. LY U.J. C1 U- J J. 11. L"J. Gt 1 W .L 11 i:1 G ti e IR jJ -C L U G cI C:
advantage of the currently difficult political position
of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir
Arafat, the Phalangists' sense of victory, and the
political independence of .the leader of Lebanon's
Shia Muslim community, Imam Musa S adr , to divide the
opposition and gain grudging acceptance of his government
and extended observance of the cease-fire. If this
strategy 'succeeds , it will win a short-term improvement
in the security situation and--again in the short term--
Justify President Franjiyah's considerable political
.gamble in appointing a predominant ly','?military government.
Even if Rifai, is able to. implement the 'cease-fire,
however, he is certain to face what will probably turn
out to be overwhelming political challenges. In a
display of unity., important Muslim politicians, Lebanese
leftist leaders, fedayeen spokesmen, the Syrian press,
and one dissident;. Christian political leader have joined
in condemning the new government. They have charged that
it threatens the country's majority Muslim population,
the Palestinians, Lebanon's National Covenant, and
Syria itself. If these opposition forces remain united,
they have a good Chance of succeeding in their announced
goal: to force Rifai to resign.
Radical Arab governments, notably Iraq and Libya, are
sure to increase, their financial and military support to
Lebanese lef;tists and fedayeen radicals willing to
challenge Rifai. These governments already. expend large
sums for subversive activities in Lebanon, and their agents
have played a major role-in escalating urban violence over
the past few,,months. The principal Arab states join
with the Lebanese government in decrying this meddling
in Lebanon's domestic affairs, but are po%5erless to
stop it.
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Implications of Iyur, Lhe_r. F.i.r,h H..nc
iiiil . n _
P b.. .1. r'!:?7I1
C al.Cof l (DC :1.CjV'I^?CiI.Io,J()1:'t:ed ) i:1C1:LC:l,L; a
t:cradna:, t1l' . L Ill!.l;i 1-. us c En
?
:.,. 1 i. Li.1.L, .l, C. W.LJ..L X-i.ak an all-out Coll 2:ro11Laf:ion
with the fedayeen. In the recent Past, when there has
been a civilian cabinet:, lc_:.ader: of the major fedayeola
groups have resisted pressure from their fol lowers to
become directly involved in the violence. Now, wheh
the government is. itself....widely perceived to have
changed the rules..of. the game, even the relatively
'moderate fedayeen* leaders would probably find it impossible
to stay out of renewed fighting.
If heavy fighting broke out between the feda
een
y
and the Lebanese army, it could quickly escalate to
engulf and destroy much of Beirut. In the past,
successive civilian governments have; considered this an
unacceptable risk, and have elected to avoid a showdown.
This has led to gradually increased freedom of movement
for the fedayeen -in Lebanon. Now,- when the now military
government may be prepared to take greater risks, the
fedayeen are more heavily armed than in, the past. Although
they do not have the capability to defeat the combined forces
of the Christian militias and the 'L'ebanese army, they
do have the capability to-sustain urban warfare for some
time.
There is some anti--American feeling in Lebanon,
but it is not likely that extended urban violence would
assume a strongly anti-American character. Several dozen
American companies have 'offices in Beirut, and some 6,000
Americans are resident in the country..
Potential for- Syrian Intervention.
If the Lebanese army. were to come near success. in,
defeating the fedaye.en or driving them from Lebanon:,
as happened in Jordan in 1970 and 1971, Syria ' would
almost certainly intervene on. the behalf of the Palestinians.
Damascus genuinely supports the Palestinian cause, and,
equally important, does not want- to aggravate its own
problem ?in dealing with Pales?tinian? refugees and the
fedayeen by having those now` in'.` Lebanon flee to Syria.
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Syrian irite.rventiun ~;ould be likely to take the
a:vCi(t, ~.:LL':; C, V~ v ~> V:i jC:l p ii LLca1. Lh1 t~LL;i .1ga LLsL
Franjiyah and the government of Lebanon. L..:banese'
J.eadc.rs are mi.ncifu1 that. Lebanon and Syria were
historically joined, and that Syria has overwhelmingly
superior military capabilities As a'resul`k., the Lebanese
are sensitive to Damascus' views on internal Lebanese
political matters.
if Syria needed to do more than threaten, it could
allow or encourage larger numbers of fedayeen forces and
arms to cross from Syria into Lebanon (as happened during
the May 1973 clashes between the fedayeer and the army) ,
send units of the Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation
Army into Lebanon, or, finally, send Syrian regular
army forces across the border. The - current discussions
between the Syrians and the Palestinians on closer
political and military cooperation. will be interpreted by
the Lebanese as a potential threat to them.
Damascus is now preoccupied with a host of internal
and foreign problems, and would undoubtedly prefer not to
allow events in Lebanon to deteriorate to the point that
Syrian intervention became necessary. Dar(iascus may,
therefore, insist that the fedayeen exercise restraint.
Fedayeen leaders would honor such a request, as they are
heavily dependent on Syrian political' and military support.
The majority of the Palestinians realize that cooperation
with Syria is their last hope of winning a role in Middle
Fast peace negotiations, or ultimately, of winning control
of any of the occupied territories.
In the--extreme event that Syria did intervene
militarily in Lebanon, the most likely immediate develop-
ment would be the resignation of the current government
and its replacement with a civilian government headed
by a Sunni Muslim acceptable to Syria. This probably
would be sufficient to prompt a -Syrian withdrawal, but
it would leave a virtually powerless Lebanese government
and would substantially increase the freedora and influence
of the fedayeen in Lebanon.. Zibove all, it would greatly
diminish the ability of an already-weakened array and the
security services to keep order.
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l l:r. ii'-3t.~.) iL i,, Li oil'.lt GGovo.-t.^ri.1.tic co/,3 ~a IIL
It is possible at-. any stage that civil o-
vr:. S.Y.L i ctrl L.I1L'E~`LVE i1f .Oil, :Uuld grow to the point that
either Chris +:.:i_an or--more likely---t.ius lim political
groups would withdraw Lheir support for the power-sharing
principles of the National Covenant and seek complete
po;wrer for themselves . The leaders of Lebanon's large.
own interests were best served by supporting the National
Covenant. They are now faced with the momentous decision
of whether to stick with the known but limited advantages
Sunni Muslim community have in the past felt that their'..
of the present system or overturn the system in the
uncertain hope of winning 'unlimited advantage. Although'
they have criticized the current military government as
fundamentally unacceptable and itself a challenge to the
Covenant, it is by no means clear that they are prepared
to risk everything to challenge it. ?
If the current system of government were overturned,
however; the most likely regime to emerge would be a
leftist, Muslim-dominated -government more sympathetic to
the Palestinians and the radical Arab states. A leftist
government could be. dominated by such divergent figures
as former prime minister Rashid Karami, socialist
leader Kamal Jumblatt, or Shia Muslim Imam Musa Sadr.
All would be generally acceptable to the country's
several leftist and Muslim political parties, the
feday,een, and Syria. Such a government would be likely
to adopt a foreign policy ostensibly less pro-West and
pro-US than has been traditional in Lebanon.
Impact on Israel and,Peace Negotiations
The rise to' power in Lebanon' of a radical government
sympathetic to Syria would be seen in Tel Aviv as a major
threat to Israel's security. Such a regime would not,
at least initially, be militarily powerful, but it would
leave Israel. completely surrounded by hostile Arab states,
arid would permit an increase in the number of fedayeen
cross-border terrorist operations. It could, in time,
build its military forces and-provide important support
to Syria. ? ? r
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prompt Israel to be more inflexible toward a peace
settlement, and would invite a heavy Israeli military
response that could threaten renewed general hostilities.
t ~. t.:he very leiD!3t:11c' ex-1s 1:c 11r:io oo71: i ].`'s
1j 3ir.:i:,....IIZ i11 i.ob trlol'1 C) Lt l.l1 11 (L' ic_ji'1n ti