MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 171-75.4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010073-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 73
• Publication Date: November 5, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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1. LEBANON: THE FIGHTING IN LEBANON DURING 1975 HAS BEEN THE
MOST EXTENDED AND DESTRUCTIVE IN RECENT HISTORY. IT HAS LEFT
PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN`AND LEBANESE MUSLIMS IN CONTROL, OF THREE OF THE
COUNTRY'S FOUR MAJOR CITIES---SIDON, TYRE, AND TRIPOLI--AND
STRENGTHENED SIGNIFICANTLY. THEIR HOLD ON BEIRUT. CONVERSELY, THE
RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE RIGHT-WING CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAS BEEN
r
DIMINISHED, AND THE AREAS OF'THE CAPITAL OVER WHICH LEBANESE
GOVERNMENT FORCES HAVE EFFECTIVE CONTROL HAVE BEEN REDUCED ALMOST TO
NOTHING.Y
TE:E ECONOMIC, POLI''ICAL, AND SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS PRODUCED BY
THE FIGHTING HAVE BEEN SO SEVERE THAT EVEN IF A CEASE-FIRE SHOULD
TAKE FOLD, A RETURN TO LEBANON'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY
PROVE IMPOSSIBLE. CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS MAY WELL BE FORCED TO
MAKE POLITICAL CONCESSIONS THAT WILL ENHANCE THE ROLE OF LEBANESE
MUSLIMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMY.Y
IF A DURABLE CEASE-FIRE PROVES ELUSIVE, THE FIGHTING COULD
TURN SERIOUS ENOUGH TO FORCE THE RESIGNt.TIONS OF BOTH PRIME MINISTER
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KARAMI AND PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH AND PERHAPS HASTEN POLITICAL CHANGE
FAVORING THE MUSLIMS. NEW FIGHTING COULD, HOWEVER, PROMPT ARMY
OFFICERS--MOST LIKELY CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIANS--TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE
CONTROL IN A LAST-D11:CH EFFORT TO PRESERVE CHRISTIAN DOMINANCE.Y
THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN RECENT MONTHS HA' SHOWN ITSELF
INCAPABLE OF FORCING AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES. PATROLS BY INTERNAL
SE.C'JRITY FORCES, WHICH ARE NOT REGARDED AS A THREAT BY EITHER THE
CHRISTIANS OR THE MUSLIMS, AIRE NOT OPPOSED BY ANY MAJOR POLITICAL
GROUP. ACTING ALONE, HOWEVER, THIS SECURITY FORCE IS INCAPABLE OF
FORCING ANY OF THE OPPOSING PARTIES TO RESPECT A CEASE-FIRE.Y
THE LEBANESE ARMY, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS VIEWED BY THE FEDAYEEN
AS A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT AND FOR THIS REASON HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED
TO PLAY A FORCEFUL ROLE IN PUTTING DOWN THE FIGHTING. IN BEIRUT, IT
HAS BEEN USED ONLY TO SECURE THE ROAD FROM THE CITY CENTER TO THE
AIRPORT, TO CONTROL SELECTED GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS,'
AND IN A VERY LIMITED WAY TO RELIEVE INTERNAL SECURITY UNITS ON THE
PERIPHERY OF THE CITY. IN TRIPOLI, IT HAS BEEN USED TO PATROL A
NEUTRAL ZONE BETWEEN MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN I'ORCES.Y
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IN RECENT MONTHS, CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN LEADERS LIKE PRESIDE'T
FRANJIYAH AND INTERIOR MINISTER SHAMUN HAVE FAVORED CALLING IN TH(F..
ARMY, BUT HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONVINCE MUSLIM POLITICAL LEADERS,
NOTABLY PRIME MINISTER KARAMI, THAT THE CHRISTIAN-CONTROLLED FOR'.E
WOULD PLAY AN IMPARTIAL ROLE.Y
IN THE PAST IT UAS BELIEVED THE ARMY COULD ALWAYS BE BROUGHT IN
AS A LAST RESORT TO IMPOSE A?CEASE-FIRE OR TO DESTROY THE RADICAL
f
LEBANESE LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN REJECTIONIST GROUPS. IT WAS ALSO
BELIEVED THAT THE AROY COULD--IN TIME AND WITH DIFFICULT---OVERCOME
THE MAJOR FEDAYEEN GROUPS AS WELLY
THE ARMY CAN NO LONGER DO THIS. ARMY INVOLVEMENT NOW-WOULD
RESULT IN SO GREAT AN INCREASE IN THE ALREADY HEAVY CASUALTIES AND
PROPERTY DAMAGE THAT SIZABLE UNITS, REFLECTING THEIR DIVIDED
LOYALTIES, WOULD SIMPLY REFUSE TO ASSUME ANYTHING MORE THAN DEFENSIVE
POSITIONS. SUCH AN ATTITUDE WOULD PROLONG, NOT END, THE FIGHTING.Y
PALESTINIAN AND LEFTIST ARMED GROUPS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LARGER
AND BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THEk WERE THE LAST TIME THE ARMY STEPPED IN;
THAT WAS IN EARLY 1973.Y
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IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE ARMY WERE THREATENING TO DEFEAT
LEFTIST AND PALESTINIAN FORCES IN LEBANON, UNITS OF fHE PALESTINE
LIBERATION ARMY IN SYRIA AND OF THE REGULAR SYRIAN ARMY WOULD
PROBABLY MOVE TO THE`RESCUE. DAMASCUS WOULD NOT ALLOW LEBANON TO
DEFEAT THE PALESTINIANS IN THE UAY THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY DID IN
SUPERFICIALLY, LEBANESE LEFTISTS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN THE BIG WWIN1351111
I
WINNAERS FROM THE IMPOTENCE "OF THE LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES, AR"IY, AND
GOVERNMENT. LITTLE-KNOWN RADICAL LEFTISTS LIKE IBRAHIM QULAYL AT ARE
NOU IN PHYSICAL CONTROL OF IMP09TANT AREAS OF BEIRUT AND PUBLICLY
CONSULT WITH THE PRIME MINISTERS'
SOCIALIST KAMAL JUMBLATT, A DRUZE, HAS DISCARDED WHAT REMAINED
OF HIS GADFLY IMAGE AND--A.LONG WITH SHIA MUSLIM LEADER IMAM iIUSA
SADR---HAS ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS A CENTRAL FI'URE IN THE
BEHIND-THE-SCENES PO,LITICAI. BARGAINING Ti IAT USED TO BE THE SOLE
PROVINCE OF MARONITE CHRISTIAN AND SUNNI MUSLIM LEADERS.Y
THESE LEFTISTS HAVE MADE THEIR GAINS PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY HAVE
BEEN HEAVILY BACKED BY THE LAP,'-"'k' PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS.
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LEFTIST MILITIAS HAVE BEEN TRAINED BY THE PALESTINIANS,'-LEFTIST A;:PiS
HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED BY THE FEDAYEEN, AND IN CRUCIAL BATTLES THE
LEFTISTS HAVE BEEN BACKED UP BY FEDAYEEN FIGHTERS. WERE IT NOT FOR
THIS SUPPORT THE LEBANESE LEFTISTS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERWHELMED AGAIN
BY THE POWERFUL LEBANESE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM LEADERS-Y
THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN THE BIG GAINERS. THE PRINCIPAL
FEDAYEEN GROUPS HAVE LARGELY. STAYED OUT OF THE FIGHTING, PARTLY
BECAUSE THEY ARE SENSITIVE TO Ti1E EFFECT INSTABILITY IN LEBANON HAS
ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND LEBANON.S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA.
THEY CERTAINLY RECOGNIZE THAT Tr:E CLASHES THIS YEAR HAVE MADE ALMOST
INEVITABLE LONG-TER'M POLITICAL CHANGES THAT WILL DIRECTLY-BENEFIT
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION CHAIRMAN ARAFAT IS GIVEN CREDIT
FOR HIS PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS, YET HE CAN LOOK FORI'JARD TO DEALING WITH
LEBANESE GOVERNMENTS THAT WILL BE MORE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD
MUSLIM, PALESTINIAN, AND GENERAL ARAB CAUSES. ARAFAT HAS, IN ADDITION,
EMERGED AS A CENTRAL POWER IN LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COUNCILS; HE IS NO
LONGER DEALT WITH AS AN OUTSIDER. ARAFAT AND KARAMI HAVE BEEN THE TWO
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MOST IMPORTANT FIGURES IN RECENT ATTEMP74S TO NEGOTIATE tEASE-FIRES:
AND ARAFAT WAS OFFERED, BUT REFUSE?, MEMBERSHIP ON KARAMI 'S
ALL-LEBANESE SECURITY COMMITTEE.9
A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF ARAFAT HAS SEEN INVOLVED IN A SERIES
OF.TALKS ON POLITICAL 'c;7ORM WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANJIYAH AND
PHALANGIST LEADER JUMAYYIL-, BOTH RIGHT-WING CHRISTIANS '.-'HO HAVE
A
GENERALLY DEALT WITH ARAFAT'INDIRECTLY.Y
THE PALESTINIANS ACTUALLY aEGAN TO INCREASE THEIR PUNCH IN
LEBANON Ift 1969. THE rAIRO AGREFINENT OF THAT YEAR FORCED BY AN
EARLIER ROUND OF FIGHTING, GUARANTEE THE PALESTINIANS THE RIGHT
TO LIVE IN LEBANON-4
THE MELKART AGREErIENT THAT FOLLOWED THE STRIFE OF 19'3 GAVE THE
PALESTINIANS THE RIGHT TO CONTROL SECURITY WITHIN THE REFUGEE
CAMPS---THE PREROGATIVE THAT SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED THE EXCUSE FOR A
VAST INCREASE IN PALESTINIAN MILITARY STRENGTH IN LEBANON.Y
THIS YEAR, THE PALESTINIANS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY ARE MUCH
BETTER ARMED THAN BEFORE AND THAT THEY HAVE THE ABILITY TO TURN THE
TIDE OF BATTLE WHEN THEY SO DESIRE, AS THEY DID IN THE QANTARI AREA
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,~F BEIRUT LAST WEEK. THEY HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY CAN ALSO?1IMIT THE
VIOLENCE.''
HAVING DISPLAYED THEIR POWER, THE PLO HAS NOW MADE CERTAIN
PROPOSALS TO THE LEBANESE NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, CREATED TO
CONSIDER BASIC POLITICAL REFORMS. IF ACCEPTED, THESE PROPOSALS WOULD
AMOUNT TO A RECOGNITION BY ALL LEBANESE, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING THE
PHALANGISTS, OF THE LEGALITY, OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON.
PRESENTATION OF THE PROPOSALS ON OCTOBER 13 WAS SUCH A POLITICALLY
ASTUTE MOVE THAT EVEN JUMAYYIL WAS MOVED TO PRAISE A9AFAT.Y
THE PROPOSALS WILL BE DIFFICULT TO REJECT. ALTHOUGH THE
PALESTINIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO GET A ROLE IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT,
THE TALKS NOW GOING ON WILL CEI'TAINLY REFLECT THE PALESTINIANS1'
INCREASED POWER AND RESULT IN CHANGES IN THEIR INTERESTS.''
THE CHRISTIANS WILL OFFER CONCESSIONS FIRST TO THE COUNTRY'S
SUNNI MUSLIM AND SOCIALIST POLITICIANS RATHER THAN TO THE MORE
DISADVANTAGED SHIA MUSLIMS OR THE RADICAL LEFTISTS. ALTHOUGH EVEN
MODERATE CHRISTIANS DO NOT WANT TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, MOST NOW
UNDERSTAND THAT POLITICAL AND SOCIAL REFORMS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE
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LEBANON'S FUTURE STABILITY, EVEN ITS SURVIVAL.'
SOME POWERFUL CONSERVATIVES, LIKE JUMAYYIL, HAVE SPOKEN VAGUELY
OF fHE NEED FOR REFORM AND HAVE CAREFULLY DISTINGUISHED THEIR POSITIONS
FROM THE MOPE INTEMPERATE FOLL'WERS, OF FRANJIYAH. JUI1AYYIL ALSO TAKES
GREAT PAINS, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO MAKE SURE THAT NO ONE GETS
AHEAD OF THE PHALANGES PARTY AS THE CHAMPION OF THE CHRISTIAN CAUSE.
IT IS THUS DIFFICULT FOR HIM. TO ENDORSE CONCESSIONS WITHOUT BEING
ATTACKED BY WHAT IS, IN EFFECT, A "REJECTION FRONT" ON THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT- Y
DEMANDS THAT IN EFFECT CALLED ON THE PRESIDENT TO DISMISS KARAMI,
CHRISTIAN ULTRACONSERVATIVES GENERALLY FOLLOW THE POLITICAL LEAD
OF THE CIVILIAN MARONITE LEAGUE AND THE ORDER OF MARONITE_MONKS.
THESE TWO GROUPS ARE IIfFLUENTIAL FAR BEYOND THEIR SMALL SIZE; THEY
HAVE CLOSE TIES TO FRANJIYAH AND HAVE LONG PROVIDED HEAVY POLITICAL,
FINANCIAL, AND MILITARY AID TO THE CHRISTIAN MILITIAS:Y
LAST MONTH, LEADERS OF THE TWO GROUPS PUBLISHED POLITICAL
CALL IN THE ARMY, AND SHELVE PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL REFORM UNTIL
THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM HAD BEEN SOLVED.Y
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MARONITE PATRIARCH .ANTONIOS KHREISH IS MUCH MORE TEMPERATE
THAN THE EXTREMIST LEADERS, BUT NEITHER HE NOR LEADERS OF THE
CHRISTIAN MILITIAS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO CRITICIZE THE EXTREMISTS IN
THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT CONCESSIONS BY THE CHRISTIANS WOULD AT
LEAST EPING A DEPENDABLE PEACE.Y
DESPITE THE IMPASSE, CHRISTIAN LEADERS MOST LIKELY REALIZE THAT
TIME IS ON THE SIDE OF THE MUSLIMS AND LEFTISTS. THIS REALIZATION IS
ALREADY UNDERMINING PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH, WHO IS BEING PRIVATELY
CRITICIZED BY EXTREME RIGHTzWINGERS FOR NOT BEING ASSERTIVE ENOUGH
AND BY MODERATES FOR NOT BEING FLEXIBLE ENOUGH.Y
INCREASING NUMBERS OF CHRISTIANS, SOME ALARMED AT THE STEADY
EROSION OF INFLUENCE OF THE CHRISTIAN PRESIDENCY, ARE COMING TO
BELIEVE THAT FRANJIYAH'S DEPARTURE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE.Y
CONCESSIONS TO MUSLIMS ARE MOST LIKELY TO COME IN;
THE UOUTDATED SYSTEM OF PROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF
-:RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN ALL INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT.Y
THE LAWS GOVERNING THE ELECTION OF PARLIAMENT AND THE
?PRESIDENT.Y
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXECUTIVE POWERS BETWEEN THE.
PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER.Y
THE ORGAN:CZATION OF THE ARMY.Y
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM IS COMING/ IT WILL IN LARGE PART
ONLY ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT IS ALREADY A FACT: THAT LEBANON'S OLD GOVERNING
SYSTEM IS NO LONGER FUNCTLONING AND IS NOT ACCOMMODATING THE NEEDS
OF EITHER THE DISADVANTAGED GROUPS IN THE CITIES AND THE SOUTH OR
THE UEALTHY CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE CAPITAL AND
Od
CERTAIN NORTHERN AND MOUNTAIN AREAS.Y
THE OLD SYSTEM RESTED ON THE ABILITY OF THE LEADERS OF THE
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS SECTS TO DEFEND THEIR FOLLOWERS' POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND SECURITY 'INTERESTS. WITH PARLIAMENT UNWILLING TO
MEET,-THE CABINET UNABLE TO TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION BECAUSE OF THE
SPLIT BETWEEN KARAMI AND SHAMUN, AND LEADERS OF SEVERAL CHRISTIAN AND
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MUSLIM GROUPS UNABLE. TO CONTROL THEIR FOLLOWERS, THOSE INTERESTS
CANNOT BE PROTECTED IN THE OLD WAY.
2. SPANISH SAHARA: MOROCCO'S EFFORT TO DISSUADE SPAIN AND
ALGERIA FROM SEEKING AN UN-SPONSORED SOLUTION TO THE SPANISH SAHARA
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PRESS REPORTS FROM MADRID ON TUESDAY, CITING INFORMED SPAIT SH
SOURCES, SAID MOROCCAN PRIME MINISTER OSMAN HAD FAILED TO STEER
SPAIN AWAY FROM SEEKING A UN SOLUTION THAT WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE
.,
A REFERENDUM IN SPANISH SAHARA. SPANISH LEADERS REPORTEDLY TOLD
OSMAN THAT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MADRID AND RABAT COULD CONTINUE ONLY
UNDER UN AUSPICES AND ONLY IF MOROCCO CALLS OFF ITS PLANNED MASS
r
MARCH INTO SPANISH SAHARA. AS HE LEFT MADRID, OSMAN SAID THAT TALKS
WILL CONTINUE, BUT THAT THE' MARCH W_T_LL. GO ON- Y
A MOROCCAN EMISSARY TALKED WITH ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE
ON MONDAY. WITHIN HOURS OF THE TALKS, THE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY
ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING THAT ALGERIA COULD NOT ACCEPT A
UNILATERAL MOROCCAN MOVE. THE STATEMENT ADDED THAT THE DECOLONIZATION
PROCESS SHOULD BE LEFT TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND SHOULD BE IN
KEEPIN' WITH A RECENT UN REPORT AND AN ADVISORY OPINION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, WHICH IN EFFECT ENDORSED
SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SPANISH SAHARA.Y
UN SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM'S PERSONAL ENVOY HELD TALKS WITH
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KING HASSAN ON TUESDAY. THE ENVOY WILL ALSO CONSULT WITH'MAUPITANIAN,
ALGERIAN, AND SPANISH OFFICIALS.'
ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM NEW YORK, WALDHEIM HAS
SUGGESTED A S_;-MONTH. COOLING-OFF PERIOD DUPING WHICH THE UN
COULD CREATE A TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION IN THE TERRITORY. Kll'N'D:,
HASSAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH A PROPOSAL IJNLESS MOROCCO WERE THE
ADMINIST~-'I ING POWER- Y
MOROCCO IS STILL THREATENING TO GO AHEAD WITH ITS MARCH INTO
AT ASSEMBLY POINTS IN SOUTHERN] MOROCCO.
SPANISH SAHARA. ONCE KING HASSAN GIVES THE GO-AHEAD, THE MARCH
MAY BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM OR ANYONE ELSE TO CONTRCL.Y
THE GOVERNMENT RECRUITID SOME OF ITS MARCHERS FROM THE RANKS OF
THE UNEMPLOYED AND URBAN STREET ROUGHNECKS. THESE "VOLUNTEERS" ARE
NOT LIKELY TO FOLLOW ORDERS OR BE ESPECIALLY PEACEABLE. THEY WERE
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DOUBTLESS RESPONSIBLE FOR SOME OF THE DISORDER THAT HAS OCCURRED
3. ANGOLA: THE NATIONAL FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA AND
5X1 THE NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA' ANNOUNCED IN
KINSHASA ON MONDAY THAT THEY ARE SETTING UP JOINT COMMITTEES TO
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COORDINATE FUTURE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES. THE COMMITTEES
PROBABLY REPRESENT A FIRST STEP BY THE TWO GROUPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING
THEIR PLAN TO ORGANIZE A GOVERNMENT TO RIVAL. THE ONE THE POPULAR
MOVEMENT FOR THE LIB.RATION OF ANGOLA IS EXPECTED TO PROCLAIM ON
NOVEMBER 11-Y
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE NATIONAL UNION
IS POOR, HOWEVER, AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TROOPS DO NOT GET ALONG
I.
WELL IN THE FIELD. MILITARY-LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THE
OTHER GROUP IS ATTEMPTING 1*0 TAKE THE LION'S SHARE OF CREDIT FOR
RECENT BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND IS HOARDING SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT-Y
THE TWO GROUPS ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONFER WITH
THE POPULAR MOVEMENT IN, KAMPALA, AS PROPOSED BY UGANDAN PRESIDENT
AMIN,?THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY. THEY MADE
NO REFERENCE, HOWEVER, TO THE CEASE-FIRE THAT AMIN CALLED FOi' LAST
WEEKEND UHEN HE INVITED THE 'THREE GROUPS TO MEET IN THE UGANDAN
CAPITAL..Y
WITH `THEIR JOINT FORCE DRIVING TO RECAPTURE THE IMPORTANT
BENGUELA-LOBITO RAIL AND PORT COMPLEX IN CENTRAL ANGOLA, THE NATIONAL
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FRONT AND THE NATIONAL UNION ARE IN NO HURRY TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE.
HEAVY FIGHTING IS APPARENTLY TAKING PLACE IN THAT AREA, BUT THE
JOINT FORCE EVIDENTLY STILL HAS NOT REACHED THE ENVIRONS OF
EITHER TOUN. THE TIJO ;GROUPS SEEM COt`:,-_ 'SENT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE
THEM SOON. SUCH A SUCCESS WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY STRENGTHEN THE
CREDIBILITY OF ANY GOVERNMENT THEY MAY PROCLAIM.Y
TI:E HARD-PRESSED POPULAR MOVEMENT HAS ALREADY SENT A
REPRESENTATIVE TO KAMPALA. :T HE MOVEMENT NEEDS A RESPITE IN ORDER TO
BOLSTER ITS DEFENSES AT BENGUELA AND LOBITO AND ALSO AROUND LUANDA,
WHICH IS THREATENED WITH EARLY ATTACK BY A SEPARATE FRONT FORCE.
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EAST ASIA BRIEF L71-75.Y
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SERVED AS SOCIAL 0CLFAiU. NT'JZSTER FOLLOVI'dG T11E :E1IOVAL OF LOPEZ
REGA? T,E ACTION STr11S FROM Atl INVESTTGATIO IN THE LOWER ;i01.1?E OF
ALLEGED P At CIAL NILSDEALIIcGi. '
TAE LECI yLAT!Jf;L: AUDTTAE JUDICIARY HAVE GENERALLY f?CEli SLJc r.VIEnT
TO THE PRESIDENT, 9UT IT TS CLEAR T'IAT MOST GOVERUMLINT FIGJF S W,O
Ai 40T WHOLLY DE:PENDEi>T ON '3EPOtJ NOW SEE HER DEPAr:TU"L E FROf' OFFICE
A;- THE ONLY P03SIf3LC WAY TO PREVZNT A MILITARY TAl'EOVER.+i'
ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PRESS, EVEN MEIBERS OF THE CA~L3I' T
AGREE THAT SHE SHOULD STEP DOHN- THE LEADING POLITICAL GPPOSITIO;;
LEADER, RICARDO BALGIN, WHO HAS LONG COOPERATED WITH T!-',E GOVERNMEA:T,
NOW WANTS PERON TO GC.''
PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THE GOVERNMENT HAS GIVEN IN TO LABOR
DEMANDS FOR A WAGE "IKE DESPITE THE EFFORTS ECONOMY MINISTER CAFIERO
WAS HAKIJG LAST WEEK TO GET LABOR AND BUSINESS TO COOPERATE IM Are
5X1 EFFORT TO RETARD INFLk,TION? THE SIZE OF THE INCREASE HAS NOT BEEN,
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1. PORTUGAL: PORTUGUESE PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO PAID A
SECOND VISIT TO THE PROVINCES ON TUESDAY TO ENLIST POPULAR SUPPORT
SHORTLY AFTER HIS CABINET CALLED FOR A MEETING WITH TOP MILITARY
LEADERS TO DISCUSS THE COUNTRY'S CRISIS OF AUTHORITY.Y
A ZEVEDO'S TRIP TO THE SOUTHERN RESORT CITY OF FARO WAS AN
EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE. NEWLY INSTALLED NON-COMMUNIST CIVIL
GOVERNOR AND FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION.
THE C OHMUNISTS' EFFORTS TO REMOVE THE GOVERNOR TEN DAYS AGO FAILED
WHEN THEY WERE DRIVEN FROM HIS OFFICES BY AROUSED SOCIALISTS AND
POPULAR DEMOCRATS-Y'
THE TRIP WAS ALSO DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THE AZEVEDO
GOVERNMENT'S POPULARITY AT THE GRASS ROOTS. AN EARLIER VISIT BY
AZEVEDO TO PORTO, IJHERE HE WAS HAILED BY 100,000 SUPPORTERS, WAS AN
IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO RESTORE
DISCIPLINE IN THE NORTHERN MILITARY REGION.'>'
AN ENTHUSIASTIC CROWD OF SOME 10,000 ATTENDED THE FAKI RALLY.
AZEVELO TOLD THO%',., ASSEMBLED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO ESTABLISH A
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Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010073-9
in rii.s -ff
STRONG AND STABLE CENTRAL GOVERNING AUTHORITY RECOGNIZED AND FREELY
ACCEPTED 8'r ALL. EVEN AS HE SPOKE, SOME 100 FAR LEFTIST SOLDIERS
BEGAN A 'OUNTER-DEMONSTRATION BUT MOST DISPERSED WHEN THE COMMANDER
OF THE SOUTHERN MILITARY REGION APPROACHED AND CASTIGATED THEM.'
At'EVEDO HAD COMPLAINED TO A PRESS CONFERENCE EARLIER THAT THE
GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO GOVERN BECAUSE OF A LACK OF
DISCIPLINE AND.DISSENSION WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. AZEVEDO WAS HEARD
COMMENTING TO LOCAL OFFICIAL$ THAT HE HAS BEEN PATIENT THUS FAR BUT
WOULD NOW TAKE THE OFFENSIV~:Y
BEFORE AZEVEDO LEFT, THE CABINET ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE THAT
REAFFIRMED ITS DECOLONIZATION POLICY AND URGED ~