SECURITY REVIEW TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86-00674R000300140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1978
• Content Type: MF

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~R_xxvcutivIt PO~C dry
I think that this is am*41Cre ?,rat,
although I have some problems with it.Ij,hav
asked Jack Blake to send copies to the Deputy
Directors for comment..
Attachment:
Report of the Security
Review Task Force
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
9 November 1978
Chairman, Security Review Task Force
SUBJECT: Security Review Task Force
REFFRENCES: (a) Memo for DD/A from the DDCI, dtd.
18 August 1978, Subject: Request
for a Security Review and Assessment
(b) Memo for Chairman, Security Review
Task Force from Director of Security,
dtd. 21 August 1978, Subject: Request
for a Security Review and Assessment
.(c) Memo for DDCI from the DD/A, dtd.
31 August 1978, Subject: Security
Review - Interim Report
1. In accordance with the references, the Security
Review Task Force has completed its review of the Agency's
security policies and procedures. The conclusions and recom-
mendations contained in this summary report are well supported
by the Task Force investigations. The investigations, as
indicated in the Interim Report, were conducted by three
separate segments, each addressing a general topical area,
i.e., Personnel Security, Physical Security and Information
Control Security. Remarkably, each segment independently
reached the conclusions and shared in the principal recommen-
dations of this report, specifically those pertaining to
reemphasis of the principle that security in the Agency is
a command responsibility; Area Security Officers, and Security
Education.
2. The Task Force believes it is essential that all
responsible recipients of this report comprehend the fact
Regraded "Administrative/
Internal Use Only" V hen
Separated from Attac _ e:it
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that regardless of the quality of the Agency's Personnel,
Physical and Information Control Security, rei=o~?ya~ay
n,,.tos.e3u ze 3 yr~e.3ur1e:. ar~athe wi~c i=dent" bfi's~zn~`u~'`~ :12~
Put another way,
we submit
that~i~rl`v'e=c~an'i3rt`}f'}~reeri`td
..~7t~tan'tC~~+~r?~i~?73?a~i~r~=~ii~~]~`;:~~-3rd;;
3. In conclusion, I want to assure you that the Task
Force members approached their task with professionalism
and integrity. Fourteen officers were assigned to the three
segment organization, as follows:
Personnel Sep-:ent
Physical Segment
Information Segment
Their reports represent, in my opinion, an exceptionally dedi-
cated effort in response to your direction.
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SECRET
SECURITY REVIEW TASK FORCE
REVIEW OF
THE CIA SECURITY PROGRAM
What follows is a review of the current CIA Security
Program and recommendations which, if approved, will improve
that program.
When examining the contents of this report and contem-
plating the recommendations contained therein, the reader
should bear in mind that in this Agency security is a command
responsibility. He should consider the contents of this
report with the idea in. mind that unless there is a constant
and conscious exercise of that responsibility by all employees,
and particularly by supervisors and managers at all levels, no
security program, no matter how well designed, can be success-
ful.
There is only one reason for the existence of this orga-
nization and that is to provide information to the President
on the intentions and actions of other nations of the world
which could adversely affect the security of the United States.
It follows that the sources and methods used to collect that
information, as well as the information itself, must be protected
from unauthorized disclosure if it is going to be of any benefit.
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It also follows that security is paramount in the accomplish-
ment of the mission.
>oSz;vrs+dL>a'geTS involved in the accomplishment
of the Agency's mission not only should, but er,
eta?ce erm _a x-sec r4t)r. It does not
matter what that action is. It could concern the management
of a clandestine or technical operation. It could be a decision
to be made on whether to hire a new applicant for staff employ-
ment. It could be a decision to be made on whether to retain
the services of an employee who has married an alien. It could
be a decision to be made on the elimination of Career Security
Officers in operating components when there is a reduction of
personnel in the Agency. In any situation, the first question
the manager has to answer is: What effect will his decision
have on the secure accomplishment of the mission of the Central
Intelligence Agency? Unless managers exercise their security
responsibility consciously, constantly, and in a responsible
manner, the results of all their other efforts, no matter how
well designed and managed, will be worthless.
The Task Force review included extensive documentary
reviews, written surveys, and personal interviews within and
external to the Agency. Several hundred personal interviews
were conducted by the Task Force members. The Information
Control Segment alone conducted 140 interviews during its
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;EGRET
fact finding. The internal investigations touched all
Directorates, and the cooperation of those individuals con-
tacted was gratifying. External discussions were carried
out with representatives of NSA, DIA, DOD, the Department of
State, and the industrial sector.
The Agency's Personnel Security program was found to be
essentially sound, particularly in light of available resources.
st gdYve' 3rfen -Indeed, one might have expected that con-
clusion, as the program has been tested and refined for thirty
years.
.r$atars. We believe the erosion
can be attributed in large part to the dramatic reduction,
during the past decade, in the number of Career Security Officers
assigned to operating components, and to the inadequacy of the
Agency's Security Education Program. We believe a viable
program restoring Career Security Officers to close proximity
to the collectors and producers of intelligence is the only way
to reverse the trend.
Similarly, th eeo3rrrclitg?+"r? 3,a 1,
-~,Y;,~grar{;~tEYesrl~fj~'sd: The problems
uncovered in this area are not new. The solutions to some
equipment problems have been delayed by budgetary restrictions.
But the maat P,T y aj- j?. x angi.~.x th r"sK a a t~h 7,; ,~.,
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-re~~-a.rsr~r-G:uA~~~:~.~,~~w~.:~?~7~~~-~:r.?~~~n g ,~;~i;egs~~
.apoerdu,.esr; is a good example.
The T l~ftt,e~pl-ied
a~s.aese~~rasnf~c,ual~:. Again, that might have been
expected because the Agency, as the rest of the government,
has been overwhelmed by the information explosion resulting
from technological advances in intelligence collection experi-
enced over the past fifteen years. The information control
recommendations necessarily represent drastic and far-reaching
changes. We believe that for the first time the magnitude
and complexity of the information control problem has been
accurately, albeit not completely, described. The essential
recommendation in this segment is the a=~~ee~~_
th
t
t t
'
:_
r.aas aT rQ-
o on
a.
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~m r ki 'Dtxii A zs jex ~eRtd-omal-l sen t
This report represents a distillation of the findings
of the Security Review Task Force. The recommendations are
those which are essential to movement toward much-needed
reforms in security practices and procedures throughout CIA
and, where appropriate, the Intelligence Community.
SECRET
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SECRET
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SPOT INVENTORIES
Current Procedures:
An underlying factor in the three basic questions probed
by the Task Force, as described at the beginning of the docu-
ment control section, is the serious lack of inventories of
accountable material. Within CIA, DIA, and NSA the only
material afforded periodic inventory is TOP SECRET non-compart-
mented and Restricted Data. Among these agencies, the inven-
tories vary from the first agency-wide TS non-compartmented
inventory in CIA, to regular, semiannual inventories at NSA.
The minute amount of Restricted Data furnished CIA allows
one control officer to maintain accountability on a day-to-day
basis. This is an example of the axiom of inverse relationship
between volume and control at its best.
An example of this axiom at its worst is found in the
control and accountability of Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI), a generic term for all categories of formally compart-
mented intelligence, including SI, TK, and BYE. The three
categories frequently receive community-wide dissemination based
upon predetermined dissemination lists, accounted for only
by document copy number. Accompanying document receipts
forwarded to recipients by NFAC/PPG are executed only 85 percent
of the time. Based upon 1977 figures for NFAC/PPG, the receipt
of some 13,000 TS/SCI documents was never verified by the
intended recipient.
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