TROUBLED WATERS FOR LUSITANIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 20, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5106122:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD190D06-D
 ffP85~'08 r 9F/ Mr . ~1
Approved For Release 20075R002000
YO06/225-
CIA INTERNAL USE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
20 February 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 13-61 (Internal 0/NE Working Paper - CIA
Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Troubled Waters For Lusitania
1. Portugal's political torpor has been rudely and
suddenly shattered by overt e..-pressions of foreign and domestic
opposition to the Salazar regime and by serious disorders in
Lngola. The government's self confidence has been shaken; it
is not only embarassed by the international publicity given these
events, but also concerned lest additional incidents be in
inspired which might seriously impair stability and, over the
long run, jeopardize the traditionalist and conservative
orientation of Portuguese politics. Meanwhile, within the
regime some officials are reportedly speculating on how best
to oust the ailing 71-year-old Salazar, whom they now believe
incapable of adapting policies to cope with the rising pressures
against him and his government.
Approved For Release 206#l01;Edliiftb'CIA-DPU13q0875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22SLRDP85T00875R002000190006-0
CIA
2. Opposition to Salazar in Portugal proper is largely
confined to the politically conscious elite, to members of the
business community and to small radical groups. By and large
the general public is apathetic about politics, although when
given the opportunity to register its weariness with the status
cuo it may manifest strong interest in change -- as it did when
General Delgado ran as an opposition candidate in the
Presidential election of 19580
3. Because of Salazarts long held monopoly of power, all
opposition groups in the metropole have been forced to live in
semi-clandestir:ity, to move warily, and often to accept allies
in
with which they were not/fundamental agreement. The radicals
apart, they have been little more than collections of individuals,
critical of the government, but not necessarily agreed on
constructive programs of their own, Recently, however, three
prominent oppositionists were granted an interview with
President Thomas and permitted to publish an attack on the
regime calling for changes in government leadership and freedom
for the establishment of a responsible opposition. Although
the government's display of noblesse oblige was probably
primarily designed to let its critics blow off steam, it now
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
SECRET
CIA
seems morally committed to permitting non-regime candidates
to run in the Fall National Assembly elections.
14. Assuming that no palace coup takes place before the
elections, the intervening period is likely to be one of
intense political maneuvering and even unrest. Oppositionists
who do not temper their criticisms will provoke repressive
action by the security police (FIDE),, which we believe will
remain loyal to Salazar. Many oppositiord Sts will probably
find it difficult to disassociate themselves convincingly
from the now largely discredited Galvao-Delgado movement.
Some may seek to obtain the backing of prominent leaders such
as Santos Costa and Defense Minister Monizpboth of whom are
now identified with the regime but discontent with its policies.
The defection of either of these two men would be a blow to
Salazar's prestige and might damage the unity of the still
loyal armed forces, but neither is a sufficiently popular figure
to rally widespread popular support against the dictator.
Moniz, however, probably has sufficient backing within the armed
forces to mount a coup against Salazar -- a move he has
threatened more than once.
-3-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : J@i}.RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
CIA11Ui1.:1JJILb G;~LY
5. Over the next fLw months the developing situation
in the Portuguese overseas territories will be critically
impor!,ant, with African nationalism breaking the surface and
the ,ettle.s becoming more politically conscious. While
the incumbent regime has tied its prestige to the retention
of its African "provinces" and to their development as primary
sources of national wealth, it has imposed a tight, arbitrary
rule on these areas and has in practice consistently failed
to meet settler expectations of much needed economic expansion
and foreign investment. Moreover, the violent rioting in
Luandsi and revelation that native unrest and anti-,white
feelings are by no means confined to the capit*.l has raisod
serious misgivings in Portuguese officialdom over the efficacy
of colonial policy as a whole.
6. Settler reactions to domination by Lisbon are generally
of three kinds: (a) Simple hostility to Salazar and his govern-
ment on the part of those whose loyalty to Portugal remains
steadfast, but who feel the "provinces" and their particular
problems are being overlooked by a far-away capitol. (b)
Separatism, which has, according to some reports, some following
in Angola and considerably more in Mozambique among the settlers --
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/228h;J DP85T00875R002000190006-0
61A
IJU~l:il1 AL U?'L,
soma; of whom feel Lisbon will never act fast enough in
implementing the assimilation policy while the natives are
still attracted to it, and some of whom are tempted to experiment
with a form of apartheid. (c) Scattered radical opposition,
prepared to use any allies, even African nationalists to dis-
credit and eliminate the dictatorship and all its institutions.
7o Finally, it should be noted that the overseas
territories themselves are almost certain to be exposed to
external pressurus over the next few years which could intensify
the political malaise within them. Portuguese Guinea is an
inviting target for Tourers nationalist propaganda and is
likely to become increasingly unsettled; the situation in
northern Angola is reportedly already troubled by Abako tribal
agitation originating from kinsmen in the Congo; and Mozambique
expepiences recurrent low level native unrest, in part stimulated
by outside agitators. All three provinces have apparently been
infiltrated by the well--financed pro-Communist Revolutionary
Movement for the Independence of Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN)
based at Conakry. The Portuguese military establishment in
U-hese areas, although recently enlarged, is probably spread
too thin to cope with multiplying; disorders; the loyalty
-.5-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 DP85T00875R002000190006-0
Cis
of its nativ;; so oys in Angola is alruody op6~ to question.
Although the scanty evidence available would indicate that the
Africans, themselves, nru not as yet seriously infoct,.:d with
anti-Portuguese sentiments, they will probably continue to
stir up hostile action against their white rulers in response
to some form of foreign pressure.
CONCLUSIONS
In brief, the fixed assumptions on which Portuguese stability
has rested for decades -- generaa acquiesence in Salazar's rule
and the close and mutually beneficial attachment of the overseas
territories to the metropolo are now in doubt. How the
situation in Lisbon will develop over the, next few months will
depend on the interaction of official discontent at home and
the evolution of diverse tendencies in Africa. Continuing native
unrest in Angola would probably sharply reduce the government's
image at home. Increasing demands for greater autonomy in
Mobambique would probably contribute to the fragmentation of
opposition groups and provoke attempts at stern repression from
Lisbon. However, to the extent that widespread outside
agitation in either Angola or Guinea could be identified, the
-6-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0
S1 CILT
CIA JNiL-:i fN/W U:-i i)i LY
the re&-Ime might be able to call successfully for patriotic
support, Finally a combination of these prussuros, plus the
rising; level of African and UN criticisms could drive PortuE;al,
no matter who is at the helm, into sullen isolation?
25X1A
-7-
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190006-0