FOOD IN COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000190002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 31, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
?FFICE OF NATIONAL ] mIMATES
31 January 1961
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 6.61 (Internal 0/NE Working Papar v- CIA
Distribution Only)
SUBJECT: Food in Communist China
1. The Problem. Following a bumper crop in 1958,
Communist Chinats agricultural production has decreased for
two successive years. The estimated productf.on of grain., the
chief food, is as follow; (millions of metric tons):{f
1958 1959 1960
21 4
During the same period the population increased about 30
2. For the first time since the chaotic days of 1949
actual famine threatens the land. Improved communication and
stern rationing have up till now enabled the regime to avoid
th% development of large areas of localized starvation which
*These figures include tubers in terms of grain equivalent.
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marked the old China. Instead of allowing some to starve
while food is adequate in other areas., the Communist regime
arranges things so that all are hungry but starvation is
rare. There are limits to this solution., however. Food is
now so scarce and rations so meager that diseases of malnu-
trition (dropsy, beri-beri,, et al.) appear to be rampant in
nearly every province.*
stevedores and ricksha men who could not do their normal
work because of inadequate food., and it is likely that this
situation prevails among a considerable portion of the less
conspicuous workers. From many different areas come reports
of popular unrest including the appearance of wall posters
calling "Down with Communism" and "More Food." After three
years of unremitting hard work the Chinese people are worse
off than they were before the "Great Leap Forward" with its
glorious promises was launched.
3. Causes of the failure. Demonstrably, 2960 was marked
by bad weather in China, and we believe that this was the major
cause of the shortfall, The regime must bear the blame, however.,
for other, very important causes, including mismanagement and
*The traditionally prosperous province of Szechuan appears
to be an exception, in spite of Peiping's efforts at levelling,
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Gill ir~rcr;r~~~~ use ors.
peasant apathy. Bureaucrats arbitrarily applied orders from
above and ignored the advice of the veteran peasants whom they
con~,rolled. The peasants were deeply disillusioned with the
regime. They were overworked., they were forced to do much
work which they felt was wasted., their lives were severely
regimented, and there was no material reward to compensate
for all this.
4. Response of the leadership. By mid 1960 Peiping
realized that it was facing a second bad ycar. That summer
it inaugurated nationwide cam,)aigns for the collection of wild
foods and fibers. As the peak of harve::t season approached,
masses of labor were diverted to farming. Even the propaganda-
valued sports teams were sent to what began to be called "the
agricultural frontlines.""
5. These efforts were not enough to produco a good crop
in 1960, however, and rationing became increasingly severe as
winter approached. The regime began taking steps, unprecedented
in its short history, to lessen its demands on the people.
Unable to provide increased food, clothing., or housings Peiping
is offering lessened work loads for the people. The peasants
are to be allowed to hibernate a bit in this winter season,
especially in the natural disaster areas. Athletics and other
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nonproductive activities which increase the need for food tale
being stopped or greatly reduced. Trees have been stripped of
their leaves to provide food for animals whose usual food is
being consumed by humans. Over the longer ranges the regime
is planning not only to demand a little less of the people but
to provide them with a little more. This is designed to combat
worker apathy and resistance, and the increased rewards, if
available., will be mainly in the form of production incentives.
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6. A very compelling indication of the severity of tho food
shortage is the fact that in 1961 China may become a net
importer of food. Agricultural exporesa, mainly foodstuffsp
have been the regime's chief means of paying for the imports
necessary for expanding its industrial plant. Now hard
currency from very limited reserves is being paid out to
Australia and Canada for wheat, barley, and flour.
Estimated Trade Commitments in Crain, 1961 (millions of tons)
Trading Partner Imports Exports
Canada 1.10
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Australia 1.10)E
Burma 0.35
Total 2.7
- E!lfmL Lk. -
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Albania
0.10 to 0.15
Ot.`.er Bloc
0.60
Ceylon
0,23
Cuba
0m10
Total
1, 0-8
These figures are, of course) highly subject to change as
further trade contracts are signed during the year., but the
important point is that in no previous January have the regimexs
trade balances showed food Imports exceeding exports.
7. A study of Communist China's food exports to Hong
Kong indicate that through October 1960 (the latest available
Hong Kong monthly trade report) they have continued at a rate
equal to that of 1959. We knows however., that other important
food export commitments, especially to Eastern Europe., have not
been met during the fourth quarter of 1960. The drawing up of
1961 trade contracts with the rest of the Bloc has been lagging
badly.
8V A response of more enduring potential has been to
focus increasing effort and investment on improving agriculture.
*40.,000 tons of the Australian wheat is to be shipped
directly to Albania as an important part of Peiping's effort
to replace Moscow's withdrawn aid to Albania.
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SEi" M,
Between 1957 and 1960 the proportion of capital investmer
devoted to agriculture in the national budget increased nearly
50 percent, and it is likely to increase further this year.
The newfound appreciation of the requirements of agriculture
reached a peaks to date, in the Kiangsu Province directive for
1961 to "develop agriculture as its base and industry as its
supplement.It
99 Pros ecte The big Factor which defies all prediction
is the 1961 weather. Another bad crop year and Communist China
would be in desperate trouble. So far this year the weather
has continued bad: severe cold has damaged winter crops in the
South and drought continues in the North. The main growing
season has not begin, however, and should the rest of the year
have average weather or bettor, a substantial recovery could
be achieved. Even at best, however, fairly severe rationing
would have to be maintained in order to permit a partial
replenishment of reserves. Furthe:l.nore, in times of hunger
in China the pinch is always worst in the spring months preceding
the first major harvest. Thus, the bitterest suffering lies
ahead. Increased public disturbances are probable, and reports
from the mainland will make inspiring reading for Chiang
Kai-shek, but it is not likely that the stability of the
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Communist regime will be seriously threatened. Poiping;'s
controls are clover, pervasive, and ruthless. A system
which equates unproductiveness with starvation will probably
squeeze an adequate work effort from the peasants in 1961.
1s, Significance. Industrial growth, which was already
suffering from mismanagement, shortage of spares, and the
withdrawal of Soviet technicians, has been farther depressed
by the agricultural failure. Light industry failed in most
of its goals in 1960, mainly bacause of the shortage of
technical crops. All industry has suffered from hunger-
caused loss of worker energy and morale and by the increasing
diversion of investment to agriculture. These effects will
continue in 1961, and goals for the year have already been
lowered.
11. There is little basis for predicting what result
this depression will have on Peiping's foreign policy.
Although it is commonly believed that authoritarian regimes
are inclined to seek foreign adventures to rally their
people in times of domestic distress, we are faced with the
fact that Peiping launched its most aggressive foreign policy
during its period of manic optimism, in 1958. Perhaps the one
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useful estimate that we can make is that the economic retrench-
ment of 1961 will not prevent Peiping from encouraging and aiding
leftist reic1.vtions in other countries -- such as Laos. The
resources required for such ventures are so small in relation
to China's total assets and liabilities that they-lo not
critically affect the balance.
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