CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A NEW DIRECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 12, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

25X1
Approved For Release 20D5106129:CIA-RDPBST00675ROD2DOD160D01.8
 I Approved For Release 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00875R002000164Q'T'a,t
No Foreign Dhsem
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
Czechoslovakia: A New Direction
Secret
12 Jan. 68
No. 1-68
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 -qe cJkOf 100875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
12 January 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 1-68
SUBJECT? Czechoslovakia: A New Direction*
SUMMARY
The demotion of Czechoslovakia's Party First Secretary, Antonin
Novotny, after 14 years in his posts signifies more than a change
of personalities. A European Communist state is becoming less
Communist and more European, and neither the pace nor the goals of
the transition are likely to please Moscow. The forces which
succeeded in removing Novotny -- presumably against the desires
of the Soviets -- are now beginning to place emphasis not only on
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared
by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated with the
Office of Current Intelligence.
CgcUP 1
Fxc:lided fan e.~atoraatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
NO FOREIGN DISSEM declassification
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29~~ N19O0875R002000160001-8
economic reforms but political reforms as well. The latter will
pertain mainly to domestic affairs -- the reduction of arbitrary
party authority -- but also, inevitably, to foreign affairs. The
new forces in Prague are concerned with internal political
pluralism, as are the Yugoslavs, and with national sovereignty,
as are the Romanians.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : erATQ3P8%1 0875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Changes at the Top
1. On 5 January, 46-year old Alexander Dubcek, First
Secretary of the semi-autonomous Slovak party organization,
replaced 63-year old Antonin Novotny as First Secretary of the:
entire Czechoslovak Party. Four full members were added to t;:!
Party Presidium raising the total in that body to 14 full mejabers
and 5 candidates. The Central Committee meeting which effee..ed
these changes was the fourth meeting since mini-September 19?-'r.
The Presidium itself had been in almost daily session since the
beginning of December. Certain Czechoslovak armed forces
reservists had apparently been alerted for several days in
connection with the crisis, and Soviet Party Chief Brezhnev had
invited himself to Prague in early December to see, inter alia,
if the Czech political wines were vintage Budapest 1956.,
2. The election of Dubcek to lead the entire poa.?,,y~ seems to
be the latest, but not the last, in a series of bids power by
a coalition representing Slovak regional interests an1.the more
generally liberal elements in the party. Dt bcek may i:iot have
been the leader of the coalition in the Presidium; one of the
names which had more frequently been mentioned as likely successor
to Novotny was planning chief Oldrich Cernik, a Czech with
-3-
S-F-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 -CCIA--RD T 5T00875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
25X1 C
reformist ;hews. Nevertheless, Dubcek earned some stature among
liberals during his four years in charge of the Slovak party.
It was relatively easy for liberal writers who had difficulty
with the censors in Prague to have their articles published in
Bratislava. Moreover, Dubcek played a particularly active role
in the last few months in spearheading demands for change.
25X1
criticized Novotny before the Central Committee for being "unable
to solve problems", noted his age and deteriorating health, and
recommended that he give up his main party post and retain the
rather ceremonial office of the presidency -- the recomme.idation
finally adopted.
3. Despite some 17 years residence and study in the USSR,
mostly as a young man, Dubcek does not strike us as being
Moscow's man in Prague. Dubeek's speech at the Czechoslovak
Central Committee plenum last September alluded not at all to the
experience of the Soviet comrades, and the terminology he used
was more reminiscent of Walt Rostow than of Marx or Lenin.
Dubeek's above mentioned attack on Novotny preceded, not followed,
Brezhnev's trip to Prague. A plausible story now circulating
among Czechoslovak party members has it that Dubcek was among
- 4 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : ??L -F~Dj?BJj 0875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSE2-4
s^veral Presidium members who told Brezhnev to keep out of
Czechoslovak internal matters. Ae a practical politician Dubcek
probably realizes that Czechoslovakia's problems and his own
prospects are not going to be settled in the USSR but at home.
Finally, residence in the USSR is no guarantee of permanent
loyalty to the USSR; Imre Nagy spent about 15 years in Moscow.
The Revisionist Drift
4. It seems to us that the comings and goings of various
persons, however interesting in themselves, are not what it is
really all about in Czechoslovakia. One of the main reasons
cited by the Czechoslovak press for the 5 January changes was the
need for the "democratization" of Czechoslovakia's political
system. This is more than a rhetorical flourish. We are not
suggesting that there is no longer any debate in Czechoolovakia
concerning "economic reforms" -- i.e. the transition from a
command economy to a market economy, improved quality of goods
(especially consumers' goods), social welfare, and so forth. Bat
the Novotny regime had officially endorsed most of these "economic
reforms", and still Novotny was removed. T'.:,:: important point is
that there appears to be a growing consensus among most articulate
elements in the country that economic reforms must be accompanied
- 5 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/g$2,1~LD-.RJ 85T00875R002000160001-8
NO FOflEIGN DISSEM
by basic political reforms as well. These elements argue that
the political system must be radically changed -- "liberalized"
in the term many Yugoslav observers prefer, "revisionized" may be
what Brezhnev muttered to himself on the way home from Prague.
5. Whatever its label, the process has been slowly gathering
momentum since the early 1960's, when Novotny belatedly permitted
the de-Stalinization demanded from below. Since that time, Novotny
has been fighting both the dogmatists and the liberals, but it is
the former who have grown weaker, and Novotny has moved by fits
and starts towards accommodation with the latter. In 1965 and
1966, writers in the party and cultural press focused on the
tension between the individual and the government, the absence of
real representative institutions, the lack of public influence on
policy, and the abuse of rule by dogmatic politicians. Many of
these writers held influential positions, such as Zdenek Mlynar,
Secretary of the Legal Commission of the Party Central Committee,
and Michal Lakatos, a legal scholar attached to the Czechos?.ovak
Academy of Sciences. Lakatos, for example, borrowed from Yugoslav
theorists the argument that the party should withdraw from the
daily management of affairs and relinquish some of its decision-
making power to "autonomous" institutions (e.g. workers' councils,
-6-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN PISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSM4
nationality groups, trade unions). But he went beyond the
Yugoslavs to urge that a multi-party system be instituted in the
Czechoslovak National Assembly, and several other Czech and Slovak
writers have publicly echoed Lakatos on this point.
6. During the past two years the liberals have become
bolder, and their terms of argument more explicitly political.
Among the less obvious conditions facilitating this process have
been the excesses of the Chinese cultural revolut-^a, which have
caused greater revulsion in Czechoslovakia, both in and out of
the party, than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Writers in the
Slovak press, for example, have attributed these excesses not just
to Mao and company -- as the Soviets usually have done -- but to
basic defects in the party as a political institution. They have
argued that similar deformations can be barred from Czechoslovakia
only through democratization of society and government.
7. Probably the most extreme statement of political dissent
was expressed by writer and party member Ludvik Vaculik at the
Writers' Congress last June. He praised the "high level of
democracy" achieved by the pre-World War II republic under Masaryk,
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
"It is necessary to understand that no human
problem has been solved in our country for 20
years -- starting with the elementary needs, such
as housing, schools and prosperity, and ending with
the more refined requirements which cannot be
satisfied by the undemocratic systems of the world.
For instance, the feeling of full value in society.
The subordination of political decisions to ethical
criteria. The belief in the value of even small-
scale labor, the need for confidence among men, the
development of the education of the entire people ..."
8. 'In the good old days, of course, Iudvik Vaculilc might have
been shot; this time he and his companions merely lost their
party membership cards, which apparently they did not value
highly anyway. They probably received such gingerly treatment
because the party itself was divided, both on the tactics to be
used against people like Ludvik Vaculik, and indeed on the merits
of their protest.
9. Resides the intellectuals' protest, the restive students
have played an indirect role in the Czechoslovak transition. Open
manifestations of student unrest are not rare in Eastern Europe,
and the overtones are usually political. But only in Czecho-
slovakia, we suspect, could university students repeatedly stage
sit-in demonstrations against the regime as they did last fall,
-8-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSE4
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO2000160001-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
hear a Party Central Committee member and university official
tell them to be patient because an "irreversible democratization"
was taking place in their country, and then read the party youth
newspaper's condemnation of the "police brutality" of the
uniformed men who dispersed them. Moreover, one of Novotny's
high cards in dealing with student unrest on previous occasions
had been the failure of the students to arouse the sympathy of
the workers. This time, however, the trade union newspaper echoed
the Party youth newspaper's exoneration of the students, and then
added that the episode demonstrated the need for establishing
regular channels for expressing dissent and obtaining redress of
grievances on all important areas (i.e. workers' interests). At
that point Novotny may well have realized he was in serious
trouble.
Internal Changes Ahead
10. The expansion of the Party Presidium form 10 to 14 full
members was apparently to solidify the liberal majority (including
the Slovaks). Further changes in the top echelons of the party
and government are in prospect. There are still plenty of anti-
liberals around, but for the moment they are on the defensive.
Their representatives in the Presidium, such as Jiri Hendrych,
-9-
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOtsiIC-F DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85TOO875ROO2000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/062: - 2gP85T00875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
are likely to be demoted. In addition, Premier Lenart, a liberal
Slovak, may be replaced in that post by someone such as the
previously mentioned Oldrich Cernik, in order to maintain a
nationality balance. There could also be significant changes in
the Ministry of the Interior, which was publicly attacked by a
candidate member of the Presidium last September. The reasons
cited for the attack -- inefficient operation of the Ministry's
buildings and grounds in Prague -- are so trifling as to suggest
the beginnings of a more serious campaign against the Ministry
and against its subordinate organization, the secret police (StB).
Novotny will apparently retain the ceremonial title of President
and his full membership in the Presidium for the time being. As
long as he does not work against Dubcek, he is unlikely to becor,e
an unperson like his friend ICr~v3hchev, probably because the
Czechoslovaks Irish 1.o show that they can handle problems of this
natur^ with more dignity than the Soviets.
11. Judging by the extensive and favorable coverage given
Czechoslovak developments in the Yugoslav press the Yugoslavs
expect the Czechs to become something like themselves. They also
expect that the changes in Czechoslovakia will stir similar
impulses in other parts of Europe.
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 S4MAe U00875R002000160001-8
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
12. If there is a similarity between what is happen-.'mg in
Czechoslovakia and Romania, what has happened in Yugoslavia, and
what may happen elsewhere, it may be that -- freed from continuous
Soviet importunity -- all are reasserting their traditional
patterns of political behavior. In the case of Czechoslovakia,
these aatterns are more Western and democratic than elseattere in
Eastern. Europe, ari the Czechs may ultimately therefore go
further than the iugoslavs or anyone else in Eastern Europe
toward political democracy. Also in Czec:a fashion, however, they
will probably move cautiously lest the transition provoke
unpleasant Soviet reprisals.
'zechoslovak-Soviet Relations
13. As the new liberalization in Czechoslovakia emerges more
clearly, a new facet of it is revealed: its opposition to
Moscow's domination of Prague's foreign policy. The Middle East
crisis produced widespread dissatisfaction within all segments of
society, partly because of sympathy for Israel -- e.g. the Party
member and writer Mnacko who defected to Israel -- and partly
because so much of that Czechoslovak foreign aid extended on
behalf of Moscow's interests seemed to have gone to waste, and
yet Moscow expected Prr,gue to do more. Even Novotny himself
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
S-E-C-R,r'.E--T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
evidently went to Moscow lac summer to plead that Czechos ovakia's
share of aid to the Arab states be cut. Indeed it appears that
most of the people who count in Prague have begun to have serious
doubts about the wisdom of Czechoslovakia's material support for
Moscow's clients throughout the world.
14. Over the past year a new attitude in Prague toward West
Germany and the Warsaw Pact has become manifest. It now appears
that a majority of the Czechoslovak Party is unhappy with Moscow's
attitude toward Eastern European diplomatic recognition of West
Germany and that this majority favors recognition without major
precondition -- a situation which distinguishes the Czechoslovaks
from their Polish counterparts. The attraction toward Bonn is
partly economic -- the advantages Romania has reaped are evident
and partly political and psychological; Czechs like to remind
foreign visitors these days that Prague is a hundred miles west
of Vienna.
15. Czechoslovakia, a vital element in the northern tier of
the Warsaw Pact, seems unlikely to duplicate Romania's defiance
of the Pact at this point. But there are some interesting straws
in the wind. Last September a journal of the Socialist Academy
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
in Prague questioned whether Soviet efforts to promote further
integration within the Pact were compatible with the pre'.-ogativcs
of "sovereign" governments. More recently another segment of the
prese cited public sentiment favoring Czechoslovakia's emulation
of the neutral policies of Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria.
Prague Domestic Radio offered its listeners a lengthy and
implicitly favorable exposition of Romania's independent policies,
including its special relationship to the Warsaw Pact.
16. And there are nov-the little irritants in Czechoslovak-
Soviet relations that Prague formerly took care to prevent. The
eloquent protest by Russian writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn against
literary censorship was not read at the Soviet Writers' Congress
last May, but it was read by a delegate to the Czechoslovak
Writers' Congress the following month, aad Solzhenitsyn r,_imself
was interviewed by Czechoslovak journalists. The principal Czech
literary journal is publishing excerpts from Svetlana's book. One
of the last acts of the Novotny regime was to decree, as Romania
did iii September 1963, that students are no longer obliged to
study Russian.
- 13 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8
S?-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
17. The Soviets, fo- their part, are likely to see in the
changes in Czechoslovakia a potential for serious trouble, either
political instability in Prague or growing Czech resistance to
Moscow's leadership, or both. But the Soviets will probably not
move to apply heavy pressures unless or until the situation in
Czechoslovakia clearly threatens their interests. The Czechs,
aware of this, will probably avoid moves which might provoke the
Soviets into precipitous actions. In any event, there are
inhibitions on the USSR's use of crude pressures -- e.g. Moscow's
concern over its own image in Western Europe -- and there are
likely to be limits on the effectivenc.ss of any political and
economic levers the Soviets might seek to apply, a probability
attested to by the lack of success of their efforts to arrest
similar developments elsevhere, e.g. in Romania.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES : 25X1 A
- 14 -
S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP85T00875R002000160001-8