THE CONSTANTS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100100079-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 79
• Publication Date: August 1, 1971
• Content Type: IR

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onfidential
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
The Congants in French Foreign Policy
DOCUMENT ..,521e:737:S BRANCH
ALE
DO tIOT DESTROY
Confidential
August 1971
No. 1729/71
N.Y. 07
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
8, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is piohibited by law.
CROUP 1
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THE CONSTANTS IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY
Page
Summary
111
A. EUROPE
1
1. Roads to Unity
4
2. The Common Market
6
3. Eastern Europe
10
B. DEFENSE
13
1. Defense Doctrine.
14
2. NATO
16
3. European Cooperation for Defense
18
4. Arms
20
C. THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN
23
1. The Western Mediterranean
25
2. Middle East
26
D. WORLD-WIDE INTERESTS
29
1. Black Africa and the Overseas Territories
29
2. The UN
30
3. The US
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Augtv .t 1971
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Constants in French Foreign Policy
Summary
In the two years since Charles de Gaulle gave up the presidency, the
orientation of France's foreign policy has been subject to minute scrutiny
from every direction. Any hint of variation between him and his heirs and
between Gaullists and other Frenchmen has been carefully sifted to deter-
mine its significance. Official statements and new expressions of policy
regularly elicit wide-ranging interpretations of their import. Such concentra-
tion on inferred new directions has tended to obscure the essential unity
apparent in policy tacks despite divergent political philosophies.
Interpretations originating west of the Atlantic frequently suffer be-
cause the base for comparison of French policy innovations is usually the
immediate postwar period, when Francc regularly acquiesced in US-led
containment of Soviet expansionism. Unfortunately, the early 1950s was
hardly a representative era for such exegesis; the ideological atmosphere of
the cold war hung heavy over Western Europe, France was struggling to
recover from the effects of defeat and occupation, and Germany was
impotent.
By the end of that decade, however, key aspects of the general situation
had changed enormously. Cracks had begun to appear in what had been
considered the monolithic world-Communist structure, the economic re-
covery of Western Europe was ensured, and many Europeans were beginning
to express second thoughts about the desirability of perpetuating two
antagonistic blocs. As a result, the world view from Paris began to return to
its traditional focus.
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Going back to pre - World War II concepts, the geographic, economic,
and cultural factors that color French political perceptions have long been
clearly defined. For centuries France's aspirations to maritime power have
been circumscribed by the prime requirement cf defense against land incur-
sions. Since 1870 this preoccupation has been reinforced by the resurgence
of Germany, and the prime foreign policy objective of republican France has
been to contain German expansionism. The traditional continental preoccu-
pations of French leku.;e10 may be somewhat reoriented by the threat of
nuclear weaponry, but they cannot be entirely distracted from their pri-
mordial area of concern.
As the cold war developed, France's allies tended to forget that the
Western European Union had been formed in 1948 by five nations still
fearful of Germany's recovery potential. The abortive European Defense
Community afforded France, in the opinion of many Frenchmen, insuffi-
cient protection against Germany in a community of six. When West Ger-
many was admitted to WEU in 1954, it was counterbalanced by the UK's
adherence?to avoid any possibility that Germany might be rearmed without
being restricted by sufficiently forceful international commitments.
The genesis of the other integration schemes in Western Europe was
also the desire to contain German dynamism. The French-German treaty of
1963 had the same objective; De Gaulle had proposed a similar arrangement
for all the governments associated in the Common Market. In each case, the
intent was to inhibit possible future German aspirations to hegemony as
much as to encourage Europe's economic expansion.
Most French political leaders agree that the ultimate goal of European
integration is politica,' union, but none see that objective a imminent. Until
the national priorities of all the potential participants can be submerrd in a
continental identity, Paris will strive t; ivtain freedom of action wherever
possible. Even De Gaulle acknowledged that aP states are interdependent
today, but he insisted that France should retain control over policy decisions
where its interests are involved and that othc,. states should have the same
prerogative.
For the foreseeaole future, therefore, assessments of France's inter-
national role must start from the premise that freedom of acdon and defense
against foreign aggression are the constants in the basic political equation.
The goal is not standpat policies, but dynamic adaptation to changing
circumstances.
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Paris has not always been ready to adapt as quickly as circumstances
light warrant, particularly in areas wherz historic ties were at stake. Never-
theless, when the trend of events in other parts of the globe made clear that
change was inevitable, Paris has reacted to cut Fren.th losses and to fall back
to its European "hexagon."
Insofar as the world outside Europe is concerned, Paris' primary objec-
tive has been to have its voice heard in international forums on developments
anywhere on the globe. Without surrendering its claim to world-wide inter-
ests, it has adjusted its relationship to areas formerly under French sover-
eignty; co operation has become the catch-word for ties with its former
African and Indochinese territories. The organization, in the late 1960s, of
the Fre ,ch-speaking Countries' Agency for Cultural and Technical Coopera-
tion is tar less rigid than the Common Market ties to France's neighbors in
Europe, but it establishes a formal relationship which ensures continuation
of French influence.
Although France is now acknowledging more frankly than during the
era of De Gaulle that it is limiting its major fields of international activity
largely to adjacent areas and to Africa, it still proceeds on the assumption
that the evolution of nuclear arms gives it wide leeway to exert influence
elsewhere, too. Because a nuclear holocaust is unthinkable, French strategists
argue, a moderate-s :zed power with access to atomic weapons can carry
considerable weight in diplomatic channels. The threat of action implicit in
its control over nuclear arms is sufficient to enhance its bargaining power in
peacetime, even though its actual strength would be negligible in conflict.
In practical terms, French efforts to exert influence on a global scale
will probably turn increasingly to the UN Security Council. Not only does its
permanent seat give Paris a sense of equality with the big powers, but it also
ensures France a degree of importance more and more out of proportion to
its relative size and st,ength. Outside the UN, Paris seeks to establish good
relations with the USSR and China and to retain with the US as weak an
alliance as is compatible with national security. In other aspects, Paris will be
inclined to look on itself as a regional rather than a world power. One
indication of this tendency io ty:, renewed interest it is showing in the
Mediterranean. France is openly trying to develop a position of strength
there to counter growing Soviet influence and to make up for possible
dwindling US concern. Europe, the Mediterranean and, to a lesser degree,
Black Africa will in the future be the areas of prime importance to Paris.
Even the most nationalistic French leaders acknowledge that the indivi-
dual nation-state in Western Europe is no longer competent to deal with
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technical and economic realities. They also accept the evolution of Ithe
continent toward a new European context. Only a very small minority,
however, see ary early possibility that Europe can replace today's nation-
states as the framework for a national culture that would provide sufficient
community of identity to permit full political integration.
Pending the eventuality and as preparation for it, French spokesmen
emphasize th.; cultural factor. If France is not to be dragged along in the
wake of more powerful partners, if it is to have enough power to exert
influence on world developments, they warn, it must not only work toward
a wider political entity, but also strive to achieve a leadership role in such a
polity. Michel Debre expressed this thought in extreme terms when he stated
that unless France is essentially the dominant element in any association of
European states, "it risks subordination, that is to say, disappearance." To
that end, all Frenchmen stress the importance of the French language.
Waning linguistic influence is viewed as reflecting, and indeed hastening,
ebbing national vitality. The use of French as a vehicle for international
communication is considered linked to the part France will play in a more
closely knit Europe.
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A. EUROPE
In recent years both French Government officials and political activists
have turned increasing attention to questions about the kind of comprehen-
sive European community they consider most likely to ensure peace and
France's long-range security interests. They have sought to define "Europe"
to determine what geographical area and what peoples might reasonably be
expected to find a basis for close association. They have explored what
powers might safely be delegated to an essociation of European nations,
what goals it might pursue and what steps might be taken to achieve both.
Government spokesmen have regularly expressed the need to expand
European cooperation beyond the confines of the Community of Six, but
they have always cautiously avoided specifying time and space coordinates
for their proposals. Two unofficial bodies have been much more definite,
however, about both the extent of European cooperation and the time span
in which it might be effected.
In 1967, a research group of the private Foreign Policy Study Center,
working under the center's Study Committee on French-German Relations,
piepared a program geared to the three-stage progression from detente to
entente to cooperation that De Gaulle had long propounded as the sequence
through which relations with the USSR could be improved. Subsequently,
the European Independence Movement, founded in 1968, has undertaken,
through conferences and formai studies, to advance the idea of broad
European collaboration cutting across current associational ties.
The research group gralited that detente would confirm the stable
situation now prevailing in Europe, but rejected it as a permanent solution to
European problems. The group's conclusion was that detente would rein-
force the status quo by making it impossible to eliminate the fundamental
causes of tension and world ensure Western Europe's continued dependence
on the US. The result, as the group saw it, would be a Soviet-American
condominium over Europe, precluding a real rapprochement between the
two parts of the continent; without institutional links or common political
interests, the growth of trade would not be enough by itself, the group felt,
to create a wider community of views.
Passing on to its understanoing of what entente might encompass, the
research group envisaged an initial phase contingent on the end of hostilities
in Vietnam and fruitful negotiations between the two Germanys. At this
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stage both alliances could undertake to work out together a system of
inspection of forces. In a second phase, mobile observation teams would
inspect military contingents in Germany; nuclear arms would be withdrawn
from this pilot zone and ceilings placed on conventional military units there.
In a final phase, surveillance would be extended to the rest of Central
Europe.
The objective of cooperation, as the research group envisioned it, would
be to establish a new political system in Europe, replacing the two military
alliances by a pan-European security arrangement. Tlp. goal would be to
make German reunification possible by creating a new German confedera-
tion within a broader confederation embracing the members of NATO and
the Warsaw Pact a8 well as the unaligned nations of Europe.
Althougl,.. as its name implies, the European Independence Movement
(EIM) wants to free the continent from outside restraint, this does not mean
that it proposes isolating from the world the "organization of European
states" it hopes to create, It insists that it does not suggest renunciation of
existing alliances, that it seeks only to give priority to European ties. At the
same time, however, it flatly rejects the thought of a Europe - United States
"partnership," and looks ultimately to a pan-European association including
the USSR. Indeed, it sees the USSR as an eventual pillar corresponding to
Western Europe in a purely European organization.
The EIM favors strengthening the structures of the European Common
Market as a means of more closely coordinating foreign, economic, and
financial policies. An independent Western Europe, it argues, is essential to
the evolution of all of Europe, because the orientation of the Common
Market will determine in large measure the attitude of Eastern Europe. It
proposes intensified bilateral and multilateral cooperation between both
parts of the continent, the withdrawal of foreign armed force from all
countries concerned, and the formulation of a European security system as
steps toward the ultimate gcal of a united Europe open to all European
states.
The EIM is supported by politically active elements ranging from the
Gaullist-allied Independent Republicans to the Communists. It numbers
many Socialists in its membership, but the bulk of its strength comes from
the Ga.ullists, including ex-ministers Pierre Messmer, Alain Peyrefitte, and
Jean Foyer.
EMI proponents are rei...4ctant to specify geographic boundaries for tleir
conception of Europe. They insist that no European system is possible
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without the USSR, but what the USSR encompasses in their minds remains
unsaid. Nevertheless, the concept of a broad Europeiln setting for a solution
to the problem of German reunification appeals to thoughtful Frenchmen as
the only guarantee of lasting peace. The well-known theorist on strategy,
General Andre Beaufre, for example, rejects the idea of a Western European
community as a viable solution, arguing that only the enlargement of
"Europe" to? the Soviet frontier would permit both the reunification of
Germany and liquidation of the issues arising from World War II.
Government officials are skeptical about the immediate practicality of
such idoas, but they continue to make overtures to t ttild links with countries
outside the established Western European organizations. Defense Minister
Michel Debre, long a spokesman for France's most narrowly nationalistic
aspirations, continues to reject the feasibility of a political and military
entity in Western Europe, let alone one covering the whole continent,
because he sees little cohesion beyond present-day national boundaries. Even
he, however, grants a growing awareness of a psychological affinity among
Europeans which impels them to seek solutions to intra-European conflicts
within a community of interests.
Debie dismisses as unrealistic for the present a policy based on extra-
national loyalties, but he recognizes the progress that has been made in
integrating Western Earopean economies and accepts the desirability of
concerting French policies with those of its major neighbors. Although he
expresses doubts that the USSR will continue to be able to exercise control
over Eastern Europe, he sees a durable basis for Moscow's overtures to
Western Europe and insists that it is in France's interest to push on boldly
toward entente and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
In sum, although French interests in international cooperation continue
to be concentrated on the Common Market countries, Pali; does not feel
that European cooperation should be restricted to the area thy encompass.
Both De Gaulle and Pompidou, as chiefs of state, have unde,taken formal
visits to the USSR to make commitments for closer links betwcen the two
countries. When De Gaulle visited Poland in September 1967, he raised the
hope for a "contractual settlement of the great problem of Germany, and
through this the achievement by the whole continent of the security and
union which it has never known."
Similarly, the communique issued following Premier Jacques Chaban-
Delmas' visit to Yugoslavia in April 1971?the first by a head of the French
Government?expressed the hope that cooperation would be reinforced
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among European countries independent of their political orientation or
social structure. Both sides expressed their wish to pursue efforts to over-
come the division of the continent and to pass beyond the eta of antago-
nistic blocs.
Such overtures parallel steps Paris has taken to develop close ties on the
Common Market's western flank. In recent years joint commissions have
been e-Aablished with Spain to coordinate cultural, scientific, technical,
comme7cial, industrial, agricultural, and social cooperation. In February
1970, for the first time since the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish foreign
minister?Lopez Bravo?visited Paris. An agreement to purchase Mirage III
aircraft was reached, and subsequently a military cooperation accord pro-
viding for joint exercises and exchange of personnel was siped.
1. Roads to Unity
Whatever support may exist in France for pan-European cooperation
"from the Atlantic to the Urals," proponents of early union fasten on more
modest goals. Without denigrating the desirability and usefulness of indivi-
dual steps to relieve tension and to forge new links with states outside the
ideological barriers erected in both the Cold War and the Spanish Civil War,
the cooperation-minded forces in France have tended to concentrate most of
their energies on constructing the Common Market.
Even General Beaufre, who has strong reservations both about relying
on economic integration as a road to political union and about attempting to
establish "Europe" on tno restrictive a geographic basis, thinks, that it is
unrealistic to believe in the possibility of unifying Europe other than by
progressive stages. Failing more broadly based politico-strategic discussions
and efforts te reorganize NATO, he is prepared to back integration of he
Common Market Six as a preliminary step.
The authus of The European Challenge?Louis Armand and Mlchel
Drancourt?espouse a variant electic approach that would make it possible
to transcend the Europe of the Six. They propose "federalism a la carte," a
selective network of agreements permitting countries to cooperate in specific
fields, with varying numbers of participants according to the purpose. A
federal structure, they suggest, could start with establishing a common legal
basis for all the new technologies,, developing in common what is too r ew to
have yet been bound into existing patterns. They are categoric that "only
federalist sructures can transform the material associations between men
into lasting emotional, spiritual, and political bonds."
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In his press conference in January 1971, President Pompidou expressed
his conviction that only the national states?not commissions composed of
technicians?,;an bring a Europ ,an government into existence. As a means
toward achieving such a government he presented an adaptation of the
Fouchet Plan?named for De Gaulle's representative in Common Market
negotiations a decade earlier. That proposal embodicAl De Gaulle's deter-
mination to safeguard France's national sovereignty as integration advanced.
Pompidou envisaged an evolution during which one minister in each national
government would be responsible for over-all European matters. Eventually,
their duties would expand, they would be obliged to meet more and more
frequently, and at some distant date they would cease to bc 7art of their
national governments: they would have become a truly European govern-
ment.
Until that time, and until a real European parliament exists, important
decisions can be taken only by unanimous consent of the member states.
Pompidou had Edicated earlier that he sees no chance of a European nation
coming into being for a long time to come, and that any idea of demolishing
the existing nations at the start would condemn the whole project to
complett, failure. He has also made clear that he was not in favor of any form
of political integration of Western Europe that could place obstacles in the
way of a rapprochement between the two parts of the continent.
Pompidou's admonition against early moves to weaken national iden-
tity was probably sparked by the extraordinary resurgence of regionalism in
recent years, not only in France, but elsewhere in Wrstern Europe also. Since
World War II France has recognized the need for decentralization of many
governmental functions and the creation of intermediate administrative
entities between Paris and the departements, which were constituted follow-
ing the overthrow of the anrien regime. Over the past quarter of a century
superprefectures have been established, forming regional groupings of de-
partements, and several overlapping patterns of regional divisions are now
operating for different purposes.
It is recognized that one set of regional partitions should serve all
administrative purposes, and there is general agreement on the need for
France to determine new regional jurisdictions comparable to the West
German laender, the newly constituted Italian regions, and the British Board
of Trad a districts. In France, most of the proposals for formal regional
structures follow closely the provincial divisions of prerevolutionary days,
although the basic criterion is economic. In nearly every instance some of
the pressure for regional autonomy comes from groups motivated by cultural
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considerations, but the primary impulse stems not from those with a nos-
talgic urge to turn toward the past, but from young forward-looking ele-
ments intent on optimum exploitation of economic potential.
Should such decentralization be pursued, however, it is expected over
the long run to make the departement an anachronistic relic between the
local municipalities and the increasingly powerful regional institutions. Na-
tionalists view such a potential development as a direct threat to the existing
nation-states if, as they anticipate, the political integration of Europe evolves
out of the Common Market and EUKkTOM.
They reason that the proposed regions would be more practicable units
than the current national entities for the intermediate level of government
between the local municipalities and the future confederal authority.
Whereas the departement is proving too small an intermediate unit in the
national context, they argue, the state as it exists today would in turn cease
to serve a useful political function; it would survir only as a cultural
framework. That possibility seems sufficiently remote to most Frenchmen to
merit no consideration in negotiations on European integration, but fervent
nationalists can be expected to rely increasingly on it to oppose real or
potential threats to national autonomy.
2. The Common Market
After more than two decades of formal negotiations on various aspects
of economic integration, France continues to demonstrate that it is not yet
prepared to surrender essential facets of national sovereignty to any supra-
national organization. Paris follows a policy of expanding economic coopera-
tion on a wide front, and where its interests are best served by reliance on an
international forum, it is quick to press for such consideration. It recently
sought European parliamentary discussion of common agricultural prices, for
example, before accepting them. On the other hand, it maintains a continu-
ing nationalistic stance vis-a-vis EURATOM.
Despite optimistic prognostications by official committees of the Euro-
pean Economic Community organizations, the outlook for political integra-
tion in the 1970s is dim. In 1970 a working group of high-level Common
Market officials under Luxembourg Finance Minister Werner concluded that
decisions on economic matters could be realized within a decade by a
popularly elected European parliament. This opinion was immediately chal-
lenged by Jacques Vernant, secretary general of the Foreign Policy Study
Center. Even without the adhesion of Great Britain, he believes, the trans-
formation of the Six alone into a Western European state is a theoretical
consideration without any realistic foundation.
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Vernant argues, moreover, that such close integration is no longer as
desirable as it may once have appeared. One reason for that opinion is his
belief?shared by most Frenchmen and their government?that the danger of
Soviet aggression or Communist subversion has disappeared. In addition, he
is convinced that economic stability and development cannot be guaranteed
by broadening the political framework. Big business, he points out, operates
satisfactorily across international borders, and?most important?the super-
powers seem as subject to social and political crises as are small or middle-
sized states.
However valid Vernant's analysis may be, it must be admitted that
there is no assurance the piecemeal approach will lead to political unity. The
need for simultaneous political and economic accord is perhaps most force-
fully apparent in the area of monetary policies. Recurring monetary crises in
the past few years have concentrated attention on the problems divergent
currency policies among member states pose for the survival of the integra-
tion steps already taken.
France insists that . the Council of Ministers from the participating
countries, rather than the European Communities' Commission, play the
managing role in a futuie monetary union; yet with a common currency
Paris would face real limitations on its sovereignty. Theoretically the mem-
ber states could continue to project independent budgets even if they were
operating in a unified monetary area with a central bank. In practice,
however, the political implications of divergent fiscal strategies would almost
certainly lead to what would be essentially a common budget.
What this means is that should this stage be reached, France will have
made the decision to sacrifice national autonomy. Monetary concordance is
therefore likely to be as much a consequence of political union as a step
toward it.
Paris should not have much difficulty in finding a basis of accord with
its EEC partners in most of the remaining areas under consideration, or at
least in devising ways to circumvent embarrassingly restrictive covenants.
The most troublesome of these may be the energy field, which implies some
restriction on sovereignty, specifically in defense matters. The solution may
well have to await creation of a genuine community executive. A common
transport policy, on the other hand, would presumably be no more serious a
political problem to Paris than to its partners.
A common commercial policy would, of course, block the freewheeling
contacts Paris and its EEC partners have sought to develop with various
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Eastern European countries. In any event, trade agreements cannot be
handled indefinitely by individual countries within the Common Market.
When unification of such procedures is achieved, it is likely to have more
effect on French prestige than on its business interests. Trade arrangements
will probably be much easier to accomplish than industrial specialization,
which will involve personal as well as national prerogatives.
It is likely that Paris will be more eas!'y moved on these questions than
on agricultural policy, which has absorbed a disproportionate share of the
time, money, and attention of all the countries participating in the Common
Market. The price support program instituted at French insistence has
imposed an unhealthy financial burden on the community and has created
unwieldy agricultural surpluses. Presumably steps must be taken eventually
to distinguish the marketing problem from social welfare considerations by
retraining or pensioning farmers no longer able to compete. Some such
solution can probably be worked out over the long run without arousing the
strong emotional reactions that made agricultural policy a critical issue in the
early 1960s.
The lure of the British market for or) itinental farm produce has had
some weight in softening the French Govelliment's opposition to the UK as
a partner in the EEC. The reality may fall short of the French hope, of
course, because the technically advanced British farmers will increase their
production of competitive items to take advantage of the common agricul-
tural policy. Over the long run, however, agricultural problems will probably
play only a minor role in France's attitude toward Britain's place in Europe.
Regardless of how well-founded the suspicions of the French Govern-
ment have been in the past of the degree of commitment London was
prepared to make to the integration movement, Paris now is convinced that
Britain has demonstrated its intentions by positive actions. Some of the
British moves may seem minor, but their psychological moment cannot be
discounted. The conversion to decimal measurement and monetary systems,
the decision to adopt a value-added taxation program, and steps toward
reforming the agricultural price support system drastically altered the out-
look on the French side of the Channel.
Probably the most persuasive indicator, however, was Britain's willing-
ness to acc,cpt the Rome treaty and its subsequent elaboration, asking only
for time to work out transition problems. In French eyes this expression of
intent reversed the attitude Britain had displayed in refusing to participate in
the Coal-Steel Community in 1950, in the proposed European Defense
Community in 1953, and in EURATOM and the Common Market in 1957.
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With fear of disruptive tactics on the UK's part dispelled, Paris was
ready to give more weight to its long-standing apprehensions about both
extension of the economic community's authority and German preponder-
ance in the community. Paris made its point on the first question in 1966,
when it blocked the attempt by its partners to implement the majority rule
called for in the Rome treaty, and subsequently other member states availed
themselves of the same prerogative. Nevertheless, France has felt isolated in
its insistence on unanimity for important decisions? and it looks to the UK
to reinforce its position by showing similar reserve on majority rule.
The traditior al French preoccupation with Germany's role in Europe is
also of major importance in this context. Although Paris encourages Bonn's
rapprochement with Moscow, earlier fear of German-Russian collusion has
not been entirely dissipated. Regardless of France's benign attitude toward
Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, therefore, a closer link to Britain has become
increasingly attractive to France. The reassurance that would be provided by
a British counterbalance to German dynamism has overcome French qualms
over the possibility that the UK would hold the balance of power in a
confrontation between Bonn and Paris, and might on occasion incline
toward West Germany.
France is increasingly prepared to take the risk in view of West Ger-
many's economic resurgence. Although the French and West German econ-
omies have been growing at similar rates, West Germany's larger population,
increasing independence and assertiveness, and especially its greater inter-
national economic reputation have enhanced fears that inevitably Bonn
could be expected to take the ascendancy in an association limited to the six
original Common Market countries. With Britain formally committed to the
integration organizations, Paris can be expected to accede more readily to
coordinated efforts in foreign policy because it can hope to rely on firitain
to brake possible German aspirations to broader power.
Finally, because Paris and London retain certain prerogatives?vestiges
of former world-wide pre-eminence?they may see some advantages in sup-
porting each other's pretensions to a more prestigious status than that of the
other Western European countries. Both are permanent members of the UN
Security Council, both can still lay claim to some degree of global influence
because of close ties with their former colonies, both are nuclear powers, and
both still have formal responsibility in two areas of direct concern to all
Germans: reunification and Berlin. Perhaps most important for the long-
range prospects for political ut).r.y and European independence, the nucleus
of a modern defense system for Western Europe is implicit in closer French-
British relations.
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Two remaining areas of concern will preoccvpy France for some time
after the question of the UK's accession to the European communities is
settled: the international role of sterling and the outlook for the French
language. Because London has indicated that it is prepared to close out the
use of sterling as a reserve currency, this problem can probably be solved to
the satisfaction of Paris without undue strain.
The language question touches deeper emotions. Within the Six, French
has played a major role. With the entry of the UK, and particularly if
Norway, Denmark and Ireland follow, the pre-eminence of English will be
inevitable. The almost universal reliance on F.I.glish in international business,
and its accelerated use as the preferred vehicle for scientific communication
make certain that French will be challenged as the medium of diplomatic
intercourse in an expanded Common Market.
3. Eastern Europe
The accession of the UK to the EEC can 1;o a long way toward
cementing the reconciliation France has sought with Germany by reducing
French fear of German hegemony in Western Europe. As Herve Alphand,
secretary general of the Foreign Ministry reminded the official Advanced
Studies Institute for National Defense in 1967, the will to reconcile France
and Germany is the basic reason for France's European initiative. British
accession lea?res indeterminate, however, a key factor which Michel Debre
cited in 197C that France must make a great effort to achieve a cooperative
relationship with Germany because such a relationship was indispensable to
France's security as well as to the security of the continent.
France is acutely alive to the problem of a divided Germany. On his
visit to Poland in 1967, De Gaulle spoke of the division of Germany as "an
abnormal situation which must be resolved." Reunification, he said, "is a
matter for the Germans themselves," within the framework of an agreement
between "the West, the Center, and the East of Europe." In other words,
Paris looked then and still looks for an eventual solution of the German
question within a context wide enough to include Eastern Europe and in
particular within an arrangement acceptable to the USSR.
When Pompidou visited Moscow in 1970, he reaffirmed France's dedi-
cation to the goals of detente, entente, and cooperation that his predecessor
had stressed. He signed a protocol intended to give fresh impetus to French-
Soviet political cooperation by reaffirming the special ties established by De
Gaulle's visit in 1966 in the economic, scientific, technological, and cultural
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fields. The agreement calls for efforts to concert the positions of the two
countries on all aspects of situations that create a threat to peace and for
consultations on major international problems of mutual interest. The two
foreign ministers are to meet when necessary?"in principle, twice a year."
Following MI Gaulle's call for increased cooperation, on his visit to
Moscow in 1966, a definite intensification in French-Sovot relations has
been apparent. Until then, the five-year trade agreement concluded in 1964
had done little to increase exchanges between the two countries, but by
1969 trade had tripled, due in large part to Soviet orders for capital gools.
These sales gave France a favorable balance with the USSR for the first time
in years. The renewal signed in 1969 anticipates that, trade will amount to
$1.4 billion in 1974, double its present volume. Paris hopes that Russian
orders for consumer goods will swell in the late 1970s.
The joint permanent commission that was created to encourage French-
Soviet exchanges following De Gaulle's vi3it gains special importance in this
context. After its first session, steps were taken to implement an agreement
to set up Renault production lines in the USSR, to establish a French
factory in the USSR to make television tubes, and to provide for coopera-
tion in nuclear physics. Subsequently, the commission expanded Renault's
role, and attention was turned to bringing other European countries into
major industrial prcjects, particularly in the automotive field. The 1969
accord called for Frence to import Soviet industrial goods as well as raw
materials, and Soviet organizations are participating in the construction of a
metallurgical complex near Marseilles.
The development of cooperation between the USSR and France in
industrial undertakings may later encourage broader European participation.
Moscow has pressed for markets in France for Soviet-built equipment and
industrial products to avoid balance-of-payment difficulties. Over the short
term, however, no great expansion of trade is in prospect in this field.
On the scientific side, France and the USSR have cooperated on
programs to measure upper-air temperatures. Although the first plan for the
USSR to launch a French-made satellite was canceled for financial reasons,
this setback has been overshadowed by successful launches in the past two
years, highlighted by the landing of French laser reflectors on the moon in
1970. Paris reportedly offered Moscow the use of a site near the French
Guiana complex for a Soviet receiving and directional station which could
benefit from an equatorial location.
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Paris leaves no doubt about the eventual political goal it seeks to attain
by such efforts toward expanded cooperation with Moscow. France takes
credit for hastening the relaxation of tensions in Europe in recent years, but
stresses that lasting peace cannot be guaranteed until major sources of
discontent have been eliminated. Germany is the core problem, and Alphand,
in his speech to the military staff college, said that the moves toward
cooperation between East and West that France had initiated must be
expanded to bring about the conditions required for reuniting Germany.
Both Debre and Pompidou have made clear in the past year that German
reunification must take place within a framework of European states acting
in concert. They reject the idea of competing blocs, proclaiming that the
essential consideration for France is to maintain its freedom of action.
Although they hasten to add that they have no intention of sacrificing ties
with the US, they make clear that they want to be able to implement their
own desires independently to the fullest extent possible.
The vehicle that the French now favor for furthering understanding on
the continent is a conference of all the states with a stake in a European
settlement?including the US and Canada. In his visit to the USSR in 1970,
Pompidou reversed the position France had held earlier and expressed strong
support for the European security conference concept Moscow has been
pushing for years. He called for an -active phase" of preparations, which he
said meant speaking of a security conference "as something that is going to
hapven."
Pompidou's statement reflects broad opinion in France that wider
contacts with the USSR and the other states of Eastern Europe have
contributed considerably to reducing tension in Europe. The distrust aroused
by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 set back detente sentiment
only temporarily, and relations between Paris and Moscow have gone on as if
nothing had disturbed them. Even insistence on some progress in discussions
on the status of Berlin no longer seems as important a prerequisite as it did
at the end of 1970, although at the NATO meeting in June 1971 France
reaffirmed its commitment. Prime Minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas and
Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann had linked the two questions in 1970,
Schumann proposing that the US, the USSR, France and the UK call on the
Germans?including the Berliners?to work out proposals to be approved by
the Four. In January 1971, Pompidou implied that one problem need not
necessarily depend on the other, although subsequently he qualified his
position considerably without retracting completely. Simultaneous discus-
sions may be the solution, but in any event, Paris can be expected to persist
in seeking to expand cooperation between both parts of Europe in as many
fields as possible.
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B. DEFENSE
The premise that no country can claim to have an authentic foreign
policy unless it has an independent means of defense has been so closely
identified with Gaullism that its origins in pre-Gaullist France are frequently
overlooked. The Fourth Republic's acceptance?albeit reluctant?of NATO's
integrated military instrument is usually contrasted with De Gaulle's insist-
ence on freedom of action in the realm of defense. Yet, the Fourth
Republic's aversion to submerging the national military force in a European
defense community scheme was a major blow to US policy in the early
1950s. Moreover, the Fourth Republic not only launched France's atomic
energy program, but also made the decisions to channel it toward nuclear-
weapon development.
Them is no question but that the Fifth Republic has been far more
forthright than its predecessor in proclaiming its determination to defend the
nation's sovereignty. It has not, however, rejected the alliance framework
formalized by the pre-Gaullist regime. De Gaulle's decision to withdraw from
NATO's integrated military command was strictly within the limitations of
the alliance treaty, and?most important?it was backed by a majority of the
French people, who as a result of France's suffering in two world wars, were
convinced that in matters of defense, there is no substitute for self-reliance.
In any event, Gaullists are still dominant, and they make clear that they
consider defense a basic responsibility of the state, which can surrender no
element of sovereignty in this area. Defense Ministe7 Debre defined the
coverage of his policy in 1970: "Nuclear retaliation capability, territorial
defense capability, intervention capability beyond our frontiers, in Europe
first cf all, then in the Mediterranean and outside Europe, and finally the
requisite scientific and industrial capability."
Integration of French armed forces in supranational organizations is,
therefore, rejected, and emphasis is placed on providing the nation's 'military
components with the most modern weapons available. It is noteworthy, in
this regard, that when opponents of the government pose objections to the
nuclear-weapons program, they usually couch them in economic terms rather
than posit them on military grounds.
Nuclear parity between the US and the USSR has strengthened France's
determination to develop an independent capability in modern weaponry.
French spokesmen reason that the US could not be expected to risk Soviet
attack on American territory by launching nuclear weapons against the
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USSR if the Russians moved on Western Europe. The "nuclear risk is not
divisible," Debre wrote in Foreign Affairs in April 1971, "it is so enormous
that a people would accept it only as a final defense of their supreme
self-interest?their existence as an independent and sovereign state."
Debre went on to argue that any attempt to determine in advance the
conditions under which the nuclear weapon would be used restricts its
credibility as a deterrent. The decision can only be made by one nation,
therefore, and no ally can expect that its interests will be given equal priority
with those of the state that has the responsibility and the capability to fire
the weapon.
An additional consideration foi Paris is the prestige factor; possession
of an independent nuclear-weapon force justifies the special status France
enjoys in the UN because of its permanent seat on the Security Council.
1. Defense Doctrine
France's declared basis for its military policy is to forestall the outbreak
of hostilities. President Pompidou told the Advanced Studies Institute of
National Defense in 1969 that national defense is based on dissuasion. He
credits France with originating the concept when French atorn.ic weapons
came into being. In French strategic thinking, possession of nuclear weapons
is a particularly effective defense for a small- or medium-sized power against
aggression on the part of a superpower. The French argue that the Russians
would not consider France a sufficient stake to warrant risking the destruc-
tion of even part of their own industrial potential.
Despite the fundamental consonance of views between the US and
France on the dissuasive role of nuclear weapons, Paris has differed drasti-
cally with Washington on the circumstances under which it sees an attack
might be launched. Paris has felt that flexible response is a luxury it can ill
afford, given its geographic proximity to the most likely source of aggres-
sion. Washington can reflect on the seriousness of a threat from a distant
enemy, but France must decide with much less lead time.
This divergence in viewpoints has been accentuated by the limited range
of the French nuclear arsenal, and there are come indications that France
may be inclined to adopt a limited flexible response once it has control over
its own tactical missiles with nuclear explosives. By late 1972, when such
weapons are expected to be deployed, Paris presumably will follow a more
relaxed policy. In the meantime, it seems clear that Paris feels confident
enough of its present and potential capabilities in the area of over-all defense
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to modify considerably the hard-line self-sufficiency expressed most force-
fully by the late General Charles Ailleret in hs official capacity as chief of
staff of the a med forces.
Questioning the West's continued adherence to the platosophy that
brought the Atlantic Alliance into being, Ailleret took the position in 1967
that the danger of a Soviet attack was becoming increasingly hypothetical
and that Moscow could no longer be considered the only potential Eggressor,
nor even the prime one, that France might have to contend with. Citing ;he
rapid development of missile and satellite technology, he emphasized that
France was vulnerable to attack from any place in the world and should,
therefore, be prep.,red to respond in all directions with weapons capable of
reaching the remotest corner of the globe.
But even before De Gaulle relinquished power, official spokesmen had
backed away publicly from the idea of immediate massive nuclear retaliation
and from the idea of equal a:ertness to attack from all directions. In 1968,
the then defense minister, Pierre Messmer, expressed the desirability of the
armed forces attempting to determine the real intentions of an aggressor. He
cited tactical atomic weapons as the cheapest and most effective means to
that end.
In early 1969, Ailleret's successor, General Michel Fourquet, intro-
duced a further cautionary note. In an address before the Advanced Studies
Institute of National Defense he reiterated that French forces must be
prepared to act independently, but he also made clear that the major
concern for France was still an attack from the East. Because such an attack,
he said, would be met in cooperation with France's allies, a flexible response
would be possible. He maintained, nevertheless, that the level at which
atomic weapons should be brought into play was still a matter of profound
concern for the French.
Essentially, then, in the official French view, the center of discord
between France and its major ally is the threshold beyond which nuclear
missiles would be employed. Pending French control of its own tactical
nuclear weapons, Paris will be governed by the kind of NATO tactical-
weapon support its troops could expect to rely on.
No closer rapprochement with NATO's integ-Med militai y arm is im-
plied by willingness on the part of Paris to envisage such reliar:,..:e?which in
effect is no more than an acknowledgement of the existing situation. It can
be assumed, however, that Paris is not unalterably opposed to an eventual
European defense organization, and both the prospect of a heavier financial
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burden for defense and of the accession of the UK to the Common Market
reopen the possibility that France would be prepared to explore such a
solution.
Alphand raised the question before the Defense Institute in 1967, and
preoccupation with the idea of French participation in a European defense
organization is evident in the concern over the large percentage of the
defense budget devoted to the development of the strategic forces often
expressed by ,iroponents of the national conventional forces. Furthermore,
French military analysts see an increase in the value of dissuasion in a force
supported by and committed to the defense of all of Western Europe. They
have long warned against Western European emphasis on conventional
forces, arguing that such a buildup implies uncertainty on willingness to use
nuclear weapons and, therefore, means weakening the dIssuasive force in
Russian eyes.
At least, for the intermediate future, however, the answer is still in
Michel Debre's conviction, as expressed in the Foreign Affairs article, that
without political unity, no European nuclear strategy is possible. Until then,
defense can be ensured only on a national basis.
2. NATO
In French eyes, the Atlantic Alliance is no more than a useful basis for
cooperation among a number of countries that draw mutual advantages from
their association. It is not an indissoluble union, although, as then Foreign
Minister Maurice Couve de Murvirio expressed it in 1966, it should continue
to exist for years to come because it is a factor of equilibrium and conse-
quently of peace in a disordered world.
Its "military and administrative expression," as Couve's colleague,
former Defense Minister Pierre Messmer put it, is another matter. Couve
drew a sharp distinction between the two, and President Pompidou holds
firm to the decision De Gaulle took to withdraw French forces from the
NATO command and to ask that foreign troops and facilities be removed
from French soil. That decision was inevitable, he told the Advanced Studies
Institute in March, 1971, from the mom-nt France was able to construct
from its own human and material resources an independent nuclear weapons
system. France had the duty, he repeated, to maintain its freedom of choice.
and to remain independent in relation to the two military blocs.
The defense of France will be primarily the responsibility of the French
nation, at least well into the next cemury, Defense Minister Michel Debre
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wrote in 1970. Cooperation with other nations is an indispensable element
for industrial progress in strategic matters, and alliances may, depending on
events, lead to mutually profitable associations. For the foreseeable future,
however, France itself has the task of defending French material and spirit-
ual interests.
The dire consequences French official spokesmen profess to foresee in a
close-knit military association were summed up by General Ailleret in his
1967 analysis France's defensive stance. Even in the case of potential
Soviet aggressio.;), which is the basis for the existence of the Alliance, France
would be robbed of its freedom of action and, therefore, of its independ-
ence, he prophesied, because its defense would depend entirely on the US.
French forces vrould be ordered into action by decisions arrived at by
American generals, not by French officers responding to directives from
Paris. Frenchmen would be the front-line foot soldiers, Americans the
relatively secure manipulators of highly mechanized equipment that would
be the decisive element.
Ailleret envisioned three additional situations in which France could be
the victim of rash trust in a military. association wherein the power of
decision would be beyond French control. First is the possibility that "the
Alliance or its most powerful member" might decide not to defend France,
particularly in a situation that did not conform to the requirements of the
treaty. Secondly, if an ally became involved in a war that was not the result
of Soviet aggression, operations cou::1 conceivably be launched from French
soil, or France and French forces might be the object of attack from the
enemy of France's ally. France would be involved willy-nilly in a conflict
outside its interests. Finally, even without any question of operations from
French bases, preventive moves by the enemy uf an ally could ravage France
and decimate its population.
Such apprehensions help explain the insistence of government spokes-
men on the removal of NATO installations from French soil. Cabinet
members under De Gaulle stressed the infringement on national sovereignty
represented by foreign bases during a protracted period when the threat of
attack seemed increasingly remote. They somewhat softened the force of
their refusal to continue to harbor allied troops by implying that in the event
of actual hostilities, a closely integrated system would be acceptable. Until
then, however, they rejected any attempt to implement peace-time plan-
ning?at least on an integrated level.
Underlying the determined opposition France expressed against peace-
time integration of military forces is the conviction that alliances are
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temporary responses to passing problems. Because France is proceeding on
the assumption that the decision to use nuclear weapons cannot be shared,
the military association that would make a nuclear-based alliance practicable
would have to be complete integration, that is, the creation of a community
equivalent to a nation-state. Failing that ideal, alliances in the nuclear age :iv
necessarily less stable than in earlier ages.
Given the likelihood that the interests of different members of the
Atlantic Alliance may change over a period of time, links should be kept as
loose as possible, and the possibility of withdrawal should be ensured. Since
De Gaulle's rejection of military integration, the question of recasting the
form of the Alliance has received less attention than it did in the mid-1960s.
It is probably relevant, however, to an appreciation of the problem to
remember that fervent anti-Gaullist proponents of NATO were also insistent
on reassessing the structure of the organization and the manner in which it
functioned. By the mid-1960s few were as unrealistic in their appraisal of the
relationships involved as was prewar premier Paul Rcynaud when he pro-
posed that France offer to accept an integrated Atlantic Community in the
expectation that the US would make available to Paris all information
necessary for nucIear-weapon construction.
Others, equally convinced of the value of the Alliance, rejected those
aspects of the relationship that subordinated European unity to the Atlantic
concept. General Andre Beaufre propagandized forcefully for a reorganiza-
tion of NATO to create a specifically European component capable of
bearing equal weight in the "two-pillar" concept identified with President
Kennedy. Government spokesmen dismissed such ideas as illusory, maintain-
ing that the proposed European pillar would be unable to maintain equality
with the US. Nevertheless, the idea of European cooperation in the area of
defense is a hardy perennial whose roots cannot be severed from the dream
of political as well as economic integration.
3. European Cooperadoi. for Defense
Although France continues to plan its military programs in terms of
national capabilities, it must in the not-too-distant future prepare to seek
much closer cooperation than now prevails with its neighbors in defense
matters. There has been a decreasing sense of urgency since the 1950s in
regard to the danger of military aggression; in fact, the stability evident
throughout Western Europe has fostered widespread complacency. Neverthe-
less, growing pressure in the US for a reduction in American forces abroad
and the prospect of much more onerous costs for new armaments can be
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expected to accelerate efforts to base Western Europe's defense on coordi-
nated indigenous efforts. Ultimately the answer must be a European nuclear
force.
Probably only the abrupt withdrawal of US troops now in Germany
could galvanize Paris to a rapid reappraisal of its current policies. The loss of
the US troops in Germany would not only remove a buffer for France, but
also would pose a strategic problem Paris has heretofore been able to siee
step. France itself simply lacks sufficient geographic area for the type of
defense system now co,. 'lered essential to its security. Only an accord with
neighboring statc s can provide adequate protection.
Financial considerations will also be important factors in inducing
France to seek closer defense ties with its neighbors. Although France
probably has the means to keep its nuclear weaponry abreast of Soviet
defense capabilities?both in financial and technological resources?spreading
the burden and broadening the technical base hold continuing attraction.
Cooperation with the UK and with West Germany could also, of course,
meet a majo: political objective.
Such technological kmoperation on an ad hoc basis would be a logical
sequence to British adhesion to the Common Market. It could be part of the
natural development of a European Common Market for armaments, as
economic integration advanced. Ultimately, of course, the question of inte-
grated defense must be posed, and Paris remains adamant against facing this
problem without a corresponding political framework.
The catalyst might be Germany. If US influence in Europe declines
further, particularly through a pullback of American troops, Bonn will feel
increasingly thrc Nn on its own resources. To prevent any temptation on the
part of West Germany to venture into nuclear weaponry on its own, France
and Britain will be under strong pressure to come to an agreement on a
Western European --iangement. Defense needs could speed up European
unity moves immeasurably.
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In 1969, when Franz-Josef Strauss was Bonn's finance minister, he took
advantage of a visit to London to reopen the question of a European nuclear
force based on the fusion of existing French and British elements. He has
long insisted on the eventual necessity for Europe to look to its own defense,
although until recently few of his compatriots have exhibited much enthu-
siasm for the idea. Washington's reassessment of the US military posture in
Europe is forcing Bonn to reconsider its options, and Strauss may find wider
support for his European outlook than in the past.
Both the French President and his prime minister are on record in favor
of close ties with the UK in the military field. In his election campaign and
subsequently Pompidou has expressed his readiness to discuss with London a
common nuclear defense policy. He cautions, however, that a European
agreement in this field will take time, and particularly that a political
consensus is a prerequisite. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, after becoming prime
minister, took the public position that once the UK acceded to the Common
Market, an agreement on nuclear matters could be reached, "seriously
modifying the conditions of our national effort, which would cease to be
national and would become European."
At the moment, then, there is increasingly open recognition of the
eventual necessity for Western Europe to take full responsibility for its own
defense. If there is still no likelihood that France would participate in a
closely integrated defense system without prior creation of a political unit
closely enough integrated to be generally recognized as a sovereign ledem-
tion, at least there is now wider acceptance of such a goal.
4. Arms
Despite forebodings about the ability of the French economy to sup-
port the weapons program laid on under the Fifth Republic, cost has not
deterred the government from its goals. Indeed, what slippage has occurred
has been more the result of a reordering of priorities t1 an of financial
stringencies or even technological lag. In the early 1960s, there was some
slight support in France for spreading armament construction among the
Common Market countries, both to encourage technological innovation and
to cut costs. In practice, however, the national economy has benefited
considerably as a result of th,:. spinoff from scientific progress. The French
electronics and aerospace industries, especially, have flourished and have
now become the foremost in Western Europe. The most spectacular evidence
of French technological growth has been the expansion of arms sales abroad.
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Sales nearly tripled from 1965 to 1970, putting France in third place, behind
the US and the USSR, in arms exports.
Aircraft accounted for over 70 percent of the nearly $1.5 billion earned
in 1970 from armament sales abroad. Mirage sales alone have averaged 100
units per year since 1960, and many more are now on order. Missile-launch-
ing patrol boats are in increasing demand. Defense Minister Debre insists that
the absence of political conditions makes French equipment attractive to
many foreign countries. In light of the French embargo on arms to Israel and
the restrictions placed on Libya's use of the Mirages it bought, Debre
presumably means that such limitations do not constitute a quid pro quo for
receiving the equipment.
There is no likelihood that Paris would add nuclear weapons to its
foreign sales stock. Although France refuses to sign the nonproliferation
treaty, the French ambassador to the UN assured the General Assembly in
1968 that his country would conduct itself in the future exactly the same as
the states that decided to adhere to it?except of course, for inspection. On
cesting, however, Paris refuses either to sign the accord banning explosives in
the atmosphere or to comply with its provisions. Its position is that the ban
does not eliminate the nuclear threat and is essentially a subterfuge to
protect the kad the two superpowers have in the nuclear-weapon field.
The official French position on nuclear disarmament continues to be
the policy De Gaulle laid down in 1958, when he said that the only solution
is to stop bomb production, destroy existing stocks, and establish effective
international control to prevent violation of the agreement. Paris favors
discussions among the five nuclear powers as a step toward disarmament. It
is cool to proposals for mutual balanced force reduction, however, because
of the bloc-to-bloc framework in which talks on the proposal would be held.
Even without French suspicion of discussions in which Washington and
Moscow would be the major spokesmen for opposing sides, Paris is probably
reluctant to undertake negotiations that might oblige it to cut back its
conventional forces.
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still the largest in Western Europe. Moreover, for reasons of prestige as well
as a guarantee of influence in Black Africa, the intervention force that was
devised when the former overseas territories were declared independent
retains its relatively modest claim on the budget.
The outlook in defense matters continues to be Gaullist, therefore, not
only in the broad context in which the General stressed national freedom of
action, but also in the specific areas of military decision. Types of force,
armament, and anus production, and particularly disarmament will be deter-
mined within a frame of reference that will requirr: minute attention to the
implications any change may have for French national interests.
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C. THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN
Quickening Fren:h interest in the Mediterranean, which has been appar-
ent since the mid-i 960s, is a result of a convergence of economic, military,
political, and cultural factors both at home and abroad. De Gaulle's drama-
tization of some aspects of these developments initially obscured their
intrinsic importance to French national purposes, but subsequently the pat-
tern has emerged in sharp focus. In mid-1969, at his first press conference as
president, Pompidou proclaimed France's intention to defend its moral and
material rights in the Mediterranean Basin. French interests there are both
extensive and diverse, he stated, and depend on good relations with the Arab
nations.
Strategic considerations had probably been paramount in De Gaulle's
mind when he laid the basis for the Mediterranean policy his successor has
now expanded. Pompidou may attach less immediate importance than his
predecessor to military planning and logistics, but he is at least as alert to
French industry's growing dependence on outside sources of energy. For
both De Gaulle and Pompidou the prime objective has been to forestall any
possibility that France's freedom of action might be curtailed by another
country's control over ess,.Mial gas and petroleum supplies.
Petroleum accounts for about ten percent of Frances imports and over
half of French energy consumption. Most of the French oil supply has come
from Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. De Claulle'',3 concern
from the beginning was based in considerable part on the overwhelming
influence of British and American companies in the production of petro-
leum. He fear-d that expanding demand accelerated by anticipated greatly
amplified needs of the Communist world would threaten France's sot!rces in
any event, and he was particularly apprehensive that growing animosity in
Arab lands toward Britain and the US would further restrict French supplies.
Hence Paris has pressed for French participation in oil exploitation in Algeria
and Libya in order to ensure a role in production as close to home as
possible; at the same time it has sought more insistently for a foothold in the
major producing countries in the Middle East.
France has high hopes, also, for the market possibilities the oil-pro-
ducing countries represent for modern equipment. The complementary rela-
tionship that French business interests could exploit is an increasingly
frequent theme, sparked by the foreign exchange imbalance resulting from
massivi. oil imports. French goods have been increasingly popular in the Arab
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world since the Six-Day War of 1967, and Paris feels that continuing poor
relations betwecn the Arabs and the "Anglo-Saxons" are bound to benefit
the French e) nort pattern. France can provide the Arab world with practi-
cally all it needs for modernization and development, the argument runs, in
exchange for petroleum.
French industry has become increasingly dependent on oil imports,
practically all by way of the Mediterranean-44 million tons through Leba-
non and Syria, 27 million tons from Algeria, and 17 million from Libya in
1970?and Pails has become correspondingly nervous over the growing
Soviet naval presence in these waters. France, as the major power in the
Mediterranean Basin, is particularly sensitive to the military importance of
the area. On his visit to the US in 1970, Pompidou defended the sale of
Mirages to Libya on the grounds that France could not afford to ignore the
countries on the southern shores of the sea that formed Europe's "soft
underbelly" from which an attack might be launched. Of more immediate
concern for Paris, of course, is the importance of a;r and sea lanes for access
to the African states with which it maintains close ties as well as to its
remaining possessions in Africa and in the Indian Ocean. The French posi-
tion is that there can be no security for Europe if the other shore of the
Mediterranean is hostile or if powers foreign to the area create tensions there
that polarize the states bordering on the sea.
It is noteworthy that the National Defense Advanced Studies Institute
has taken the initiative in exploring the industrial potential of the area. In
1970 it organized a conference of public and private interests to consider
possibilities for industrial development, particularly in southern France. With
cheap energy now available for areas previously handicapped by the absence
of coal and iron, France sees wide opportunities for industrialization and,
through French expertise and equipment, the creation of new markets.
The hope of Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann that France will serve
as a center of attraction for nonaligned states in the context of a European
security conference also buoys up French aspirations in the Mediterranean.
President Pompidou has emphasized France's intention "to maintain the
closest, the best relations possible with all our Mediterranean neighbors
without exception." France expects to be able to penetrate the area more
readily by stressing that cooperation does not imply subservience to an
ideological program. The theme pushed by the European Independence
Movement is that the renaissance of a true community around the Mediter-
ranean Basin would be a decisive factor in promoting world stability as well
as the independence of Europe. To achieve these ends, France is seeking
political and cultural as well as economic cooperation with its Mediterranean
neighbors.
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1. The Western Mediterranean
Since Michel Debre took over the Defense Ministry he has insistently
stressed the role France intends to play in the Mediterranean. Just as France
has undertaken genuine cooperation with Germany, he states, it is adopting a
policy of genuine cooperation with its neighbors in the Western Mediter-
ranean, despite differeneos in race, religion, and economic systems. Paris
must be alert, he says, to see that its demands are respected, at least in the
Western Mediterranean. French relations with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia,
as well as with Spain and Italy, he asserts, are taking on an importance that
can only increase over the coming years.
At the end of 1969, Paris announced that full diplomatic relations were
to be renewed with Morocco. Relations were interrupted in 1965, after a
prominent member of the Moroccan nationalist opposition disappeared
mysteriously in France under circumstances that implicated a high Moroccan
Government official. For nearly four years the respective ambassadorial
posts remained vacant, and French economic and military assistance pro-
grams were cut back. Cultural relations were not disturbed, however, and
thousands of French teachers remained on the job. As of mid-1971, France
was increasing its economic and military aid, although it is still below 1966
levels.
Relations With Tunisia have also been on the mend since the low point
in 1964 when President Bourguiba nationalized the last of the French-owned
farms there. Before De Gaulle left office he had invited Bourguiba to visit
Paris, and Pompidou renewed the invitation. Although the nationalization
measures resulted in a loss of tariff and quota advantages to Tunisia?as wi.:11
as of direct aid?cultural and technical cooperation was largely unaffecLed,
and a preferential tariff was reinstituted in 1966.
Algeria's oil resources make it both more attractive to France than its
two neighbors and more difficult to deal with. The basis of cooperation is
the Evian agreement of 1962, as modified by a petroleum accord in 1965.
Even when negotiations on oil reached an impasse in February 1971, Paris
stated its intention to continue cultural and technical aid. It announced,
however, that the special status Algeria had enjoyed would no longer prevail
and that aid programs would henceforth be on the same contractual terms as
those to other countries.
Here again, despite the government's inability to reach an accord on oil
production, it continued to implement the cultural and technical accords,
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and to import liquified natural gas from Algeria. The oil companies were
obliged to contrive their own accommodation with Algiers, and one of the
two major French oil producers soon signed a joint-venture agreement
accepting minority-partner status. The other will probably negotiate a similar
agreement. Settlement of the oil problems may presage continuation of
credits France had made available for industrial development, although
probably not at the exceptionally low interest rates that had prevailed before
1971.
Throughout the Maghreb, French is still the language of the educated
classes and of instruction. Paris can be expected to support education in the
three countries by furnishing teachers, particularly at secondary and higher
levels, as long as the local governments will permit the teaching of French
and of other sutject matter in French. French policy in this regard is
influenced not or.ly by the desire to keep French culture alive in these
countries but also to preserve the French role elsewhere on the globe?par-
ticularly in Black Africa and in the UN.
2. Middle East
The emotions aroused by the attitude of De Gaulle toward Israel in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 have tended to obscure the
rationale for French policy in the Eastern Mediterranean since then. Paris
does not question the right of Israel to exist as an independent state. It
points to the role played by both the Fourth and Fifth French republics in
providing the Israelis with the armaments that ensured their success in
combat.
The French position is that after 1967 Israel destroyed the delicate
equilibrium on which its lasting existence depends. Since the Six-Day War,
the Arabs have been the weaker of the twO antagonists, E nd France insists
that the least it can do is to prevent a further expansion of Israel's military
superiority. The continuing conflict in the Middle East has endangered
European security, Paris argues, by provoking antagonistic blocs and encour-
aging the intervention of the two superpowers in the Mediterranean.
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On a purely commercial basis, France has fared better by limiting its
arms sales to Israel than had it continued to be the Israelis' major supplier.
Aside from arms, France's exports to Israel were small. It had imported a
sizable quantity of citrus fruit, but the value of that trade was minimal
compared to the oil shipments from Arab countries. With petrochemical
products accounting for almost half the value of France's industrial produc-
tion, the decision of Paris to take pains to protect the source of raw
materials was predictable. Moreover, the vast needs of the producing coun-
tries for developmental equipment held out the promise of a continuing
outlet for French-made machinery.
Since 1967, Paris ha i insisted that peace be re-established in the Middle
iEst on the basis of the UN Security Council's resolutIon of 22 November
1967, which essentially would oblige Israel to evacuate occupied territory in
return for recognition of its right to exist and to navigate in nearby
international waters. France has formally proposed that the Big Four under-
take, within the framework of the Security Council, to seek a way to
implement the resolution. In addition, to ensure lasting peace in the area, the
French Government has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of a solution to
the Palestinian refugee problem.
The obverse of the rigid attitude toward Israel is evident in France's
readiness to make aircraft available to Arr.b states other than those directly
involved in hmtilities. The cash value of the Mirages Paris has sold Libya is
probably a secondary consideration compared to the long-range economic
and cultural advantages that may ensue. France failed to consummate the oil
concessi,?.; it had hoped to work out with at the same time as the
aborted plane deal, but it has at least established a basis for further expan-
sion of French influence.
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D. WORLD-WIDE INTERESTS
The emphasis on domestic problems that accompanied the departure of
De Gaulle and the concentration of the Pompidou regime. on developments
close to home in Europe and in the Mediterranean aroused some initial
expectation that France would be less concerned in the future with broad
international issues. Subsequently, however, Pompidou has demonstrated his
intention to follow through on the major aspects of his predecessor's foreign
policy concerns outside Europe. The scope of his activities may be less
grandiose, but the basic intent to make France's influence felt will prevail.
In three specific fields of action continuity is increasingly apparent. The
first is in Black Africa and in France's remaining overseas territories. The
second is in the UN, where France's permanent seat on the Security Council
is a p.ecious badge of global importance. The third is France's relationship
with the US, which Paris is prepared to tailor to shifts of power in global
alignments. Once peace is restored in Southeast Asia, Paris can be expected
to seek to shore up at least its cultural influence there.
1. Black Africa and the Overseas Territories
Pompidou's visit in early 1971 to five of France's former dependencies
south of the Sahara had more than symbolic value; it confirmed the French
Government's intention to consolidate and expand its aid program in the
area. The symbolism must not be discounted, however, because it empha-
sizes the cultural affinity through which Paris hopes to retain a global role
for the French language. France probably derives a net financial gain from its
outlays in Black Africa, but economic profit is not the major advantage it
anticipates from the ties it works so hard to maintain with these countries.
France is more keenly alert than most other nations to the leverage to
be gained from cultural dominance. Particularly as the number of native
French-speaking populations has declined, Paris has looked to ways to
counter the ascendancy of other languages?and English in particular?in
international use. The Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation
among French-speaking countries that was formalized in 1969 will be an
important vehicle for French-language propaganda in much of Africa.
The Pompidou regime has made clear that it intends to follow through
on the accords De Gaulle reached with most of France's former colonies in
Black Africa. These provide for a wide range of technical assistance, but they
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also put at France's disposal airfields and ports in strategic locations and
ensure France transit rights over large areas of the continent. Similar ties
may never be attained with Belgium's former African territories, but Paris is
making strenuous efforts to align these countries as closely as possible in
cultural patterns at least. General Mobutu's official visit to France in 1971
was hailed in Paris as a prelude to increased cooperation with Congo-
Kinshasa.
If anything, Paris tends now to see a more important international role
for its possessions elsewhere on the globe than during De Gaulle's presi-
dency. Paris is continuing to develop its nuclear test facilities in the Pacific
and Es space-launch complex in French Guiana. Perhaps of equal significance
from a military point of view is the emphasis France is placing on its naval
stations in Djibouti and Diego Suarez. In view of the USSR's expanding role
in the Indian Ocean, French strategists are inclined to assign new importance
to France's outposts in the area.
2. The UN
The Pompidou regime can be expected to exhibit in the future the
positive side of De Gaulle's ambivalent attitude toward the UN. Were it not
for France's permanent seat on the Security Council, De Gaulle would have
been tempted to withdraw from the organization in the midst of the
Algerians' struggle for independence. As it was, France boycotted the Gen-
eral Assembly's general discussion sessions from 1960 to 1965. De Gaulle's
position mellowed in the latter years of his presidency as the role of the
Black African states in the General Assembly enhanced the prestige of the
French language and of France itself.
The French reservations about the UN were the same that motivated De
Gaulle's refusal to accept the supranational institutions that integration
enthusiasts attempted to effect through the Common Market. Paris objected
to a democratic concept that would give the General Assembly and the
Secretariat of the UN power to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign
states. It had itself resisted what it considered such interference during the
Algerian revolt, and on the same grounds it refused to vote sanctions against
South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Similarly, Paris has not complied with
repeated requests to contribute to UN finances for such operations as the
policing of Congo-Kinshasa, or even the Middle East force, whose establish-
ment France had approved.
Essentially the French rationale for such a? posture is that the small
states which can impose their views through weight of numbers lack the
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military and economic strength to enforce their will. As a result, many of the
resolutions passed by the General Assembly have an irresponsible character
that detracts from -..te prestige of the organization.
The Security Council, on the other hand, recognizes the realities of
power by giving five states the veto right, so that the majority cannot impose
its views. It functions like a court, to some degree, permitting deliberation
and seeking solutions through other means than force. Above all, in French
eyes, it has the virtue of including France among the major powers. As far as
Paris is concerned, the Security Council is essentially the five permanent
members, and their concordance is what determines the measures to be
taken in a given situation.
Despite the veto power, France continues to be fearful that efforts will
be made to institutionalize peace-keeping operations that may not always
coincide with the desires of all the permanent members of the Council.
Particularly if such operations require fairly extensive outlays of funds,
materiel, and manpower, Paris is inclined to suspect that the UN is being
used as a cover for operations essentially national in character.
Paris has long maintained that the UN lacks adequate contact with the
real world as long as it refuses to give Peking China's seat. The Charter was
signed, France maintains, not by governments, but by states, and member-
ship in the UN should reflect political realities, that is, it should be the
prerogative of the government that has effective control of a given country.
Even though the presence of the Chinese Communists in New York may
complicate debate, it should make peace-keeping easier because the composi-
tion of the world organization will be closer to existing conditions in the
world itself.
3. The US
In an exposition of French foreign policy before the National Defense
Advanced Studies Institute in 1967, Herve Alphand introduced his discus-
sion of differences with the US by a quotation from Jefferson: "Differences
of opinion are not differences of principle." France does not question
American intentions; but it frequently expresses doubts about specific objec-
tives pursued by Washington and the means adopted to attain them.
In the mid-1960s, De Gaulle seemed to be systematically applying a
policy that opposed the US at every turn. In the final years of his administra-
tion, however, he seemed to be much more relaxed in his attitude toward the
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US. The change reflected his impression that the US had changed both its
objectives and its operational approach. When the power at Washington's
disposal seemed unlimited and virtually unchallenged, France saw its na-
tional interests in resisting American hegemony. As American frustration
over the Vietnam impasse generated self-doubt and introspection, France
turned back to a more understanding attitude tu,vard the problems Wash-
ington faces.
But understanding does not necessarily imply acquiescence in American
policy, and the prime consideration for Paris in its dealings with Washington,
as with other capitals, is French national interest. This stance is not exclu-
sively Gaullist; in a general sense, of course, it is not exclusively French.
Insofar as France is concerned, its antecedents are readily discernible in the
period between the end of World War II and De Gaulle's return to power in
1958. Two ?.amples in particular show how each country has thwarted the
other when national interests clashed. In rejecting the abortive European
Defense Community in 1954, France expressed its determination to main-
tain a semblance of freedom of action despite the pressure of its powerful
ally. In 1956 when France and Great Britain launched an attack on Egypt
over the Suez Canal, Washington refused to support its allies against Soviet
threats.
France has applied that lesson since; it accepts the Atlantic Alliance as
the gauge of its national security against direct Soviet aggression; it is
increasingly doubtful, however, that it has absolute confidence in US protec-
tion. Its aim, therefore, is to seek good relations with the US and to retain
freedom of choice in each new situation it faces.
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