CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 200
• Publication Date: September 5, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

6
APP roved Foi eCeas ! t ,.C P 5T008~ 0 0 -6~
,. 12
~:. AS_ .. -R.R 0.Z..
{ A
.,. .~ } ro ffF.. r F r ~N } ,:~ ~ ~ S . ~~ . ~ i i i , ,; 'i
/ t. !?N C r N# #n,fa #u., F" #ff .191
t rfo,j
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
No Foreign Dis.rem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intellrence Bulletin
St4te Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
C 0A
N IlRegEeSi
: CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
5 September 1972
 Approved For Release 2005/06Q1DP85TOO875R000800020200-6
"he CENTIIl11. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. ii
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of time time fact-'r, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items iu. this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of, the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
I ,. inpl In,1~1 ,rrm 1.11
., Li..ll l~.rl1. hrJ,II; I II 1.
. ~~ 111I'11~~1~ ~tJ'1 '=111 11 I :1
~Ir.l.1~11rr~1~111.~ .1; ..11 ~~I
1... 1111.:1~~1 i?I l in11.111111 r1i1.~ n,.
Warning: Sensitive Sources
and Methods Invol"red
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T0f$75ROOQ8f6b20200=6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/ ~fi4!85T00875R000800020200-6
No. 0212/72
5 September 1972
'Y T - 77
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: Counter--offensives make little prog-
ress. (Page 1)
NORTH VIETNAM: Premier Pham Van Dong delivers com-
prehensive statement of Hanoi's negotiating position.
(Page 4)
LAOS: Government offensive suffers sharp setbacks.
(Page 7)
URUGUAY: Government captures leader of Tupamaros.
Page 8)
DENMARK EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Concern that voters
may turn down entry into the EC. (Page 9)
COSTA RICA: Government withdraws in effect from
Central American Common Market. (Page 11)
Approved For Release 2005/06/ ~&-RX85T00875R000800020200-6
 S1? R E'T'
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
I) Mitts 75
FSB Ross 1? due Ln Vallky
\
.
`
._.... Tien Phuoc
/ J
"Ni
Kontum
TWA L HIGHLANDS
Mai Die., inq 'I
SOUTH
VIETNAM
out n I_oi 5
An q&
Dinh Loot
Approved For Release 2005/06/ .~P85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/:QEikP85T00875R000800020200-6
5X1X
SOUTH VIETNAM: Government troops apparently
made little progress in their counter-offensives
over the weekend, and the Communists stepped up the
fight!~ng in the central highlands.
In the Que Son Valley, the government has re-
gained control of Que son district town but has not
been able to clear several pockets of resistance
from it. South Vietnamese fo1_ces also report that
they have moved to within a few hundred yards of
Fire Support Base Ross, but it remains in enemy
hands. Government forces moving west on the ridge-
line north of- Que Son have made no pro ress. A
priscner from the North Vietnamese
c aims
that the regiment has su ere eavy losses.' and has
received no replacements. Other prisoners
report that, the 711th Division is engaged in a ma-
jor -:?esupply effort, suggesting that fighting will
continue in this area.
In an apparent effort to divert South Vietnam-
esc forces from the Que Son area, Communist troops
attacked Tien Phuoc district town and a number of
government outposts in Quang Tin Province. The en-
emy was pushed back, with both sides suffering light
casualties, but several battalions of government
troops were pulled out of the Que Son area and sent
into Quang Tin Province to reinforce South Vietnam-
ese positions.
In Quang Tri Province, South Vietnamese Marines
clashed frequently with the Communists in the heav-
iest fighting of the weekend. Most of the action
took place along the northern and southern approaches
to Quang Tri City. The Communists pounded South
Vietnamese positions with several thousand rounds
of mortar and artillery fire.
In Binh Long Province, the government's drive
north from An Loc is malting little progress. There
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
25X1X
25X1 C
 Approved For Release 2005/06/8C85T00875R000800020200-6
were several sharp clashes near Quan Loi on Sunday;
the South Vietnamese reported killing nearly 150,
while government losses were light.
The Communists launched their heaviest attacks
in more than two months in the central highlands
when they assaulted the Plei Djereng Ranger camp
west of Pleiku on Saturday and Sunday. The Commu-
nists fired more than 1,000 rounds of mortar and
artillery shells into the camp. Late reports in-
dicate the camp has been overrun. Enemy forces
also attacked government positions around Thanh An.
Prisoners captured in the recent fighting near
Pleilcu indicate the North Vietnamese 320th Division
is involved. It shifted south from Kontum Province
several weeks ago, and its presence in the Pleilcu
area suggests there will be more heavy fighting in
the area.
Military action in the rest of the country was
light throughout the weekend.
The Communists apparently have ordered an in-
crease in military activity in South Vietnam for
October; in spite of major weaknesses in their
25X1C capabilities. F__ I 25X1C
the Central. Office for
out Vietnam has issued recent instructions
to its subordinates that outline Communist objec-
tives in South Vietnam during September and October.
25X1 C
x1 C
the instructions
specify October as the decisive month of the 1972
offensive. During October, Communist main forces
are to lead a surge of military activity designed
to force the US and South Vietnamese governments
to grant concessions at Paris prior to the US
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2005/06 Cm EP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/0, iR- t 85T00875R000800020200-6
presidential elections and to move the "revolution"
into a new political stage by the end of the year.
The instructions also reportedly emphasize that
American prisoners are the most valuable commodity
the Communists hold because it is the prisoner is-
sue primarily that will eventually force the US to
accept a political settlement of the war. In this
regard, the new directives specify that it is better
to capture one American than to kill 30. Communist
cadre and troops are cautioned to guard all US pris-
oners closely to prevent their escape or death.
Other major aspects of the instructions include
specific tasks that the main and local forces are to
carry out to accomplish Communist goals. Basically,
COSVN's main forces are to use their artillery and
sapper units to attack South. Vietnamese defenses pro-
tecting Saigon, as well as large US and government
bases in the hope of tying down the South Vietnamese
and preventing them from launching counterattacks
into "liberated" areas. Viet Cong local forces are
tasked with the job of assassinating government of-
fic-als so that the government's administrative or-
ganization will be weakened at the lowest levels.
The new instructions also provide direction to
Viet Cong cadre, who are cold to recruit new members
actively and to penetrate legal organizations, in
order to be in position to manipulate the populace
following a cease-fire.
The new instructions also appear to include a
large measure of exhortation for the cadre to commit
themselves more fully to carrying out the policies
of the party central committee. COSVN was reportedly
well aware of the grave difficulties it faced. To
compensate partially for the manpower shortages at
all levels, COSVN echoed the party central committee's
call for "every party member to make his greatest
effort to carry out this decision and be willing to
die for the party." Low-level cadre were also ad-
monished for questioning policies and directives, of
higher authorities. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM) 2
3
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2005/06/05 l~t~FWP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/01]Lf85T00875R000800020200-6
NORTH VIETNAM: Premier Pham Van Dong, in a
major address, has offered one of the most compre-
hensive statements of the Communists' negotiating
positicn since the Paris talks resumed in -raid-July.
In his traditional National Day speech on 2
September,-the Hanoi official repeated sweeping de-
mands for a complete US withdrawal from South Viet-
nam, an end to US support for the Saigon government,
and "respect for the South Vietnamese people's right
to self-determination." His elaboration of some of
these points was unusual, however. In discussing
the meaning of "self-determination," for instance,
he omitted two items which are usually broached in
this context: nowhere did he mention the long-
standing Communist demand for President Thieu's res-
ignation, nor did he refer to the elections which
the Communists have consistently demanded under a
so-called coalition "government of national concord."
He did repeat the call for such a coalition, but of
its function he said only that its members would
"together share the enormous, imperative, and com-
plex tasks to which the people of various strata
are urging a solution." This vague treatment of a
critical issue suggests that the Communists might
be flexible on the details of political change in
Saigon, once the basic outlines have been agreed on.
Dong sharpened his language considerably when
dealing with the issue of US troop withdrawal and
US support for the Saigon regime. He clearly indi-
cated, for instance, that Hanoi has only the US
"military commitment" in mind when it calls for a
halt of US support for Saigon. Moreover, he left
no doubt that in pressing for an end to US involve-
ment, Hanoi would insist that the US cease its "air,
naval, and other military activities" in both the
north and the south, in addition to withdrawing its
ground forces .f.r -)m South Vietnam, Dong did not men-
tion the US presence elsewhere in Indochina.
On the timing of a settlement, there is at
least a hint in Dong's speech, as i.n other recent
North Vietnamese statements, that some kind of solu-
tion could be reaahcd merely on the basis of a US
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 W85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/OJ:& T85T00875R000800020200-6
national duty." (CONFIDENTIAL)
endorsement in principle of Communist demands. In
one passage--which Radio Hanoi's international serv-
ice repeated for emphasis--Dong said that "a funda-
mental and stable solution of the Vietnam issue must
affirm" the principles he enumerated. The phrasing
may be designed to suggest that the US can achieve
some sort of preliminary agreement with the Commu-
nists simply by signifying agreement to a total
troop withdrawal, US respect for "South Vietnamese
determination'- and the like, and that Hanoi would
be willing to postpone the haggling over details.
Any analysis such as this, based solely on
overt North Vietnamese statements, must be highly
tentative. In particular it imputes a high degree
of precision to a speech, which obviously includes
some casual holiday boilerplate. Moreover, them:
are a good many other themes in Dong's address, in-
cluding large doses of fighting rhetoric that are
anything but conciliatory. It does seem noteworthy,
however, that along with such breast-beating Dong
sets out Hanoi's demands in such a way as to suggest
flexibility on some issues,
In one respect Dong's speech seems unambiguous.
In the section dealing with the support Hanoi has
received from the Communist world, he went about as
far as etiquette permits on such a formal occasion
in signaling his dissatisfaction with Hanoi's Com-
munist backers in general, and with Moscow and Pe-
king in particular. In his rendering of Hanoi's
customary statement of gratitude, he took a decidedly
pro-forma line, lumping the "socialist" countries
together with "all the world's people." Although
he did express "greetings" to the Soviet Union an.
China, he did not single them out for special tha:._s,
as Hanoi generally has in the past on such occznions.
Dong then went on to inform Hanoi's patrons that,
given the contributions of the Vietnamese Communists
to the proletarian revolution, Hanoi is "all the more
entitled" to ask its allies to "fulfill their inter-
5 Sep 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 % - P T00875R000800020200-6
LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA
Mllns ,.. C
o^ aiovornmanrnalu location
0 Communist-hold location
Highpoint r - sari.. ~' r f 1
~..~'noU
~,tYhei PL {i~E f Dr~S
AARRES ~~ .
Irregular task force L r...
Bouam Long,
Irregular task fcrce
pushed bank
S Houang
J 0
(Phou
4reular task ford
Long iin 3 l
rf CONFIDENT 1AL
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 S,]glgi'5T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/O9 CTA=RTAT5T00875R000800020200-6
LAOS: The government's offensive in the north
has suffered some sharp setbacks.
In the most serious reversal, heavy North Viet-
namese ground attacks and shellings dispersed the
irregular task force that had been operating north
of the Plaine des Jarres. Thus far, some 600 to 700
troops from this force have worked their way to
other irregular positioiis near the Plaine's western
edge. Most of them have since been evacuated. Other
irregular forces assigned. to this group reportedly
are continuing tc filter back to friendly lines in
the same area. Almost all of them evidently will
need some medical treatment.
Northeast of the Plaine, the irregular task
force from Bouam Long--it had been advancing toward
Communist supply lines near Nong Pet--has also en-
countered stiff opposition. Three of its battalions
pulled back late last week in the face of heavy Com-
munist attacks. At last report, however, the task
force commanders indicated that they were still de-
termined to move toward their objectives.
The Communists are also keeping the pressure
on the two irregular task forces operating south of
the Plaine. In the past few days, North Vietnamese
units have launched ground attacks against and spo-
radically shelled elements of the task force located
in the Tha Tam Bleung sector. The irregulars have
managed to hold their positions, however. Elements
of the other southern task force, which is in the
vicinity of Phou Houang, had several clashes on 3
September. Two battalions were forced out of their
positions and withdrew slightly to the south to re-
group.
The weather continues to have a crucial effect
on Vang Pao's current campaign. Bad weather pro-
hibited any extensive air support for the ill-fated
northern irregular task force; it also hindered re-
supply missions. Conditions have since improved,
however, and 105 air strikes were conducted on 3 Sep-
tember in support of irregular units deployed around
the Plaine. (CONFIDENTIAL)
5 Sep 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/06E A ?S 5T00875R000800020200-6
URUGUAY: The recapture of Raul Sendic, Tupa-
maro founder and leader, may signal the demise of
the extremist organization as a major Latin Ameri-
can terrorist group.
According to an official release, Sendic was
seized early Friday and hospitalized ,following'
a gun battle with police in which he was shot in
the face. He had been captured in August 1970 and
escaped from Punta Carretas prison in the mass break-
out on 10 September 1971. Although Sendic has been
rumored at various times to be hiding in Chile, he
reportedly attempted to arrange a truce with Uru-
guayan security officials a couple of months ago.
The Uruguayan Government has not released re-
cent figures on the total number of Tupamaros cap-
tured, but it is well over 1,300, including most of
the organ&.zationws leaders. With tha exception of
a few assassinations, the Tupanmaros 'have.:not:-
launched a major operation since 14 April, when the
"state of internal war" was declared. It appears
that their organizational capability has been perma-
nently hurt. (CONFIDENTIAL)
5 Sep 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/0 i !l 1g' kDP85T00875R000800020200-6
DENMARK - EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Government
leaders in Copenhagen now share the deep concern of
their Norwegian counterparts that their countries
may reject entering the Communities in referenda to
be held within a month.
Two events are primarily responsible for the
Danish Social Democratic government's new concern.
At a 28-29 August seminar for Copenhagen trade union
leaders, a vote against entering was averted only by
the strong language of government leaders, including
Prime Minister Krag. The meeting followed release
of a Gallup poll that demonstrated support for join-
ing had slipped from 46 to 41 percent in August.
The poll also indicated that a negative vote
in Norway's advisory referendum on 24-25 September
would result in an even split among Danish voters'in
their referendum on 2 October. Although only a sim-
ple majority is required in the Norwegian balloting,
a poll in July showed 45 percent against, 35 percent
for, and 20 percent undecided, Three fourths of
parliament must then approve membership before it
becomes law. Unless voters deliver a clear-cut man-
date, say 60 or 65 percent, it is unlikely parlia-
ment will do so. The Danish vote is binding on par-
liament. The issue will be defeated if more than 30
percent of all registered voters veto entry and if
this figure exceeds the number voting in favor.
Norwegian Prime Minister Bratteli has indicated
his minority Labor government will resign if the
vote goes against entry. Most Norwegians would like
to avoid the chaos of a government change, preferring
to await the next scheduled elections is 1973; there
is no provision in the Norwegian constitution for
calling early elections. Nevertheless, anti-EC mem-
bers of the Center, Liberal, and Chiistian Peoples
part :es reportedly met early in the summer to dis-
cuss formation of a shadow cabinet, in the event the
Bratteli government resigns.
(continued)
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/060QtP85T00875R000800020200-6
In Copenhagen last week, Prime Minister Krag
admitted that he has drafted two speeches to report
the referendum vote to parliament, pro or con. Al-
though indicating the issue would not b2 considered
a vote of confidence, he said the thought'of having
-co use the negative-vote speech gave him "weak
knees."
Neither government has addressed the problem of
a long-term economic solution in the event the ref-
erenda are negative. Krag said that a Nordic Eco-
nomic Union was out of the question, and a free-
trade agreement with the EC wa,s a very poor alterna-
tive. Presumably this would also be true for Norway.
Some observers feel that the summer lull, with
many parliamentary supporters of entry on vacations,
probably contributed to the leveling-off in support,
which had showed steady growth through the spring.
Feverish campaigning between now and the referenda
is certain to increase the number in favor, and US
Embassy observers point out that Scandinavian voters
rarely repudiate their governments' policies. (CON-
FIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2005/06`~t -RDP85T00875R000800020200-6
 Approved For Release 2005/06/gli' pP85T00875R000800020200-6
COSTA RICA: Costa Rica has withdrawn in ef-
fect from the Central American Common Market by im-
posing protectionist trade measures against it's
Market trading partners.
On 1 September, Costa Rica announced it will
apply its two-tiered exchange rate to other Market
members, thus placing them on an equal basis with
non-Market countri:s. The decision underlines Costa
Rica's firmness in its long effort to reduce imports
and to stabilize its balance-of-payments deficit.
It could signal the demise of the Market, however,
and pose a serious threw to Central American inte-
gration. Honduras has not participated in. the Mar-
ket since the summer of 1969; Costa Rica's withdrawal
would leave a three-country Market that probably
would not prove viable.
The Common Market, long the shining example of
Latin American integration, has suffered hard times
in 4he last three years. Numerous trade inequities
continue to be dealt with in an ad hoc manner, sig-
nifying the need for fundamental structural change.
The Central American commitment to integration may
still be strong enough to surmount this latest shock.
Indeed, it may prove to be the catalyst needed to
r '-t~ p' a- bas' an g an a;- the revital-
ization of the Market. (CONFIDENTIAL)
5 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2005/06V4TDP85T00875R000800020200-6