CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020118-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 118
• Publication Date: May 26, 1972
• Content Type: BULL

A toned far Release 2?05106109 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020118-8
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No Foreign Dissem
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence .bulletin
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
015 aIR A NCH
26 May 1972
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and enclosed in brackets.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immed?ate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amc ded.
Its transmission or re:?vc1-lion of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
deciaisificatlon
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No. 0126/72
26 May 1972
Central intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR: Shelest replaced as head of Ukrainian Commu-
nist Party. (Page 3)
25X6
CHILE: Communist leaders ready to compromise on
some issues with the governing coalition. (Page 5)
25X6
ITALY: Efforts to form a new government. (Page 8)
SUDAN-. Numayri's moves toward the West face stif-
fened opposition. (Page 10)
25X6
CEYLON: Protests over new constitution (Page 13)
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K VIETNAM: The Communists are increasing pres-
sure on government positions in several areas.
In the central highlands North Vietnamese
forces supported by tanks mounted new attacks dur-
ing the night against the defenses of Kontum City.
Five enemy tanks have been knocked out. Prelimi-
nary reports indicate that the main enemy attack
has been repelled, but fighting continues in the
area. Yesterday North Vietnamese sappers infil-
trated the city and skirmished sharply with govern-
ment troops before being beaten back. Heavy and
accurate enemy shellings also knocked out a number
of South Vi tnamese artillery positions around Kon-
tum and closed the airfield.
Heavy fighting also broke out again north of
Hue overnight as North Vietnamese infantry and tank
forces attacked South Vietnamese marine lines. The
enemy reportedly failed to make a major penetration,
and casualties on both sides are said to be substan-
tial. The South Vietnamese marines raiding behind
enemy lines in Quang Tri in recent days, meanwhile,
report that they have destroyed large quantitites
of enemy equipment and supplies. The enemy losses,
however, will tend to be offset by the substantial
quantities of supplies the enemy is continuing to
move into northern South Vietnam from Laos.
Some of the supplies evidently are intended
for the enemy buildup in the area west of Hue.
Lion their forces for offensive operations and are
keeping pressure on government forces on the major
battlefronts, they apparently view their recent
Although the Communists are continuing to posi-
26 May 72
Central Ine:elligenee Bulletin
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battle performance as less than satis ac
oorr
the
vie namese+ ommunis ig command in e southern
provinces nas issued an assessment of the offensive
that observes that Communist military forces and
political cadre had fallen far short of their ob-
jectives by mid-May.
The document criticizes the military units for
scattering rather than concentrating their assets,
and describes the Communist political operation in
tr.a c ties as "paralyzed." The guidance differs
markedly from an earlier optimistic assessment is-
sued by the same headquarters last month.
In North Vietnam, the regime is apparently
still having problems with the performance of its
cadre following the step-up in US bombing and the
increased efforts needed to support the offensive
in the South. The first hint that dissatisfaction
has, reached the point where the regime is at least
considering a purge of deficient cadre was contained
in an article on 16 May in the Hanoi city newspaper
by an official of the local party committee. He
claimed that, in a combat situation, the "small seg-
ment" of party members who are unequal to the new
tasks are "no longer worthy of being party members."
These cadre must be ostracized "in time" in order
to keep the party "clean and steadfast."
The article appeared only a few days after the
regime had announced strict new security measures
to curb "socialist abuses." Whether the problems
go beyond effective performance by cadre and re--
flect some cadre dissatisfaction with Hanoi's policy
on the war is not evident at present. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
eV
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
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USSR: A plenum of the central committee of
the Ukrainian Communist Party on 25 May elected
Vladimir Shcherbitsky first secretary, replacing
Petr Shelest.
The change in the Ukrainian leadership had
been expected since Shelest was appointed to the
less important position of deputy chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers last week. Ukrainian
Premier Shcherbitsky was the logical choice. At
the 24th party congress in March 1971, Shcherbit-
sky, a long-time protege of party chief Brezhnev,
became a full member of the politburo in an elec-
tion engineered by Brezhnev--an event which now
makes it clear that Shcherbitsky was being groomed
as Shelest's successor.
The coincidence of recent events suggests
that Shelest, who has a reputation as a critic of
detente, lost out in debate over foreign policy.
His demc'.ion would seem to strengthen Brezhnev's
hand in foreign, policy. Shelest has also been a
critic of some of Brezhnev's internal policies
and the demotic a may ultimately have an effect in
this area. Shelest may well retain his CPSU
politburo seat for some time, however, as have
Shelepin and Voronov, who were previously demoted
to jobs not calling for politburo status.
In moving up to become first secretary,
Shcherbitsky will soon give up his position in
the Ukrainian government. The speedy change in
the Ukrainian leadership avoids the potential
embarrassment of having President Nixon meet
with Shelest during his visit to Kiev next week.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Communist Party leaders, temporarily
successful. in the showdown within the Popular Unity
(UP) coalition over violent tactics, are now ready
to compromise on some other issues.
Communists 25X1 C
25X10 agree with President Allende that the con--
s.an conflicts within the UP must cease. They
reportedly have dropped their opposition to a
cabinet reorganization, so long as they continue
to hold the same ministries. Fearing that Allende's
opposition to a plebiscite is weakening, t=iey will
reluctantly accept the Socialists' insistence on
using this device to test public support for the
government.
On the use of violence, however, no lasting
agreLment is likely. The Communists do not be-
lieve that the Socialist leaders' recent public
repudiation of the violent activities of the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) will end
their behind-the-scenes support for the increasingly
active MIR. In fact, neither the Socialists nor
national leaders of smaller extreme leftist UP
parties can--or wane to--control local members who
prefer to make common cause with the MIR.
The Communists are shrewd enough not to unite
their UP rivals by pushing the advantage they gained
last week on the violence issue. They are well
aware that in several areas, such as labor union
elections next week and the mismanagement of the
Chuquicamata copper complex, they are themselves
vulnerable to challenge. They are conscious too
that despite Allende's preference for the cautious
tactics the Communists favor, he has often given
it to hard-line Socialist pressures on vital issues.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
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ITALY: Formal consultation leading to a new
government will begin soon but the prospects for
forming a lasting coalition remain uncertain.
Informal exchanges among top political leaders
show a willingness to reconstitute a center-left
coalition but only if the Socialist Party retreats
from its demands that the Communists be allowed to
contribute to legislative programs. So far, So-
cialist leaders have not publicly corunitted them-
selves, and they may not take a final position
until internal problems are sorted out at a na-
tional party congress next autumn.
The attractions of power and patronage will
be difficult for the Socialists to resist. Ul-
timately they probably will submit to coalition
discipline and drop their insistence on a greater
parliamentary role for the Communists.
in the interin, Italy will be governed by a
minority coalition or an all-Christian Democrat
caretaker Government. The Socialists reportedly
are prepared to support a tripartite combination
composed of their former center-left partners
(Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Re-
publicans) as long as it is understood that the
Socialists will be included in a more permanent
center-left ccalit`.on after the fall party con-
gresses.
Christian Democrat leaders also prefer a
temporary tripartite government. They are con-
cerned that Italy's many problems will seriously
weaken their party if they continue to govern
alone. If the Christian Democrats and Socialists
postpone a decision on future cooperation until
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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 SECRET
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after their party congresses in the fall, an all-
Christian Democrat government may be the only solu-
tion available in the near term.
The newly elected parliament convened yesterday
and will spend its first few sessions electing of-
ficers to head the Senate and Chamber of Deputies.
After this is resolved the floor leaders of the
various parties are elected and formal consultat4.ons
prior to the naming of a premier-designate by Pres-
ident Leone will begin. (SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEM)
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
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SUDAN: The pro-Egyptian faction in the govern-
ment is stiffening its opposition to President Nu-
mayri's moves toward the West.
Minister of Economics Mansur confided to a US
official in Khartoum that Numayri was coming under
increasingly heavy criticism for going too far in
developing ties with Western nations, especially
the US. In Mansur's view the benaf its to be derived
from a formal resumption of relations with the US
would be outweighed by the political storm this ac-
tion would generate.
Mansur's observations should be interpreted
against a. background of worsening Sudan-Egypt rela-
tions and the ouster over the past three months of
a number of ministers and other officials who favor
close ties with Cairo. Numayri has now begun to
weed out a number of pro-Egyptian army (.)fficers from
responsible positions, and he is said to be ready
to move against some of his remaining critics in the
cabinet.
The Eqyptians and their friends in the Khartoum
government have tried to halt Numayri's gradual
loosening of Sudan's ties with the Arab world and
to turn him away from his concentration on domestic
problems. The almost daily meetings of the politi-
cal bureau of the ruling Sudan Socialist Uni.o,i over
the part week could indicate a climatic debate on
these issues, particularly on foreign policy. (CON-
FIDENTIAL)
26 May 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
114
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171111
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c3CEYLON
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CEYLON: The minority Tamils are becoming more
active nnpprotesting the new constitution enacted
last Monday. The Tamils, who comprise about 22 per-
cent of the population, insist that the new charter
does not adequately guarantee the use of their lan-
guage in Tamil areas of the country. Although most
of the protest activities have remained non-violent,
Tamil students in the Jaffna peninsula reportedly
have begun harricadinq roads, clashing with the po-
lice, and damaging vehicles and public facilities.
Similar incidents on a smaller scale have been re-
ported at Trincomalee and Batticaloa, which, like
Jaffna, are located in areas where Tamils are con-
centrated. Government security forces apparently
have been exercising restraint so far and have
avoided the use of firearms. They may, however, be
forced to become tougher, particularly if large num-
bers of Tamils decide to support the students rather
than the more restrained Tamil political leaders.
(CONFIDENTIAL)
26 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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