LETTER TO MR. STEVEN GARFINKEL FROM HARRY E. FITZWATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85B00236R000200150008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 25, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20505
2 5 FEB 1983
Mr. Steven Garfinkel
Director, Information Security
Oversight Office
General Services Administration (AT)
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Enclosed are the "Guidelines for Identifying and Handling CIA Information
During Declassification Review of Records from the Period 1946-54," as required
by Section 3.3(a) of Executive Order 12356, 47 F.R. 14879, April 6, 1952, and
Section 2001.31(c)(3)(i) of Information Security Oversight Office Directive
Number 1, 47 F.R. 27839, June 25, 1982. The guidelines were coordinated in
draft with Mr. Edwin A. Thompson, Director of the Declassification Review
Division, National Archives and Records Service.
The policy at CIA is that our officers must review information for which
we are responsible before it can be declassified and released to the public.
In the attached guidelines we have attempted to explain the reasoning behind
that policy. In addition, we have described our activities as an intelligence
agency as they relate to the creation and protection of records, and we have
tried to anticipate, at least in a broad sense, where such records might be
encountered in the files of other U.S. Government agencies. Finally, we have
provided a three-page listing of the various types of intelligence reports
that CIA produced during the period with descriptions and comments about
where they may be held in governmental records.
The enclosed guidelines supersede the "Central Intelligence Agency
Systematic Review Guidelines" which were issued pursuant to Executive Order
12065, signed by Director Stan field Turner, and forwarded under a letter
dated 5 June 1979.
Previously issued guidelines currently in use at the National Archives
and Records Service covering the records of the Office of Strategic Services
(OSS), material, of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), and
the Foreign Documents Division (FDD) remain in effect but will be reviewed
and considered for revision as necessary.
UNCLASSIFIED WIMN
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contact Director of inform ion Serv:kce's, Directorate of
Admi.r: istr,q'iota, CIA, t s tiington, D. C. 205115,
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GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA .INFOINATION
L RII~C'Il '~' t: UiV i 4TiZ,11 b " 0 'US T-ffaf- l:COU 1946 - 54
This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying n -id handling
information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of
its predecessor organi:ations, or Is information from that period which
falls under CIA jurisdiction. This guid::li.n.e provides no authority to declassify
information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions
intended to aid declassification review personnel to identify CIA material
that may be found in the records of other agencies. When such material is
found it must be reviewed for declassification by CIA personnel. This is
necessary because an intelligence agency has special. security problems.
All. components of an intelligence agency are either directly involved in
clandestine work, provide support to elements that are engaged in clandestine
work, or are involved in processing clandestinely acquired information into a
finished intelligence product. whatever their role, there is an interrela-
tionship among these elements which makes than all sensitive to one degree
or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It
requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrela-
tionships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to
Intelligence matters anal pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)
The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by
the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence
organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years
and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is
important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly
to the U. S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of
Information Act, the Privacy Act, m,indatory review, and systematic declassifi-
cation review, and are very sensitive' to the possibility that information
that they 'pass to the U.S. government may be exposed. For this reason, we do
not declassify or even downgrade information from other intelligence services
without their concurrence. (C)
BACKGROUND
During the years 1946 to 1.954, U.S. int.clli ;ence was pass:~'iag through a
transitional period. The Office of Stratagic: Services (OSS), which played
the. major U.S. intelligence role during WV1, was disbanded. on 1 October 1945.
1 t was succeeded by the Strategic,er. vices Unit (SS7J) which existed for one
year. The records of the OSS and the S U reflect a wartime context, being
staffed with military personnel and patting c~:~plk sis on "hot war?" activities
related to the achievement of militias.~y> ob iectives. On 22 January 1946 the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began. to. take in more
civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1.946.
The CIG in turn was ? eplaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was
created as a civilian orgazizatiorr and remains one today. (U)
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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime,
then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few yeirs with hostilities
in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not
of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast.
Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthen-
ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action.
operations. Measures were ".undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation.
Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of
intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations
were not ignored. Throughout this period the "iron curtain" between the West
and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies
to penetrate, and it restricted the flow of even overt information to the
West. That forced collection efforts into many unlikely areas which normally
would be considered overt. (U)
During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national. security agencies
were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing
channels among themselves and with other U.S. government agencies to get
administrative and operational support. Because intelligence agencies must
establish themselves and operate abroad under some legitimate form, i.e. cover,
they require a broad spectrum of support from agencies that function overtly.
The latter will provide transportation, housing, offices, equipment, medical
facilities, etc., the provision of which must be done covertly to provide
cover for intelligence personnel. The arrangements for and actual providing
of this support will leave a "paper trail" some of which will be classified,
and some of. which will not, This "paper trail" may be found among any type
of administrative or operational records of the agencies and units which are
involved in providing the cover. Many of those records may appear routine and
normal for the unit. If all is done properly, it may be difficult from
administrative records to identify the Intelligence connection. But care must
be exercised when reviewing all the unit's records that no document is
declassified which could compromise the intelligence connection, even
inferentially, and thus "blow" the cover. (,.tee also the CIA Guideline to Aid
N RS Ide itif Unclassified Information Co Ice ni.; hnte3li eiice izrces end
the identification of intelligence rela?ued docLmlents anal information can
be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records
reviewer in identifying records that. relate to intelligence and, more
specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered t;iat relate to `IA, or
relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be
determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review. (U)
GENERAL GUIDELINE
For the purpose of identifying informtion relating to CIA we may break
down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection;
Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemi.na.ti.on. Following is a
brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a
framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)
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Plans and Policies - Overall. guidance to the intelligence
com~acartl }Y c:ames rom t~h National Security Council (NSC) . Many
intelligence activities, particularly special. activities, are
initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating
Board .(OCB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and
eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record
of such collective activities may be held by all the participating
agencies. The inl.)l.ementation of such plans must be coordinated at
all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement
will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the
files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning
papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information
used. In such a. document if an intelligence matter is involved and
i.t is not possible to identify the specific agency or department
responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the
opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and
policy records relating to intelligence activities normally will
require protection for long periods of time because (J) they
officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible
denial and, (2) might provide details which could cargn?omise
intelligence sources and methods. (C)
Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by
all mat s Tiotth hzunan, and technical. This involves the
development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can
obtain the intelligence information that our government needs.
the protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to
preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption
in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations
who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national
investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent
the targeted. persons and countries from becoming aware of our
intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will. not take
actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive
countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)
It appears somewhat contradictory, but to establish a
clandestine foreign intelligence collection capability requires
extensive support from overt agencies or: entities. The support
required includes transportation, housing, ostensible employment,
funding, and medical care; in short, all the things a large
organization must have to p.lacaa; and maiDta.in personnel all arocuzd
the world. This support also must be rendered in such a way that
the cover it provides to intelligence personnel, and their activi ties
is not compromised. Much of this support comes from other U.S.
government agencies. This is "official" cover and of course, like
any element of the goverment, the units involved must keep
record of their activities. (C)
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While it is generally 1mown, and therefore unclassified, that
CIA conducts intelligence operations around the world, the details
and specifics remain classified. The CIA's covert presence abroad
is made possible by the use of cover, and to maintain that cover
the U.S. government cannnot acknowledge that a specific CIA
presence exists abroad.. It is also important to protect friends
and allies and to avoid frictions in our foreign relations by not
disclosing details of our presence in specific countries or of our
l.iaision relationships with foreign intelligence and security
services. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)
Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships With
-Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security Services,
effective 18 January 1982, '(Attachment A), states that the fact of
intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and a specific governmental
component in an allied county=, or general description of the nature
of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and one of these
components is classified CONFIDENTIAL unless a higher classification
or no classification has been specified by mutual agreement with the
government or organization concerned.. Finally, intelligence agency
elements are stationed abroad to obtain and report information.
Collections of their raw field reports can reveal. a great deal about
the organization that produced them. Therefore, all, raw, unevaluated,
field intelligence reports dated I January 1946 or later are
withheld from automatic declassification .under the authority of a
letter from the DCI to the Archivist of the U. S. dated 1.6 October
1978 which was approved by the .Arc.hi.vis-.1_. (U)
Technical Collection - %I1A is responsibi.l e for the clandestine
ti chni.c. 1 co ec; :an `o the intelligence connuai.ity - as distinct
from overt technical collection, which is the responsibility of the
Department of Defense. Technico-1 collection encompasses sensors and
methods of their use including platforms, transmitters and receivers
for relaying the data collected, and all related equipment. Sensors
are designed for various types of technical intelligence collection:
ACOUSTINT, RADIN1', SIGINT (ELINT and CC}IINT) , PHOT TNT, etc.
Platforms can range from the very small in the case of the
microminiature, to vans, ships, aircraft , and satellites. Generally,
mything having to do with the research and development, procurement,
transportation, storage, location, and use of this equipment by the
Agency, and its success or lack of it in collecting the required
data, is classified. Certain codeword controls often apply to such
information and could also serve as a key to identifying intelligence
collected in a technical manner. (C)
Processing. and Anal sis Processing is the conversion of
technical ata into inEorn)a.ti.orn useful to the intelligence analyst.
An example would be the development of Film from overhead
reconnaissance, and its examination and reporting by photo interpreters.
Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of
"intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are
always classified, with the most highly classified information
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being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if
divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to
negate collection. (U)
Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the
field of overhead, photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other
U. S. government agencies, particularly elements of the Department
of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of
technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing
contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies.
Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be
found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of
classified docunents arising from such joint activities must be
coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation
and processing of raw data from irony different sources to find the
solution to some question confronting our policy makers. 'Mere are
mauay specific tecluniques that will be classifi_e(l. The weighing and
establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in
estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an i_ntellectii