BOLIVIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MAP

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070001-3
State Dept., DIA rqk)jpW pWlR se 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00671R000300070001-3
 Approved Fo41ease 2002/08/21 CIA-RDP85-0067140300070001-3
Argentina
Bahama Islands
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
British Honduras
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
French Guiana
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Lesser Antilles
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Trinidad-Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
INNIEW
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Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070001-3
 Appro f eTeasENQ2/0f/O -&N5-D1 M0070001-3
Bolivian Government Facing Most Crucial Period
The Bolivian Government is facing its most
crucial period since taking office in August 1966.
President Barrientos' political opponents,
although still factionalized, are exploiting the
unpopular aspects of the government's military oc-
cupation of the mining regions, while elements that
normally support the administration are seeking to
dissociate themselves from the action. The armed
forces, key to the government's survival, apparently
gave full support to the military intervention, but
Armed Forces Commander Gen Ovando -- a politically
ambitious but cautious man -- has continued his non-
committal attitude toward Barrientos' policies;
there are some indications that he is trying to
convince the miners that the military action was
Barrientos' decision alone. Military control has
not been consolidated at the mines, and this evidence
of government weakness has further detracted from
Barrientos' support.
Reaction from students and urban labor has not
been as violent as predicted. Students demonstrating
in La Paz and Ururo in support of the miners were
easily dispersed by police using tear gas. Student
extremists will, nevertheless, probably continue to
be the most volatile and dangerous elements for the
next few days. Coordinated demonstrations in the
major cities, followed by an almost inevitable military
response, could set off widespread reaction. One
highly placed general, citing the students' role in
past upheavals, has sent his family out of La Paz.
With the mines operating only sporadically, in-
creasing fiscal problems are adding to the adminis-
tration's woes, and both Barrientos and Ovando have
appealed to the US for financial assistance.
Meanwhile, military efforts to contain the guer-
rillas in the southeast have failed. A 60- to 70-man
force killed three soldiers and wounded two others
(Continued)
30 Jun 67 DIA Intelligence Bulletin
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in a 26 June clash north of the Rio Grande. The 8th
Division with about 500 men has been given responsi-
bility for the area north of the river. Some guer-
rillas probably crossed the river from the south,
but the size of the northern band would indicate that
it contains previously unreported members who may
be new adherents to the insurgent cause. The most
likely source of recruits is the western mining
region, to which the valley of the Rio Grande pro-
vides a natural access.
The army estimates that three guerrilla bands
with a combined strength of from_60 to _IImen are
operating south of the river. The 4th Division,
which is still charged with counterinsurgency opera-
tions in the south, has some 1,200 troops in the
field and another 8Q2--in.--t-rain-ing. n of the
precarious situation in the mining region, it is
unlikely that antiguerrilla units will soon be re-
inforced.
The increased burden of maintaining security
in the mining regions while simultaneously confronting
the guerrillas in the southeast will put great strains
on the marginal capabilities of the armed forces. A
serious and humiliating breakdown of military effec-
tiveness would probably be blamed on the executive,
thus decreasing Barrientos' chances of survival. In
his favor is a seemingly general reluctance on the
part of important military figures to assume respon-
sibility for the country's current problems; indivi-
dual ambition and avarice have, however, frequently
overridden such considerations. (CONFIDENTIAL NO
FOREIGN DISSEM)
SOURCE: EMB LA PAZ 3257, 3258, AND 3260 (C); DAO
LA PAZ 185 (S/NFD) AND 188 (C)
30 Jun 67 DIA Intelligence Bulletin
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Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP85-00671 R000300070001-3
SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM