WESTERN EUROPE- CANADA- INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A002300370001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 16, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Western Europe-Canada-
International Organizations
F NOTES
Secret
No. 0324-75
December 16, 1975
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WESTERN EUROPE - CANADA - INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with
occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
EC-China Trade Agreement Ahead . . . . . . . . . 1
British Labor Party Loses Parliamentary
Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Left Radicals Hold Party Congress in Paris . . . 5
The Spanish Government's Statement of
Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Portuguese Anti-Communists Edge Country Back
Toward Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
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EC-China Trade Agreement Ahead
Peking has accepted the EC offer to begin
negotiations on a trade agreement along the lines
the EC suggested a year ago for pacts with Communist
countries. A Chinese delegation will come to Brussels
for the negotiations, perhaps in early February.
In contrast to the East European countries,
Peking has acknowledged the Commission's role as
negotiator for all EC member states jointly under
the common commercial policy. The model agreement
proposed by the Commission to all state-trading
countries suggests non-preferential trade accords
of five or ten years duration. It would include
offers to enlarge or eliminate quotas. The model
also holds open the possibility of wider economic
cooperation.
In addition, the Chinese mission in Brussels
had already showed interest this fall in the
trade preferences available to all developing coun-
tries under the Community's scheme of generalized
preferences. Commission officials believe that a
Chinese application for generalized preferences
would probably be granted by the EC Council.
The EC ranks third this year--after Japan and
Hong Kong--among Peking's trade partners, and
China would like to reduce its trade deficit with
the community. In 1974, the EC exported goods
valued at $975 million to China, while its im orts
from China were valued at $828 millinn_
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British Labor Party Loses Parliamentary Majority
The death of a Labor MP this week has deprived
the Wilson government of its one-seat majority
in parliament. The vacancy leaves Labor and
the combined opposition tied, each with 317 seats.
Labor has yet to decide on a candidate
to run for the vacant seat and to settle on
a date for the by-election. There is speculation
that the election will be held in early spring.
The Coventry Northwest seat has traditionally
been held by the Labor Party, which carried
the constituency with 56 percent of the vote
in the October 1974 elections.
The vacancy is unlikely to threaten the
government's working majority on the floor of
the Commons, but it will deprive the government
of a majority on committees.
The death of the MP further complicates
what appears to be an increasingly difficult
situation for the Wilson government. Two Labor
seats held by John Stonehouse and John Ryman
are expected to be declared vacant as a result
of court proceedings. (See Staff Notes of December
12.) There is speculation that another Labor
MP, Alfred Broughton, may resign shortly; his
resignation would set the stage for a fourth
probable by-election. All four of these seats
have large and presumably safe Labor majorities,
but the Labor candidate to replace Ryman could
be defeated should former incumbent Eddie Milne,
an independent candidate, decide to run again.
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Left Radicals Hold Party Congress in Paris
The left Radical party congress in. Paris on
December 14-16 failed to put an end to the party's
soul-searching over its role as the junior partner
in the Communist-Socialist alliance and suggested
that President Giscard's efforts to woo individual
members could meet with further success. The party
is the only member of the alliance to have accepted
Giscard's offer to open a dialogue and some senior
members have said they could support the government
on certain issues.
Much of the left Radicals' public weighing
of the relative advantages of remaining in the left
alliance, taking an independent stance, or joining
the governing coalition is a warning to their leftist
allies that the party, and its 13 deputies, cannot
be taken for granted. At the same time, the party
is deeply concerned that the increase in the Socialists'
popularity may lead them to try to absorb the left
Radical constituency. It fears that the Socialists
may no longer be willing to step aside to let the
Radicals run in "safe" districts. More general
concerns center on complaints that the Communists
and Socialists make alliance policy without adequate
consultation with their small partner.
The congress did succeed, as party leaders
had hoped, in presenting a vivid contrast to the
earlier congress of the rump Radical party, with
which the left Radicals broke in 1972. The Radicals,
now a member of the governing coalition, elected
a new party president only after a last-minute challenge
by party mavericks that revealed the Radicals' deep
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divisions on both personnel and policy options.
In contrast, the left Radical congress sessions
proceeded on schedule and unanimously elected officers,
returning its president Robert Fabre for another
term. The party voted support for proposals that
a proportional representation system be adopted
for legislative elections; for continuing progress
toward European integration; and for efforts to
achieve a leftist electoral victory. The congress
also rejected the organization of unions in the
armed forces-, but favored instead "soldiers' committees."
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The Spanish Government's Statement of Principles
The statement of principles which the new
Spanish government issued on Monday emphasizes
economic and social welfare and orderly political
reforms. The statement is forward looking, but its
broad generalities and lack of any timetable will
disappoint the left, which will continue to try to
organize strikes and protest demonstrations to bring
pressure on the government.
The statement, issued following a cabinet
meeting presided over by King Juan Carlos, declared
that the government's commitment to act implies
constant improvement of the institutional system.
Continuing the King's policy of taking every op-
portunity to solidify his military support, the
government's statement led off with praise for the
armed forces as a pillar of constitutional order and
a promise to strengthen the services.
Turning next to economic and social goals, the
government said it would work to assure a job for
all and pledged a transformation of economic, social,
and cultural structures to promote social justice.
The government statement said these policies would
be pursued within the framework of a market economy
and noted that "austerity and work are required of
all."
In promising political reforms, the statement
of basic principles gave special priority to ex-
pansion of civil liberties and rights---particularly
the right of association. While noting that it
would be premature to present a detailed program,
the government seemed to point to reform of the
legislature, to a widening of suffrage, to the
development of political parties, and to the abro-
gation of anti-terrorist laws.
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The statement cautioned that reforms presuppose
popular acceptance of a process of evolution. This
is a clear warning against demonstrations and strikes
which leftists have already started. The government
also promised to strengthen national unity by in-
stitutional recognition of all regional and local
autonomy. This is an effort to respond to Basque
and Catalan grievances.
In foreign affairs, the government promised
cooperation, "--without acceptance of discrimination--"
with other countries in defense of Spain's national
interests which are especially tied to the Atlantic
and Western world. This was clearly a restatement
of Spain's desire to join NATO, and a rejection of
Madrid's exclusion because of its form of government.
Two small actions this week tend to add
credibility to the government's intentions to open
up the political system. It returned Socialist
leader Felipe Gonzalez' passport, and Deputy Prime
Minister Fraga reportedly had lunch with Professor
Tierno Galvan, leader of the illegal Popular Socialist
Party and a member of the Communist-dominated Demo-
cratic Junta.
Meanwhile, discontent continues over the limited
pardon issued by King Juan Carlos. According to
press reports, political prisoners in Madrid and
Segovia went on a hunger strike Monday to demand
complete amnesty for opponents of the Franco regime
who were not released. At the same time some 5,000
miners in Asturias staged a strike to demand a broad
amnesty and liberalization of the regime. F7
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Portuguese Anti-Communists Edge Country Back Toward
Center
The unsuccessful uprising by leftist para-
troopers on November 25 brought Portugal to a polit-
ical crossroads. As a result, the country is no
longer being moved steadily toward the left, but is
being edged back toward the center.
The anti-Communists' exploitation of the far
left's poorly planned uprising does not necessarily
portend political stability for Portugal--at least
not in the near term. Even in the face of a dimin-
ishing Communist threat, new frictions have devel-
oped within anti-Communist ranks over the Communist
participation in the government and the military's
role in politics.
The excesses of the pro-Communist left over
the past year have served to blur the memories of
right-wing rule and enabled conservative views--
virtually unheard since the 1974 coup--to gain new
respectability.
A Conscious Overreaction
Anti-Communists in the armed forces consciously
overreacted to the paratrooper uprising, responding
as if it were a full-fledged leftist coup attempt
and portraying it as such. Anti-Communist leaders
have, as a result, been able to consolidate their
power and remove leftist military officers, even
those not directly implicated.
Generals Carvalho and Fabiao and the Communist
Party have been fingered by some anti-Communists
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as the instigators of the uprising, but all three
have been exonerated of any direct involvement in
preliminary conclusions reached by the committee
investigating the affair.
The committee has found evidence that the para-
troopers were supported by radical soldiers--some
with connections to the Communist Party--and by fol-
lowers of extremist political parties who probably
hoped to overthrow the government. The extremists,
taking a cue from the paratroopers' occupation of
four air bases, seized several Lisbon radio and TV
stations and broadcast hysterical appeals for sup-
port. The response was negligible.
The far left attracts the fanatical backing of
a dedicated few, but has never had much success in
turning out sizable crowds without the help of the
Communist Party. The extremists-, in this case,
probably counted on Communist help, but it has not
been established that Communists ever encouraged
the plotters to believe they would have such help.
A Moral Promoter
While the Communist Party may not have played
a direct role, it was, in the words of Socialist
leader Soares, the "moral promoter" of the uprising.
Before November 25, Communist-led demonstrations had
effectively paralyzed the government and put an end
to Prime Minister Azevedo's step-by-step campaign
to limit left-wing influence.
On one occasion, a Communist-incited mob laid
siege to Azevedo's residence and forced the govern-
ment into an about-face on prohibiting wage increases.
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The Communists probably would have preferred
simply to keep the government impotent and to con-
tinue a war of attrition against their political
enemies. Now, the party must reappraise its strat-
egy.
The Communist Party still has the capacity to
make a lot of trouble for the government.. The party
has lost much of its influence in the military and
the media, but it is still an effective organization
with a considerable following in labor and among
agricultural workers in the south.
Party discipline appears largely intact. For
example, 20,000 cheering Communists turned out in
inclement weather last week for the first party
rally since the uprising.
For the time being at least, party leaders are
taking a conciliatory line. They are backpedaling
on attacks against the Azevedo government in an
effort to continue Communist participation in the
cabinet.
In an attempt to soften memories of the Com-
munists' earlier strident attacks, party statements
now seek to remind those in power that the party
has always advocated a political solution to the
country's ills and kept the door open for a recon-
ciliation with the Socialists.
Communist officials are not, however, willing
to give up too much just to maintain the party's
single post in the government. They have ignored
the Socialist demands that they repudiate the Nov-
ember 25 incident and pledge complete loyalty to
the Azevedo government.
It is no secret that the Socialists and other
government leaders want the Communist;. to share
responsibility for the unpopular economic policies
that will soon have to be enforced. The Communists
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seem confident that they will have a continuing role
in Portuguese politics.
In the past, the party has usually responded to
a setback by shifting to the left or right to accommo-
date the side with the temporary advantage. This time,
the party is trying to make peace with the victo-
rious military faction led by Foreign Minister Melo
Antunes. The party can be expected to continue its
effort to drive a wedge between the Socialists and
Popular Democrats.
The Antunes group and the Socialists will be
wary of Communist blandishments. They know now that
the hard-line Communist leadership's concept of co-
operation is domination.
If popular front tactics as practiced by the
battle-hardened Communist leader, Alvaro Cunhal, are
not softened, party fortunes will probably continue
to sink.
Reported dissension within the party over basic
strategy could bring to the fore younger leaders,
who would prefer to follow the example of the Ital-
ian Communists. There is little chance that Cunhal
will be thrown out any time soon, but his control
of the party may be loosened.
New Frictions
The Socialists and Popular Democrats' are
seeking to capitalize on the Communist retreat and
are demanding that their political power be in-
creased at the expense of those responsible for
the leftist trend of the past 20 months--the Armed
Forces Movement and the Communists. The aggres-
siveness of the democratic parties--and particularly
the Popular Democrats--is designed not only to keep
the military and political left on the defensive,
but also to enhance the parties' prospects in the
legislative election, promised in the first half
of next year.
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The two parties worked closely when the Com-
munists were threatening, but now that the danger
is subsiding, the basic differences between Social-
ists and Popular Democrats are taking on new import-
ance. They have never gotten along well, partly
because they compete for support among the same
segments of society. The Popular Democrats last
year shifted their line to the left in an effort to
take supporters away from the Socialists.
Now, the Popular Democrats sense a trend to-
ward political conservatism in the country. Party
chief Sa Carneiro is moving the party to the right.
The Socialists sense the trend, too, but they can-
not move too far to the right for fear of destroy-
ing the delicate balance between the party's Marx-
ist and social democratic factions.
The Popular Democrats' move to the right has
cost them in terms of party unity. Several prom-
inent Popular Democratic leaders--members of the par-
ty left wing--have quit the party and the youth wing
is challenging Sa Carneiro's leadership.
The Popular Democratic leader has already been
forced to back track. He had been insisting on the
Communists' immediate dismissal from the Azevedo
government.
Now he has accepted the more tolerant Socialist
position. The Socialists, along with many military
figures like Antunes, believe Communist participa-
tion in the government is desirable to cover the
purge of party adherents lower down.
Debate Over Military
The Socialists and Popular Democrats agree on
the need to restrict the military's role in pol-
itics. They point out that the Armed Forces Move-
ment is demonstrably too divided to rule effec-
tively and that the generals and admirals ought to
lead the military back to the barracks.
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In contrast, the Communists are urging military
leaders to retain their present political role. The
Communists aim to regain support in the armed forces,
which have been the focal point of the Communist
strategy for the past 20 months.
Military leaders are far from agreement on the
subject. They have, however, agreed to allow the
civilians a greater role in running the country and
are revising the pact signed last April, which gave
the armed forces domination for the next three to
five years.
The agreement being worked out will redefine
the role of the military; making it the "guarantor
of democracy" instead of the "driving force of the
revolution."
In fact, a law approved by the Revolutionary
Council last Friday stipulates that the military
stay out of partisan politics.
Military figures who have been prominent polit-
ically--notably Major Melo Antunes--will be looking
to their political futures and will be reluctant
to give up specific military advantages--like the
right to veto presidential nominees.
Antunes believes that the military will have
to go on with a key role in government if the
Portuguese revolution is to be guided beyond the
stage of parliamentary democracy and on to the
desired socialist society.
The Antunes philosophy is essentially that of
the armed forces when they took power in April 1974.
Today, it is a source of dissension within the
military. More conservative officers are begin-
ning to question the commitment to socialism; some
are :Leaning toward a military withdrawal from
political affairs.
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Proponents of these views have organized them-
selves into a group known as the "professionals" and
have drawn up a list of objectives. Opposed to
socialism, still espoused by the Antunes faction, the
new group prefers to restrict the armed forces to
military affairs and let the people choose for them-
selves whether they want socialism.
Antunes' preeminent position does not appear to
be in danger at this point, but the "professionals"
hope eventually to force him from his military posts
though they are amenable to his remaining in politics
as a civilian. The leaders of the "professionals"
directed the operations that put down the November 25
uprising, and many have since assumed key military
posts.
As the purge of the left runs its course and
officers known for their professional standards and
a willingness to enforce discipline are placed in
command positions, the "professionals" will be in a
better spot to assert their will.
Meeting the Opposition
Despite the problems caused by the diverging
political interests within the ranks of Portugal's
anti-Communists, the Azevedo government seems likely
now to stay in power, with only minor changes, until
a legislative election is held some time next spring.
Prime Minister Azevedo has proved himself a fairly
strong leader, and his government is in a good
position to continue removing Communists from their
strongholds in the media, labor unions, and the
military and to slow down the pace of land expro-
priation and nationalization.
Azevedo's most serious challenge will be the
economy. An economic austerity program is supposed
to go into effect before the end of the year, but
it may not be austere enough to ease significantly
Portugal's foreign exchange troubles. If more
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drastic restrictions are imposed, the resulting
shock could provide the Communist forces with the
impetus for a comeback.
Right now, the Communists do not pose serious
problems, but the government will still face opposi-
tion. Harsh government measures to round up weapons
held by civilian radicals and to deport foreign
revolutionaries will anger the far left, which may
turn to terrorist retaliation. Terrorism has been
used sparingly by the left since the overthrow of
the Caetano regime.
Right-wing exiles are already active on the
terrorist front. They have been responsible for
most of the bombings so far.
Some of the rightists reportedly have contacts
within the "professionals" and may hope to ride the
coattails of the "professionals" back into power.
The exiles, who regard Antunes as a Communist, will
continue to be a danger as long as he is in a posi-
tion of power.
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