WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A001600110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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25X1
USSR Pessimistic About Situation in
Portugal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
3
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General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos
Could Portend Policy Moves . . . . . . .
. .
6
Buy British Campaign . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
8
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The Bavarians Know What Is Really
Important . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
14
Communist-Socialist Collaboration at Center
of Italian Political Debate . . . . . .
. .
15
August 20, 1975
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25X1A
USSR Pessimistic About Situation in
Portugal
The Soviets yesterday published an authorit-
ative article on the situation in Portugal. Un-
like previous Soviet commentary, the Pravda
article expresses Moscow's views directly, rather
than putting them in the mouths of the Portuguese
Communists or others.
The tone of the Pravda article is defensive
and pessimistic. As -ti pressure on the Portu-
guese Communists has increased, expressions of confi-
dence about the course of events have given way to
increasing criticism of what the Soviets term "out-
side meddling."
The Pravda article draws the analogy between the
situation i Pn ortugal and events in Chile just before
the overthrow of former president Allende that was
first sounded by the Soviets in a broadcast to Hung-
ary on Friday. Pravda goes on to criticize NATO, the
Western press, Western economic organizations, and
"international social democracy."
The Chinese also are dragged into the cast of
evildoers; they are accused of cooperating with
"international reaction" by fomenting discord in An-
gola and the Azores.
Pravda charges that leaders of the Portuguese
Socialists are providing a rallying point for re-
actionaries by attacking the Communists, but Moscow
was more critical of the Socialists just after they
left the government. Indeed, Pravda again calls for
concerted action by the Armed Forces Movement, the
Communists, Socialists, and other left progressive
forces.
August 20, 1975
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Pravda offers no practical advice and provides
no clues about what, if any, action the Soviets
themselves might take in support of the Portuguese
Communists.
Moscow would clearly like to see the Portu-
guese Communists recover from their present isola-
tion, but there is little indication the Soviets
believe their exhortations will have much practical
effect.
They may, in this article, be preparing an ex-
planation for an eventual collapse of the Communist
position in Portugal, placing the blame primarily on 25X1
the Socialists and the West.
Hungarian Statement
The Hungarian party yesterday issued a short
statement that had been clearly coordinated with
Moscow. In the statement, the Hungarian party:
--Expressed shock at the increasingly organized
attacks against "democratic" developments in
Portugal.
--Cited cooperation of all "democratic and
anti-fascist forces" as the best defense.
--Assured "the Portuguese Communists and the
anti-fascists" of Hungarian solidarity.
Statements such as this provide a cheap and
easy way for the Soviet and the East European par-
ties to display their support of the Portuguese
Communists; the Hungarian statement will probably be
followed by others from Eastern Europe.
I I
August 20, 1975
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25X1A
General Franco's Meeting with Juan Carlos
Could Portend Policy Moves
The meetings which General Franco is holding
this week with his designated successor Prince Juan
Carlos have sparked speculation that an important
political announcement is pending. It could come at
a cabinet meeting scheduled for Friday.
Speculation stems from the unexpected nature of
Juan Carlos' sudden visit to Franco at his vacation
retreat in northwest Spain. Franco customarily meets
with his cabinet several times during his long summer
vacation, but this is the first time Prince Juan Carlos
has interrupted his own vacation to join Franco at La
Coruna. The prince, who just visited Franco there
last month, is scheduled for three days of talks with
Franco, but government officials refuse to disclose
any details.
Franco has given no indication that he is ready
to turn over his powers to the prince, although there
has been speculation that such a move could come as
early as October. Such rumors crop up periodically,
but there is a wide range of possible topics for the
talks--many of which will reportedly be taken up at
the cabinet meeting.
--Possible cabinet changes; rightists have re-
portedly been pressing Franco to replace
Prime Minister Arias. Arias has been under-
cut by Jose Solis Ruiz, Franco's recent appoint-
ment as minister secretary general of the Na-
tional Movement.
--Base negotiations with the US; Spanish negotia-
tors have taken a hard line in the ninth round
of talks that began this week. The possibility
has been raised of asking the US to withdraw
August 20, 1975
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from all its facilities in Spain except the
naval base at Rota if Spain's desire for a
NATO connection cannot be met.
--Counter-terrorist measures; tough new regula-
tions are planned that are likely to draw a
hostile reaction from Spain's European neigh-
bors.
--The recent military arrests; Franco may want
to sound out Juan Carlos on the handling of
the officers arrested for their political
activities. Some of those arrested were re-
portedly classmates of the prince the
military academy. F77 I 25X1
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25X1A
Buy British Campaign
A recent series of appeals to "Buy British"
by Trade Minister Peter Shore reflect growing
pressure on the government to protect British
jobs from foreign competition.
Shore is concerned about increasing imports
of goods that directly compete with those produced
domestically. He has promised to look into allega-
tions that foreign goods are being "dumped" into
the UK and to take action where charges can be
confirmed.
The trade minister has been careful to balance
his views by reiterating the government's opposition
to import controls. The success of Labor's economic
policy rests heavily on an export-led recovery and
import controls would risk damaging retaliation
from abroad. There have been reports that Shore
is considering the merits of an official advertis-
ing campaign urging consumers and industries to
use more British-made goods. The government may
look on such a campaign as a way of reducing
political pressure for the imposition of selective
import controls.
Trade unions and left-wing Laborites favor the
use of import controls to curb unemployment which
is already at a record level. Last week the economic
committee of the Trades Union Congress recommended
that the government be pressed to adopt selective
controls as soon as possible. The unions are
especially concerned about the effects of imports
on the textile, automobile, television tube, and
electrical appliance industries.
Pressure from the labor movement to buy
British could have an effect in the selection of
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certain weapon systems. The British army, for
example, would probably like to purchase the
helicopter mounted Franco-German anti-tank guided
missile, Hot. Instead the army could end up
purchasing the inferior British Aircraft Corporation
(BAC) Hawkswing missile because of union pressure
and the government's desire to set an example to
buy British. Furthermore, an unequivocal recommenda-
tion by a bipartisan parliamentary committee that
the army purchase another Franco-German anti-tank
missile--the Milan--may run into opposition from
the politically powerful unions. Workers at one
BAC plant recently recommended that the company
produce a modified version of an existing British
mi
ssile for ce of the Milan.
F__
August 20, 1975
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O'L
25X1A
The Bavarians Know What Is Really Important
Bavarian Interior Minister Bruno Merk has re-
quested the West German ministry of the interior not
to go through with plans to schedule next year's
Bundestag election on either October 3 or October 31.
Merk's objection to the first date is that it
falls within the three week period when Munich hosts
the world's biggest beer-bust, the "Oktoberfest."
Merk believes--and he is probably correct--that many
thousands of people will be traveling to or from the
Oktoberfest on October 3, and might not vote.
The Bavarian official objects to the second date
because November 1 is a legal holiday in many parts of
West Germany, and tens and even hundreds of thousands
of West Germans will take advantage of a three-day
weekend to travel. Again, they might not vote.
One would not be surprised if the federal auth-
orities see the merits of Merk's arguments, and sched-
ule the election sometime between October 3 and 31.
August 20, 1975
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25X1A
Communist-Socialist Collaboration at Center
of Italian Political Debate
Italian government and party leaders
are still grappling with the consequences
of the Communist Party's unprecedented gains
in the June regional and local elections.
The main controversy centers on the continuing
trend toward closer relations between the
Communists and the Socialist Party, which
is pledged to support the Moro government
in parliament.
Since the elections, the Socialists
have shown a clear preference for alliance
with the Communists in the new regional
and local governments. The Socialists,
who gained moderately in the elections,
now share power with the Communists in
most major Italian cities, 5 of the 20
regions and nearly a third of the 94 prov-
inces.
Socialist leader De Martino has rebutted
criticism from partners in the national
government--the Christian Democrats, Social
Democrats, and Republicans--by maintaining
that he is against a Socialist-Communist
coalition at the national level. Such an
alliance would not control a majority in
the present parliament, but that could
change after the next national elections
which must be held no later than 1977.
De Martino drew additional fire from
the other governing parties last week by
signing a joint communique with Communist
chief Berlinguer on the situation in Portugal.
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The communique called for a political agreement
in Portugal between the "democratic" parties--
including the Communists--and the Armed
Forces Movement.
It was the joint signature by De Martino
and Berlinguer, more than the document
itself, that drew criticism. Although the
Communists and Socialists have consulted
discreetly on policy matters in recent years,
they have not issued joint communiques since
the dissolution of their common "front" in
1957.
Berlinguer scored a major plus by
persuading one of the governing parties
to sign the communique. That will help
him deflect the renewed criticism he has
come under as a result of his party's recent
signing of a joint communique on Portugal
with the Soviets. The communique seemed
to give stronger support to the Portuguese
Communists than Berlinguer has in the past.
On many occasions, he has publicly stated
his disapproval of Portuguese Communist
strategy.
De Martino, on the other hand, will
be able to point to the less-than-revolutionary
language in the document he signed with
Berlinguer to bolster his argument that
Italy's Communists are developing into a
legitimate national party. The Socialists
have used this line to help justify growing
collaboration with the Communists.
The Socialists, meanwhile, have spelled
out what they regard as a suitable successor
to the Moro government, which is almost
certain to be replaced before the end of
the year. Although still opposed to giving
the Communists any cabinet positions, the
Socialists desire an arrangement that would
allow the Communists to participate indirectly.
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Last week, the Socialists pointed
to the regional administrations in Lombardy
and Campania as models for the next national
government. Although the Communists are
excluded from the center-left governments
formed by the Christian Democrats and Socialists
in those areas, the two parties have agreed
to negotiate formally with the Communists on
the regional legislative program.
August 20, 1975
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Secret
Secret
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