DCI BRIEFING FOR CIA SUBCOMMITTEE OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00827A000900050007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: BRIEF

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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Page Time
Cuban Subversion in Latin America 1 29:30
Venezuela 10
Colombia 14
Bolivia 18
Guatemala 20
Other Guerrilla Potential 22
Chinese Domestic Developments
Hong Kong
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Other Communist Military Developments42
Vietnam 45
Middle East (Arab Israeli)
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Yemen
Greece
Backstop papers: Thailand 73
India 76
Panama Canal 78
Negotiations
Dominican Republic
215
1100
930
400
1:45 &
1:15
230
200
200
USAID, State, Army review(s) completed.
ARMY review(s) completed.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
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CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA
1. The recent Castro-supported guerrilla outbreaks
in Bolivia, and Cuban involvement in the in-
surgent landing in Venezuela on May 8th are
the most recent indications of Fidel Castro's
long-standing determination to spread revolu-
tionary violence in Latin America. Tangible
Cuban support for revolutionary activity in
Latin America has been at a somewhat lower
level over the past two years than during the
peak period from 1961 to 1963. This does not,
however, reflect any weakening of Fidel Castro's
determination to spread his revolution.
May 18th the Castro regime once again proclaimed
its determination to "fulfill its duty of sol-
idarity" with revolutionaries around the world.
A. Castro agreed, at an extraordinary meeting
Latin American Communist parties held in
Havana in November, 1964, that he would
stop supporting would-be insurgent groups
which were not under the control of the
orthodox pro-Moscow Communists.
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1. He has continued, however, to give
moral, material, and financial support
and training to such groups in Vene-
zuela, Colombia, and Guatemala, and
most recently Bolivia, his four pri-
hqs
ority targets at present. He,made it
b-.sreceit s?e.ec12as
clear in that he
does not feel bound by the 1964 agree-
ment.
B. On March 13th, he repeated his persistent
thesis that violent revolution is necessary
to bring about any meaningful political
and social change in Latin America--a theme
also used in a May Day speech by Acting
Minister of Armed Forces Almeida.
1. Castro accused the orthodox Communist
parties which do not support dissident
insurgent groups--in Venezuela and
Colombia, for example--of cowardice and
betrayal.
2. He appeared particularly irked that a
Soviet delegation has been attempting
to improve relations and expand trade
in some of the countries--Colombia and
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Venezuela in particular--where he hopes
to develop revolutions. In specific
reference to the Soviet Union, he com-
plained that members of the Communist
camp who deal with oligarchies in
countries where insurgents are active
are betraying the revolutionaries.
C. Castro's statements continue to reflect
his intense disillusionment with the urban-
based pro-Moscow Communist parties. They
indicate that he will place even greater
emphasis on the rural guerrilla movements,
which frequently operate independently of
the regular parties.
1. In his March 13th speech, Castro stated:
"If, in any nation, those who call them-
selves Communists do not know how to
fulfill their duty, we will support
those who--even though they do not call
themselves Communists--behave like real
Communists in the struggle."
2. This was a crystal-clear renunciation
of the November 1964 agreement. Castro
was saying that wherever the orthodox
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Communist parties refuse to seek the
violent road of revolution to seize
power, he will ignore the party lead-
ers and work with militant extremists
who are ready to fight.
II.. In those Latin American countries where there
is no significant insurgency under way, the
Cubans have been concentrating for the past
two years on developing a support mechanism
while they wait for a suitable opportunity and
adequate assets.
A. The Cubans continue to provide some ideolog-
ical and guerrilla warfare training to
militants from several Latin American coun-
tries.
1. This is by no means a maximum figure
for the guerrilla potential. Many of
these trainees in turn trained others
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when they returned to their home coun-
tries. A few, however, probably became
disillusioned with the difficulties of
initiating armed revolution, and left
the field to more willing martyrs.
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The Cubans have been able to bring about in-
ternational cooperation of national move-
ments and parties in some areas. This has
helped to create or strengthen infrastructures
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upon which future revolutionary activities
can be built, by making it easier to channel
funds, move agents and leaders, transmit
communications, and obtain false documents.
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III. Castro's fervent appeals to Latin American ex-
tremists to carry out armed struggles in their
countries betray a certain amount of frustration
over his program's lack of success, and the lack
of enthusiasm it engenders among the pro-Moscow
Communists in Latin America.
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A. Several important Communist Party leaders
were quick to criticize Castro's revolu-
tionary strategy after his pointed attack
on the Moscow-oriented parties in his
speech on July 26th, 1966. At that time,
he called them "pseudo-revolutionaries,',
who lacked the courage to follow the path
of armed struggle,
B. Despite the fiery declarations of the
January 1966 Tri-Continent Conference in
Havana, and the subsequent general call
for insurgency in Latin America, no measur-
able continent-wide response has been noted.
In fact, some potential insurgent movements
have lost rather than gained ground during
the last year or two, although pro-Castro
insurgents in Colombia, Venezuela, and
Bolivia have very recently shown signs of
new life.
1. An outgrowth of the Tri-.Continent Con-
Terence--the Latin American Solidarity
Organization--is to hold its first meet-
ing in Havana in late July. The efficacy
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of the strategy of violent revolution
in Latin America will certainly be one
of the main themes.
2. It will. also give the Cubans an excel-
lent chance to offer more training,
propaganda guidelines, and possibly
funds to the leaders of various groups
of the extreme left who will be attend-
ing the conference.
C. For the past year, inflammatory propaganda
has constituted Cuba's most consistent sup-
port for insurgency in the hemisphere. The
emphasis has shifted somewhat from the
strident calls for immediate armed action
in the early days of the Castro regime.
1. The current emphasis is more on laying
a solid foundation for future revolu-
tionary action, attempting to unite
feuding factions of the extreme left,
and extolling those revolutionaries who
are willing to take up the fight, re-
gardless of whether they are bonafide
Communists.
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2. Havana now is broadcasting about 175
hours a week to Latin America, primarily
in Spanish and Portuguese. There is
also, however, propaganda in French and
Creole for Haiti, Guarani (Gwah-rabl-NEE)
for Paraguay, and Quechua (KETCH-WAH)
for Bolivia. The Quechua schedule for
Bolivia was increased from 1--1/2 hours
per week to seven on March 31st--just
one week after the first successful
Bolivian guerrilla attack.
D. The extent of guerrilla activity in Latin
American countries is directly related, of
course, to how dissatisfied the people of
a given country may be over social injus-
tices and the lack of economic opportunity,
and what chance there appears to be for
reform.
1. Cuban propaganda takes the line that
the ruling oligarchies have frustrated
and will continue to defeat all attempts
to change existing conditions by legal,
parliamentary methods.
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2. Therefore, Havana Radio argues, the so-
called "via pacifica" or peaceful path
of reform sought by many of the orthodox
Communist parties is ineffective, and
the only course is armed struggle.
IV. I propose at this point to examine Cuban goals
and activities in the individual Latin American
target countries, beginning with active insur-
gent movements in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala,
and Bolivia.
Venezuela (Map)
V. Cuba actively supports Communist insurgency in
Venezuela which heads Castro's list of Latin
American targets.
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C. The other, and larger, guerrilla group that
Castro supports is called the F.A.L.N., or
Armed Forces of National Liberation. This
group began operations more than five years
ago as the combined paramilitary arm of the
militant Communists and the M.I.R.
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1. In :19963, the F.A.L.N. pulled off such
dramatic feats as the hijacking of a
Venezuelan freighter, the ANZOATEGUI,
and bombing the U.S. Embassy' in Caracas.
It launched major campaigns of urban
terrorism, sabotage, and rural guer-
rilla raids in an effort to forestall
the visit to Washington of President
Betancourt, and the subsequent Venezue-
lan national elections.
2. When the F.A.L.N. failed to achieve
these goals, and also failed to attract
any substantial sympathy in the country-
side, the orthodox Communist leadership
decided that its achievements were not
worth the damage they were doing to the
Party's political image, and tried to
tone down the militancy.
D. The orders of the Politburo, however, were
defied publicly by the F.A.L.N. leader,
Douglas Bravo, who announced that he would
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continue guerrilla operations.
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E. The Venezuelan government, reacting to the
terrorist murder of the Foreign Minister's
brother on March 1, the increasing guer-
rilla forays in the countryside, and now
Cuban involvement in the May 8th landing,
plans to protest in the Organization of
American States against Cuban subversion.
1. It is difficult, however, to determine
what further sanctions the O.A.S. can
apply beyond those already taken
against Cuba.
2, Castro is unmoved. In his March 13
speech, after denying Cuban Involvement
in the murder of the Venezuelan foreign
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minister's brother, Castro praised the
guerrillas, and implied that they would
continue to receive full Cuban support.
Colombia (Map)
VI. There has recently been renewed and intensified
guerrilla activity in Colombia, which Castro
highlights along with Venezuela as being in the
forefront of those countries "struggling against
imperialism."
A. There has been banditry in Colombia for
400 years, since the days of the Conquis-
tadores. Traditionally, it has varied from
outright outlawry to political warfare.
1. In recent years, many thousands were
killed in the bloody fighting between
Liberal and Conservative Party parti-
sans which raged for five years after
the assassination in 1948 of Liberal
leader Jorge Gaitan. Revulsion over
the bloodbath created the opening for
the country's last military dictator,
General Rojas, to take power.
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2. Strong gangs variously described as
bandits or Communists have been operat-
ing for years in the rugged mountains
south of Bogota. These areas are often
referred to as Communist enclaves. In
recent years, Communists have taken
over the leadership of some of these
gangs, have established influence over
others, or converted the bandit chief-
tains to Communism.
3, These are remote areas where even the
army operates only with difficulty, and
the peasant has little sense of identity
with any national government.
4. It might be said that there are only
half a dozen of these enclaves, in out-
of-the-way regions. But the same state-
ment could have been made with equal
validity about South Vietnam in 1959,
when there were only half a dozen areas
of Viet Cong activity.
5. It is worth noting that where inroads
have been made against these Communist
enclaves, it has been as a result of
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civic action programs, either government-
sponsored or public. One of the most
effective programs has been a series of
radio broadcasts run by the churches,
to teach the farmers easy, do-it-your-
self methods to improve cultivation,
sanitation, home life, and the like.
This, backed up by roads to let the
government in and the farm produce out,
can do more lasting good than a regient,0A,
M! IItL4t^y.f r"'ce 1S Of Coarse. rrr-l104 ddks v7
tke_ b d l f 3cr s /
VII. Insurgent operations in the southern mountains,
insofar as there is any central direction, are
generally run by the F.A.R.C., or Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia,
In
the area north of Bogota, a new organization
stimulated by Cuba, the E.L.N., or Army of Na-
tional Liberation, has taken the field.
A. There have been six major incidents in less
than three months, including an E.L.N. at-
tack on a police post in which five police-
men were killed, and an F.A.R.C. ambush of
an army patrol, in which fifteen soldiers
were killed.
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B. Both the E.L.N. and the F.A.R.C. are
strongly supported by Cuban propaganda,
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zuela, the Communist Party of Colombia, or
PCC, is increasingly opposed to Castro's
support for guerrillas not under PCC con-
trol.
1. PCC leaders correctly reason that they
are the ones who suffer during govern-
ment reprisals for guerrilla attacks.
The recent large-scale roundup of Com-
munist Party leaders in Bogota bears
out their fears.
2. The PCC is somewhat more flexible on
this issue, however, than the Venezuelan
party, and pays at least lip service to
the need for supporting the E.L.N. and
F.A.R.C.
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Bolivia (Map)
VIII. Cuban Embassy officers in Bolivia were extremely
active in the early 1960's, supporting various
leftist-extremist groups
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B. Moreover, there is strong evidence that
Cuba is directly involved with the Bolivian
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in the guerrilla camp
Cubans are present
C. The most celebrated captured guerrilla,
Jules Regis Debray, is a young French guer-
rilla warfare theoretician closely associ-
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Guatemala (Map)
IX. Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
guerrilla and terrorist groups
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Other Guerrilla Potential
X. Guerrilla potential exists in Panama, Ecuador,
Peru, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. So
tar, however, nothing significant has developed.
A. Panama--because of the U.S. presence and
the importance to us of the canal--is high
on the list of Castro's long-range targets.
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aries can be expected to be in the forefront
of future disorders which might take place.
B. Ecuador's long history of instability should
afford a fertile ground for a Castro-oriented
insurgent movement. The perpetual disorgan-
ization, lack of cohesiveness, and poor quality
of leadership among all Ecuadorean political
groups, however, also characterizes the
leadership among the various Ecuadorean rev-
olutionary groups. This has probably led the
Cubans to conclude that revolutionary pros-
pects in Ecuador are slight at best.
C. In Peru, Cuba's relationship with leftist-
extremist groups has been severely hampered
by the government's crackdown following the
initiation of guerrilla activity in June, 1965.
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Today, insurgent leaders are either dead, in
jail, or in exile, and their organization is
badly disrupted.
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2. Internal bickering and successful govern-
ment counterinsurgency operations, how-
ever, would seem to preclude an increase
of insurgent activity in Peru to the pro-
portions of the 1965 troubles.
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Cuba has continued to provide political and
paramilitary training for a limited number
of Dominicans, mainly members of the self-
proclaimed "Leninist" 14th of June Movement
and the Communist Dominican Popular Movement.
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activities was proved
XI. In summary, Cuba has given ample notice that it
intends to continue its propaganda, training,
and financial support to selected revolutionary
movements. As long as exploitable situations
exist in the hemisphere, Cuba is on record as
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being willing to contribute toward the estab-
lishment of "more Cubas and Vietnams" in Latin
America.
A. It is also apparent, however, that Havana
is unwilling to run the great risks in-
volved to provide significant military
assistance to antigovernment groups in
Latin America.
B. The effect of the Communist parties' grow-
ing opposition to Castro-influenced armed
action remains to be seen. Some of these
parties may follow the lead of the Vene,-
auelan party in openly denouncing Castro's
revolutionary meddling. At the very least,
such a development will speed up political
fragmentation which -- on the leftist-
extremist side -- could mean less control
and discipline from above, and more urban
terrorism and rural violence.
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
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23 May 1967
CHINESE DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Chinese Cultural Revolution is regaining its
frenzy after a brief lull in February and March.
On the surface, there is a renewed and perhaps
final drive to destroy the titular Chief of
State, Liu Shao-chi. Behind this facade, the
extremist elements around Mao Tse-tung and Lin
Piao appear to be locked in struggle with more
moderate forces led by Premier Chou En-lai.
A. Mao, Lin and Chou maintain the appearance
of unity in public; Chou remains the chief
spokesman for the regime. Lin has again ap-
peared in public after an absence of almost
five months. We believe that their alliance
is at best very shaky and uneasy.
B. The unleashing of Red Guards last month led
immediately to reports of new outbreaks of
violence.
1. We are uncertain how much credence to
give these reports, most of which are being
circulated by Red Guard groups themselves.
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2. According to poster reports, a particularly
brutal incident occurred on May 6th in
the western Chinese city of Chengtu, where
troops allegedly used machine guns and
grenades to kill or wound 2,000 Red
Gii rds
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II. After the Cultural Revolution had brought the
country to the brink of chaos in January, order
and discipline were restored in most areas largely
as a result of efforts by Chou En-lai.
A. Chou's most important role in that period was
to reassure the army, and to make it a more
responsive instrument of control. He did
this b7 damping down a purge which had been
launched in the army, and by issuing a series
of policies moderating the Cultural Revolution.
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III. His actions were grudgingly supported by Mao and
Lin at the time. But they were hotly debated,
and in some cases reversed
A. A major effort seems to be under way to re-
move military commanders, both in Peking
and the provinces, who were vigorous in im-
plementing the directives Chou pushed through,
even when that meant arresting unruly Red
Guards.
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IV. Vicious Red Guard poster attacks are now being
aimed at Chou's proteges in the government, and
at top military men who are being held responsible
for letting the Cultural Revolution subside in
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February. A common thread running through the
charges against these men is that they resisted
extremist policies desired by Mao and Lin.
A. The military men under attack--Yeh Chien-
ying (YEH JYAN-YING) and Hsu Hsiang-chien
(SHOO SHYANG-CHYAN)--had worked very closely
with Mao and Lin until recently. Both are
politburo members and vice chairmen of the
powerful Military Affairs Committee. Hsu
(SHOO) was named head of the special army
purge group formed on January 11.
1. Now, however, they are accused of oppos-
ing Lin Piao at a recent meeting of the
Military Affairs Committee, and of saying
that Lin was not fit to be Mao's successor.
B. In recent weeks a main target of Red Guard
posters and demonstrations has been Chou's
protege, Foreign Minister Chen Yi.
1. The foreign minister has been criticized
before, but never this harshly. He is
now accused of being a "counterrevolutionary
revisionist" who has opposed Lin Piao and
followed the line of the disgraced chief
of state, Liu Shao-chi.
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2. Chen Yi continues to perform ceremonial
duties, but he is clearly in serious
trouble.
C. So far, Chou has not come to the defense of
his proteges during the new wave of attacks.
With his usual flexibility, he is adjusting
to the latest political winds, with his own
status uppermost in his mind.
1. Chou is still running 'the day-to-day work
of the regime. This could be by default,
however, and not necessarily a reflection
of his political powers. He is 69, but
he is the only one of the ruling triumvirate
who is physically strong enough to put
in a full day?s work.
2. He does not have many people left to help
him. Last August, 25 men were installed
in the politburo; today, only seven of
them are still active and in apparent good
standing--Mao, Lin, Chou, one propagandist,
two security chiefs, and one economic
planner.
V. Looking into the future, no end to the Chinese
political crisis is in sight.
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A. Instability and confusion are likely to persist
as long as Mao Tse-tung retains effective power.
B. After Mao goes, we expect a disorderly and
contentious struggle over the succession.
1. The military may play a decisive role,
but Lin Piao would not necessarily be
their candidate. A collective including
Chou En-lai and military leaders might
emerge.
2. We believe that ultimately many of Mao's
radical dogmas and practices are likely
to be set aside, but this might be a
gradual process.
C. The political crisis has focused the leader-
ship's energies and attention on internal
affairs, and has damaged Chinese prestige
abroad.
1. For the most part, Peking has maintained
foreign policy positions which were well
established before the Cultural Revolution.
It has tended, however, to become more
rigid in its major areas of preoccupation--
Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet dispute.
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2. As long as Maoists retain control, deep
hostility to the US and the USSR is likely
to remain the predominant feature of Chi-
nese foreign policy
3. If the internal policy eventually shifts
in the direction of moderation, this could
conceivably create an opening for rapproche-
ment with the Soviet Union., but we do: not.
see any likelihood of any change in. Peking's
implacable hostility toward the United
States.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITEE
The Chinese Communists have begun a pressure
campaign against the British in Hong Kong,
similar to the one they directed against the
Portuguese in Macao last December and January.
A CO. (3
A. You may recall that in the case of N600.
the Chinese maintained the pressure until
the Portuguese authorities made an abject
and public apology to Chinese Communist
organizations in Macao, in effect admitting
that the Chinese were the real masters
of the colony.
1. It was reminiscent of the demands early
in the 19th century that foreigners must
"kow tow" before the Imperial Throne.
B. In Hong Kong, the Chinese are probably not
prepared to challenge British control at this
time. For one thing, Peking earns about
$550 million a year in foreign exchange
through Hong Kong.
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1. The objectives are probably more limited.
Peking may want to weaken British control
by bringing enough pressure to force the
Hong Kong authorities into public conces-
sions to the leftist groups which are
stirring up trouble. This would also in-
crease public support for the Communists
in the Crown Colony.
II. On the surface, the disputes are economic issues-
strikes at a cement plant and a plastic flowers
factory. Leftists have turned the strikes into
riots, in order to raise the target from plant
management to the Hong Kong government.
A. The British, who believe that a strong line
might have served the Portuguese better in
Macao, seem determined not to give in. They
have mobilized the police reserve, alerted
the British Army garrison, and slapped a
curfew on part of Kowloon, the mainland part
of Hong Kong.
B. On May 15, the Chinese Communist Foreign
Ministry handed a statement to the British
charge in Peking, warning that the British face
"grave consequences" unless they immediately
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accept all of the leftist demands, release
those arrested, offer apologies, and promise
that there will be no recurrence of the re-
pression.
C. Peking emphasized its strong support for the
leftist campaign against the Hong Kong Gov-
ernment on May 18 when Chou En-lai and other
top leaders attended a mass rally in the
capital called to denounce British actions
in the colony.
D. As I said, the Chinese Communists probably
will not push the British as hard as they
did the Portuguese. I expect, however, that
Peking will exert enough pressure to learn
what concessions the British would make to
avoid a crisis, protracted riots, and perhaps
strikes cutting off the utilities.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUB,'OMMITTEE
COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
I. The Paris Air Show opens May 26, and as you recall,
this was the occasion last year at which the Soviets
first 4Lsplayed their big AN-22 transport, and a
model of their supersonic transport.
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B. The Soviet supersonic transport, as far as
we .:an determine, is not yet ready to fly
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in prototype, but the AN-22 will be shown again.
(MAP, YU-L1N NAVAL BASE ON HAINAN ISLAND)
II. The Chinese Communists are making preparations
which wDuld enable them to support extensive
naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin and South
China Sea.
A. They are expanding the naval base at Yu-lin,
the only-well-protected harbor on Hainan Island.
B. The Japanese used Yu-lin as a submarine base
in World War II. Communist China has some 34
submarines
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In Vietnam, the enemy build-up along the Demili-
tarized Zone, which we have been watching for
several months, was first dramatized April 6th
and 7th by the major Communist raids in and
around Quang Tri city and Hue, the capitals of
South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces.
A. The tempo of enemy operations in northern I
Corps has continued to accelerate in recent
weeks, accompanied by heavy and well-coordi-
nated mortar, rocket, and artillery bombard-
ment of U.S. Marine positions just south of
the D.M.Z. in Quang Tri Province.
B. In late April U.S. Marines engaged elements
of two North Vietnamese regiments in nearly
two weeks of sustained heavy fighting near
Khe Sanh in the western region of Quang Tri
Province. The battle for control of three
strategic hills astride key enemy infiltration
routes into Quang Tri from both Laos and
the DMZ proved very costly to both sides,
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as reflected in Communist losses of 800 con-
firmed killed (plus an additional 600 es-
timated killed) and US losses of 133 killed
and 383 wounded.
C. US Marines and South Vietnamese Army forces
on May 18 began a three-pronged offensive
aginnst North Vietnamese regulars--numbering
approximately 9,000 men--south of the Ben
Hai River in the DMZ and in the northeastern
section of northernmost Quang Tri Province.
Only moderate enemy resistance was met in
the opening phase, as 12 allied battalions
swept the area in search of the enemy and his
supply points. Cumulative casualties reported
theol
on 22 May show more tie-550 Communists killed,
in contrast to allied losses of 83 killed and
648 wounded.
D. Early this year elements of the North Vietnamese
341st Division, along with units of the 324B
Division which had retreated into North Vietnam
after last summer's incursions, began slipping
back into Quang Tri Province.
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E. In recent months the Communists have also
extended a feeder road--Route 922--from the
Laos panhandle into the A Shau Valley of
western Thua Thien Province, giving them
their first motorable through road from the
North, all the way down the Laotian panhandle,
and into the South.
a considerable build-up and extensive
stockpiling in the A Shau Valley, and in
base areas near Route 922 in Laos.
indicated that the Communists plan a major "summer"
campaign in the Quang Tri - Thua Thien areas;
lans for regimental and even
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division-sized actions.
Ithe enemy's 1967 "summer
campaign" would begin in early April in
Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, subse-
quently expanding to the western highlands
and the coastal provinces of north-central
Vietnam by June. Of these three major
battlefields, the western highlands of Pleiku
and Kontum provinces were reportedly considered
of prime importance to the Communists' over-
all strategic objectives in the northern half
of South Vietnam.
B. A threat to such towns as Quang Tri and Hue
cannot be ruled out, but the Communists seem
more likely to undertake actions designed to
protect their infiltration routes through
Laos and the western DMZ area, and to keep
allied forces spread out.
1. The Communists have stepped up their
efforts to harass and kill the pacifica-
tion teams. The effort is nationwide,
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Replacement Depot, and are now back
in War Zone "C."
IV. Our military command in Saigon has pulled together
some statistics which will give you an idea of the
increase in incoming enemy fire.
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but more than half of the 300-plus
attacks since the first of January
have taken place in the northern
First Corps area.
III. The Communists are maintaining a replacement
and convalescent group on Cambodian territory,
according to documents captured in March and
April during operation JUNCTION CITY, the
spoiling operation in the Communist War Zone
"C" along the Cambodian border west of Saigon.
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about 7,500 men, and is subordinate to the
Central Office for South Vietnam.
B. The Viet Cong Ninth Division, composed of
the North Vietnamese 101st and the Viet
Cong 271st and 272nd Regiments, lost more
than 2,700 killed during JUNCTION CITY,
and pulled back into Cambodia to regroup
and retrain.
C. There are indications that the three regi-
ments have now made up their losses from the
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A. MAC-V figures for enemy mortar, rocket, and
artillery attacks--excluding enemy reaction
to operations initiated by our side--show
that in 1966 there were an average of 60
such incidents per month.
1. In 1967 there were 44 incidents in Jan-
uary, 51 in February, but 141 in March
and 100 in April.
2. This increase is compounded by a greater
number of rounds per incident, and
heavier projectiles.
B. General Westmoreland's headquarters estimates
that the weight of the incoming barrages was
less than ten tons altogether during the last
six months of 1967--but 49.4 tons for March
and April alone in 1967.
C. This would seem to give added significance to
our observations that the enemy was able to
move 15 to 20 thousand tons of supplies south,
to or across the South Vietnamese border, by
daylight during the four-day Lunar New Year
truce in mid-February.
D. The enemy has brought a number of new weapons
into play in the first quarter of 1967. In
1966, his heaviest bombardment weapon was the
120-millimeter mortar.
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E. Now he is using Soviet 122 and 140-millimeter
rockets, Chinese 102-millimeter rockets, and
artillery firing 100, 105, 122 and 152-
millimeter shells from positions in or behind
the so-called "Demilitarized" Zone.
1. The 140-millimeter rocket has a range of
about six miles, and the 122-millimeter
about 10 miles--in either case outside
the defense perimeter which is normally
maintained around one of our bases.
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V. The forthcoming presidential election in South
Vietnam, scheduled for 3 September, is becoming
complicated by the rivalry between Premier Ky
and Chief of State Thieu.
A. Ky has already announced that he will run,
and Thieu has all but committed himself to
do likewise.
1. Previously, the armed forces leadership
had announced that it would not formally
back a candidate, hoping to avoid taking
sides between Ky and Thieu.
2. If the two men do run against each other,
however, they will split the military
vote, and could touch off severe divisions
in military unity..
3. On the other hand, if only one military
man eventually runs, his chances for
victory are fairly strong, since the army
is the only effective national organization.
B. Only two of seven civilian candidates, assembly
president Phan Khac Suu and former premier Tran
Van Huong, seem to have any substantial support.
Both appeal largely to southerners in the delta
area, and therefore could cancel each other out.
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VI. Meanwhile, the local elections for village and
hamlet offices, which began in early April and
will run into early June, have been proceeding
fairly well.
A. Despite considerable voter apathy and some
reluctance by candidates to risk Viet Cong
retaliation, voter turn-out in areas where
elections were held averaged 78 percent for
the five Sundays of voting for 984 village
councils.
B. In these elections the Viet Cong killed 12
and kidnaped 31 of the candidates.
C. Voting for some 4,600 hamlet chiefs which
began on May 14th, has proceeded with about
the same amount of voter participation and
Viet Cong harassment.
VII. North Vietnamese officials have not withdrawn
their offer to consider talks with the U.S. in
exchange for a permanent cessation of the air
strikes, but they have indicated clearly that
this concession is as far as they are prepared
to go at the present time.
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A. The Hanoi leaders have resumed their emphasis
on the importance of the "Four Points" as the
only basis for a settlement of the war. On
at least three occasions they have gone out
of their way to underscore this attitude.
VIII. Peking is the only DRV ally who has not approved
of Hanoi's recent offer to talk in exchange for
a cessation of the bombings.
A. The Chinese have greeted both the original
offer by the DRV foreign minister and the
Ho-Johnson correspondence with stony silence.
IX. The most interesting recent North Vietnamese de-
velopment is the trip Pham Van Dong made to Moscow
in late March and early April. He spent about
five days in Peking on his way home.
A. This trip is believed to have been connected
with an increase in Soviet military assistance.
It was kept strictly clandestine at the time,
although word later leaked out
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3. It also appears that Pham stopped off in
Peking for about a week on his way home
from Moscow, perhaps arranging further
r~c
Chinese aid and a commitment/Mao's
men that Soviet supplies will be moved
through to the DRV.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS AND RUSSELL
SUBCOMMITTEES
N E W L E A D
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
I. The Arab-Israeli confrontation this morning has
reached a critical point. An incident, an accident,
or a miscalculation could result in war.
A. Neither side 11 wants a full-blown war, but the
moves and counter-moves of the past week or
10 days have evoked a chain of reactions
which are now perhaps beyond the control of
the leaders on\e4thdr sides-
B. The most dangerous development overnight has
been the defiant statement by UAR President
Nasir that he is closing the Gulf of Aqaba
to Israeli shipping and to any ships carrying
strategic cargoes to the Israeli port of Eilat
at the head of the Gulf.
C. We believe that interference with Israeli
shipping to Eilat is one of the contingencies
which Israeli security policy rates as a
cause of war.
1. In 1956, the Israelis took Sharm al-Shaykh,
the Egyptian headland which dominates the
shipping channel into the southern end of
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The Gulf of Aqaba, and spiked the Egyptian
guns which had been guarding the Strait.
2. Since then, a detachment of the United
Nations Emergency Force has been stationed
at Sharm-al-Shaykh, but it is now withdrawing.
4. Egypt also has submarines and guided missile
patrol boats in the Gulf of Suez. They could
quickly move into position to guard the
entry into the Gulf of Aqaba.
D. War could result from this situation, from the
Israeli ground and air patrolling to monitor
Egyptian moves near the Israeli border, or
from continued Palestinian raids into Israel,
provoking Israeli retaliation and a Syrian
call for Egyptian help.
(44L&i1 IT) E>
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DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
23 May 1967
I. The current Arab-Israeli crisis is an outgrowth
of the Palestinian terrorist harassment of
Israel which has been supported by Syria.
A. Two recent incidents--on May 5th and 8th--
were particularly responsible for causing
the subsequent buildup of military forces
in Israel, Syria, and Egypt.
2. At the time, Israeli officials said those
incidents were the 13th and 14th since
the Israeli-Syrian air clash in early
April.
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IPressure
began to build up in Israel in favor of
some kind of counterattack. Official
spokesmen, led by Prime Minister Eshkol
and Army Chief of Staff Rabin, publicly
warned again that unless the sabotage
ceased, Israel would punish Syria for its
support of the terrorists.
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II. Following the Israeli warnings, the Syrian
Government became genuinely concerned about
the prospect of another round with Israel,
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especially so soon on the heels of their defeat
in the April 7th clash (in which they lost six
MIG-21s).
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III. The response in Egypt has been, of course, more
clear in terms of the support Cairo appears
ready to give to Syria in the event of an
Israeli attack.
A. Egypt has a joint defense agreement with
Syria. Moreover, during Syria's disastrous
engagement with the Israelis in April,
Cairo was conspicuously silent--a silence
which the Jordanians were quick to point
out.
B. For these reasons--intimately tied up with
Nasir's prestige as an Arab leader--Nasir
realized he probably would have to intervene
in the next major Israeli-Syrian clash.
Egypt
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began a series of moves which have strengthened 25X1
forces in Sinai and increased over-all capa-
bilities vis-a-vis Israel.
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the steps that ve been taken which would
enable Cairo to in erdict Israeli shipping
through the Gulf of aba in the Red Sea.
This is a route which t Israelis consider
vital, largely because the'r oil shipments
from Iran come that way. Un l the Sinai
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The posture assumed by
Egypt, and the widespread publicity that has
been accorded its military preparations,
suggest that Cairo hopes Israeli awareness
of these moves will discourage any aggressive
Israeli intentions.
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V. The withdrawal of the 3,400-man U.N. Emergency
Force (UNEF) has removed one of the deterrents
to trouble along the border,
A. Nasir initially asked UNEF to congregate its
troops in Gaza, "to ensure their safety."
U Thant, however, refused to agree to any
such curtailment of UNEF's operations, and
this apparently forced Nasir to follow through
by requesting its complete withdrawal. He
clearly was moved to take some action to re-
move UNEF because of past Jordanian criticism
about his "hiding behind a UN shield."
B. U Thant saw no legal basis for resisting
Nasir's demand, and the withdrawal is now
under way. The Secretary-General arrived in
Cairo on 22 May to seek some other means of
preserving peace along the border, and he
probably will try to reactivate the Egyptian-
Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. Israel,
which repudiated the commission in 1956, has
indicated it would oppose this.
VI. The key to the situation probably lies with the
Palestinian terrorists.
A. They're still making forays into Israel--
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the Israelis even-
tually may be compelled to strike back. They
almost certainly would take some action if
Israeli lives are lost as a result of the
sabotage. There haven't been any fatalities
in recent weeks, however.
B. Syria shows no sign of trying to restrain the
terrorists, if indeed it could do so. Foreign
Minister Makhus told our ambassador in Damascus
on 20 May that the Syrian government "once and
for all" disclaimed any responsibility for the
actions of the Palestinian extremists.
C. The Jordanians, incidentally, are trying harder
than ever to prevent the terrorist incursions
from Jordanian territory, and we doubt that
Israel would punish them again for terrorism
which King Husayn's regime opposes.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. The recent crisis in our relations with the
Egyptian puppet regime in Yemen centered on a
completely fraudulent charge that two American
AID employees--accused by the Yemenis of being
CIA personnel--fired bazookas at an ammunition
dump in an effort to blow up the city of Taiz.
A. Four bazooka rounds were, in fact, fired
at a camp of the Egyptian 85th Parachute
Battalion, not far from the U.S. residential
compound outside Taiz. At least two men
were killed. The Egyptians and Yemenis say
dogs followed a scent from the scene of the
firing to the U.S. compound, and that
bazooka rounds were found in the compound.
B. The facts are that the two AID representatives
are not CIA personnel, and that they were
in the compound, in the company of other
Americans, at the time the shots were fired.
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1. Sabotage of this kind is attempted
frequently in Yemen by various tribal
groups under the control of South
Arabian Federation leaders who are
anti-Egyptian, and the U.S. is often
publicly accused of complicity in
subversion, in which we are not
involved.
C. The Yemeni Government ordered the AID
mission out, and all American personnel
have been evacuated except for 11 diplomatic
personnel. AID equipment has been
commandeered.
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3. The two AID employees were never
formally indicted, and were well-treated
while in custody. They were finally
released on bail on May 16, and allowed
to leave the country.
II. Four days after the arrests, the Egyptians began
to realize that they could make propaganda points
whether or not they could ultimately prove the
involvement of AID officials. Top Egyptian
authorities began controlling the handling of
the investigation.
A. Cairo took the line, however, that the
quarrel was between Yemen and the U.S.,
with Egypt as the honest broker arranging
for release of the prisoners.
B. The Yemenis, probably at Egyptian direction,
have asked for closure of the Taiz office,
claiming that it is "unsafe" for Americans,
and the U.S. will shut it down.
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III. The Egyptians are carrying out an intensive air
offensive against tribal dissidents, royalist
and republican alike. The chief weapon in this
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23 May 1967
DIC BRIEFING; FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. Since I briefed you on Greece, the Revolutionary
Committee has taken a small step toward re-
storing parliamentary government by announcing that
constitutional changes will be drafted within six months
and submitted to a popular referendum. After
this,, parliamentary elections will be held, but no time
has been set for the referendum or the elections.
A. These steps are likely to take a year to
eighteen months to carry out. But the pres-
sure to take constructive steps is now on
the Committee.
I.I. Andreas Papandreou remains in custody,apparently
He has now been charged in civil court wLth
eanspira.cv to commit high treason
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
THAILAND
I. Communist insurgents are intensifying their
activities in northeast Thailand in an apparent
attempt to counter government security programs
there.
A. During March the insurgents initiated 30 per-
cent more armed encounters than in February.
1. This means an average of one clash a day,
and matches the number started by govern-
ment forces.
2. A marked rise in casualties was noted on
both sides.
B. Although the picture is not clear, there are
indications that the insurgents are tailoring
their effort to meet a government security
program begun last January in areas of known
Communist strength.
1. The guerrillas have apparently attempted
to avoid direct confrontation with large
security units. In some cases the guer-
rillas have moved some of their assets
into peripheral areas.
TH-1
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2. At the same time, they appear to be try-
ing to upset Bangkok's efforts to es-
tablish local defense forces in isolated
villages.
C. The insurgents are also stepping up their
political activities.
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D. Despite the rise in the Communists' activity
there is no evidence that they have signifi-
cantly increased their strength or have
brought new areas under their influence.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
I. In India, the food crisis is going to become even
worse this summer, and it will remain acute at
least until the end of this year.
A. The second straight year of drought in some
of the major grain regions is going to reduce
this fall's harvest.
B. On top of that, the summer monsoons will make
roads impassable, creating serious distribu-
tion problems for food imports.
1. Many of the areas hardest hit by food
shortages can be reached only by road.
II. The slim Congress Party majority in Parliament
remains intact, but only eight of India's 17
states are under Congress control.
A. Strained relations between the Congress Party
central government and non-Congress state
governments could create additional food sup-
ply and other problems.
B. Several of the non-Congress state governments
are shaky coalitions that may not last long.
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C. The splintered opposition parties, at least
in New Delhi, have been largely unable to
form a common front against the weakened
ruling party.
III. The victory of the ruling Congress Party's can-
didate for president has given a much needed
boost to the sagging prestige of both the party
and Prime Minister Gandhi.
A. Zakir Husain, a prominent educator and pre-
viously vice president, is the first Indian
Muslim to occupy this prestigious, though
largely ceremonial, office.
B. Husain reportedly favors a strong Indian
government and improvement of relations
with Pakistan, but his influence on policy
is likely to be minimal.
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23 May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
PANAMA NEGOTIATIONS
I. Negotiations with Panama for a new canal treaty
have entered a crucial stage. From here on in,
the Panamanians are bound to look at them as a
major issue in the campaign for their presi-
dential elections in May, 1968.
A. President Robles, in a speech on his return
from Punta del Este, said he was elated over
his meeting with President Johnson, and
hopeful that the canal talks could be finished
within the time frame set by the Panamanians.
B. Robles sent Foreign Minister Eleta to New
York on May 8 to wind up the canal treaty
negotiations
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C. The Panamanians want a draft treaty completed
in time to be ratified by a special assembly
session late this summer. Robles feels that
he needs at least six weeks before the special
session for an intensive campaign to "sell"
the merits of the new agreement to the country.
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1. If ratification is delayed until the
regular session begins on October 1,
the pressures of the presidential cam-
paign will make it increasingly difficult
to hold the fragile government coalition
of seven parties together.
II. Opposition leader Arnulfo Arias and his mass-based
Panamenista Party have begun to step up attacks on
the efforts to reach a canal settlement with the U.S.
A. Arias claims he was robbed in the 1964 presi-
dential election, and that the present regime
is therefore illegal and does not represent a
majority of the people. As a result, "the
people" will reject any canal agreement reached
by the Robles regime regardless of its content.
B. Arias has not yet decided whether to run again
in 1968. He is convinced the election would be
rigged against him, and might prefer to abstain,
claim fraud, and then try to seize power by
force.
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May 1967
DCI BRIEFING FOR
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
I. There has been some deterioration recently in
the political position of President Balaguer.
A. He has come under intensified attack from
the left and the "anti-Trujillo" right over
such issues as the government's failure to
prevent or solve sporadic incidents of po-
litical terrorism and the presence of as-
sociates of Trujillo in the government.
B. Moderates have been critical of the Presi-
dent's failure to respond positively to re-
sponsible criticism.
II. There is no available evidence that this dis-
satisfaction has yet been translated into ser-
ious plotting that threatens the government.
A. Balaguer still appears to be accepted by
most of the military and has the enthusi-
astic backing of some officers.
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B. Nevertheless, if trends evident over the
last few months continue there will be in-
creasing polarization into pro- and anti-
Balaguer elements and the chance of a
serious threat to stability will increase.
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